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Abstract 
The Beckettian creature is a product of dehumanisation and endures a variety of 
irresolvable tensions which culminate in a contingent mode of being that subsists in 
the nostalgia or hope for an authentic, meaningful life. This thesis examines Samuel 
Beckett's evocation of the 'creature' as an ontological concept to make the case for 
the oblique historical and political significance of his artistic forms. My work traces 
the aesthetic, biopolitical and humanistic resonance of the creature to contribute new 
ways of analysing Beckett's 'art of failure' in the post-Holocaust context. Through 
close readings of Beckett's prose and drama, particularly texts from the middle period, 
including Mol/ay, Ma/one Dies, The Unnamab/e, Waiting/or Godot and Endgame, I 
explicate four arenas of creaturely life in Beckett. Each chapter attends to a particular 
theme - testimony, power, humour and survival- to analyse a range of pressures and 
impositions that precipitate the creaturely state of suspension. I draw on the 
philosophical and theoretical writings of Theodor Adomo, Giorgio Agamben, Waiter 
Benjamin and Jacques Derrida to relate Beckett's creatures to a framework of critical 
theory that addresses the human condition and the status of art in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The key findings of this thesis are that Beckett's creatures 
traverse the edge of a bare life devoid of meaning, but live on through the debased 
idea of the human as they negotiate pressing obligations and melancholic repetition 
compulsions. Beckett invents author-narrators and narrative modes replete with 
epistemological and expressive failures, which act as an appropriate aesthetic 
response and pertinent reflection of the destabilised human after the Holocaust. As 
such, Beckett conveys the anti-humanist vision that attends the perverse or ineffective 
performance of humanist assumptions. 
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Introduction 
Forgive me now and always for all my stupidities and blanknesses, I am only a tiny 
little part of a creature, self-hating vestiges, remains of an old longing, when I was 
little, for rounding out, even on a small radius. That shuts you in your whole life long. 
And one drives in vain towards figurelessness. 
Samuel Beckett, letter to Georges Duthuit, 1 t h August 1948. I 
Drawing upon the expansive semantic value and recently theorised form of the 
'creature', this thesis examines the 'creaturely' aesthetic and political dimensions of 
Samuel Beckett's work to explicate the relevance of his art in the post-Holocaust 
context. The creature is a concept that encompasses authorial tensions in the 
composition process as well as the antagonisms of power apparatuses and ideological 
systems. It is best understood as a dynamic arising from creative and biopolitical 
animations, in which the actions of authority and pressures of necessity impinge on 
the very materiality or texture of the subject. In essence, the creature describes a post-
human state that resides within the human as a potential and is either actuated by other 
humans or manifest as an anachronistic performance of the human. As the human's 
constitutive properties and forms of meaning become unviable, the creature's debased, 
melancholic life ensues. One of the central claims I make is that Beckett's work is 
attentive to the ways in which the creature embodies a suspended mode of being 
resulting from the irresolvable tensions between contradictory or interdependent 
forces. The Beckettian creature marks the endurance of a crisis of the human that is 
sustained by the idea, memory or hope of a liberating resolution. The concept of the 
I Samuel Beckett, The Letters of Samuel Beckett. 1941-1956, Vol. 2, ed. by George Craig et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011), p. 104. 
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creature therefore acts as a versatile lens in this thesis through which to view 
Beckett's mode of bearing witness, the type of subject issuing from power struggles, 
the degradation of the human in his humour and the ontological state of his surviving 
characters. 
Dictionary definitions of the word 'creature' reveal how its creative resonance 
is interlaced with political meaning. In the most general sense, it describes 'a created 
thing or being; a product of creative action; a creation,.2 The terms 'creature' and 
'creatures' occur frequently in Beckett's major works, usually in this first sense. They 
appear on twenty-nine occasions in the post-war trilogy of novels Molloy (French 
1951; English 1955), Malone Dies (1951; 1956) and The Unnarnable (1953; 1958) to 
refer to the created narrators and to the author-narrators' own figments. For example: 
'Yes, a little creature, I shall try and make a little creature, to hold in my arms, a little 
creature in my image, no matter what I say' (T, 226). The etymology of 'creature', 
deriving from the Latin verb creare, meaning 'to create', suggests a fictitious or 
imaginary being, especially an aberration or grotesque figure. These latter qualifiers 
establish the further sense of the creature as a subject of another's control, 'a person 
who owes his or her fortune and position, and remains subservient to, a patron; a 
person who is ready to do another's bidding; a puppet, a cat's paw', which evokes a 
certain level of being that incites contempt or stirs up sympathy. Beckett often 
emphasises the wretched side of this relationship: 'The essential is to go on squirming 
forever at the end of the line, as long as there are waters and banks and ravening in 
heaven a sporting God to plague his creature' (T, 341). The creature is subject to 
another's power, but in this hunting image, Beckett brings to mind a subordinate 
animal. The creature also denotes 'a living or animate being; an animal, often as 
2 All definitions are taken from OED online. <www.oed.com>. 
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distinct from a person" which is how the term appears in the book of Genesis: 'And 
out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of 
the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever 
Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereor (King James Version, 
Genesis 2.19). The Biblical connotation of the creature also suggests 'all created 
beings', which implicates man and therefore encompasses both animals and humans, 
as in the phrase 'fellow creatures'. 
Much literary fiction exploits these associations with creation and control, 
notably Romantic literature, in which there is often a keen awareness of the author's 
role in original creation and a strong sense of affinity between the poet's personal 
voice and the protagonist. Indeed, 'the Romantics position the author as at the centre 
of the literary institution by insisting on the immediacy and spontaneity of poetic 
creation, on the work of art as the direct representation of the creative experience,.3 In 
this regard, the creature also has an entrenched metafictional level that calls to mind 
the creative force, or, in Beckett, the 'deviser', which intimates the presence of an 
implied author whilst indicating the divine creator (e, I). This relationship is alluded 
to in Gothic fiction, a genre that engendered one of the most familiar and enduring 
literary creatures in Adam, or simply 'the monster', in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
(1818).4 
Taking into account Beckett's metafictional leanings, the creature is an apt 
description for his characters in that it fore grounds their constructed nature whilst 
retaining the potential for an autonomous life. The focus on creaturely life in my own 
work underlines the significance of the on-going creative act for the existential status 
3 Andrew Bennett, "The" Author (London: Routledge, 2005). p. 62. 
4 Dirk Van Hulle draws on these connections between creation and Romanticism in Beckett in 
"'Accursed Creator": Beckett. Romanticism. Modem Prometheus·. Samuel Beckett TodayIAujourd'hui, 
VoI. 18. All Sturm and No Drang. Beckett and Romanticism. ed. by Dirk Van HuUe and Mark Nixon 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi. 2007). 115·129. 
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of the creations themselves, in order to identify a type of vitality that subsists despite 
the static, self-reflexive conditions of Beckett's work. The c r e a ~ e e is effectively 
exposed to survival conditions, facing the task of acquiring meaning independent from 
the status offered by unfulfilling creative and ideological animations, which sees the 
creature anticipating a resolution whilst continuing nonetheless. As the author-
narrators seek to extricate themselves from the mechanisms of creation, the ironic 
consequence is that they protract the creative process: 'The search for the means to 
put an end to things, an end to speech, is what enables the discourse to continue. No, I 
must not try to think, simply utter. Method or no method I shall have to banish them 
in the end - the beings, things, shapes, sounds and lights with which my haste to 
speak has encumbered this place' (T, 301-2). The creature endures in the act of 
creation as it is occupied by other creaturely figments. It lives on with the imperative 
to pursue the expression, identity and meaning that will offer completion, but it is 
effectively penned in the void. 
I posit notions of the creature in the ambivalent spaces of creation and 
authority in Bcckett's writing in order to trace a number of intersections between 
artistic, historical and socio-political significations. The underlying aim is to outline 
ways in which the creature in Beckett's work responds to the state of literary writing 
after the Second World War and acts as a necessarily oblique reference point to the 
Holocaust. In the most general sense, the creature is the subjectivity that survives the 
disruption of established values. The creature therefore stands out as a particularly 
applicable concept in terms of investigating Beckett's art of failure and his 
dehumanised characters alongside the contemporaneous crises in expression and 
humanity. 
10 
Critical Perspectives 
Before introducing the theory behind the creature in more detail, it is necessary to 
situate my theoretical and contextual approach in the history of Beckett studies to 
describe the intervention this thesis seeks to make. The critical reception of Beckett's 
work has amassed a profuse and plural account of the formal, philosophical, structural 
and theoretical range of the literature, rendering Beckett studies one of the most 
prolific and dialogic critical discourses on any twentieth-century writer. Although a 
comprehensive study of over fifty years of criticism is now a formidable task, 
particularly since the output comes from at least three different languages and 
traditions of critique, scholarly material on Beckett has yielded considerable reflection 
on its own evolution. It is worth summarising the trends in Beckett criticism to 
highlight how notions of the creature constitute a timely and incipient analysis of the 
Beckett canon. A mixture of formal and philosophical angles, which are now 
recognised by the rubrics New Criticism and Existential Humanism, characterizes the 
early commentary from the 1960s and 70s. The preeminent critics of the period Ruby 
Cohn, John Fletcher and Hugh Kenner recognised Beckett's engagement with formal 
experimentation, identified his affinity with the work of Dante Alighieri and Amold 
Geulincx, and,· most notably, underlined his fascination with Cartesian duality. 
Significant to this thesis are Cohn's The Comic Gamut (1962) and Kenner's Flaubert, 
Joyce and Beckett: The Stoic Comedians (1962) for their contributions to the study of 
Beckett's humour, thus ensuring this crucial aspect was not overwhelmed by accounts 
foregrounding his supposed nihilism or esotericism. S 
Martin Esslin's The Theatre of the Absurd (1961) situated Beckett amongst 
other contemporary dramatists, and, in the process, popularised Beckett's vision of the 
S Ruby Cohn, Samuel Beckett: The Comic Gamut (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1962); Hugh 
Kenner, Flaubert. Joyce. and Beckett: The Stoic Comedians (Champaign, IL: Dalkey, 2005 [1962]). 
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human condition and the profound formal impact of 'absurd' drama.6 Esslin associates 
Beckett's aesthetic with a trans-historical value, displaying t ~ e e emptiness and 
senselessness intrinsic to human existence. However, although Esslin's introduction is 
cited as 'undoubtedly the most influential fifteen pages in the history of Beckett 
criticism in English', his initial reading holds less weight for the generations of 
criticism that follow, partly owing to Beckett's own assessment of 'absurdity,.7 When 
asked whether artistic enterprise is impossible without rigorous ethical standards, 
Beckett replied: 
[M]oral values are not accessible and not open to definition. To define them, 
you would have to make value judgements, and you can't do that. That's why I 
have never agreed with the idea of the theatre of the absurd. Because that 
implies making value judgements. You can't even talk about truth. That is part 
of the general distress.s 
Esslin's value judgement reveals his use of a humanistic paradigm; he promotes a 
rational and decorous vision of a bygone humanity that acts as a frame of reference to 
the absurdity on stage. The devaluation of human ideals and purpose eannot be 
acknowledged without addressing its implicit counterpoint, and the theatre audience 
observes this discord, aware of the fact that one is unable to evaluate without firm 
criteria of what constitutes value. 
6 Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961). 
7 P. J. Murphy et al., Critique of Beckett Criticism: A Guide 10 Research in English, French, and 
German (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1994), p. 17. 
8 Beckett qtd. in Charles Juliet, Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van Velde, trans. by 
Janey Tucker (Leiden: Academic Press, 1995), pp. 148-9. For a recent reconsideration of Esslin, see 
Michael Y. Bennett, Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd: Cam us. lonesco. Beckett, Genet and Pinter 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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In Esslin's usage, the theatre of the absurd denotes the 'sense of the 
senselessness of life, of the inevitable devaluation of ideals, purity, and purpose' 
through the 'unity between its basic assumptions and the form in which these are 
expressed,.9 Whilst this thesis does not make use of Esslin's n.otion of absurdity 
specifically, the genesis and provisional nature of his concept is relevant, particularly 
since Esslin is keen to stress the historical foundation of this essential vision. He 
explains how the dramatic techniques of the theatre of the absurd were 'elements that 
arose from the zeitgeist, the atmosphere of the time, rather than deliberate theoretical 
considerations'. \0 Each playwright is included under Esslin's umbrella term by virtue 
of an intuitive experimentation with form and a shared perspicacity on the expressive 
requirements of the post-war period. Therefore, the theatre of the absurd refers to an 
existential condition, but Beckett's insight into life develops supposedly from 
ideological shifts occurring at a distinct historical juncture. 
The tension between the timeless profundity and contemporaneous import of 
Beckett's work leaves Esslin reluctant to commit to his exegesis, and he revises the 
text over three editions. Esslin discusses his misgivings regarding a systematic 
definition of absurdist drama and his forewords repeatedly aim to safeguard absurdity 
from simplification. Indeed, he places emphasis on the title as a 'working hypothesis', 
which suggests that categorising these particular dramatists under an umbrella term is 
less than reliable and should not be accepted as rule. 11 Beckett appears to warm to this 
hesitancy, perhaps because it undercuts the restrictive interpretations of academic 
criticism. In a letter to Esslin, Beckett wryly comments on the critic's technique: 'I 
like the way you raise hares and then say they are better not pursued' .12 By proposing 
9 Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, 3rd edn (London: Methuen, 2001), p. 24. 
10 Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, 3rd edn, p. 12. 
11 Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd. 2nd edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) p. 10. 
12 rd ' Esslin, Theatre of the Absurd, 3 edn, p. 12. 
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and dismissing possible lines of inquiry, Esslin illustrates Beckett's resistance to 
comprehensive explanation, and, coincidentally, echoes the, affirmations and 
negations of Beckett's author-narrators. In this way, Esslin's early reading 
foregrounds the difficulties Beckett criticism faces in surmounting an ambiguous and 
elusive style that works to disempower critical approaches and keep meaning in a 
state of uncertainty. 
The value of existential and essentialist readings declined by the 1980s when 
Beckett studies followed mainstream literary theory into a poststructural interrogation 
of language and meaning. The focus of discussion turned towards the aporetic textual 
conditions of Beckett's writing, questioning its representational function and disputing 
the authority of the author. Curiously, Esslin's contemporary Theodor Adomo, whose 
essay 'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen' (Trying to Understand Endgame) was 
published in the same year as Esslin's book, returned to prominence during this 
decade, profiting from a 1982 translation into English by Michael T. Jones for an 
edition of New German Critique. According to David Weisberg, Adomo's essay 
'might still be the best piece of criticism on a single work by Beckett', precisely 
because it manages to propose the cultural significance of Beckett's play whilst doing 
justice to its resistant nature. Thus, Adomo's understanding of Endgame (1958) as an 
exercise in the absence of stable meaning complements Beckett's anticipation of 
issues related to poststructuralism and deconstruction in both the immediate post-war 
work and later minimalist writing. 13 
Adomo famously asserts that Endgame 'cannot chase the chimera of 
expressing its meaning with the help of philosophical mediation. Understanding it can 
13David Weisberg, Chronicles of Disorder: Samuel Beckett and the Cultural Politics of the Modem 
Novel (New York: SUNY. 2006), p. 6. 
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mean nothing other than understanding its incomprehensibility'. 14 According to 
Adorno, Beckett's play educes the malfunctioning structures of conventional thought 
and value, which elevates Endgame to a new level of commentary suitable for 
critiquing contemporary society and culture. The 'truth content' of Beckett's work is 
implicitly connected to its aesthetic formation, specifically the dramatic and linguistic 
material that organises its emptiness. IS As David Cunningham notes, 'the 
"meaninglessness" of the work is determinately "enunciated", via its realization in 
"the aesthetic material", thus becoming a kind of aesthetic meaning'. 16 The artistic 
merit and social significance of Endgame is achieved in the workings of the play as a 
whole, developing a negative revelation through the dramatic embodiment of 
meaninglessness. In other words, the meaning of Beckett's text is its meaninglessness. 
Yet, besides the dominant message of Adorno' s seminal essay, peripheral 
details regarding his motivation and approach are also significant to the current study. 
Adorno's essay is, in part, a defence of Beckett's work against Georg Lukacs' 
denunciation in The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (1957). Lukacs rejects the 
static form and asocial detachment of modernism in general, arguing that Beckett's 
solipsistic psychopathology and primitivism in particular celebrates insularity and 
exalts abnormality. He writes that Beckett 'presents us with an image of utmost 
human degradation - an idiot's vegetative existence,.17 In response, Adorno contests 
Lukacs' objections to Beckett's reduction of humans to 'animality', pointing out the 
irony in 'a kind of artistic behaviour denounced as inhuman by those whose humanity 
14 Theodor Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', New German Critique, Critical Theory and 
Modernity, 26 (1982), trans. by Michael T. Jones, 119-150, p. 120. 
IS Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 120. 
16David Cunningham, 'Trying (Not) to Understand: Adorno and the Work of Beckett', in Beckett and 
f,hilosophy, ed. by Richard Lane (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 125-139, p. 133. 
Georg Lukacs, The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, trans. by John and Necke Mander (London: 
Merlin, 1963), p. 31. 
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has already become an advertisement for inhumanity,.18 For Adorno, the simple 
relegation of the human to the non-human other is itself a cursory reduction of 
Beckett's characterisation. Beckettian Man is not animalistic per se, but rather the 
'image of the last human'; he is the end product of previously esteemed philosophy 
and education. 19 The orderliness and selectivity of 'perspective' that Lukacs lauds in 
realism is left in tatters in Endgame for Adorno precisely due to Beckett's fidelity to 
prior epistemological foundations: 'thoughts are dragged along and distorted like the 
day's left-overs,.2o Hence, the animal state of Beckett's figures is apparent in a vision 
of what humanity has become as a result of human properties. Adorno sees this 
degradation in Beckett as the culmination of humanity's trajectory; it is the nemesis to 
humanistic hubris. 
However, in Adorno's own reading he employs animal analogies to describe 
Beckett's characters. They are 'flies that twitch after the swatter has half smashed 
them' and 'not a self but rather the aping imitation of something non-existent', whilst 
the audience are like 'people who, when visiting the zoo, wait attentively for the next 
move of the hippopotamus or the chimpanzee,.21 Adorno's recourse to the animal 
suggests that animality is bound up with the last human, that modernity's 
'progression' bears the hallmarks of a regression in the ontogenetic process. 
Therefore, for Adorno, it is not that Beckett's figures are 'ahistorical', as Lukacs 
implies, but that 'only the result of history appears - as decline,.22 Adorno's dialogue 
with Lukacs, in effect, points out a humanist teleology in which catastrophe is viewed 
as a backward step, contrary to advancement. In contrast, Adorno's position is closer 
to the concomitance of progression and retrogression; he is more open to the idea of a 
18 Adorno, 'Trying to Understanding Endgame', pp. 125,126. 
19 Ibid. p. 123. 
20 Ibid. p. 121. 
21 Ibid. pp. 128, 143, 140. 
22 Ibid. p. 125. 
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paradoxical progress that is itself a mode of decline, which suggests that the 
Beckettian last human conveys a process of ruination. This explains Adomo's 
assertion that 'Endgame is true gerontology' .23 The means of enlightenment have 
aged, suggesting that sage cognition and judgement have matured and become senile. 
In its depiction of decrepit and unsound old age - the stage when enriching life 
experiences, knowledge and wisdom are typically extensive - Beckett's play actually 
evokes earlier stages of both human life and pre-human organic evolution. In effect, 
the final image of the human encloses an atavistic vestige of humanity's origins. 
After the emphatic textual autonomy of poststructuralism and deconstruction, 
the 1990s onwards saw the reassessment of the relationship between Beckett's work 
and its historical background. Beckett's death in 1989, and the centenary anniversary 
of his birth in 2006 - which was marked by a six-week festival at the Barbican theatre 
- served as catalysts for reflection on the author's life and legacy. The effort to 
reinsert the author's life and times into the work was encouraged predominantly by 
two biographies in 1996: Anthony Cronin's The Last Modernist, and, with Beckett's 
cooperation, James Knowlson's Damned to Fame.24 Each account offers an insight 
into the interplay between the personal and the artistic, principally referring to 
Beckett's correspondence for commentary, and Knowlson in particular brought to 
critical attention the diaries Beckett wrote during a 1936-7 trip to Germany. These 
biographical leads have intensified the consideration of the social, political and 
historical value of Beckett's work in recent years, and resulted in the publication of 
.io'>' 
Beckett's letters, his German diaries and his t h ~ a t r i c a l l notebooks. Unsurprisingly, 
critical interest gravitates towards Beckett's reading, and, partly due to Beckett's 
notes on Wilhelm Windelband's History of Philosophy (1901), there is a return to 
23 Ibid. p. 142. 
24 Anthony Cronin, Samuel Beckel1: The Last Modernist (New York: Da Capo, 1997). James 
Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life o/Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996). 
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writers such as Fritz Mauthner, Amold Geulincx and Marcel Proust.2S Beckett's 
appreciation of visual art, film and music has attracted more sustained critical 
attention as a result of the influx of biographical detail and is now considered integral 
to understanding Beckett's formal concerns. Recent critics such as David Weisberg 
and Sean Kennedy have also attempted to situate Beckett in relation to the 1930s 
literary scene, and establish his relationship with the postcolonial conditions of his 
native Ireland.26 
Parallel to the historicisation of Beckett's corpus is the increasing 
acknowledgement that the manuscripts have received since Richard L. Admussen's 
The Beckett Manuscripts: A Study in 1979. Genetic criticism has illuminated Beckett's 
process of obliteration as he revised and edited his drafts. Stan Gontarski's The Intent 
of Undoing in Beckett's Dramatic Texts (1985) reveals Beckett's reduction of 
biographical material and more recently Dirk Van Rulle's Manuscript Genetics: 
Joyce's Know-How, Beckett's Nohow (2008) describes Beckett's 'work in regress' 
against Joyce's 'work in progress' .27 Undoubtedly, genetic criticism in Beckett studies 
will yield a plenitude of material as critics take advantage of the burgeoning 'Samuel 
Beckett: Digital Manuscript Project'. This collaborative effort to archive Beckett's 
manuscripts electronically promises to be an accessible and efficient research tool, 
and the first instalment has already enhanced awareness of Beckett's late writing 
25 For example, see Matthew Feldman, Beckett's Books: A Cultural History of Samuel Beckett's 
'Interwar Notes' (London: Continuum, 2006). 
26 See Weisberg, Chronicles of Disorder; Patrick Bixby, Samuel Beckett and the Postcolonial Novel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009); Sean Kennedy, Beckett and Ireland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2010); Sean Kennedy and Katherine Worth, eds., History, Memory, Archive 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and Emilie Morin, Samuel Beckett and the Problem of 
Irjshness (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
27 Richard L. Admussen, The Beckett Manuscripts: A Study (London: G. K. Hall, 1979); S. E. 
Gontarski, The Intent of UndOing in Beckeu's Dramatic Texts (Bloomington: Indiana University. 
1985); Dirk Van Hulle, Manuscript Genetics: Joyce's Know-How. Beckett's Nohow (Gainesville: 
University of Florida, 2008). 
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practice.28 
The current critical focus on historicising, and, to a lesser extent, politicising 
Beckett informs the direction of my research into the artistic manifestation of the 
wartime and post-war milieu in Beckett's contemporaneous work. Beckett 
experienced Nazi ideology and propaganda in pre-war Germany; fled to Roussillon 
and the Vichy 'free zone' in southern France during the Nazi occupation of Paris; 
served with the French Resistance group Gloria SMH, mediating information for the 
Allies; grieved the death of his close friend Alfred Peron who was imprisoned at 
Mauthausen; and helped rebuild the hospital at Saint-Loo That Beckett was involved 
in and had first-hand knowledge of the effect of the Second World War is not 
disputed, yet Beckett does not or cannot explicitly address these events in his prose 
and drama. Despite diverse approaches, recent criticism shows that historical and 
socio-political considerations are a burden for Beckett that cannot be lifted with 
artistic tools. Rather, the manifestation of the war and Holocaust in Beckett is bound 
with his preoccupation with narrative, language and representation - with the failure 
of art. 
Beckett in Context 
James Knowlson's biography suggests that Beckett was involved in the wartime 
situation purely on a personal and private level. He regards Beckett as an altruist, 
concerned with the injustices committed against people and especially partial to the 
'underdog' figure: 'His responses almost always seem to have been motivated by 
spontaneous feelings of sympathy for the underdog: the failure, the invalid, the 
28 Dirk Van Hulle, The Making of Samuel Beckett's Stirrings Still I Soubresauts and Comment Dire I 
what is the word (Brussels: University Press Antwerp, 2011). 
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prisoner (political or otherwise), the beggar, the tramp or even the rogue,.29 Beckett, 
then, is attuned to the reality of the situation on a human level, conscious of subaltern 
groups regardless of the political dimension of the Third Reich. Deirdre Bair presents 
a similar account in her early biography, in which she suggests that Beckett was 
beyond political motivations despite his 'abandonment of neutrality' with Gloria SMH 
and the French Resistance: 
'I was so outraged by the Nazis, particularly by their treatment of the Jews, 
that 1 could not remain inactive,' he said. Long after the war, when an 
interviewer asked Beckett why he had taken an active political stand, he 
replied, 'I was fighting against the Germans, who were making life hell for my 
friends, and not for the French nation.' He was being consistent in his 
apolitical behaviour.3o 
Beckett's feeling of responsibility, specifically towards his friends and generally 
towards the victimised, reveals a basic ethical imperative that supersedes any protest 
against Nazi or Vichy laws. This viewpoint is epitomised in Knowlson's later work 
Beckett Remembering, Remembering Beckett (2006), in which he recalls Beckett's 
phrase 'revolted but not revolting,.31 This distinction implies that Beckett's disgust 
arises at an individual level as opposed to being roused by a collective rebellion. 
Moreover, as a determined effort to resist, 'revolting' implies an on-going action or 
process, whereas Beckett's revulsion appears fixed and fundamental. According to 
29 Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, p. 642. 
30 Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography (London: Vintage, 1990), pp. 326-7. 
31 James Knowlson and Elizabeth Knowlson. Becketl Remembering, Remembering Beckett (New York: 
Arcade, 2006), p. 137. Knowlson's biography also relates Beckett's view: 'you simply couldn't stand 
by with your arms folded', Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, p. 304. 
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Knowlson's and Bair's biographical portraits, it appears that Beckett does not take an 
active political stand, but is instead emotionally activated. 
As a result of Beckett's apolitical assertion, Beckett studies have sought to 
trace how his work avoids socio-political material and yet betrays a historically 
informed rejection of political art in the process. In his Chronicles of Disorder (2006), 
David Weisberg suggests that artistic and creative directions are historical 
consequences. He notes that 1960s and 70s criticism perceives political art in the 
degree to which it eschews 'bourgeois' narrative conventions. In contrast, Weisberg 
regards Beckett as 'a refraction of the more general struggle to define art's social 
function' during a divisive and transitional historical period.32 The profound 
magnitude of the Second World War introduced a cultural disorder that thwarted the 
effort to narrate meaningfully in literature and therefore repudiated creative authority. 
Accordingly, as Weisberg opines, Beckett's own indeterminacy arises from the more 
generalised indeterminacy of the writer's social function in post-war conditions. 
Although critics like Adomo deem the lack of explicit subject matter, determinable 
message or 'metaphysical meaning' in Beckett an attempt to avoid the oppression of 
authoritative communication associated with articulated political programmes, such 
ambivalence is not a simple expression of a liberal antithesis.33 Rather, Beckett's 
constant vacillations elicit the neutral, the undecided, even the nugatory status of an 
art form unsure of its purpose. 
In 'Art After Auschwitz: Theodor Adomo' (1990), Terry Eagleton discusses 
the 'poor but honest' claustrophobic artistic spaces that Beckett navigates and Adomo 
explicates.34 By way of Adomo, Eagleton claims that Beckett's reticence towards the 
32 Weisberg, Chronicles of Disorder, p. 5. 
33 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 120. 
34 Terry Eagleton, 'Art After Auschwitz: Theodor Adomo'. in The Ideology of AeSlhelic (Cambridge: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990),341-365. p. 357. 
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historical climate participates in art as 'contradiction incarnate', which is 'critically 
estranged from its history yet incapable of taking up a v a n ~ g e - p o i n t t beyond if.3S 
Notwithstanding art's alienation from the conditions of its production, Eagleton's 
Marxist view subscribes to the inextricable reality that accentuates Becketfs approach 
and remains as a diaphanous boundary to the work. The idea of not belonging, of 
being 'estranged', maintains the alterity between history and autonomous art, which 
maintains a negative relationship between the presented work of art and the tacit 
context. 
In his later decisive article 'Political Beckett?' (2006), Eagleton places Beckett 
firmly on the political Left. Following a biographical study of Beckett's self-exile 
from Ireland and his role with the French Resistance, Eagleton underlines the 
progressive values of Beckett's art: 
Unusually among modernist artists, this supposed purveyor of nihilism was a 
militant of the left rather than the right. A champion of the ambiguous and 
indeterminate, his fragmentary, provisional art is supremely anti-totalitarian. It 
is also an art born in the shadow of Auschwitz, which keeps faith with silence 
and terror by paring its language, characters and narrative almost to vanishing 
point. It is the writing of a man who understood that sober, bleak-eyed realism 
serves the cause of human emancipation more faithfully than starry-eyed 
utopia.36 
35 Eagleton, 'Art After Auschwitz', p. 352. 
36 Terry Eagleton, 'Champion of Ambiguity', The Guardjan, Monday 20th March 2006, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/mar/20/arts.theatre> [accessed 1114/12], para 6 of 6. 
This excerpt is a revised version of the article 'Political Beckett?', New Left Revjew, 40, (2006), 67-74. 
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For Eagleton, Beckett's work is politically and historically relevant due to its elusive 
nature, eviscerated material and stoic vision. Yet there is a basic problem in asserting 
this critical position. Eagleton's reading is couched in persuasive rhetoric, with 
'champion', 'supremely' and 'faith' suggesting an overt Left-wing--commitment on 
Beckett's part. Despite Eagleton's sensitivity towards Beckett's ambiguity, the critic's 
political framing and emphatic tone serves to appropriate indeterminacy in order to 
ascertain a prevailing meaning, which, in effect, undermines the qualities it applauds. 
For this reason, Beckett's work proves to be difficult to articulate since it renders even 
the most receptive interpretation totalitarian. 
Leslie Hill makes a similar point early in the first of two complex essays on 
the textual politics in Beckett. In "'Up the Republic!": Beckett, Writing, Politics' 
(1997), he notes that 'to translate the author's writing into ready-made terms of an 
established political discourse is to do little more, in fact, than to reiterate a gesture of 
violence,.37 Hill begins his piece by stating a general resistance towards politics in 
Beckett's work, noting the text's irreducible singularity. Yet, in an effort to transcend 
a politics of representation and the inescapable causality beneath art, Hill explores the 
friction between writing and discourse, exemplified by the political slogan 'Up the 
Republic!' in Beckett's Ma/one Dies (T, 236).38 For Hill, '[a] fundamental disjunction 
intervenes in the text, with the result that the political discourse that is audible in 
Beckett's novel operates there solely as an ironic residue of itself .39 The sincere and 
mocking resonance of the phrase loads and unloads signification at the same time, 
which approximates a political affair in the ineluctable struggle between contradictory 
forces. This 'micrologics of relation', as Hill expresses it, reveals a basic principle of 
37 Leslie Hill, '''Up the Republic!"; Beckett, Writing, Politics', MLN, Comparative Literature, 112.5 
(1997),909-928, p. 910. . 
38" UPTHEREPUBLIC I' was also Beckett's laconic response to Nancy Cunard for Authors Take 
Sides on the Spanish War (London: Left Review, 1937). 
39 Hill, 'Up the Republic!', p. 913. 
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political activity in that it enacts the manoeuvring of discrete and associated forces. 
He sums this up, stating that: 
Writing as contestation, writing as challenge, writing as a response to the 
infinity of the other beyond all representation [ ... ] [is] indispensable for any 
attempt to think in its radicality the relation of non-relation between Same and 
Other that is fundamental to politics as such.40 
Hill seeks to uncover core political relations in Beckett's use of language as Beckett 
refuses to resolve the pervasive contradictory forces in his work, particularly between 
autonomous writing and historically constituted discourse. For Hill, this 
indeterminable texture perpetuates the difference and engagement between opposing 
positions, which makes a sort of political negotiation implicit when navigating 
Beckett's work. 
As if to clarify his position, Hill responds to his own piece, reiterating that 
writing is intrinsically connected to history as an inscription and event, but not 'a 
treacherous copy or dubious semblance'. 41 Hill's contribution to the debate on 
Beckett's political relevance is to argue that the inside and outside dichotomy should 
be abandoned in order to look beyond both the referential function of art and the 
simple resistance to reference. As a consequence, his essay distances Beckett from 
any recognisable political persuasion, such as the ideological agendas and pragmatic 
methods of nationalism, conservatism, socialism or liberalism. Instead, Hill enters into 
political philosophy, or rather, textual politics after poststructuralism. Hill's textual 
40 Hill, 'Up the Republic!', p. 925. 
41 Leslie Hill, 'Beckett, Writing, Politics: Answering for Myself, Samuel Beckett TodaylAujourd'hui, 
Vol. 9, Beckett and Religion: BeckettlAestheticslPolitics, ed. by Matthijs Engelberts and Onno Kosters 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 215-221, p. 218 
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approach effectively beholds a kind of political lily pad and proceeds to explore the 
submerged stem, the base origins that buoy up the visible political mass. Yet, the 
salient political dimension away from a literary representation of the external remains 
unclear. There is no vocabulary or discourse available to articulate an alternative 
political dimension without disengaging from the received idea of the 'political'. This 
dearth is fitting for Hill since it conveys the unnameable that requires a name and the 
untranslatable that translates itself, which are paradoxes that highlight the struggle for 
freedom that is endemic to politics. As Hill readily acknowledges, his approach 
occludes a large part of what is understood as politics and this makes it difficult to 
discern how Beckett's irreconcilable registers or paradoxical conundrums constitute 
political value distinct from social, moral or ethical intercourse.42 
Gabriele Schwab also advances the textual politics of Beckett's The 
Unnamable, asserting that the very fabric of language that Beckett unravels reveals a 
political engagement. According to Schwab, language is a system that works towards 
a 'territorialization of subjects', a locking in of the reflexive '1'.43 Beckett's political 
level emerges in his challenge to this linguistic incarceration,' since his work 
endeavours to collapse dichotomies and nullify difference, which leaves identity and 
authority suspended and dispossessed. Beckett's work withstands such codification to 
launch unowned and unanchored 'de-constructs' that exist in an indefinite state of 
deferral. As with Hill, the orientation of Schwab's argument necessitates a politics 
beyond practice" or instrumentality: 'A voice that is neither I nor Not-I, subject nor 
object, performs speech acts on the tightrope toward the impossible' .44 Beckett's 
42 Hill writes: 'Formulas such as these do not found a politics, if politics is to be understood as the art of 
the possible, the feasible, or the practical', Hill, 'Up The Republic!', p. 925. , 
43 Gabriele Schwab, 'The Politics of Small Differences: Beckett's The Unnamable', in Engagement and 
Difference: Beckett and the Political, ed. by Henry Sussman and Christopher Devenney (New York: 
State University of New York, 2001), 42-57, p. 42. 
44 Schwab, 'The Politics of Small Difference', p. 56 
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textual no-man's land subsists as unresolvable linguistic factions, which serve to 
invoke and deny the basic political functions of ownership and belonging at the level 
of language. 
Evidently, critics take heed of Beckett's refusal to enter directly into historical 
commentary, social critique or political agendas, and have developed ingenious ways 
to draw out the contextual significance of the work. Both neo-Marxist and 
poststructuralist critics have problematized the biographical formation of Beckett's 
aesthetic, often deflating real-world politics and resorting to political abstractions. 
Indeed, it is difficult to identify the contextual relationships that Beckett's literature 
supports without underestimating its capacity to exceed the limits of biographical 
interpretation. As a result, Beckett's enduring texts are broadly recognised in relation 
to the author's wartime experiences and the Holocaust, yet the importance of this era 
remains as an intermittent or underlying account accumulated over the past fifty years. 
The dialogue-between different phases of Beckett studies, then, has tended to show 
that the significance of Beckett's response is how it questions biography, history and 
politics as much as it employs or reflects them. However, Beckett's engagement with 
the social, cultural and political conditions of wartime Europe has emerged in a 
handful of recent essays that benefit from rigorous precedents but also utilise a more 
complete biographical portrait and sophisticated but controversial philosophical 
apparatuses. 
Several Beckett scholars turn to the seminal and provocative writings of Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben to discuss the relationship between the Holocaust and 
literary responses to mass trauma. In 'What Remains of Beckett: Evasion and 
History', Daniel Katz assesses Agamben alongside Adorno to adjudge 'silence' as a 
pertinent response to catastrophe, and, in doing so, touches on several key notions 
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discussed at length in this thesis. Katz refers initially to the violence of the 'image 
ban' that Adorno points out, and maintains that the absence of the atrocities of the 
Holocaust in Beckett's work is appropriate, not owing to ethical sensitivity or even 
artistic inadequacy, but by virtue of the severe and forceful manner of its interdiction. 
For instance, in light of Knowlson's observation that Estragon in Waiting/or Godot 
(French 1952; English 1954) was originally named 'Levy', Katz suggests that Beckett 
removes the Jewish name to impose an uncompromising image ban.45 
In pursuit of further elisions, Katz turns to Agamben, specifically his reading 
of Primo Levi's first-hand accounts of Auschwitz, in order to explore the inability to 
speak for others, and moreover, speak for oneself. Katz charts the common ground 
between Agamben and Beckett orientated around the idea that 'one speaks by proxy 
precisely when most speaking for oneself. 46 He also queries and refines several of the 
arguments that Agamben sets out in Remnants of Auschwitz (1999). Katz asserts that 
Agamben's onomastic explanation of the term Muselmann - a term applied by the 
inmates at Auschwitz to people appearing 'as if dead before their death' - neglects its 
deflective quality.47 With recourse to Fethi Benslama, Katz suggests that Muselmann 
does not designate the 'non-human created by the camps', but demonstrates a kind of 
Freudian witz, or 'rhetoric of survival' by adopting a pseudonym to shift the emphasis 
of degradation away from the. denomination 'Jew,.48 Since he refrains from further 
comment, Katz's allusion to Jewish perseverance and Freud's study of jokes invites a 
sustained analysis of humour as a defence or anaesthetic in times of extreme 
adversity, which forms a part of my study of Beckett's humour in chapter three. 
Katz also takes issue with Agamben's philosophical appropriation of 'the 
45 Daniel Katz, 'What Remains of Beckett: Evasion and History', in Beckell and Phenomenology, ed. 
h{ Ulrika Maude and Matthew Feldman (London: Continuum, 2009),144-157, p. 153. 
4 Katz, 'What Remains of Beckett', p. 149. 
47 Ibid. p. 152. 
48 Ibid. p. 152. 
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ineluctable link to one's own singularity' in the Levinasian concept of shame. 
According to Katz, Agamben is insensitive to the individuality of Holocaust accounts, 
and therefore lacks subjective and historical specificity in his focus on the enunciation 
of testimony. This point serves as a reminder of both the analytical and ethical 
sensitivity required when interrelating first-hand, literary and philosophical accounts 
of the Holocaust. Beckett criticism that addresses the biographical, historical, social or 
political context of his prose and drama broaches contentious ethical issues in 
comparing fictional and non-fictional accounts. In terms of biography's ability to 
highlight broader historical truths, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
Beckett's personal experiences relate to other victims and represent a wider 
community. The more pressing issue is the extent to which Beckett, and then 
Beckett's fiction, can be a legitimate substitute or voice-piece for other war and, 
particularly, Holocaust accounts. Beckett as a 'survivor' and 'witness' is a specious 
idea that risks subsuming the survivors and witnesses of warfare or the death camps. 
In effect, the thrust of Katz's essay foregrounds the tension between the ethical 
obligation and implications in exacting, denoting and naming the catastrophe, or 
approximating, connoting and 'not-naming'., In other words, Katz addresses the 
differences between articulating and evoking the narrative of Auschwitz, which are 
issues that charge Beckett's elision with ethical relevance. Beckett's strict silence on 
the Shoah is a significant response to the event that shows how art can bear witness 
whilst respecting the idea that the horror is beyond artistic representation. 
In 'Beckett's Theatre "After Auschwitz''', Jackie Blackman explores the 
'unsayability' of catastrophe that materialises in both Adomo's essay on Beckett and 
Agamben's writings on the death camps. She notes that Adomo tempers his famous 
assertion '[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric' to admit that '[p]erennial 
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suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to s c r e a m ' . 4 ~ ~ The latter 
formulation stresses entitlement, not efficacy, and is therefore in close proximity with 
Agamben's analysis of the ethical obligation to bear witness to the inability to bear 
witness, or, as Beckett implies in Watt (written in English in 1943; published in 
English in 1953), eff the ineffable (W, 61). From this expressive duty, Blackman 
extends a more biographical reading in response to Michel Foucault's question: 'How 
can one define a work amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death?' .50 
She suggests that, short of a textual signature, biographical 'traces' remain in the 
artwork that indicate contextual information and aesthetic decisions, which, in turn, 
disclose the expressive dilemma that compels one to express what cannot be 
expressed. Thus, it is 'possible to read Beckett's early plays as a very personal and 
unique creative response to the unsayability and unplayability of Holocaust narrative 
- a story impossible to represent, yet, a story which must be repeatedly told and 
somehow understood' . SI 
In two other valuable essays, Blackman expands upon Beckett's unperformed 
play Eleutheria, written in 1947, and the Jewish presence in Beckett's post-war work. 
Blackman accepts Alain Badiou's perception of Beckett as a 'Resistant Philosopher' 
whose commitment to silence, or rather, a kind of spoken voicelessness, is a 'radical 
and intimate, violent and reserved, necessary and exceptional action'. 52 However, 
Blackman again finds historical and socio-political 'traces' in Beckett's work that 
remain despite, and as a result of, the general erasure of specifics. In fact, in contrast 
49 Adomo qtd. in Jackie Blackman, 'Beckett's Theatre "After Auschwitz"', in Samuel Beckell: History, 
Memory. Archive, ed. by Sean Kennedy and Katherine Weiss (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 71-87, pp. 71,79. 
so Ibid. p. 74. 
SI Ibid. p. 82. 
S2 See Alain Badiou, Metapolitics (London: Verso, 2005), p. 5. Jackie B1ackman, 'Beckett Judaizing 
Beckett: "a Jew from Greenland" in Paris', Samuel Beckell TodaylAujourd'hui, Vol. 18, All Slurm and 
No Drang, Beckett and Romanticism, ed. by Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2007), 325-340, p. 326. 
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to Katz's insistence on the particularity of each trauma, the most striking reflection of 
<' 
the Jewish situation that Blackman points out is in the complete negation of 
distinction. For Jacques Derrida, this contradictory identity of non-identity is 
inherently Jewish, or at least a humorous Jewish self-image: 'the more one dislocates 
one's self identity, the more one says "my own identity consists in not being identical 
to myself, in being a foreigner, the non-coinciding with the self," etc. the more Jewish 
one isl,.s3 It seems that, as much as Beckett's work strips back particularity and 
allows indetenninacy to reign, the overarching critical view is able to appeal to world 
history to account for it. The idea that Blackman mobilises is that biographical 'traces' 
do not define the text's scope, but are further evidence of the feeling and 
incompetence that make up Beckett's artistic toolset after the war. These tools are 
incapable of representing an extra-literary reality but can perforate the materials of 
production to reveal the reality of producing. 
For '.lames McNaughton, the inability to convey a past that deserves 
recognition is also a portal into Beckett's historical predicament. Crucially, 
McNaughton arrives at this conclusion in his essay 'Beckett, Gennan Fascism, and 
History: The Futility of Protest' by way of Beckett's Gennan· diaries, which 
meticulously record Beckett's trip through Gennany in the years prior to the 
annexation of Austria in 1938. As McNaughton notes, it is 'more antiquarian in its 
documentation than reflective'. 54 Moreover, the critic develops his historical 
perspective on Beckett in spite of the author's supposed lack of 'historical sense' and 
S3 Jacques Derrida qtd. in Helene Cixous, Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint (New 
York: Columbia University, 2004), p. 83. Blackman, 'BeckeU Judaizing BeckeU', p. 334. 
S4 James McNaughton, 'Beckett, German Fascism, and History: The Futility of Protest', Samuel Beckett 
Today/Aujourd'hui, Vo!. IS, Historicising BeckettfIssues of Performance, ed. by Marius Buning et al. 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), 101-116, p. 108. It is apt that McNaughton's essay appears in an issue 
dedicated to both historicising Beckett and issues of performance, because increasingly Beckett is seen 
not as a reflection of historical events but a demonstration or enactment of obligations and problems 
related to a specific historical juncture. 
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'disgust of sweeping historical narratives,.55 Against the aesthetic protest of modernist 
art, which experiments with form to frustrate the rationalisation of oppressive 
regimes, Beckett's diaries take the first steps towards a view of logical structure and 
precise detail as absurd and meaningless. Thus, in his diaries, Beckett's fidelity to an 
intrinsically flawed method divulges its own weaknesses. McNaughton clearly sums 
up the crux of this dynamic for Beckett's art: 
Beckett appears caught in a paradox: on the one hand, without memory and the 
capacity to rationalise the past, the present cannot be understood and the same 
events threaten to repeat. On the other hand, he rejects causes and backgrounds 
and finds the rationalisation of them intellectually dishonest and politically 
dangerous. Far from making him an ahistorical writer, as Beckett's critical 
reputation often has him, this paradox reveals Beckett caught between the fear 
of forgetting the past and greater fear of rationally misshaping it. S6 
The prefixes 'non' and 'mis' capture the two potential forms of injustice towards the 
recent past that Beckett encounters; the event itself is at risk of oblivion if not treated 
or wrongly treated. The difficulty, then, is how to attend to the historic event without 
reducing it to an inadequate historical narrative. 
A handful of other critical texts elucidate the themes that are central to this 
thesis. The extant research on testimony, historicity and politics in Beckett's work in 
relation to the Holocaust and post-Holocaust context shapes my own research, 
encourages certain areas of development and informs decisions on which Beckett 
texts to examine. Peter Boxall's Since Beckett: Contemporary Writing in the Wake of 
ss McNaughton, 'Beckett, German Fascism, and History', p. 102. 
S6 Ibid. p. Ill. 
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Modernism (2009), for instance, includes a couple of sections on what he calls 'a 
Beckettian mode of remembrance', which complements my own chapter on Beckett's 
method of tracing the lacuna of the event to respond to the recent catastrophe.s7 
Boxall describes how Beckett evokes a concern for the past whilst being reticent 
towards it. Along with Austrian author Thomas Bernhard, Beckett develops 'a form 
with which to express the uncanny presence of the past, but for both writers this 
presence, this continuity between present and past is achieved only through a kind of 
radical discontinuity, through the erection of a boundary between present and past' .58 
This kind of separation from the past but traversal of the schism between past and 
present filters into Beckett's writing style. For Boxall, 'the experience of literary 
correction and disintegration' seen in Beckett, whereby the very substance of the text 
involves its deconstruction, appropriately conveys this simultaneous proximity and 
distance; the past is on the edge of the tongue but always in the process of being 
revised or e r a s e d . ~ S 9 9 For the most part, however, Boxall's text concentrates on 
Beckett's literary legacy and his parity with later writers, such as Bernhard and 
Sebald. Furthermore, Boxall is primarily interested in the texture of temporality and 
testimony in Beckett, whereas the present work extends the relationship between 
Beckett and the Holocaust to identity thinking in power struggles, humour as a 
reaction to suffering and the prevalence of survival. 
Similarly, David Houston Jones has produced a monograph dedicated to 
testimony in Beckett, which makes certain areas of inquiry less pressing. In his first 
chapter 'Situating Testimony', Jones examines The Unnamable and Textsfor Nothing, 
singling out the latter as a particularly fertile text for readings of testimony owing to a 
57 Peter Boxall, Since Beckett: Contemporary Writing in the Wake of Modernism (London, Continuum, 
2009) p. 86. 
58 Boxall, Since Beckell, p. 92. 
59 Ibid. p. 109. 
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narrator who 'can only speak by disavowing his own voice' .bU Jones argues that 
contumacy 'figures the breakdown of the dialectic of presence and absence which 
conventionally characterises the relation of the speaker to the dead, as the speaker is 
the subject of discourse which attempts to make him or her present,.6) The very 
speech that should confirm the speaker's presence also exposes the speaker's 
depersonalisation in language. In Texts for Nothing, it is the figure of contumacy that 
'allows the discourse of the witness to express both belatedness and the parasitical 
occupation of the other'. 62 Since Texts for Nothing is the culmination of this type of 
disintegration, a sustained reading of that collection would only duplicate or converse 
with much of the work Jones has already undertaken. However, there is less material 
on Mol/oy and Ma/one Dies in Jones' monograph, and these texts consequently make 
up the majority of my chapter on testimony. By focusing on these earlier texts 
initially, there is opportunity to offer productive readings of Beckettian testimony in 
the context of creaturely life and subsequently develop Jones' analysis ofheteronymy 
in The Unnamable. 
The Lost Ones (French 1970; English 1971) is another text that is highly 
appropriate for an interpretation of Beckett and the Holocaust but has already received 
sustained attention in this context. Antoinette Weber-Caflisch's French-language 
study Chacun son depeup/eur (1994) details the striking likeness Beckett's searching 
figures have to the malnourished and demoralized prisoners in the Nazi camps. In this 
text, Beckett describes a cylinder that acts as an incarcerating container for these 
searching inhabitants, some of whom try to escape on ladders whilst others have given 
up. In a reference to Weber-Caflisch's book, Jean-Michel Rabate describes how she 
'shows that "si c 'est un homme" used twice in the last section of the text quotes 
:0 David Houston Jones, Samuel Beckett and Testimony (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 12. 
I Jones, Samuel Beckett and Testimony, p. 21. 
62 Ibid. p. 28. 
33 
directly Primo Levi's book Si c'est un homme (Se quest'un uomo). The questers, 
, " 
called here the "vanquished," do resemble those concentration camp inmates who had 
abandoned all hope and who, as Levi narrates, were "Muslims'" .63 Weber-Caflisch 
makes the allusions to the Holocaust explicit, which conflicts with the largely indirect 
relationship with context that I underline in the following chapters. Her study leans 
towards a representation of the camps as a site and specific experience whereas my 
reading tends to appreciate Beckett's engagement with the Holocaust as a more distant 
response, attentive to certain testimonial problems, power struggles and survival 
conditions without necessarily showing how Beckett's texts set these themes in the 
camps themselves. Rather, it seems that the modes of creaturely life in Beckett's . 
earlier post-war prose and drama that relate to the Holocaust constitute the aftermath 
that has impacted upon the everyday world, and, for this reason, I choose not to dwell 
on The Lost Ones here. 
Alysia Garrison's essay '''Faintly struggling things": Trauma, Testimony, and 
Inscrutable Life in Beckett's The Unnamable' (2009) intersects with several key 
concerns of this thesis. Garrison's focus is on Beckett's relationship with trauma 
theory and how both transhistorical trauma and the historical trauma related to the 
Holocaust are evident in the last text of Beckett's trilogy. She argues that 'The 
Unnamable formalises wounded forms of life by an aesthetic of diminishment'.64 In 
terms of transhistorical trauma, this diminishment occurs as Beckett's subjects fade or 
are fragmented physically to become more spectral and through the inability to 
account for this collapsing subjectivity. Nevertheless, this increasingly bare life 
demands to be heard and seen, giving rise to 'the luminous trace that endures' as 
63 Jean-Michel Rabate, 'Philosophizing with Beckett', in A Companion 10 Samuel Beckell, ed. by S. E. 
Gontarski (MaIden: Blackwell, 20 I 0), 97-117, p. 113. 
64 Alysia E. Garrison, '''Faintly struggling things": Tmuma, Testimony, and Inscrutable Life in 
Beckett's The Unnamable', Samuel Beckett: History. Memory. Archive, ed. by Sean Kennedy and 
Katherine Weiss (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 89-\06, p. 92. 
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'memory gasps'.65 In the second half of the essay, Garrison explains how more 
precise images and terms such as 'tears' and 'ash' act as 'placeholders for specified 
loss',66 Although a secondary or distant witness, Beckett still uses his experience or 
knowledge of the events according to Garrison and his texts are therefore inevitably 
marked by these memories. One of Garrison's key claims, then, is that the 
transhistorical and historical registers of trauma entwine so that nonspecific visions of 
trauma are always suggestive of specific traumatic events and vice versa. The notion 
that Beckett's novel 'can be read as an effect or symptom of the atrocities' resonates 
with my own approach to Beckett and the Holocaust, whereby the modes of creaturely 
life evident in Beckett serve to illuminate 'life's distorted alterity under contingent 
biopolitical duress' and 'the annihilation of expression and the return of ghostly 
remains, a testimonial form appropriate, perhaps, to witness what remains of the 
human in the inhuman in the aftermath of traumatic limit events'. 67 Although Garrison 
only touches on these areas, the biopolitical dimension and the human-inhuman divide 
offer potential for further development in the attempt to associate Beckett's work with 
the political dimensions of the Holocaust and post-Holocaust views of the human. 
Indeed, Beckett's work does engage with experiences of trauma and the concept of the 
creature articulates the h i s t o ~ i c a l l significance of these experiences more acutely by 
theorising the denuded mode of being seen in Beckett's inscrutable life. Furthermore, 
the creaturely life apparent in Beckett's post-war prose and drama helps us to 
understand this ~ o n s t r u c t t as a literary figuration in a historical context. 
Ostensibly, Joanne Shaw's Impotence and Making in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy 
Mol/oy, Ma/one Dies and The Unnamable, and How It Is (2010) is also a pertinent 
study, with its focus on the creation of beings and how impotence in Beckett's prose 
6' Garrison, 'Trauma, Testimony and Inscrutable Life', pp. 97,98. 
66 Ibid. p. 99. 
67 Ibid. pp. 93, 10 1. 
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texts actually generates creativity. For Shaw, the performance of language, however 
inadequate or impotent, marks the beginning of the physical condition of the self: 
'through an impregnation, words fertilize Beckett's narrators to produce the foetus 
that will develop into their bodily offspring. [ ... ] I want to examine how Beckett and 
his narrators pose the question of being - the question of how the self is made, or (if 
you will) "how it is" or how it comes to be'. 68 Shaw goes on to offer a 
psychoanalytically oriented study that describes Beckett's work as a narrative of 
creation and destruction between birth and death drives. As Adam Piette explains in 
his review of the book, Shaw applies the idea of a 'male mother' to Beckett's 
narrators and views creativity as 'the symptom of a death-entranced longing for the 
womb created by a myth of the foetus born prematurely in an amniotic space'. 69 In 
this reading, Beckett's impotent creatures appear to be a consequence of the enduring 
desire to be unborn, but in their very desire for nothingness the creatures reveal their 
substance as creative subjects. 
Shaw's examination of impotence and making does contain several overlaps 
with my own work. The idea of a subject produced through the performance of 
language and the dialectic between power and impotence are areas of inquiry that I 
also pursue. The most directly relevant aspect of Shaw's study is the relationship 
between textual creativity and bodily creation. In this thesis, chapter three on humour 
includes a section on textual performances in which the language in Beckett's prose 
takes on a 'demonstrative quality, and a section on flesh and words in which language 
in Beckett's drama is considered as a fundamental part of the physical action on stage. 
Yet, given my interest in humour as a response to the impotence of language, these 
68 Joanne Shaw, Impotence and Making in Samuel Beckett 's Trilogy Mol/ay. Malone Dies and The 
Unnamable. and How It Is (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2010), p. 16. 
69 Adam Piette, 'Impotence and Making in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy Mol/ay, Ma/one Dies and The 
Unnamable, and How It Is' (Review), French Studies, 67.3 (2013),436-437, p. 436. 
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issues are largely treated with a different analytical framework. More importantly, 
there is no concept of creaturely life or the creature in Shaw's study despite several 
references to creatures in her introduction. As such, I replace Shaw's psychoanalytical 
navigation of mind-body duality as it appears in Beckett with an analysis of the extent 
to which creaturely life pertains to a politically produced form of being. On this front, 
Shaw's study is mainly disinterested or else lacks detail. As Piette affirms in his 
assessment of Shaw, 'the occasional allusion to Holocaust or Cold War nuclear 
contexts is too fleeting to have any real impact'. 70 Although this thesis responds to 
similar Beckettian themes as Shaw, I seek to contribute an exposition of the modes of 
creaturely life apparent in Beckett's work that also have a broad historical and 
political dimension to them. 
Finally, one of Beckett's later stage pieces warrants mention for its potential 
for political interpretation. Catastrophe (French 1982: English 1982) is a short play 
dedicated to Czech dissident and fellow playwright Vaclav Havel. It centres on a 
director and his assistant as they manipulate a 'protagonist' on stage in preparation for 
a performance. The pair strip off the protagonist's gown and hat, which makes him 
shiver. They raise him on a pedestal and force him to bow his head, but in the final 
moments of the play, the protagonist looks up defiantly as the sound of an audience's 
applause fades. There is clearly a play on the idea of authority in both an artistic and 
political sense as Beckett explores the power involved in directing, which resembles 
the tyrannical control associated with a dictatorship, Appearing late in Beckett's 
career, this play makes the artistic and political axis relatively explicit, and, as Beckett 
affirms, the end is obviously a display of dissidence: '''There's no ambiguity at all," 
said Beckett. "He's saying: you bastards, you haven't finished me yet!'" ,71 Indeed, the 
70 Piette, 'Impotence and Making' (Review), p. 436. 
71 Knowlson, Damned to Fame, p. 680. 
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play is at odds with the general tenor of Beckett's body of work owing to its strong 
political connotations and unusually unambiguous ending. The political and power 
dynamics of the play have been covered at length in other studies, including Robert 
Sandarg's 'A Political Perspective on Catastrophe' (1989) and Shannon Jackson's 
'Performing the Performance of Power in Beckett's Catastrophe' (1992).72 My work 
is predomimmtly limited to earlier Beckett texts in order to trace these themes as they 
germinate between 1945 and 1960 during which time Beckett's work enters a 
transitional stage and bears the creaturely dislocation from a recognisable, meaningful 
world. For the most part, I focus on Mol/ay, Malone Dies, The Unnamable, Waiting 
for Godot and Endgame since these texts are central to the Beckett canon, 
contemporaneous with the immediate post-Holocaust cultural milieu and yet still 
underexplored in terms of relating Beckett's work to the historical and political 
context. 
The argument that I develop in terms of Beckett's relationship with the 
historical context is that Beckett is attentive to two key elements that are specific to 
the Holocaust but have implications that extend well beyond the camps. In the 
chapters that follow, I unpack Beckett's evocations of the unspeakable event and the 
inhuman with the human, both of which are made clearer through the concept of the 
creature, which is discussed at length in the next section. These two elements pertain 
to the Holocaust as a traumatic experience and exercise in dehumanisation, and yet 
lead to more diffuse responses to the Holocaust as a cultural watershed in the West. 
Hence, the unspeakability of the event escalates into the inadequacy of art after 
Auschwitz. The individual's obligation to account for the unsayable or unintelligible 
72 See Robert Sandarg, • A Political Perspective on Catastrophe', in 'Make Sense Who May',' Essays on 
Samuel Beckett's Later Works, ed. by Robin J. Davis and Lance St J. Butler (Totowa: Bames and 
Noble, 1989), pp. 137-144. Shannon Jackson, 'Performing the Performance of Power in Beckett's 
Catastrophe', Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, 6.2 (Spring 1992), 23-42. 
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catastrophe suggests a crisis in expression and epistemology that also puts artistic 
forms in jeopardy. Likewise, Nazi ideology against the Jews and the creation of the 
Muselmann in the camps question the capacity for inhuman cruelty and suffering. The 
power struggles between different groups and the perverse sovereign decision on life 
worthy of living destabilises the humanistic vision of the human and the very notion 
of universal human rights. 
Beckett engages with these issues through his art of failure and his creaturely 
beings so that the Holocaust is evident in Beckett's work not only through traces that 
permeate his writing, but in modes of expression (testimony, humour) and being 
(power, survival) that constitute the texture of his work. What might be considered 
direct references or allusions to the historical context in Beckett, then, are generally 
eschewed in favour of these pertinent conditions or states made apparent by the 
catastrophe whilst having repercussions for the status of art and the human 'after the 
Holocaust'. It is not my intention to suggest that Beckett attempts to represent the 
Holocaust as an event that happened to people, but more that Beckett's post-war work 
bears the products of the Holocaust. The direct impact of this historical context on 
Beckett's work is in his awareness of the obstacles facing testimony and the idea that 
the human has entered a survival mode or post-human phase, which are aspects of the 
perceived rupture in value systems and structures of meaning in the wake of the 
Holocaust. 
In a 1995 address to celebrate the 50th anmversary of the liberation of 
Auschwitz, Elie Wiesel claims that '[alfter Auschwitz, the human condition is not the 
same, nothing will be the same' .73 This assertion indicates the broad cultural impact of 
the Holocaust, an impact that dominates postmodem thinkers who 'insisted that the 
73 Elie Wiesel, 'Liberation of Auschwitz', First Person Singular: EUe Wiesel, 
<http://www.pbs.orgleliewieseVlife/auschwitz.html> [accessed 19/07/2013]. 
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Holocaust marks a break in the trajectory of the West, one which provokes us to 
rethink the implications of the project of modernity,.74 Beckett is at the epicentre of 
this shift in thinking regarding art and the human condition, and an insight into his 
creatures and art of failure goes beyond the idea that 'Beckett's skeletal characters and 
desolate landscape are haunted by the ghosts of Auschwitz'. 7S Whilst Beckett's 
imagery might be said to resemble the camps and inmates or convey the ruins of 
culture, one of the focal points here is the conditions evoked by the Muselmann, both 
in terms of a curious testimonial position and as an uncanny, inhuman survivor. Since 
I describe these two elements with recourse to creaturely life, thus making the creature 
a product of the historical context, each mode of creaturely life in Beckett's work that 
I explicate here is to be understood as being related to the Holocaust implicitly. 
'Defining' the Creature 
The current ;>tudy enters into dialogue with the model premises and precepts 
developed in Beckett studies to expand upon the intricacies of Beckett in context. My 
own standpoint on Beckett's historical relevance, in an amalgamation of biographical, 
social and political elements, draws upon the notion of the 'creature', which has yet to 
be applied th'oroughly to Beckett's work.76 I suggest that Beckett's literature develops 
a number of 'creaturely' dimensions that relate to the historical juncture in an oblique, 
elliptical manner but also extract the kind of basic components of power and 
production, ownership and organisation that found interactive relations. As such, the 
creature and its attendant meanings open up parallels between artistic and socio-
74 Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, eds., Postmodernism and the Holocaust (Atlanta: Rodopi, 
1998), p. 2. 
75 Ronan McDonald, Tragedy and Irish Literature: Synge. 0 'Casey, Beckett (New York: Pal grave, 
2002), p. 142. 
76 The study of animals in 8eckett, and the relationship between human and non-human beings, has 
deservedly received critical attention. See Mary 8ryden ed., Beckett and Animals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2013). 
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political issues to relate Beckett's work to his contemporary milieu, which was 
dominated by a sense of disenchantment, particularly towards a humanist model of 
meaning and purpose, after the devastation of the mid-twentieth century. The Second 
World War and the Holocaust transformed, or rather revealed, the idea of the human 
as people had witnessed its creaturely potential. 
The creature is an especially ambiguous and polyvalent concept, and it is 
therefore necessary to outline its theorised form in order to understand what it might 
signify for Beckett. In Julia Lupton's essay 'Creature Caliban' on Shakespeare's 
figure of servitude and monstrosity, the 'creatura is a thing always in the process of 
undergoing creation: the creature is actively passive or, better, passionate, perpetually 
becoming created, subject to transformations at the behest of the arbitrary commands 
of an Other'.77 Lupton's emphasis is on the process of creating the creature and its 
endless potential, focusing on the perpetual act of manipulating an inferior other, 
which serves to differentiate the superior maker. As an identity in action, the creature 
is an indeterminate figure, defined as much by the forces inflicted upon it as the 
results of the SUbjugating process. Therefore, a figure such as Caliban can embrace 
each of the various layers of the term 'creature' by evoking its overall pliability. He is 
essentially human despite his lack of human form, and in this respect, he is a liminal 
being that unsettles the borderlines of anthropology.78 Beckett recognises this type of 
uncanny being, both familiar and alien, early in his career. In Beckett's first published 
novel Murphy (1938), the title character is described as not 'rightly human' by the 
'chandlers' eldest waste product' (M, 47). 'Not rightly human' is an apt description of 
the creature's position; it suggests a being that retains an element of the human but 
77 Julia Reinhard Lupton, 'Creature Caliban', Shakespeare Quarterly, 51.1 (2000), 1-23, p. I. 
78 In performance, Caliban is necessarily portrayed by a human actor, which makes the human 
semblance more apparent and is a fitting dramatic limitation that fixes the inextricable human aspect of 
the creature. 
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fails to correlate with humanity's vision of the human. The fact that a character 
metaphorically reduced to excrement can justifiably cast such a judgement on Murphy 
shows how the hierarchy system works, in which each individual jostles for the 
higher, more human rank. 79 
Whilst Beckett's 'not rightly human'· figures retain human properties, the 
Beckettian creature is also an amalgamation of human, animal and mechanical 
. elements, which can imply either a composite monstrosity or introduce the creature as 
a being that potentially inhabits each denomination. In the same way that 'animal' 
evokes animate and 'machine' suggests contrivance, the creature intimates a process 
of making or being made. Creatureliness is an ontological condition that a god, 
sovereign or writer can inflict upon a person or produce within a subject, and is 
therefore 'intrahuman'. The potential to be impoverished and attenuated, to be an 
amorphous and ambiguous being, to be more inhuman, is endemic to the human. As a 
result, the semantic baggage of the term 'creature' alludes to a framework of 
fabrication and mastery that scaffolds both socio-political relations and artistic matters 
in Beckett. 
In his book On Creaturely Life (2006), Eric Santner employs W. G. Sebald as 
a key exponent of several interrelated definitions of 'creaturely life'. It should be 
noted that Santner uses 'creature' and 'creaturely life' interchangeably, and, on the 
whole, I will adopt a similar strategy to avoid confusion. Having said that, there are 
acute differences between the terms. The latter is a more general and mobile phrase, 
not necessarily referring to the creature's life but rather applied to evoke a particular 
condition and set of characteristics that might be associated with the creature. Santner 
suggests as much in his formulation of the unsettling proximity between humans and 
79 See Shane Weller, 'Not Rightly Human', Samuel Beckett TodaylAujourd'hui, Vol. 19, Borderless 
Beckett (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 211-221, p. 216. 
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animals, in which he manages to retain both similarity and difference between the 
species. In the wake of the philosophical argument about 'speciesism' from the early 
1970s, he writes that creaturely life occurs in 'the peculiar proximity of the human to 
the animal at the very point of their radical difference,.8o Creaturely life, in Santner's 
approximation, is a paradoxical state of individuality and commonality between 
humans and animals, as though adjacent through their alterity. It is anchored in the 
distinct category of human or animal, but retains impressions of its other. Therefore, 
there is a distinction between 'creature1y life' in which we find the creature within a 
distinct being, and the 'creature', which incorporates aspects of the human, animal 
and machine but, despite appearances and behaviours, is essentially none of these. 
The creature's essence, in effect, is in its lack of definition and its ability to resist 
fixed denominations. The upshot of this distinction is that Santner confines his 
reading to creaturely life as a human dimension, and whilst this is a significant part of 
the present study, I also use the creature to access a less anthropocentric view of the 
human, the overlapping areas between human and non-human categories, and the 
more animalistic and mechanical components of Beckett's figures. 
The real significance of creaturely life for Santner is that it marks a political 
dynamic. Santner suggests that the political constitutes the human's passage into 
creaturely life and yet it is the political that distinguishes man from the creature: 
'human beings are not just creatures among other creatures but are in some sense 
more creaturely,than other creatures by virtue of an excess that is produced in the 
space of the political and that, paradoxically, accounts for their "humanity,,,.81 This 
contradictory state, in which the political appears simultaneously to make and take 
humanity, is misleading if creaturely life is perceived in isolation from human life. On 
80 Eric L. Santner On Crealurely Life (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006), p. 12. 
8\ ' Santner, On Crealurely Life, p. 26. 
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the contrary, creaturely life forms a dimension of human life, it is 'the threshold where 
life becomes a matter of politics and politics comes to inform the very matter and 
materiality of life,.82 According to Santner, the creature's political being correlates 
with what Foucault, and subsequently Agamben, calls 'biopolitics', and evokes an 
essential vitality known as 'bare life'. Foucault proposes that politics permeates the 
raw substance of being and makes a decision on what constitutes a life worth living: 
'For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence; modem man is an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question' .83 As Foucault intimates here, the 
political sphere of human life was once an ancillary property that confirmed 
humanity's place at the summit of the Aristotelian scala naturae.84 However, in the 
modem age, political being is conflated with being itself, which realises the transition 
from the contingency of politics, or its place as a human privilege, into creaturely 
terrain and the more essential, animalistic foundations of the human. In Foucault's 
initial conception at least, biopolitics appears to blur the margins between 
anthropological and ethnological perspectives by reducing 'man the animal with 
politics' to 'man the animal afpolitics'. 
For Santner, however, the creature emerges as the new subject of political 
interventions that pervade the core of human existence. Creaturely life is removed 
from politics that govern a particular way of life and is exposed to the biopolitics that 
regulate life itself, altering the meaning of 'state politics' to suggest an authority that 
grants the very state of human being. Santner makes it clear that creaturely life is a 
S2 Ibid. p. 12. 
RJ Michel Foucault. History o/Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, Vol. I, trans. by Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage. 1990). p. 143. 
M4 Jacques Derrida points out the human's inherent political capacity: 'The definition of man as political 
animal. a detinition that never fails to specify "by nature· ... The Beast and the Sovereign. Vol. 1. trans. 
by Gcoffrey Bcnnington (Chicago: University of Chicago. 2009). p. 315. 
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human component that 'pertains not primarily to a sense of shared animality or a 
shared animal suffering but to a biopolitical animation that distinguishes man from 
animal,.8S This 'biopolitical animation' occurs most obviously for Santner in ajudicial 
prorogation, which draws heavily on Agamben's readings of the German political 
theorist Carl Schmitt. Santner asserts that 'creaturely life is just life abandoned to the 
state of exception/emergency, that paradoxical domain in which law has been 
suspended in the name of preserving law'. 86 The state of exception rejects valued 
principles in order to safeguard them, which undermines the sanctity of the rule and 
underlines its provisional status. As such, the state of exception indicates an 
alternative jurisdiction: a default set of rudimentary actions invoked when the ideal 
order fails or no longer suffices. 
Agamben argues that the concentration and extermination camps are the 
paradigmatic sites of biopolitical activity under a sustained state of exception. They 
represent 'an extreme and monstrous attempt to decide between the human and the 
inhuman, which has ended up dragging the very possibility of the distinction to its 
ruin,.s7 As facilities introduced to solve an excess population that was labelled the 
Ballastexistenzen in Nazi Germany, or lives that were encumbrances and a 'waste of 
space', concentration and extermination camps prevent unworthy life from becoming 
unmanageable. 88 It appears that when the exception becomes the rule, the 
unexceptional, there is a kind of devolution in the name of revolution, whereby a 
primitive intervention invoked by rationalised prerogatives or 'necessity' supersedes 
8S Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 39. 
86 Ibid. p. 22. 
87 Giorgio Agamben, Open: Man and Animal, trans. by Kevin Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University, 2003) p. 22. 
88 Lawrence Rees, Auschwitz: The Nazis and the 'Final Solution' (London: BBC, 2005), p. 54. 
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the former ideological structure. Hence, creatures abandoned to the state of exception 
are subjects of an order at once enlightened and barbaric.89 
Although Santner rejects 'shared animaIity' as a determining part of the 
creature, his use of the state of exception at least suggests a more atavistic human 
jurisdiction that evokes a master narrative of power relations. Indeed, when Adolf 
Hitler invoked the 'Decree for the Protection of the People and the State' and pursued 
the Nazi regime's Gleichschaltung that marked a twelve-year long state of e x c e p t i ~ n , ,
he inaugurated a biopolitical domain that reintroduced the primacy of sovereign 
power, identity and alterity, and survival. These implications materialise in Beckett's 
creaturely narrative dimensions and creaturely subjectivity to suggest an artistic and 
biopolitical axis. His post-war work interrogates, and arguably protests against, total 
authority to explore the power struggles in the production of subjects. When Beckett 
employs the poioumenon (a literary genre in which the work is about its own making) 
as he doesl in his post-war trilogy of novels, his work engages with the power 
dynamics involved in the mutual ordering and structuring of worlds in art and reality. 
As H. Porter Abbott contends: 'tyranny is rooted in the imagination. The creating of 
art, like the making of worlds, is a matter of cramming, jamming, wedging, bending, 
poking. Nothing is sacred in this process' .90 Similarly, Beckett's work survives on the 
power to unravel systems that make sense, that shape efficient and proper relations, 
and that aspire to utopian perfection. 
Beckett's movement between historically pertinent images and tones, and an 
elemental or biotic plane, shows a facet of the Beckettian creature that relates to an 
89 Although Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer do not address the political state of exception, my 
reading is informed by ideas described in their co-authored book Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947): 
'With the spread of the bourgeois commodity economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the 
sun of calculating reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of new barbarism are germinating'. See 
Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic oJ Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. by 
Gunzclin Schmid Nocrr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2002), p. 25. 
90 H. Porter Abbott, Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author in the Autograph (Ithaca: Comell University, 
1996),p.141. 
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underpinning theme of this thesis. In the following chapters I introduce ways of 
combining a historical perspective with an anthropological significance to show that 
Beckett's contextual relevance also pertains to a larger ontological scale. Beckett 
invokes 'vast tracts of time' (HIl, 3), not in terms of a historiographlcal portrait that 
draws a line between the present and past, but as an atavistic presence that is always 
available to the human. That is, the more primitive, animalistic stratum accompanies 
Beckett's creatures in the present. As I discuss in chapter one, Beckett's indirect 
response to the Holocaust highlights the obstacles to human communication and 
epistemology. In chapters two and four I address the biopolitical exclusions that occur 
in Beckett's texts, whereby the protagonists are treated as substandard citizens, which 
intimates the insecure nature of the human status. The resultant degradation of 
language, disruption of epistemology and devaluation of human meaning all place 
emphasis on the human's transformation into the basic materiality of existence. In 
other words, Beckett's aesthetic and political layers convey a kind ofparaUel vision of 
the human as the debased life of the surviving creature betrays an uncanny 
~ ~ , 
resemblance to the humanistic ideal. The viewpoint I adopt in this respect is similar to 
Adomo's view as expressed in his notes on Endgame: 'B[eckett]'s genius is that he 
has captured this semblance of the non-historical, of the condition humaine, in 
historical images, and thus transfixed it',91 Together, Beckett's evocation of the 
inability to account positively ~ ~ for the Holocaust and the biopolitical assessment of 
valuable human life means he conveys the essential paradox of the human condition: 
to be human is to be provisional, in flux, and potentially inhuman. In this way, the 
historical moment discloses the precarious condition of the human, 
91 Theodor Adomo, 'Dossier: Adomo's Notes on Beckett', Journal of Beckell Studies, 19.2 (2010), 
trans. by Dirk Van Hulle and Shane Weller, 157-178, p. 162. 
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The essential captured in a temporal image is pivotal to Santner's notion of the 
creature. Apropos of WaIter Benjamin, he suggests that inapprehensible fragments of 
history· reify the abstruseness of nature to reveal the natural historical distance 
between the human world and its human meaning. Santner's explanation is worth 
quoting at length: 
The opacity and recalcitrance that we a ~ s o c i a t e e with the materiality of nann:e -
the mute "thingness" of nature - is, paradoxically, most palpable where we 
encounter it as a piece of human history that has become an enigmatic ruin 
beyond our capacity to endow it with meaning, to integrate it into our 
symbolic universe. Where a piece of human world presents itself as a surplus 
that both demands and resists symbolization, that is both inside and outside the 
"symbolic order" [ ... ] that is where we find ourselves in the midst of "natural 
his!Ory". What I am calling creaturely life is a dimension of human existence 
called into being at such natural historical fissures or caesuras in the space of 
meaning.92 
Santner's Benjaminian 'natural historical fissures or caesuras' are intimately related to 
the idea of 'the open', considered in different ways by Rainer Maria Rilke and Martin 
Heidegger. In contrast to Heidegger's view of the animal as weltarm, or 'poor in 
world', belonging to its environment without conscious reflection, Rilke suggests that 
the human ability to fonn the world, what Heidegger calls weltbildend, aligns man 
with the poor in world. According to Rilke's eighth duino elegy, consciousness 
distances man from the 'pure space' of the world, the open, whereas animals are 
92 Santncr. On Creaturely Life, p. xv. 
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united with their environment.93 Man therefore borders on the animalistic poor in 
world, not because he is incognizant and merely exists, reacting to the things he 
encounters around him, but because he is unable to apprehend the world in an 
immediate sense. The human world is impoverished as a result of a-self-constructed 
and mediating worldview, complete with lexical signs and conceptual values.94 
It is the remote position in relation to the open - accentuated by historical 
moments that expose the hiatus in world meaning - that forms the creaturely 
dimension. The decisive event here is the human's dislocation from the construction, 
as it enacts the 'traumatic disruption' of creaturely life, which is shown to be not quite 
animal but not exactly human.95 For Santner, the natural historical status of artefacts 
beyond the 'symbolic universe' leads to a state akin to Benjamin's 'petrified unrest', 
or 'undeadness, the space between real and symbolic death', which Santner takes to 
be the ultimate domain of creaturely life.96 This definitive space of the creature 
between types of death resonates profoundly in the purgatorial images of Beckett's 
work and conjures the Muselmann's death-in-life. When the ability to effect the 
world-forming mediation is redundant, the human withdraws from human life, 
endures a symbolic death and is thrown into a creaturely realm between the open and 
the construction. Santner writes that '[c]reatureliness is thus a dimension not so much 
of biological as of ontological vulnerability, a vulnerability that permeates human 
being as that being whose essence it is to exist in forms of life that are, in turn, 
contingent, susceptible to breakdown,.97 By all accounts, the creature is a figure of 
93 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies. trans. by J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (London: Hogarth, 
1963), p. 77. 
94 See Santner, On Creaturely Life, pp. 1-12. 
9' Ibid. p. 10. 
96 Ibid. p. xx. 
97 Eric L. Santner, The Royal Remains - The People's Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty 
(Chicago: Chicago University, 2011), p. 6. 
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trauma that beholds the lost idea of the human as a melancholic reminder, but moves 
into the future as the post-human, bearing the remnants of the human with it. 
Santner's conception of creaturely life is the most thorough attempt to 
articulate this mode of being. In the chapters that follow, I apply and expand upon his 
key notions that I deem relevant to Beckett's work, namely the relationship between 
flesh and words in chapter three, and the state of 'undeadness' in chapter four. I also 
follow Santner's lead in drawing on Walter Benjamin's concepts of 'melancholy 
. . 
. immersion' and 'petrified unrest' to describe creaturely life. Yet, my understanding of 
creaturely life, as shaped by Beckett's evocations, departs from and develops 
Santner's model in several respects. Whilst I make use of Benjamin for an insight into 
creaturely life, one of the concepts I derive from his comments is left unsaid in 
Santner. As I discuss in chapters one and two, Beckett's art of failure suggests a 
conception of the sovereign and creature in which positions of power slide into 
weakness And contrariwise. Although Benjamin's few references to the creature offer 
ample opportunity for interpretation and are by no means prescriptive, this is clearly a 
dynamic of the creature that is present in Benjamin's work and yet Santner does not 
dwell upon it. This is perhaps because the simultaneously potent and impotent 
Beckettian author-narrator makes such a creaturely dynamic more apparent. I use the 
term '(in)sovereignty' to describe this shifting of power, which I consider key to the 
dichotomous nature of Beckett's creatures as creators and creations. 
Whereas Santner's creaturely life fixes on the human who experiences a 
process of destitution to become something other than human 'between real and 
symbolic death', my reading is often directed towards the close proximity with 
animalistic and, to a lesser extent, mechanical elements that the fall from humanity 
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suggests.98 Santner writes that 'creatureliness' is 'a specifically human way of finding 
oneself caught in the midst of the antagonisms in and of the political field'. 99 Even so, 
as the human is exposed to bare life, there is a greater similarity to the nonhuman 
animal and I emphasise this intimacy with the other in my concept of the creature. 
This involves working through the notions of the 'open' and 'construction' that 
Santner reflects upon in order to think about the use of the animal status in the Nazis' 
biopolitical applications, the realisation of human captivation through humour, and the 
possibility of human and nonhuman animal types of survival. As a product of the state 
of exception, the creature can also evoke the more contrived, mechanical elements of 
being, such as the adherence to broken human forms of making meaning and 
repetitive behaviours and recollections. If creaturely life is a mode of being between 
the human and bare life, my understanding of the creature pays attention to the 'foul 
brood, neither man nor beast' that Beckett describes in Mol/oy (T, 19) but still 
considers the extent to which a denuded human might have an affmity with 
animalistic and mechanical elements. 
I also place emphasis on the biopolitical nature of the Holocaust as an example 
of creaturely life, which means expanding on aspects of the creature that are 
underdeveloped in Santner. The Nazi denationalization and dehumanization of the 
Jews marks a remarkable state intervention in the classification of life granted 
political value and deemed unworthy of living. This signals a strong case for a 
contextually grounded creaturely life. However, Santner only offers a passing 
reference to the Muselmann in a footnote in his book On Creaturely Life, which I 
quote in chapter four. It is my contention that the creaturely life in Beckett occurs 
through an awareness of the precarious and provisional condition of the idea of the 
98 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. xx. 
99 Ibid. p. xix 
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human during this era. Beckett's creatures evoke the Muselmann and it is this figure 
that conveys the inhuman potential that resides within the human, as Dominic La 
Capra has also noted: 'One might also see Samuel Beckett as having had the daring to 
stage, in an incredible series of radically disempowered beings, the - or at least 
something close to the - Muselmann's experience of disempowerment and living 
death,.lOO The parity between the Muselmann and the Beckettian creature is made 
apparent as I refer to the Muselmann as a w i t n e ~ s s in relation to Beckett's art of failure, 
the identity anxieties that give rise to the Jew as creature in relation to Beckett's 
master-servant relationships and the Nazis' orchestration of torturous survival 
conditions that bear comparison with the purgatorial lives of Beckett's characters. 
As we have seen, the creature is called into being by disjunctions between 
states and the friction of difference, yet continues to lack a stable denomination of its 
own. For these reasons, my analysis of Beckett's prose and drama is guided by a trope 
compatible with poststructuralist theoretical practice, particularly in its misgivings 
about essentialism. Cary Wolfe recognises that the crisis of humanism was 'brought 
on, in no small part, first by structuralism and then poststructuralism and its 
interrogation of the figure of the human as constitutive (rather than technically, 
materially and discursively constituted) stuff of history and the social' .101 As with the 
destabilisation of humanism, the creature engendered and defined by external 
conditions can be considered a 'created' figure, but this creation can often imply the 
creature's own creative role. The author-narrators in the trilogy, for example, are 
effectively sundered beings that create themselves through the desubjectifying 
processes of self-reflection and projected figments, which are processes that remain 
100 Dominic La Capra. History in Transit: Experience. Identity. Critical Theory (Ithaca and London: 
Comell University. 2004), p. 187. 
101 Cary Wolfc. cd .• Zoonlologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
2003). pp. x-xi. 
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incomplete. More accurately, then, the creature is a being always in process and 
therefore a kind of unrealisable or inexhaustible potential. It is subject to creation in 
the sense that it is possible for another to make the creature, it is always yet to be fully 
made and is also a figure involved in the process of its own creation. As such, the 
creaturely is evoked in relation to Beckett in this thesis to capitalise on its many 
connotations, but also acknowledge the coalescence of other 'identities' and resistance 
to identification that renders it irreducible, or sui generis. The creature is a 
paradoxical appellation for 'this unnamable thing that I name and never wear out', 
'born of the impossible voice the unmakable being' (rN, 27, 53).102 
However, as David Wood points out, '[i]t is one of the greatest achievements 
of deconstruction to have drawn our attention to the fact that thinking (and responsible 
action) typically consists not in resolving ambivalences, but in "going through the 
undecidable," finding "productive" ways of acknowledging and responding to 
conflicting situations' .103 My own debt to deconstruction is to explicate the liminality 
and indeterminacy of Beckett's work by way of the creature and creaturely life, not 
claiming to resolve Beckett's relationship with context but allowing discourses to 
participate in a dialogue that brings social, political, biographical and historical frames 
of reference back into contention with one another. That is, to address the creature in-
between the possibilities of Beekett, his work and its various contexts. Furthermore, 
this thesis does not intend to enter into the modemism/postmodemism turf war that 
has dominated Beekett studies since the advent of poststrueturalism. The creature's 
102 In a manner akin to Hill's 'Up The RepUblic!' noted above, Jacob Lund perceives the endless 
naming of the unnameable as a political act, but in a particularly biopolitical sense: 'As with Beckett's 
unnameable being, this "wordless thing in an empty space" can be read as a manifestation of 
Agamben's infancy. which forms the basis for an ethical and political attempt to resist and counter-act 
the biopolitical ambition to completely separate naked life from political existence, the living being 
from the linguistic being', see Jacob Lund, 'Biopolitical Beckett: Self-desubjectification as Resistance', 
Nordic Irish Studies, 8.1 (2009),67-77, p. 75. 
103 David Wood, 'Thinking with Cats', in Anjmal Philosophy - Ethics and Identity (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 129-144, p. 135. 
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mobility filters into the determining approach of the thesis, which works to navigate 
conflicting critical schools in Beckett studies to offer an insight into the contextual 
value of Beckett's writing. Far from reconciling divergent critical positions, the 
framework employed here acknowledges Beckett's work as an accommodating form 
that demonstrates an inclusive but indeterminate quality, generated by the tension 
between diverse and inconsistent components. 
Terry Eagleton describes how '[i]t is possible to see Beckett as stranded 
somewhere between modernist and postmoderriist cases'. He writes: 
In his sense of the extreme elusiveness of meaning, Beckett is classically 
modernist. [ ... ] Everything in this post-Auschwitz world is ambiguous and 
indeterminate. Every proposition is a tentative hypothesis. [ ... ] The other side 
of Beckett's work, however, is a kind of postmodern positivism, for which 
thl!lgs are not endlessly elusive but brutally themselves.104 
Increasingly, Beckett is included as a 'late modernist' to convey these debts to 
modernism whilst intimating the postmodern traits that distance him from his 
precursors. The late in 'late modernism' might suggest a period at the end or just after 
modernism, and by extension, before or at the beginning of postmodernism. However, 
to periodise late modernism as a kind of 'time capsule of isolation or exile' between 
'two eras' is to miss the continuities and intersections between modernist and 
postmodernist styles. 105 Anthony Mellors points out this problematic formulation in 
his book Late Modernist Poetics (2005) and goes on to note that '[i]f modernism 
104 Terry Eagleton. The Meaning o/Life: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008), 
pp. 59, M. 
105 Tyrus Miller, Late Modernism: Politics, f'ietion and the Arts Between the World Wars (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California. 1999). pp. 10-11. 
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dissolved, its solution was more modernism. If it died, it had an afterlife, not an empty 
space. Its survival is still a powerful force in aesthetic practice and cultural ideals 
today'. \06 It therefore seems wise to recognise Beckett's work, particularly his post-
war texts, alongside late modernist artists who 'remain true to the modernist 
imperative that eclecticism and difficulty form a hermeneutic basis for renewal, but 
their belatedness involves a disavowal of the unifying and totalising gestures of 
modernist aesthetics' .107 By delineating the creature as a type of being nostalgic or 
hopeful for a settled form of meaning but actually subject to the frisson of the creative 
process, this thesis remains aware of the fact that modernist and postmodernist traits 
overlap in Beckett. Between his great precursor James Joyce and art in the wake of 
Auschwitz, Beckett's art is a strange breed of uncompromising dedication and 
kaleidoscopic possibility. 
In some respects, the Holocaust marks the transition between these types of 
thinking, as Mark C. Taylor asserts: 'In the dark light of those flames and the arid dust 
of those ashes, modernism ends and something other begins,.108 Reeling from the 
unfathomable but perversely rationalised endeavour to annihilate an entire people, 
Western civilisation finds the very idea of truth in a precarious state. As a result of 
this growing uncertainty, postmodernists 'refuse all offers of truth, wholeness and 
immediacy', which challenges the modernists' 'old-fashioned desire for presence, 
immediacy and purity'. 109 Yet, Beckett's late modernism is suggestive of a continuum 
whereby modern1st traits linger on in the aftermath of the Holocaust whilst 
postmodernist ideas are taking root. The instability of meaning, 'incredulity towards 
106 Anthony Mellors, Late Modernist Poetics: from Pound 10 Prynne (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), p. 23. 
107 Mellors, Late Modernist Poetics, pp. 2-3. 
108 Mark C. Taylor, Disfiguring: An Architecture, Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 
r ~ ' ' 46-47. 
9 Tracy Fessenden, 'Mark C. Taylor and Limits of Postmodern Imagination', in Pos/modernism and 
the Holocaust, ed. by Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1998), 85-100, p. 86. 
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metanarratives' and language's construction of the subject in postmodemist thought 
do not entirely account for the accompanying longing for meaning seen in Beckett's 
post-war works. 1 10 As such, my interest in the creaturely dislocation from meaning in 
Beckett employs aspects of critical theory to assess how, the experience of 
meaninglessness can be situated in a historical and political context whilst recognising 
how the very meaning the creatures wish to retain is itself open to a constructed status. 
The primary intervention this thesis seeks to make is in the field of ~ e c k e t t t
studies as it sets out to contribute an analysis of the suspended modes of his creatures 
and the relationship that these dynamics have with contemporaneous contexts. As a 
result, however, this thesis will also develop an understanding of the creature more 
generally, and specifically as a literary figuration entangled in the biopolitical 
dimensions of the Nazi regime. The framework of critical theory employed here is 
thus designed to articulate the broader issues of alienation from and the very 
possibility ~ f f authentic meaning that I see as a fundamental part of creaturely life in 
Beckett's post-war work. That is, how language can attest for or constitute a subject 
and how biopolitical activity unsettles the idea of a natural order, showing that 
meaningful life is dependent on a privileged place in a totalising system. The point is 
that a meaningful status as a subject is not a given fact, but a process open to revision 
and stipulations. In the most extreme case, this is true of the human category. At this 
particular period in time, to be human is to be granted value according to a biopolitical 
system that ascribes meaning, and the resulting vulnerability of meaning invades the 
idea of language as an autobiographical tool and prompts the psychical investment in 
a prior order. 
110 Jean-Fram.:ois Lyotard. The Pos/modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. trans. by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), p. xxiv. 
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The theorists selected for discussion in this thesis represent a workable and 
cohesive group that engage with related areas of critique. Theodor Adorno's essay on 
Beckett is a crucial point of reference in any reading of Beckett as a writer engaged 
-
with social content through an oblique or negative method. As noted above, Adorno's 
essay begins to understand the meaninglessness of Beckett's work in terms of an 
aesthetic response to culture after Auschwitz. I draw on WaIter Benjamin's work 
primarily for his allusive references to the creature, which help to illuminate the 
melancholic nature of creaturely life and the relationship between sovereignty and the 
creature. These issues of sovereignty and variations on the creature, such as the beast 
or inhuman, are also scattered throughout Jacques Derrida's later works and Giorgio 
Agamben's writings on biopolitics and Auschwitz. Alongside their contributions on 
testimony, Derrida and Agamben offer particularly applicable material for a 
discussion of the creaturely life in Beckett and this concept's bearing on the historical 
and political context, with their emphasis on decentring the subject and eliciting the 
unsettled nature of meaning. Derrida accepts that the Holocaust is an implicit part of 
his work ('Certainly "Auschwitz" as you correctly state has never been "very far from 
my thoughts"') and that he feels a close proximity with Beckett (,This is an author to 
whom I feel very close, or to whom I would like to feel myself vey close; but also too 
close'). 111 Similarly, Agamben's influence on contemporary reflections on the 
Holocaust is palpable, and, as the essays by Katz, Blackman and Garrison show, he is 
a felicitous figure for studies of Beckett's work in this context. Each of the four key 
thinkers are concerned with at least one, and often several, of the relationships I am 
looking to develop. 
1\1 Jacques Derrida, 'Canons and Metonymies: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', in Logomachia: 
The Conflict 0/ the Faculties, ed. by Richard Rand (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska, 
1992), 195-218, p. 211. Jacques Derrida, '''This Strange Institution Called Literature": An Interview 
with Jacques Derrida', trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, in Acts o/Literature, ed. by 
Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992),33-75, pp. 60-61. 
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However, the range and density of these four theorists' work is well known 
and consequently a sustained engagement with the entirety of their output is not 
possible. Derrida in particular was a prolific writer on a diverse range of subjects, and, 
as Shane WeBer notes, he was comfortable discussing an array of philosophers and 
writers in a single text: 'To take, for instance, the 1994 volume Politics of 
Friendship-the range of authors covered in this text is daunting, to say the least: 
Aristotle, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Schmitt, Heidegger, Levinas, Blanchot, to name ,only 
a few'. 112 Hence, the texts discussed here focus on selected points of contact with 
Beckett and suggestive ideas on the creature, biopolitics, testimony and sovereignty. 
Owing to purely practical constraints, a number of valuable other philosophers and 
theorists are marginalized, but they should be regarded as opportunities for further 
inquiry and part of the wider critical project that this thesis begins. The works of 
Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt contribute a wealth of 
material to the areas of thought that this thesis examines. The theorists employed here 
nevertheless offer a complementary and manageable theoretical framework for a study 
of the exposure to the disruption of former models of meaning. 
Overview of Thesis 
It remains to offer some prefatory notes on the structure of the present study and the 
focus of each chapter. In chapter one I examine Beckett's alternative type of 
testimony to the crisis facing the act of bearing witness after Auschwitz. I draw on 
Agamben's notion of the constitutive 'lacuna' of testimony and Derrida's 
'dissociation' between witness and witnessed object to expound the voice· of 
incapacity in Beckett's trilogy, which is unable to attest positively to past experiences 
112 Shane Weller. 'When the Other Comes Too Close: Derrida and the Threat of Affinity'. Kritikos. 
Vo!. 3, June 2006, <http://intertheory.org/weller.htm> (accessed 19/07/2013]. 
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or retrospectively account for oneself. However, with reference to Benjamin's notion 
of the 'sovereign as creature', I employ the term '(in)sovereignty' to describe how 
Beckett's author-narrators illustrate the convergence of impotence and potency as they 
articulate their failures and salvage a level of testimonial value in confronting the 
unspeakable. This insight acts as a gateway to my argument that the necessary and 
continual processes of testimony generate a creaturely subjectivity. As organic, 
progressive and unified versions of testimony collapse, Beckett conveys subjects 
exposed to mechanical rigidity, incessant enunciation and ruinous ambivalence. The 
final point I develop in this chapter is that fiction itself figures as a mode of testimony. 
Figments of the imagination and projections of the self serve to defer the subject's 
complete identification, but they allow Beckett's author-narrators to recognise the 
identity dilemma that constitutes the partial subjectivity of the creature. Thus, in my 
focus on the testimony of failure and fiction in Beckett, I argue that Beckett's art is an 
extreme example of bearing witness to the inability to bear witness after the 
Holocaust. 
In the second chapter I study more explicit assertions of power between 
Beckett's 'pseudo-couples' to explicate processes of identification through alterity. 
After a discussion of the role of writing in Beckett's experience of oppression, I offer 
close readings of the master-servant relationships in Watt and Waiting for Godot to 
underline how the influence of an absent master provides a sense of objectivity for the 
creatures, which preserves the possibility of meaning and identity. The masters in 
these texts are projected figures that grant a means of avoiding the creaturely 
subjectivity invested in failure, but ultimately give rise to an alternative subjectivity 
immersed in melancholy. One of the dominant claims of this chapter is that the 
necessary others in Beckett have a contextual equivalent in the Nazis' persecution of 
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the Jews, and that the biopolitical power that enforces these identity positions reveals 
the unsettling proximity with the animal. In the governance of space and care, 
sovereign masters decide who is human and what is inhuman, and this is reflected as 
Beckett's subaltern creatures are subjugated and take the place of animals. The 
dynamics of master-servant relationships, however, mean that the two roles are 
contracted to one another and this traces a creaturely tension between others. The 
attempt to impose a vulnerable, subhuman status invariably backfires on the m a ~ t e r r to 
expose them as equally dependent on the servant. 
Chapter three revisits Beckett's art of failure to examine how humour figures 
in the continuation of the author-narrators' expressive dilemmas. At the limits of 
language, humour and laughter act as emergency measures that respond to and 
recommence the possibility of speaking the impossible. Drawing on Mikhail 
Bakhtin's study of 'grotesque realism' in the 'carnivalesque', I contend that Beckett's 
humour d e g ~ a d e s s the elevated sphere of human language and reason to the level of the 
body. In this way, his prose works evoke amusing textual performances and equally 
his physical humour on stage depends on words. In Endgame this convergence of 
language and the body enacts a tension that contributes to the creatures' suspended 
conditions, as the dialogue sustains their physical incarceration. In the last two 
sections of the chapter I claim that this is a tragicomic predicament that extends to the 
readers and spectators in that Beckett's metanarrative techniques embroil the implied 
audience in the characters' static dynamics. More than this, however, Beckett's dark 
humour recognises the comedy of this captivation so that laughter essentially reflects 
on and contributes to the enduring tragicomic complexion. 
The fourth chapter on survival is concerned with a shared component that 
underwrites the previous studics on tcstimony, power and humour. I argue that an 
60 
underlying spirit of survival drives Beckett's corpus and produces the insistent but 
onerous tone of his writing. In the context of a specific biopolitical application of 
survival in the concentration and extermination camps, I describe how Beckett 
negotiates diminishing creative opportunities to develop an aesthetic of survival that 
echoes the debased life that persists in a post-human world. With recourse to 
Santner's concept of creaturely 'undeadness', which describes an excess of life 
granted by the subject's investment in a repetition compulsion, I argue that Beckett's 
Waiting/or Godot and Endgame exploit the vitality in iterability to evoke a • still life' 
that simultaneously encompasses the stasis of sameness and the activity of difference. 
Finally, I apply this focus on repetition to the spiral narrative structures of Mol/oy to 
illustrate that Beckett's creatures are essentially caught in a psychological 
performance of the past that sees them adhering to dead structures of meaning in the 
hope of reviving them. 
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1. Testimony 
Bearing Witness to the Event and Self 
In 1955, in a rare insight into his writing's relationship with the zeitgeist, Beckett said: 
'My people seem to be falling to bits. [ ... ] I think anyone nowadays who pays the 
slightest attention to his own experience finds it the experience of a non-knower, of a 
non-can-er,.1 The act of bearing witness in Beckett's post-war work must negotiate 
the remnants of context and identity left in the wake of this ignorance and impotence. 
The contemporaneous conditions of testimony after the catastrophes of World War 
Two and the Holocaust, 'nowadays' as Beckett puts it, are suffused with similar 
deficiencies in knowledge and ability. The traumas of these events destabilise the 
credible witness and subvert language's capacity to relate the experience adequately. 
The witness must therefore contend with absence and negation over detail and fact to 
bear w i t n e s ~ ~ to the tribulations of attesting without reliable information and without 
sound means of expression. Parallel to these testimonial obstacles, Beckett's writing 
offers an approach to the representation of experience that contests the idea that a 
verbal or written account can apprehend historical and biographical events in a 
decisive way. He begins the task of imparting the obscured accounts of struggling 
narrators and confronts the challenge of giving voice to what cannot be repeated 
verbatim. 
However, to complicate matters in Beckett, the kind of lucid statement in 
which Beckett acknowledges ignorance ('non-knower') and impotence ('non-can-er') 
as the conditions of experience does exercise the ability to point out inability. The 
recognition that witnesses cannot fully know or relate their own experiences at least 
I Israel Shenker, • An Interview with BeckeU'. in Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage, ed. by 
Raymond Federman and Lawrence Graver (London: Routledge. 1979), 160-64, p. 148. 
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grants the possibility of a disappointing but incontrovertible fact from the effort to 
bear witness to oneself, thus giving the witness a kind of perceptivity towards their 
deficiencies. Of course, the extreme implication from this devaluation of testimony is 
the disturbing suspicion that the witness was not there or a denial of the event itself. 
As such, testimony cannot rest on this inability to capture the experience, but must act 
out its ignorance and impotence, rather than simply absorb incapacity as knowledge. 
The complete absence of testimony, whilst indicating the fact that the event exceeds 
transmission, would allow the significance of that fact to fade away. It is the 
obligation to keep trying that underlines the catastrophe's capacity to elude testimony 
and, paradoxically, bears witness to the magnitude of the event. 
An echo of this engagement with the unspeakable occurs in Beckett's post-war 
writing in which he 'pays attention' to the experience of impossibility, concentrating 
on an art of failure that marks a significant re-direction in his writing practice after 
1945. In his oft-quoted 1948 dialogues with art historian Georges Duthuit, Beckett 
claimed that the Dutch artist Bram van Velde was open to failure, that this artist 
wanted 'to make of this submission, this admission, this fidelity to failure, a new 
occasion, a new term of relation, and of the act which, unable to act, obliged to act, he 
makes, an expressive act, even if only of itself, of its impossibility, of its obligation' ,2 
Beckett identifies a combination of inadequacy and continuation, hopelessness and 
responsibility that describes art as an interminable bind. The repetition of the word 
'act', for i n s t a n c ~ ~ ~ indicates an imperative to perform that must be honoured. These 
observations on failure resound in the fallible author-narrators of Beckett's subsequent 
work and serve to intimate the testimonial value of his art in the post-Holocaust 
context. 
2 Samuel Beckett, 'Three Dialogues', in Disjecla, ed. by Ruby Cohn (London: John Calder, 1983), 138-
145, p. 145. 
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In committing to the onerous fidelity to failure, Beckett not only adumbrates 
the impossibility of bearing witness but also generates a distinctive type of 
subjectivity. Beckett was accustomed to the wretchedness of expressive acts as he 
composed and reworked his material. In a letter to Pamela Mitchell, Beckett wrote: 'I 
am absurdly and stupidly the creature of my books and L '/nnommable is more 
responsible for my current plight than all the other good reasons put together,.3 
Beckett evokes a creaturely subjectivity through the martyrdom in the writing of 
failure. He is a kind of suffering figure produced by the conditions of obligation.4 In 
his reflections on the creative process, referring specifically to his 1953 French text 
L '/nnommable, Beckett shows that the travails of testimony and illusiveness of the 
traumatic event also apply to authorial and autobiographical terrain. As with his 
people 'falling to bits', Beckett includes himself in a creaturely category of being that 
is worn down by insistent acts. But whereas Beckett's creatures are doomed to failure 
owing to their deficiencies as author-narrators, Beckett's own creatureliness is 
connected to the intention to produce impotence, to 'fail better' as he puts it in the 
1983 minimalist text Worstward Ho (C, 81). This creaturely presence, subject to 
dehumanising imperatives and confounding typical notions of artistic competence, is 
the foundation of B ecketti an testimony. 
This chapter traces the expressive difficulties that Beckett embraces through 
the author-narrators in his trilogy of novels Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable 
to unearth a historically significant engagement with the challenges facing acts of 
witnessing and bearing witness. The hypothesis is that the disparity between present 
and past events, and the fissure between reality and representation, induces' a 
creaturely element endemic to the process of narration that connects a state of 
3 Beckett, Leflers, Vol. 2, p, 27, 
4 The word 'martyr' is from the Greek marlur, meaning 'witness', 
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destitution with a valuable creative contribution. Following an exposition of a number 
of key concepts from Giorgio Agamben's Remnants of Auschwitz (1999), this chapter 
draws parallels between the crisis of communication inflicted by the Holocaust, 
frequently expressed by the metonym 'Auschwitz', and Beckett's artistic engagement 
with ignorance and impotence. With recourse to Waiter Benjamin's notion of the 
'sovereign as creature', I argue that an alternative brand of '(in)sovereign' testimony 
emerges in Beckett's work. This authenticity without authority vouches for a degree 
of ineffability within experience that is not unique to the psychosomatic trauma of 
disaster, but rather exists within the necessary fracture between the event and act of 
relation that constitutes testimony. 
Since the ability to apprehend and depict events is largely wanting for 
Beckett's author-narrators, the principle of continuation becomes paramount. The 
effort required to prolong an expressive act, suffused with failure, now replaces the 
message usually delivered by a successful, positive testimony. The ensuing inorganic 
fonns and mechanical methods of continuation not only question the agency and 
humanity of Beckett's narrators, they also contribute to the creaturely aspect of 
narrative practice itself. I examine narration as an example of a particularly human 
mode of meaning and indicative of the humanistic enlightenment through reason, 
which is subverted by the very rigidity of the process in Beckett, particularly when 
conducted under the duress of obligation. The broken image of the human leads into 
the concept of 'ruin', or an identity in disorder, which is central to Agamben's 
readings of enunciation. The idea of the subject in ruins signals a simultaneous 
possession and dispossession of self that parallels the division between a founding 
voice and its figments in Beckett's prose. Consequently, in the concluding section I 
concentrate on Derrida's emphasis on the fiction of testimony in Demeure (2000), 
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which also implies the testimony of fiction, to discern the extent to which Beckett's 
narrators produce valuable accounts due to, rather than despite, their difficulties with 
epistemology and communication. This section involves a reading of prosopopoeia 
and the role it plays in expressing or effacing the life and biography of a primary 
subject. Having analysed the dislocation of the narrative voice in Beckett's Company 
(1980). the final point is to develop the ways in which a residual or implied voice 
subsists amidst the interplay between fictional voices. 
'I was not there': Agamben and the Lacuna of Testimony 
In Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben extrapolates the impossibility of bearing 
witness from Primo Levi's accounts of the Nazi concentration camp. The Italian 
philosopher employs the term 'Levi's paradox' to refer to the lacuna between 
perception and truth in the act of testimony.' Agamben conceives this notion of a 
hiatus or lapse in the act of bearing witness, at least initially, as a testimony lacking 
, 
the crucial experience and formed in absentia of the true witness. He discusses the 
inadequacy of the living speaking for the dead and questions how a survivor can 
testify for the ultimate experience of an extermination camp. Echoing Levi, Agamben 
affirms that '[t]he survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses,.6 
Having endured the Holocaust, the salvati. the saved, stand beside the lacuna that the 
sommersi, the drowned, are submerged in, speaking on their behalf as the nearest 
representative, offering a contiguous but necessarily distant account. 
Agamben elaborates on Levi's paradox with recourse to Shoshana Felman and 
Dori Laub's study Testimony (1992) and their assertion that it is impossible to tell the 
truth from the inside, the side of death, and equally impossible to reveal truth from the 
5 Giorgio Agambcn, Remnants of Auschwitz - The Witness and the Archive, trans. by Daniel Heller-
ROaLcn (Ncw York: Zone Books, 2002). p. 82. 
(, Agambcn. Remnants of Auschwitz. p. 34. 
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outside, the side of exclusion.7 The death camp presents an ineluctable problem for 
testimony since it throws the qualified witness into a state without reflection; the 
experience is not retainable because death is never part of the victim's knowledge. 
Agamben observes that 'here the value of testimony lies essentially in what it lacks, at 
its center it contains something that cannot be borne witness to and that discharges the 
survivors of authority'.s Despite the risk of undermining the survivors' stories, their 
individual circumstances and singular involvement in the event, Agamben proposes 
that the point at which the witnesses' accounts subside marks the threshold where the 
complete experience begins. This means the survivors can only testify to their 
alienation and give voice to their silence. As Laurence Simmons notes, the survivor is 
'the witness who bears witness to the impossibility of bearing witness,.9 Despite a 
profusion of first-hand knowledge, detailed observation and profound insight, the 
witnesses' accounts fundamentally accommodate the lacuna of testimony. 
Although Agamben refrains from any direct reference to Theodor Adomo, his 
commentary on testimony at this stage largely attempts to re figure the ideas of 
unintelligibility and unspeakability that the German sociologist discusses in relation to 
art after Auschwitz. In Adomo's essay 'Trying to Understand Endgame', he lauds 
Beckett as an appropriate response to post-Auschwitz culture, arguing that the play 
reflects and respects the magnitude of recent historical events through its very 
reticence towards catastrophe. Agamben detects two potential faults with this line of 
reasoning, namelY"that it can be read as glorifying Auschwitz and rendering language 
obsolete. On the first point, Agamben argues that saying' Auschwitz is ''unsayable'' or 
"incomprehensible" is equivalent to euphemein, to adoring in silence, as one does 
7 Ibid. p. 35. See also Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Teslimony - Crises of Witnessing in Lileralure, 
Psychoanalysis and His/ory (Oxford: Routledge. 1992). p. 232. 
8 Ibid. p. 34. 
9 Laurence Simmons. 'Shame, Levinas's Dog and Derrida's Cat (and Some Fish)', in Knowing 
Animals, ed. by Laurence Simmons and Phillip Armstrong (Boston: Brill, 2007), 27-43, p. 28. 
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with a god'. 10 Adomo anticipates this issue in his essay and, with reference to the 
German public's reaction when details of the Holocaust materialised, he proposes that 
'one can only speak euphemistically about what is incommensurate with all 
experience'." Initially, euphemism suggests a kind of defensive reflex that installs a 
protective barrier to reject the full extent of the event, thus granting a diluted 
acceptance only. However, for Adomo, this weakened reaction is the result of a 
profound ignorance, a withdrawn perspective on the truth, and the suspicion that, in 
the traumatic event, it is wise to avoid an intimate knowledge. Primo Levi recalls a 
corresponding feeling amongst the veterans in camp when he explains '[w]e were old 
Haftlinge: our wisdom lay in "not trying to understand", not imagining the future' .12 
As a result, euphemism is precisely the point for Adomo in the sense that Auschwitz 
should be evoked indirectly. The fitting way to address the Holocaust is to pay 
testament through silence, not with the intention of minimising the magnitude of 
reality but to point out its incommensurability with what went before and elevate it to 
v 
the level of 'taboo'. 13 
On the second point regarding the status of language, Agamben insists that 
language remain in use to demonstrate its inadequacy. He suggests that it is only 
through speaking that the vital 'unsayability' of the Holocaust will be recognised. 
Agamben writes: 
If they mean to say that Auschwitz was a unique event in the face of which the 
witness must in some way submit every word to the test of an impossibility of 
speaking, they are right. But if, joining uniqueness to unsayability, they 
10 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, pp. 32-3. 
11 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame'. p. 123. 
12 Primo Levi, JfThis Is A Man / The Truce. trans. by Stuart Woo1f (London: Abacus, 1979), p. 122. 
IJ Adomo. 'Dossier: Adomo's Notes on BcckcU', p. 166. 
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transform Auschwitz into a reality absolutely separate from language, if they 
break the tie between an impossibility and a possibility of speaking that, in the 
Muselmann, constitutes testimony, then they unconsciously repeat the Nazis' 
gesture; they are in secret solidarity with the arcanum imperii. 14 
Agamben does not advocate the impossibility of speaking, which would mean that the 
lacuna in testimony is simply occluded, but rather that the possibility of speaking the 
impossibility remains. Agamben's dispute with 'unsayability' here is perhaps overly 
literal, particularly if he has Adomo's commentary in mind, which is more cognizant 
of the 'sayable' through 'unsayability' than Agamben gives it credit for. In fact, both 
philosophers converge on one central thesis, with Adomo bringing to light the 
transmissible effect of a lack of meaning in Beckett's work whilst Agamben is 
receptive to the gaps in testimony. They ask that methods of conveying and receiving 
positive meaning, be it social content or testimonial truth, be put to the test. 
It is clear that Agamben privileges the missing experience of the camps in his 
focus on death as the defining function and characteristic of Auschwitz. Fatalistic 
prisoners known as Muselmanner hold particular significance for Agamben as figures 
enduring a state of being bordering on human life but entering a mesmerised 
existence. IS The irony of the Muselmann's experience as a being resigned to death is 
that whilst being subjected to the extreme destructive power of Auschwitz, he is also 
stripped of the awareness required to testify to that human experience. In a cruel 
muting of testimony, not dissimilar to how the deceased's stories are silenced, the 
Muselmanner are reduced to what Levi describes as 'faceless presences', figures 'too 
empty to really suffer', 'too tired to understand' and 'on whose face and whose eyes 
14 Agamben, Remnants 0/ Auschwitz, p. 157. 
IS Agamben focuses on 'Muselmann', a term used at Auschwitz, but it worth noting that there were 
alternatives in other camps, including 'Gamel' (rotting) at Majdanck and 'Krypel' (cripple) at Stutthof. 
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not a trace of thought is to be seen'. 16 These anonymous, vacuous shells are 
dispossessed of their individual stories, numb to their own conditions and unable to 
account for their on-going existence on death row. 
Agamben is drawn to the fact that the Muselmann is wholly constituted by its 
own nescience, asserting that 'the Muselmann has neither seen nor known anything, if 
not the impossibility of knowing and seeing,.17 Without consciously reflecting on it, 
the Muselmanner are simultaneously experienced in and oblivious to an ignorant state. 
If they are familiar with non-knowing in the sense that they exist as vacancy, it 
follows that the Muselmann lives through what the survivors objectify in the 
aftermath: the impossibility of bearing witness due to not really being there. 
According to Agamben, then, the Muselmann is a witness whose aphasia can vouch 
for the extremity of the conditions in the camps. 
However, in several first-hand accounts, the Muselmanner do reflect on and 
attest to t h ~ i r r descent in a kind of double impossibility - living through the 
impossibility of bearing witness and then bearing witness to the, impossibility of 
bearing witness. In David Matzner's Holocaust account entitled The Muselmann 
(1994), the author articulates his return from imminent death. Matzner writes 'I 
became a Muselmann - camp slang for someone whose days, because of deteriorating 
physical or mental condition, were known to be numbered,.ls Presuming the term 
signifies the passage to certain death, a state without self-consciousness and thus a 
condition to be diagnosed only by an onlooker, Matzner's conflicting statement 
questions how a Muselmann can be defined. As opposed to the given meaning, 
Matzner's usage suggests an interim on the fringe of life and death that can be 
resolved either way. In such cases, Agamben takes the claim 'I was a Muselmann' as 
If> Levi. ((This Is A Man / The Truce. p. 96. 
J7 Agamben. Remnants of Auschwilz. p. 54. 
IN David Matzner. The Musefmann (New Jersey: KT A V. 1994). p. 56. 
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an aphorism for the paradox in testimony: '1, who speak, was a Muse/mann, that is, 
the one who cannot in any sense speak' .19 Whilst it is debatable whether these self-
confessed Muse/manner can be what they insist they are, the point is that their 
testimonies amount to an avowal of incapacity. This paradoxical declaration signals a 
more authentic falsity than the pseudo-witnesses', the validity of which is its spoken 
silence. For figures not present at their own experience but attempting to tell the tale 
regardless, the performance of testimony envelops a necessary futility that, in its 
persistent failure, accounts for the one who cannot speak and that which cannot be 
spoken. 
It is this performance of unspeakability that gives Beckett's obligation to 
failure testimonial significance. Beckett's evocation of testimony is in developing an 
aesthetic that attempts to expose the crucial emptiness behind language, '[t]o drill one 
hole after another into it until that which lurks behind it, be it something or nothing, 
starts seeping through', thereby describing the schism between the witness's voice and 
the event.20 The act of speaking despite the inability to communicate positively is the 
transferrable element and historical parallel between Beckett's writing and Holocaust 
testimony. Furthermore, in terms of the dislocation from event and self, an obscure 
ontological status and a curious claim to testimony, Agamben's theorisation of the 
Muselmann bears comparison with Beckett's creatures. Beckett presents figures that 
also drift into detached mental spaces and become oblivious to the external world, yet 
they do return to'their physical conditions intermittently to recognise their plight. In 
effect, Beckett's creatures vacillate between the absent Muselmann that Levi describes 
and the self-reflective Muselmann that Matzner describes. They are withdrawn, 
19 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 165. 
20 Samuel Beckett, The Letters of Samuel Beckett, 1929-1940, Vol. I, ed. by Martha Dow Fehsenfeld 
and Lois More Overbeck (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009), p. 518. 
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etiolated creatures that also recognise the lack of objectivism or self-presence that 
would positively vouch for their experience. 
As with the paradoxical testimony of the Muselmann, Beckett's creatures 
negotiate a fundamental absence that causes the concomitant inability to speak and 
imperative to speak. Beckett's The End (published in French in 1946 and English in 
1953) is the first of four nouvelles written in the mid-forties. It follows an itinerant 
protagonist as he tramps from the city to a seaside cave to a dilapidated rural cabin. In 
a fugue state he gravitates towards the periphery of society, as though intuitively 
searching for a rightful home. Towards the end of the story, the narrator offers this 
assessment of his presence in the world: 'Normally I didn't see a great deal. I didn't 
hear a great deal either. I didn't pay attention. Strictly speaking I wasn't there. Strictly 
speaking I wasn't anywhere' (FN, 51). The narrator's sensory faculties are 
disengaged, leaving him virtually blind and deaf to his surroundings. This detachment 
from the external setting means he is absent, and though the narrator at least 
v 
recognises that a 'there' exists, at this point he is merely a reflection on his emptiness. 
Shortly after this insight, a political speaker in the street labels the narrator a 'living 
corpse' (FN, 52). Although the context for Beckett's tale is very different, this 
depiction of a zombie-like creature is clearly reminiscent of the Muselmann's 
automatic, desensitised existence. Both are physically present, but their empirical 
consciousness has failed so that they are effectively removed from the environment. 
At the same time, Beckett's narrator remains aware of his radical lack of presence, 
thereby articulating the inability to speak as a conscious witness. 
The paradoxical articulation of absence recurs in Beckett's play Endgame. The 
two protagonists, the blind master Hamm and lame servant Clov, are bunkered in a 
bare grey room where they pass time with jaundiced prattle. In the background, 
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Hamm's parents Nagg and Nell peer out of trashcans, beg for food and reminisce 
about better times. These figures appear to inhabit a post-apocalyptic world, with 
Hamm declaring, 'Outside of here it's death' (E, 9). When Clov goes to survey the 
crepuscular view from the window, Hamm reflects on his absence from the former 
world and ignorance of the implied catastrophe: 
HAMM: Do you know what it is? 
CLOY: [As before.] Mmm. 
HAMM: I was never there. [Pause.] Clov! 
CLOY: [Turning towards Hamm, exasperated.] What is it? 
HAMM: 1 was never there. 
CLOY: Lucky for you. 
[He looks out of window.] 
HAMM: Absent, always. It all happened without me. 1 don't know what's 
happened. (E, 44) 
Hamm says 'I was never there', that he was not strictly present in the world at the 
time. He has no knowledge of the event since the ambiguous 'happening' transpired 
without his conscious attendance. After this exchange, Hamm goes on to ask Clov 
what has happened, but the servant is also nonplussed, repeating the Beckettian refrain 
'I don't know'. AS with Agamben's vision of the Muselmann, the nature of the 
experience appears to have rendered the witnesses ignorant. Therefore, the implied 
catastrophe resides in the ellipsis; it is sustained in the inability to relate exactly what 
has occurred. In an echo of the rhetorical technique ·occultatio'. in which the speaker 
draws attention to what he will not explicitly discuss, the incipient event of Endgame 
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casts a shadow over the entire play. Although the characters' unawareness enforces an 
interdiction on the catastrophe, its absence is felt through the circumlocution that 
Hamm and Clov must necessarily conduct. 
Absence and deficient memory also destroy the accuracy of relayed 
experiences in Beckett's later play Footfalls (1976). This play centres on the character 
May pacing a corridor as she converses with a disembodied female voice. Their 
conversation makes it known that May nursed her mother during ill health, before the 
disembodied voice begins to commentate on May's movements. In the 'sequel' (K, 
112), May relates a discussion between the mother Mrs Winter and daughter Amy, in 
which the former is shown to confuse the events of the past. The elderly lady is 
adamant that Amy was at Evensong, but the daughter denies it, claiming 'I observed 
nothing of any kind, strange or otherwise. I saw nothing, heard nothing, of any kind. I 
was not there' (K, 113). Despite Mrs Winter insisting that 'I heard you distinctly' (K, 
113), thejmpression is that the elderly lady is suffering from delusions and that her 
point of view is no longer reliable. As with several of BecketCs characters, Mrs 
Winter's deterioration into misremembering causes the act of bearing witness to be 
tantamount to invention since she is without the stable psychological foundation to 
trust her experiences and commit sound impressions to memory. The play is doubly 
equivocal in that the entire account comes from May, the 'anagrammatical other' of 
Amy, which suggests that these stories implicate the main character but are projected 
as discrete events.2J 
When read literally, these three absences in Beckett's work insist that there is 
no person at the event; people were not physically in attendance. It is a prevalent point 
in the relationship between Beckett's work and the historical context of testimony in 
21 C. J. Ackcrlcy and S. E. Gontarski. The Grove C()mpanion to Beckett (New York: Grove, 2004), p. 
202. 
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that it foregrounds the difference between actual absence and psychological 
detachment. Beckett himself was not a Holocaust survivor, but a secondary witness on 
the periphery of the event, and therefore absent in a real way. In contrast to this 
distinction, I take the absence in 'I was not there' to mean that Beckett's creatures 
experience a fundamental gap in their memories due to the inability to apprehend or 
digest events. Peter Boxall argues that this frail type of memory in Beckett's work 
befits a post-Holocaust world: 
It is as if the modernist forms of recovery, the Proustian Madeleine, the 
Joycean epiphany, are not adequate to the kinds of witnessing that are 
demanded by the Holocaust. It is in Beckett's writing, in Beckett's adaptation 
of the modernist forms that he inherited from Joyce and from Proust as well as 
from (a protomodernist) Kleist, that he develops a form that can 
simultaneously remember and forget, that can at once preserve and 
annihilate.22 
Beckett's narrator-authors are denied the essence, revelation or transcendence that 
Proust, Joyce and Kleist afford. There is no release from doubt or moment of clarity to 
grasp the crux of past experiences. In terms of the Holocaust's demands on testimony 
and forms of recovery, however, the Beckettian memory suggests a form of 
remembrance in which the declared truth is less valid than the on-going process of 
remembering and failing to remember. The psychological states of Beckett's creatures 
means they are constantly outlining the lacuna of testimony that is central to 
Agamben's subsequent model of bearing witness. 
22 Peter Boxall. Since Beckell: Contemporary Writing in the Wake of Modernism (London: Continuum, 
2009). p. 127. 
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The extent of the absence from event and self that paradoxically preserves and 
undermines testimony in Beckett is such that 'his work has become, or is becoming, a 
cipher for unspeakability within the field of Holocaust studies itself. 23 It is true that, 
as an author associated with meaninglessness, Beckett's work has been appropriated 
to figure as the voice of testimony in the specific context of the Holocaust. As David 
Jones' Samuel Beckett and Testimony demonstrates, current scholarly discourse is 
wary of attributing the mechanics of unspeakability solely to the Holocaust context, 
preferring instead to present the lack of historical or biographical foundations as a 
constitutive point of Beckett's testimony. My own work accepts the fact that 
testimony in Beckett is not concerned with explicitly representing historical contexts, 
but that fact does not make the contexts for Beckett's testimony irrelevant. The 
peculiarity of theory on Holocaust testimony means that blindness, deafness and 
muteness to the event are valuable forms of bearing witness. It is - self-evidently -
not the case that every contemporaneous literary text that is not ostensibly about the 
'-" 
Holocaust is, by virtue of its silence, related to Holocaust testimony. Beckett, 
however, is clearly compelled to perform the highest fidelity to failure, and it is his 
outstanding commitment to such a restrictive project that coincides with post-
Holocaust unspeakability more concretely, making his work historically significant 
though not contextually bound. Whilst the 'shearing-off of enunciation from context' 
gives us an insight into Beckett's engagement with lacunae as the fundamental 
components of testimony in general, it is the extremity of this severance that actually 
parallels the violent dislocation of account from event that Holocaust testimony 
magnifies.24 Despite the difficulties in attesting to the Holocaust, then, Beckett is 
unable to avoid his work's affinity with testimony after Auschwitz. 
23 Jones, Samuel Beckell and Testimony. p. 3. 
24 Ibid. p. 20. 
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The accounts that Beckett's narrators proffer engage with the aporia of 
Holocaust testimony in the way that, in Agamben's reading, the Holocaust survivors 
are fundamentally compelled to 'pronounce the unpronounceable' or the manner in 
which the Muselmann vouches for the 'unexperienced experience' of death. 25 Both 
scenarios comprise an inherent absence that denies the witnesses the ability to attest 
for themselves finally, and compels them to expose the spaces between object and 
subject that occur in testimony. The narrators in Beckett's work cannot document 
articles as proof or retain impressions beyond doubt since they are open to the 
possibility that their story, their communicable existence, could consist in the 
interminable struggle to stamp their authority on events that essentially elude them. 
That is, they are condemned to an autobiographical mission that is beyond them 
experientially at first and then expressively. 
Fallibility and Dissociation 
Having noted the impossibility of bearing witness that Agamben discusses in 
Remnants of Auschwitz and Beckett alludes to through variations on the phrase '1 was 
not there', 1 now want to discuss in detail how Beckett's narrators evoke the obstacles 
to testimony and effectively bear witness to the impossibility of bearing witness. The 
aim of this section is to show that Beckett's narrator-authors are unable to offer a 
positive testimony because they are subject to ruptures immanent to the nature of 
experience and tninsmission of knowledge. It can be inferred that the impossibility of 
bearing witness arises from two distinct phases: the event, which impairs self-presence 
and restricts comprehension, particularly in cases of trauma or infirmity, and the act 
of relation, which involves further mental and linguistic. impediments that 
25 See Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 1986), pp. 7, 72. 
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circumscribe the account. In their sustained efforts to bear witness to themselves, 
however, Beckett's narrators essentially trace the impassable· aperture of their life 
stories to offer an alternative form of testimony that gives voice to the unspeakable. 
The preeminent Holocaust scholar Raul Hilberg uses the phrase 'I was not 
there' as the title of his 1987 paper on the ways in which direct survivors, secondary 
witnesses, historians and artists confront the same barriers when writing about the 
catastrophe. He highlights the inadequacy of literary and plastic arts, announcing 'the 
Holocaust has caught us unprepared. Its unprecedentedness and, above all, 
unexpectedness, necessitates the use of words or materials that were never designed 
for depictions of what happened here. This is a problem that affects everyone, 
including those who had seen these occurrences first-hand'. 26 Hilberg asserts that 
language itself is not up to the task of positively depicting the Holocaust. The 
shocking nature of the event has exposed weaknesses in the articles of representation. 
Majorie pJ'rloff finds a similar inadequacy in words in her essay on Beckett's 
engagement with the wartime context. She writes: 'To use words like war, Vichy, 
Resistance, Auschwitz, atom bomb would inevitably be to short-circuit the complexity 
of the experiences in question,.27 Hilberg and Perloff suggest that language is too 
crude to do justice to the singularity of experience. Words malfunction under the 
strain of honouring intricacies that exceed their capacity. 
Despite the inappropriateness of language, Hitberg notes that there are still 
'rules' that failing writers must heed, one of which is 'silence'. The paradox of the 
Holocaust, he avers, is that it plunges both the deceased and surviving victims into 
reticence, and yet testimony must break this silence in order to recognise it. Hilberg 
26 Raul Hilberg. " Was Not There', in Writing and the Holocaust, ed. by Beret Lang (New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1988), 17-25, p. 2 I . 
27 Marjorie Perloff, '''In Love with Hiding": Samuel Beckett's War', Iowa Review, 35.2 (2005), 76-103, 
p.99. 
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remarks 'there cannot be silence without speech. Silence can only be introduced 
between words, some times with words,.28 The acts of speaking and writing are 
therefore crucial in disclosing the fact that, although this is an event that language 
cannot communicate, only the effort to testify will reveal the silencing effect of the 
Holocaust. It is necessary to explore the protracted struggle to bear witness in order to 
underline how the event can exceed testimony and, at the same time, reveal itself in 
the all-important spaces and silences of failure. 
With the legacy of flawed empirical encounters and epistemological 
uncertainty, Beckett's narrators find it difficult to settle on an accurate reconstruction 
of the event as it happened or offer a commentary of life as it is presently unfolding. 
The trilogy of novels that Beckett produced during a prolific four-year spell after the 
war is his principal foray into a mode of narration deprived of the authority to assert 
the truth. In Mol/oy and Ma/one Dies, the title characters are storytellers, but whereas 
Molloy undertakes an autobiographical project that stipulates he apprehend and 
reproduce the chain of events he experienced, Malone attempts to shirk this 
responsibility in favour of devising narratives that act as a supposed distraction from 
self-reflection. The two texts offer differing responses to the authorial role and 
autobiography, but essentially display similar faults that serve to obscure their 
narratives and subvert the author as a consolidating agent. 
In part one of Mol/oy, the narrator writes in his mother's room about the 
journey he takes to find her. Without saying as much, Molloy is a paid writer, selling 
his stories to a man who comes to collect the pages. He says, 'Yes, I work now, a little 
like I used to, except that I don't know how to work any more' (T, 7). Molloy reveals 
that he is returning to a previous vocation, apparently after a hiatus, but that he is 
28 Hilberg, 'I Was Not There'. p. 23. 
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unable to carry out his duties as before. It is clear that Molloy's approach to writing 
. 
has altered and that the skills he possesses are no longer effective. Molloy's inability 
to work shows in the resulting interior monologue, with its tenebrous view and 
digressive texture. For example, Molloy witnesses the moon through a window, but 
his attempt to describe its movement only leads to convoluted hypotheses: 
Two bars divided it in three segments, of which the middle remained constant, 
while little by little the right gained what the left lost. For the moon was 
moving from left to right, or the room was moving from right to left, or both 
together perhaps, or both were moving from left to right, but the room not so 
fast as the moon, or from right to left, but the moon not so fast as the room. 
But can one speak of right and left in such circumstances? That movements of 
an extreme complexity were taking place seemed certain, and yet what a 
siJ:!l,ple thing it seemed, [ ... ]. How difficult it is to speak of the moon and not 
lose one's head, the witless moon. (T, 39) 
The opening sentence of the passage offers a rather lucid account of the shifting 
triptych that the window frame and the moon create. After the first use of the 
conjunction 'or', however, Molloy introduces a series of further alternatives that turn 
his attempt at accuracy into an unwieldy language game. Molloy repeats and inverts 
the words 'left' and 'right' to produce a semantic satiation effect in which the words 
appear to lose their function in plotting the imagined space. The simple slant rhyme 
'moon-room' also draws attention to the aural patterns in the passage to distract from 
the movements discussed. The 'simple thing' thus spirals into a complicated list of 
possibilities owing to Molloy's determination to understand his situation. When the 
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'complexity' of the scene first appears to dawn on him, even this concession includes 
the contradictory phrase 'seemed certain' to undermine its resolution. It is evident that 
Molloy is compelled to talk about things that elude him in both comprehension and 
expression. 
Molloy's unreliability is compounded when he realises that he witnessed a 
crescent moon the night before. His answer to this anomaly stretches the suspension 
of disbelief to breaking point: 'here I had to do with two moons, as far from the new 
as from the full and so alike in outline that the naked eye could hardly tell between 
them, and that whatever was at variance with these hypotheses was so much smoke 
and delusion' (T, 42). Molloy privileges the more radical solution of two moons in 
order to dispel other possibilities as mere fallacy. The consequence is that the reader 
must accept that Molloy resides in an unearthly world, or, more likely, that he 
confuses the time period of these sightings. Molloy's inability to assign memories to 
particular days is detrimental to the veracity of his story and reduces it to conjecture. 
Beckett's focus on fallible perspectives also impacts the narration in the 
following text of the trilogy, Ma/one Dies. Malone is a bed-stricken figure planning to 
use stories as a game to occupy his dying days. He intends to describe the present 
state; tell tales about a man and a woman, an animal, and a stone; and finally draw up 
an inventory. The story that Malone produces follows a 'precocious' boy named Sapo, 
his love of nature, his 'poor and sickly' parents as they deliberate their son's future 
and his encounter with a farming family called the Lamberts (T, 187). Malone chooses 
to refer to the adult Sapo as Macmann and relates how his character ends up in an 
asylum, has a relationship with an elderly nurse called Moll and is then under the 
charge of Lemuel. Malone's narration begins to blur his present situation with the 
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fictional tale, but in a more obvious passage of s ~ l f - r e f l e c t i o n , , he wishes to understand 
the relationship between reality and fiction: 
All I want now is to make a last effort to understand, to begin to understand, 
how such creatures are possible. No, it is not a question of understanding. Of 
what then? I don't know. Here I go none the less, mistakenly. Night, storm and 
sorrow, and the catalepsies of the soul, this time I shall see that they are good. 
The last word is not yet said between me and - yes, the last word is said. 
Perhaps I simply· want to hear it said again. Just once again. No, I want 
nothing. (T, 199) 
Malone embarks on a confabulation with himself, contradicting statements with two 
abrupt negatives and an affirmation. His attempts at assertion lead to denials, meaning 
that Malone's initial intent to express what he wants results in the disappointing '1 
want nothing'. As he tries to decipher his desires, he must make do with ignorance, 
continuing with mistaken premises so that he conducts a rather nugatory activity. 
Hence, Malone appears to demonstrate the catalepsies of the soul as his narrative 
mode descends into an entrancing vacillation. He is increasingly unresponsive to 
external stimuli the more he is embedded in the workings of his own broken 
storytelling and the fictional lives of his characters. 
It is noticeable that Beckett's author-narrators struggle with incompetence in 
their efforts to bear witness to the past, but there is no obvious catastrophe that 
prevents them from relating their stories. Beckett's trilogy does not fixate on a single 
traumatic experience that escapes his creatures, but on problematic autobiographical 
projects that, for Moltoy, Moran and Malone at least, carry on in ordinary, if strangely 
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inapprehensible, circumstances. Their depositions seem to take place at a point in time 
when any incipient event has vanished, but its lingering impact has also destabilised 
acts of bearing witness to the unexceptional, leaving figures racked with problems 
comparable to the crisis of enunciation in post-Holocaust attempts to testify. In this 
way, the author-narrators' accounts extend beyond the task of recovering one lost 
event but are still burdened with the difficulties inherent to attesting for oneself in the 
distant or near past. 
Although Agamben concentrates specifically on the impact of Auschwitz, he 
also traces several problematic dynamics that apply to bearing witness in general. 
Bearing witness, as opposed to witnessing only, is an attempt to articulate observed 
situations without the essence going missing or being distorted in the process between 
seeing and saying. For Agamben, '[t]he aporia of Auschwitz is, indeed, the very 
aporia of historical knowledge: a non-coincidence between facts and truth, between 
verification and comprehension,.29 This introduces the wordplay on 'baring' witness, 
which evokes the struggle to uncover knowledge faithfully, or lay bare unbearable 
personal experiences, considering the added task of reconciling the looking eye in the 
past with the speaking 'I' in the present. Agamben draws on the disparity between 
initial event and subsequent statement, the experience and the gathered account. As 
with Molloy's confusion with the moon, the 'non-coincidence' of testimony sees the 
shift from a fidelity to the truth to an explanation of how the event now appears. The 
witness retrospectively incorporates himself and his posterior thoughts into the 
remembered event, thereby contaminating the experience with extraneous material. 
The act of testimony therefore updates the witnessed experience and betrays the space 
in between the witness at the event and the clinical '1' bearing witness but not strictly 
29 Agamben. Remnants of AuschwilZ. p. 12. 
83 
there. The witness is unable to repeat the experience exactly and can only resort to an 
admixture of the past and present. 
This retrospective disjunction is an element of testimony that Jacques Derrida 
prefigures in his Memoirs of the Blind (1993). Derrida's text focuses on the practice of 
self-representation in the painterly arts to offer an acute insight into the interaction 
between eye and object. But whereas Agamben identifies the aporia between actual 
experience and reconstituted facts, Derrida emphasises the fracture in each moment of 
witnessing. He asserts that 'a witness, as such, is always blind. Witnessing substitutes 
narrative for perception. The witness cannot see, show, and speak at the same time, 
and the interest of the attestation, like that of the testament, stems from this 
dissociation' ,30 The discrepancy between observation, demonstration and enunciation, 
that inevitable fissure in the passage from spontaneous moment to meditated account, 
is where the taciturnity of testimony emerges. In Derrida's later essay 'Poetics and 
Politics 3f Witnessing' (2005), predominantly on Paul eelan's 1948 poem 
'Todesfuge' (Death Fugue) and the possibility of perjury t h ~ t t is inherent to testimony, 
he reaffirms his view that 'speech can be dissociated from what it is witness to: for the 
witness is not present either, presently present, to what he recalls,.31 Derrida lights on 
the problem of remembering and presenting the memory at once, rapidly shifting from 
past to present, thinking of then but speaking now. As with Agamben's 'non-
coincidence', the words betray the thought gap that occurs in the transition from 
recollection to articulation. 
Beckett's work is a precursor to the momentary non-coincidences and 
dissociations that Agamben and Derrida dissect. In the second part of Mo/loy,· for 
30 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind - The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. by Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993), p. 104 
31 Jacques Derrida, 'Poetics and Politics of Witnessing', in Sovereignties in Question -The Poetics of 
Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University, 2005), 65-96, p. 76. 
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example, Gaber's role as a messenger evokes the difficult transposition of reliable 
infonnation that constitutes testimony. In an attempt to bypass the erasing effect of 
delay, Gaber adopts an instantaneous method of reflection: 
Gaber understood nothing about the messages he carried. Reflecting on them 
he arrived at the most extravagantly false conclusions. Yes, it was not enough 
for him to understand nothing about them, he had also to believe he 
understood everything about them. This was not all. His memory was so bad 
that his messages had no existence in his head, but only in his notebook. He 
had only to close his notebook to become, a moment later, perfectly innocent 
as to its content. And when I say that he reflected on his messages and drew 
conclusions from them, it was not as we would have reflected on them, you 
and I, the book closed and probably the eyes too, but little by little as he read. 
And when he raised his head and indulged in his commentaries, it was without 
losing a second, for if he had lost a second he would have forgotten 
everything, both text and gloss. I have often wondered if the messengers were 
not compelled to undergo a surgical operation, to induce in them such a degree 
of amnesia. (T, 107) 
, For Gaber, memory is not a resource. He must resort to the spontaneity of thought and 
speech, almost c ~ n c u r r e n t l y , , with the least interference from recollection or reason. 
Gaber's reflection is bent back on what he considers only to the slightest degree, 
meaning he perfonns his ideas with the minimum of cognition, attempting instead to 
hit intuitively upon the import of his notes. Such forgetfulness aligns Gaber with the 
Nietzschean celebration of the animal's amnesia, without consideration of the past but 
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rather 'fettered to the moment'. 32 In this way, Gaber deposes the idea of the 
messenger as mediator, who typically passes on what is known. He is a passive 
conduit, in contradistinction to the 'you and l' mentioned in the passage above, who 
are presumably adept at data collection and retrospective comprehension. In their 
complicity, the 'you and l' implies the relationship between a masterful author 
complete with transmissible idea and the reader as a reflective receiver. Gaber, on the 
other hand, is a vacuous witness, oblivious to the secret information he carries and 
, literally performing his duty. 
Gaber's instinctive commentary, his inclination to gabber, is an example of the 
expressive dilemma that finds its fullest expression in the third text of Beckett's post-
war trilogy, The Unnamable. The anonymous, asexual narrative voice in this 
notoriously difficult monologue acts as a rendezvous point for many of Beckett's past 
characters, including MoUoy and Malone.33 The text also vaguely relates the stories of 
two new/figments, Mahood and Worm. It is a fragmented, self-reflexive musing on 
the nature of existence, which grows increasingly anxious the more the uttered words 
appear to form the sole condition of being. Beckett takes the belatedness of 
enunciation a step further in The Unnamable, problematizing the acute levels of 
mediation between thought and words that expand the distance between event and 
account, memory and language. The narrative voice wonders 'how can you think and 
speak at the same time, how can you think about what you have said, may say, are 
saying, and at the same time go on with the last-mentioned' (T, 377). Beckett points 
out that there is no means of simultaneously speaking and reflecting. The narrative 
32 See Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', in Untimely 
Meditations, ed. by Daniel Breazeale, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
1997),57-124, p. 57. 
33 For convenience, I refer to the narrator of The Unnamable as 'he' in this thesis, but strictly speaking, 
the voice is without gender. 
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voice is either occupied with speech or dwelling on the spoken, meaning the subject is 
not truly present to what it delivers or contemplates. 
Beckett's magnification of latency in The Unnamable shows that dissociation 
is not only a problem of vague retrospection, but also a difficulty in occupying a 
present space and being in the moment. Time appears to be running away 
immediately, each instant colliding with the living being, and every second burying 
the last: 'they arrive, bang, bang, they bang into you' (T, 399). In the aftermath, the 
mental and linguistic tools of reflection are overdue so that memory cannot lay claim 
to the essence of experience. Yet, in the present, the cognitive powers to process 
experience become inundated by the ensuing action. The present is always slipping 
into the past, and thus always distorted. As David Jones notes, '[t]estimony is doubly 
belated: not only is the listener receiving a post-hoc account, but that account 
originates in an experience from which the witness is effectively absent'. 34 In 
Beckett's work, this discrepancy between received, stored and transmitted data, each 
of which have their own inherent obstacles to overcome, is intrinsic to the testimony 
of his creatures who lack the vantage from which to master their experiences. 
(In)sovereign Author-Narrators 
As we have seen, the dissociation between witnessing and bearing witness fills 
attestation with cognitive and creative material foreign to the original event. For 
Derrida, the distance between seeing and saying calls into question the sovereignty of 
the subject. The word 'sovereign' is typically associated with the supreme power of a 
monarch, pontiff or autocratic political figure. In terms of literary or testimonial 
authority, sovereignty is used to take the idea of absolute rule and apply it to spaces of 
34 Jones, Samuel Beckell and Teslimony, p. 6. 
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meaning. It is this kind of 'essential claim of sovereignty' that Derrida identifies and 
critiques in Agamben's Homo Sacer - Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995).35 In 
session three of The Beast and the Sovereign (2009), Derrida finds Agamben posing 
as the first to identify the original practitioners of various key philosophical inquiries 
and, consequently, Derrida deprecates Agamben's self-aggrandizement and command 
of chronology.36 According to Derrida's reading, Agamben accepts the role of 
sovereign author, reigning supreme over his material. 
Derrida introduces a variation on sovereignty, in closer proximity with the 
beast, from the French words savoir and faire. He describes how knowledge involves 
a certain know-how [savoir:faire] to be made known [faire savoir], which can remove 
the resulting understanding from the original point of Ialowing.37 This expertise is 
crucial to an understanding of Derrida's reading of sovereignty because it suggests 
that the ability to communicate effectively involves the, often liberal, handling of 
information as much as the acquisition of facts. He underlines how the process of 
V' 
disseminating a message is discrete from its actual source and content. An exhaustive 
understanding of a situation or topic does not ensure a direct articulation of that 
knowledge. In fact, making known can mean 'making like' knowledge, which implies 
'fabulous' elements that breathe life into the account, and therefore borders on the 
'rogue' status also associated with the beast. 38 
Derrida exploits this impression of knowledge elsewhere in relation to 
testimony, noting '[t]or it to be guaranteed as testimony, it cannot, it must not, be 
absolutely certain, absolutely sure and certain in the order of knowing as such' .39 
35 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer - Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1995). 
36 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, pp. 92-3. 
37 Ibid. pp. 34-38. 
JM Ibid. pp. 35, 19. 
39 Dcrrida, 'Poetics and Politics of Witnessing', p. 68. 
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More than this, Derrida claims that an assured avowal is the sine qua non of 
falsification: 'That is the essence of lie, fable, or simulacrum, namely topresent itself 
as truth or veracity, to swear that one is faithful, which will always be the condition of 
infidelity',40 In Derrida's reading, testimony presupposes a personal belief that 
appeals to others, which can be rejected as a false impression or a feigned pledge. 
Testimony therefore encloses a degree of uncertainty as opposed to absolute fact. 
Beckett and his author-narrators show that the act of bearing witness to one's 
experience does not always involve a claim to the authority associated with 
sovereignty. As a writer closely affiliated with the experience of a non-knower, it is 
clear that Beckett is not interested in depicting reality as a verifiable experience. On 
the contrary, Beckett's focus on ignorance modifies the idea of savoir-faire to 
accentuate an expertise in making known what is unknown, in the sense that he 
reveals asininity as opposed to dispelling myths. In an interview with Israel Shenker, 
Beckett explains this orientation towards ignorance: 
I'm not master of my material. The more Joyce knew the more he could. He's 
tending toward omniscience and omnipotence as an artist. I'm working with 
impotence, ignorance. I don't think impotence has been exploited in the past. 
There seems to be an esthetic axiom that expression is achievement - must be 
an achievement. My little exploration is that whole zone of being that has 
always been set aside by artists as something unusable - as something by 
definition incompatible with art.41 
40 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, p. 91. 
41 Shenker. • An Interview with Beckeu', p. 148. 
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Beckett embraces the struggle to express and inability to create that the sovereign 
author subjugates. The traditional vision of the author conceives a figure who gives a 
complete and efficient form to an object. For Jean-Paul Sartre, the author assumes the 
responsibility of 'introducing order where there was none, by imposing the unity of 
mind on the diversity of things', whilst Michel Foucault recognises the concept of the 
author as synonymous with 'a principle of a certain unity of writing' .42 Given that the 
received author is the single agent who negotiates and consolidates all of the many 
constituent elements required to make up the work of art, the 'unity' that both Sartre 
and Foucault identify is closely related to the 'omni' that Beckett mentions and, by his 
own concession, is without. 
However, as Beckett suggests, he is 'using' and 'exploiting' the material set 
aside in the past. Despite his focus on failure, or 'my dream of an art unresentful of its 
insuperable indigence and too proud for the farce of giving and receiving' as he 
described it to Georges Duthuit, Beckett himself is tasked with succeeding in crafting 
'--" 
an art of failure.43 He must make decisions on the appropriate way to depict his 
author-narrators as impotent figures, which retains an impression of the artistic 
achievement that he associates with his compatriot Joyce. Beckett's trilogy is a tour 
de force with regard to its ability to give form to deficiency and make ignorance 
known, which, contradictorily, brings sovereign power into contact with impotence to 
produce a creaturely position. As noted earlier, when Beckett writes 'I am absurdly 
and stupidly the creature of my work'. he underlines the sense of obligation he has to 
an insistent task. But as the creature of his work, Beckett also embodies a peculiar 
aspect of the creature, namely its association with creativity. Beckett is both the 
42 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 27; 
Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?', in Aesthetics, Method. and Epistemology, ed. by James D. 
Faubion, trans. by Donald F. Bouchard (New York: The New Press, 1999), p. 215. 
43 Beckett, Disjecta, p. 141. 
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author and subject of his writing, acting at once as potent source of the work and 
subservient minion to its design.44 This is a creaturely junction between producer and 
product, related to the idea of a divine maker who moulds creatures • in his own 
image' (Genesis 1. 27), but is simultaneously a subject under the control of another. 
Beckett effectively exemplifies the dichotomous composition of the creature, 
implicated in both strength and weakness, and this is a status that extends to his 
author-narrators. 
Beckett's focus on impotence in his work yields authorial and narrative 
positions that are incongruous to a conventional understanding of sovereignty as 
absolute rule. It is patent that both Beckett and his narrating creatures are exposed to 
the thraldom of creative tasks. Yet, he does evoke the 'sovereign as creature' that 
WaIter Benjamin describes in his 1925 doctoral dissertation entitled The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama. 45 In this text, Benjamin initially presents an image of 
sovereignty analogous to the unifying power of the traditional author. He writes that 
'[l]iterature ought to be called ars inveniendi . .The notion of the man of genius, the 
master of ars inveniendi, is that of a man who could manipulate models with 
sovereign skill' .46 Benjamin refers to literature as the art of invention to promote the 
creative talents and adept control of a writer, but he goes on to derive a contrasting 
view of sovereignty from seventeenth-century baroque drama: 
44 James Joyce also felt his authorial grip on U/ysses slipping at times, particularly in the 'Circe' 
episode. Maud EUmann writes: 'Joyce's complaints about the episode suggest that writing is 
dehumanizing in a double sense, first because it goes on writing regardless of the writer, like the 
robotic music of the player piano, and second because it animalizes its creator, reducing the author to a 
beast in the machine', Maud ElImann, 'Changing into an Animal', Field Day Review, 2 (2006), 75-93, 
p. 75. Joyce's struggle with his 'monster-novel' in these instances is closer to the expressive dilemmas 
that Beckett explores with his author-narrators. 
45 The description 'sovereign as creature' appears on the content page of Waiter Benjamin, The Origin 
of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osbome (London: NLB, 1977). 
46 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 179. 
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The antithesis between the power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a 
feature peculiar to the Trauerspiel which is, however, only apparently a 
generic feature and which can be illuminated only against the background of 
the theory of sovereignty. This is the indecisiveness of the tyrant. The prince, 
who is responsible for making the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, 
reveals at the first opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a 
decision.47 
Benjamin aligns an artistic genre with a political theory in this passage to outline the 
power dynamics in the creative process. He refers to the sovereign duty to make 
decisions, which is equally inherent to efficient forms of narration, as Beckett notes in 
Mol/oy: 'you cannot mention everything in its proper place, you must choose, between 
the things not worth mentioning and those even less so' (T, 41). The problem is that 
the indiYidual who can make a decision can also make another to counter his original 
order. There is no necessity for the sovereign to commit to his decrees or develop an 
effective means of governing his material. Instead of making known, the sovereign's 
authority makes it difficult to stand by any single view; everything he announces can 
be renounced. In Benjamin's view, the sovereign power to choose alternatives makes 
the sovereign incapable of living by an order other than the constant flux of decision 
making. 
The power to override decisions that amounts to indecisiveness also 
undermines the narrative efficacy of Beckett's author-narrators. Molloy, for example, 
is continually at a loose end: 'my resolutions were remarkable in this, that they were 
no sooner formed than something always happened to prevent their executions' (T, 
47 Ibid. p. 71. 
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32). The complication to which Molloy refers is that he changes his mind, or, more 
accurately, his mind is never fully made. Whilst his general orientation towards the 
mother persists, the satellite thoughts and actions that surround his quest are far from 
refractory. Molloy's resolutions are always provisional, threatening to swerve at any 
point: 'How agreeable it is to be confirmed, after a more or less long period of 
vacillation, in one's first impressions. Perhaps that is what tempers the pangs of death. 
Not that I was so conclusively, I mean confirmed, in my first impressions with regard 
to-wait-C' (T, 15). The extent to which Molloy is 'confirmed' here is clearly 
questionable as the passage is rife with uncertainty in 'more or less', 'impressions', 
'perhaps', inconclusiveness and the moment of hesitation at the end. The very instant 
a decision is formed, Molloy is aware of other possibilities or problems, which can 
send him back to square one. 
Similarly, Malone's attempts to establish an order are confounded in Ma/one 
Dies. In an aside during his account of Macmann's stay at the House of Saint John of 
God, Malone considers the ambivalence of his narrative as he moves from precision to 
distortion. He remarks, 'A thousand little things to report, very strange, in view of my 
situation, if I interpret them correctly. But my notes have a curious tendency, as I 
realize at last, to annihilate all they purport to record' (T, 260-1). The inability to 
proceed with an idea causes the application of power to be capricious, ready to reverse 
itself as opposed to reassert. Malone claims to realise this problem finally, but he 
.. " 
actually produces a liar paradox so that the very claim to annihilate is itself open to 
annihilation. It is impossible to accept Malone's realisation of this curious tendency as 
true without the same logic undermining itself. Beckett's author-narrators can exercise 
the power of inconstancy in that they can nullify every statement they make, but it is 
that sovereign privilege that casts them as creatures. 
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In Molloy's provisionality and Malone's impuissance, Beckett works with a 
combination of changeability and ineffectuality that evokes sovereign power but 
places emphasis on what I label the '{in)sovereign'. In an effort to distance 
conventional notions of authority, this term suggests that from within a position of 
power, in sovereignty, comes a dearth of practical power, in sovereignty. In other 
words, the sovereign creature is theoretically potent but pragmatically incapable. The 
term '{in)sovereign' therefore avoids simply negating the ability to decide in order to 
retain a sense of the sovereign power that slides into creaturely asininity. The 
proximity between these two states is evident in Beckett's art of failure itself, which 
invests the author's creative skills into an exhibition of indigence. This hybridity 
manifests itself within the work in the form of author-narrators who conduct their own 
stories and develop fictional constructs, but are ultimately unable to reign over a 
determined meaning. In their extended conflicts with decisions that are not fixed, they 
demonstrate the instability of creaturely '{in)sovereignty'. Beckett's creatures cannot 
'-/ 
command thought and expression with the unquestioned supremacy of a deity, only 
the uncertainty of the lowly creature .. 
The creaturely junction between potency and impotence is most arresting in 
Beckett's treatment of reason. His author-narrators frequently appeal to rational 
analysis as they try to understand and articulate the situations they encounter. Despite 
this, their reasoning is often inefficient, distending the processes of logic as opposed 
to making sense. After stealing several silver items from Lousse, Molloy rigorously 
describes a knife rest because he is unaware of the name and function of the object. 
Such scrutiny of the knife rest proliferates thought as opposed to dispelling Molloy's 
ignorance: 'there was no doubt in my mind that it was not an object of virtue, but that 
it had a most specific function always to be hidden from me. I could therefore puzzle 
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over it endlessly without the least risk' (T, 64). Molloy is adamant that the knife rest is 
useful and not merely an aesthetic article, but because its function is inscrutable, he 
can contemplate the object knowing that such examination is in vain. In this case, it is 
the opportunity to indulge in reflection that drives Molloy's reasoning, not the 
possibility of knowledge. Whilst rationality does not have active power, in the sense 
that it fails to settle on explanations, causes or meaning, its template continues to 
serve as a pastime and actually sustains the enigma game for Molloy. 
The perpetuation of thought through the empty rhetoric of reason is intrinsic to 
the style of narration in Beckett's trilogy. Adorno, for one, finds this kind of 
engagement with reason at the centre of narration, asserting that 'communicative 
language postulates - already in its syntactic form, through logic, the nature of 
conclusions, and stable concepts - the principle of sufficient reason' .48 The ordering 
of language into sentences itself suggests a rational being organising thoughts. 
However, it follows that, without a stable foundation to apply language, such as an 
empirical experience, a reliable memory or a conceived idea - that is, a known point 
of causality - language is forced to revolve infinite possibilities. Whilst language 
shows logic in action, Beckett's author-narrators apply this level of reason to evoke a 
spectrum of thinking that ranges from fruitless bouts of rationalisation to the 
paralysing aporia in which every remark is negated. 
Molloy's inclination towards sincerity, for instance, frequently neutralises 
.. t>lo 
much of the conviction in his narrative undertaking, which results in a strange 
admixture of unreliability and honesty. As he grows familiar with his ignorance, 
Molloy can explicitly identify his predicament: 'notions like mine, all spasm, sweat 
and trembling, without an atom of common sense or lucidity' (T, 68). Molloy is able 
48 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 139. 
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to articulate his own lack of clarity, but the narrative project grows stagnant when this 
is the only lucid judgement. Consequently, Molloy must entertain the reasonable 
exploration of obscurities in an attempt to further his narrative, if only to return to his 
tendency towards inaccuracy, which is a point he highlights early on when he says 
'The truth is I don't know much' (T, 7). Molloy does not fabricate his account 
purposely to deceive since he has no reliable truth to conceal. Yet, he knows a more 
truthful account does exist and that his version is always parallel to reality, throwing 
an unattainable truth into relief. Again, this is a fact that he expresses distinctly: 'I am 
merely complying with the convention that demands you either lie or hold your peace. 
For what really happened was quite different' (T, 87-8). It is evident that Molloy's 
lack of awareness is a condition he realises; he is not blissfully ignorant. Molloy must 
therefore direct reason towards his lack of sovereignty as a substitute for reason's 
inability to work through his epistemological shortcomings. 
Jor Adomo, the unavailing reasoning in Beckett means that '[t]he sovereign 
ego cogitans is transformed by the dubitatio into its opposite,.49 Adomo argues that 
the logical mind inflicts its own undoing, which echoes Beckett's own view that 
'[t]here is at least this to be said of the mind, that it can dispel mind' .so The power of 
reason, in this respect, is to reveal its own weakness and reflect on its failure. This 
mental faculty is incapable of apprehending reality but does manage to illuminate its 
own inadequacy, recognise unproductive cycles of logic and realise the holes in 
testimony that captivate the creature. As such, the power of Beckett's creatures 
rapidly shifts from the original position of sovereignty, to the servitude to reasoning 
processes, to a re-evaluation of the decline into indecision. The point is that Beckett's 
(in)sovereign creatures accept the conventional forms of testimony, expose the 
49 Adomo. 'Dossier: Adomo's Notes on BeckeU·. p. 173. 
so Beckett qtd. in Richard Begam. Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity (Stanford. CA: Stanford 
University, 1996), p. 39. 
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drawbacks of communicative language and reasoned judgements, but salvage 
testimonial value in bearing witness to the crisis of positive testimony. 
Beckett develops this blurred division between sovereign and creature more 
distinctly in Ma/one Dies. Malone shares Molloy's type of reasoning without result, 
and it eventually contributes to the apathetic disposition that Malone courts, which 
would bypass the temptation to resolve any inconsistencies in his account. Firstly, 
Malone says 'I will not weigh upon the balance any more, one way or another. I shall 
be neutral and inert. No difficulty there' (T, 179). Malone goes on to express his 
intention not to be mired in an approach that neurotically catalogues details: 'My 
desire henceforth is to be clear, without being finical' (T, 181). He effectively 
renounces his position as sovereign author by refusing to make authorial decisions on 
conflicting ideas and choosing to be equivocal rather than selectively organise the 
text. He wants to concede a lack of ability and dismiss his influence upon the account. 
Indeed, he would rather defer his responsibility in favour of an arbitrary process: 'If I 
had a penny I would let it make up my mind' (T, 252). Malone's hope of relinquishing 
his authorial voice is aimed at vanquishing his identity from the forefront of the text, 
to dissolve the author in the writing and surrender to the spontaneity of creation. 
However, Beckett highlights the contradiction in Malone's decision not to 
decide, which is a conflict that makes it difficult to determine the author-narrator's 
level of efficacy in the text. Malone's intentions continue to interfere with his 
absences so thathe appears to fail on two fronts. Firstly, the decision to be ambiguous 
suggests Malone can retain sovereign power, albeit through a paradoxically resolute 
irresolution. Even when he does manage to recede into Macmann's story, the 
fulfilment of his original intention is still detectable, which reinserts Malone into his 
supposed absence from the narrative process. Secondly, Malone's original decision to 
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be detached is frequently undermined, as he is not completely neutral but 
intermittently self-aware: 'I must simply be on my guard, reflecting on what I have 
. said before I go on and stopping, each time disaster threatens, to look at myself as I 
am. That is just what I wanted to avoid' (T, 189). In this way, Malone's decision to be 
passive is not possible, which shows him powerless in one sense, but more distinctly 
the author in another; his decision is undone, but consequently, he is revealed as the 
figure behind the narrative. The paradox is that when Malone decides to be less 
present, he is ineffective in that he re-emerges in the author-narrator position, but at 
the same time he is also indulged in that his decision to be less present is not carried 
out, therefore effectuating his desire to be less potent. Ironically, Beckett accentuates 
the convergence of potency and impotence in (in)sovereignty when Malone insists 
that his sovereign presence is attenuated. 
The concomitance of failure and success continues in the final text of the 
trilogyy The Unnamable. This stunted text is made up almost entirely of aporetic 
revolutions around narrative incompetence, but it also conveys the great significance 
of reflecting on inability. In the opening pages of the text, the narrative voice develops 
an accurate description of his position albeit through a fractured narrative style: 
The fact would seem to be, if in my situation one may speak of facts, not only 
that I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak, but also, which is 
even more interesting, but also that I, which is if possible even more 
interesting, that I shall have to, I forget, no matter. And at the same time I am 
obliged to speak. I shall never be silent. Never. (T, 294) 
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The narrator of The Unnamable illustrates the fact that the crux of the matter is 
beyond his expressive capabilities. Although a 'fact' is clearly understood, it is 
delivered in such an interrupted way that the narrator loses his train of thought 
altogether. In repeatedly trying to elaborate on his inability to speak through the 
phrases 'not only' and 'but also', the narrator shows he is unable to develop an idea. 
Beckett presents a narrative voice that cannot speak but continues nevertheless, and it 
is only through this fidelity to failure that the genuine aphonia, or voiceless quality, of 
Beckett's creatures is heard. 
Shortly after his attempt at facts, the narrator of The Unnamable continues: 'I 
shall remark without further delay, in order to be sure of doing so, that I am relying on 
these lights, as indeed on all other similar sources of credible perplexity, to help me 
continue and perhaps even conclude. I resume, having no alternative' (T, 296). The 
narrator's testimony lies precisely in the 'credible perplexity' that pervades his 
endeavour. He can honestly pronounce his confusion, although that same confusion 
both invalidates the understanding of his own incomprehensible situation and prevents 
him from accepting his ignorance unconditionally. Hence, The Unnamable does not 
merely pinpoint incertitude. It is the regenerative process of trying to speak, failing to 
speak and addressing that failure that entails a performative element that guarantees 
the credibility of the perplexity. When the narrator later says, 'But what is the right 
manner, I don't know' (T, 338), it is clear that there is authenticity in impotence here, 
as the narrator ' ~ ' o n c e d e s s that the right manner is elusive but that ignorance is also 
oddly the right manner. Whereas the ability to decide results in indecision, the 
narrator's investment in indecision returns to a kind of decisive act. Thus, Beckett's 
author-narrators convey the experience of the 'non-knower' and 'non-can-er' to 
divulge frailties within the formerly sovereign human mind, but they also reveal a 
99 
vestigial authority in their ability to diagnose this unspeakability. In effect, Beckert's 
creatures acknowledge that their errant accounts are beside the point and yet necessary 
if they are to outline the lacunae that attest to the impossibility of bearing witness. 
Obligation to Testify: Mechanics, Enunciation, Ruin 
The (in)sovereign position of Beckett's author-narrators in the post-war trilogy shows 
that whilst sovereign indecision undermines their testimonies, they regain some 
credibility in the protracted and honest nature of their expressive dilemmas. The 
narrative voice in The Unnamable utters the words 'I cannot speak' and 'I shall never 
be silent' (T, 294) in an echo of Beckett's widely-cited point of view on art from his 
dialogues with Georges Duthuit: 'there is nothing to express, nothing with which to 
express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, 
together with the obligation to express,.SI The obligation to speak despite the inability 
to s p e ~ ~ presents a strained condition for Beckett's creatures apparent not only in their 
testimonies but also in their understanding of themselves as subjects. The on-going 
urge to do what cannot be successfully done produces precarious identities occupied 
with mechanical processes, composed of speaking acts and reflecting on the loss of 
self. This section will trace the impact that the need to speak has on the subjective 
existence ofBeckett's author-narrators. 
In their psychoanalytical and literary study of testimony, Shoshana Felman 
and Dori Laub frequently refer to the imperative to speak. They focus on a number of 
examples in which articulation fails in order to convey the elliptical space underlying 
the act itself. Felman and Laub stress that if it is imperative to continue verbalising 
thoughts when psychoanalysis is employed to decipher the meaning of those words 
SI Bcckctt. Disjecfa. p. 139. 
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positively, it is doubly imperative to speak when that school fails and the inadequate 
words are all the trauma victim has. Laub writes: 
This imperative to tell and to be heard can become itself an all-consuming life 
task. Yet no amount of telling seems ever to do justice to this inner 
compulsion. There are never enough words or the right words, there is never 
enough time or the right time, and never enough listening or the right listening 
to articulate the story that cannot be fully captured in thought, memory and 
speech. 52 
The mind's incapacity to apprehend the traumatic event belies the fact that the act of 
speaking itself can, on the one hand, be understood as a cathartic process, a purging of 
everything that can be said without hitting on the crux, thereby exhausting language's 
power to relate the event. In conjunction with a playful reference to stupidity, Molloy 
. alludes to this therapeutic quality: 'sorrow does more harm when dumb, to my mind' 
(T, 110). On the other hand, testimony can be the all-important act of not expelling. In 
this sense, the act of bearing witness is a cyclical inculcation in order to learn by rote 
the burden of inscribing the experience. It is this deed that discloses the survivor's 
inheritance from the trauma, namely the duty to speak the unspeakable. 
Felman relates an anecdote about a cohort of students that assimilated the 
trauma they sfudied in her university module on testimony. She points out the 
students' impulse to both expel and retain the information, which, in this case, 
resolves itself in a faltering discourse. One student writes: 'Caught by two 
contradictory wishes at once, to speak or not to speak, I can only stammer'. 53 There is 
S2 Felman and Laub, Testimony, p. 7 8 ~ ~
53 Ibid. p. 56. 
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evidently a need to tell and a simultaneous compulsion not to relive, which results in a 
verbal non-fluency. This defective language emerges as a kind of hesitancy from these 
conflicting urges. However, the student's stammer is a reaction in the true sense of the 
word: an action provoked by and therefore congruent with the initial event. The 
problem is that reaction indicates an automatic consequence of an instruction and 
consequently lacks the personality of a wilful response. As a programmed testimony, 
reaction obliterates human agency in the act of bearing witness. 
The continual act of speaking is crucial in order to invoke negative or 
coincidental testimony. If Beckett's narrators are to demonstrate the non-experience 
of ignorance and non-story of impotence, they must employ methods of continuation 
that oblige failure. However, this mode of testimony would appear to actuate 
automatic, insubstantial and disintegrated forms of existence. The nature of speaking 
the unspeakable means there is no final success, which places emphasis on the act 
itself, and, in turn, reduces the human element of narration to mechanical rigidity, 
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incessant enunciation and ruinous ambivalence. The obligation to testify therefore 
impacts upon the subjective status of the witness, divesting him or her of an organic, 
progressive and unified way of attesting to oneself. When the inability to relate life 
and account for oneself meets the necessity to try, testimony discloses a suspended, 
creaturely subjectivity. 
Paul Sheehan argues that an increased focus on the inhuman occurs as part of 
the development of a modernist narrative form. In Modernism, Humanism and 
Narrative (2002), Sheehan expounds the notion that modernist literature subverts the 
humanistic values of narrative, explaining that, 'implicit in humanism is the idea of 
autonomy, the belief that man is measure of all things and maker of all meanings; and 
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mastery, that he has dominion over himself and his world,.54 This empirical and 
epistemological proficiency correlates with the classic image of the author, which 
allows Sheehan to affirm that narration 'is human-shaped. It is a uniquely human way 
of making order and meaning out of the raw material of existence'.ss The ability to 
narrate suggests a distinctively human mode of comprehension and assessment of 
being in the world. 
Beckett, however, plays a particularly disruptive role in the move from the 
humanistic order of realism to the inhuman flux of modernity. The creaturely state of 
(in)sovereignty in Beckett's trilogy means the author-narrators negotiate the 
convergence of impotence and potency that lacks dominance over positive meaning 
whilst producing a valuable testimony ofunspeakability. Appropriately, then, Sheehan 
uses Beckett as an example of the narrative process going awry: 'Narrativised 
subjectivity is wrenched out of its human-shaped literary vessel and transplanted to 
something inhuman' .56 Despite this, Sheehan understates the human catalyst in the 
transition to the inhuman. He perceives the inhumanity of the narrative form as a 
consequence of the absence of human ways of making meaning. Conversely, 
Beckett's narratives appear to be benighted as a result of a misguided reliance on the 
properties that set the human apart as a species. The creaturely hybridity of Beckett's 
narrators is compounded by the mental faculties, such as reasoned reflection, that 
Malone accredits to humanity's ascent: 'I suppose the wisest thing now is to live it 
over again, m;ditate upon it and be edified. It is thus that man distinguishes himself 
from the ape and rises, from discovery to discovery, ever higher towards the light' (T, 
255). Given that Beckett's creatures pursue the wisest course of action and further 
54 Paul Sheehan, Modernism, Narrative and Humanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002), p. 
6. 
ss Sheehan, Modernism, Narrative and Humanism, p. 9. 
S6 Ibid. p. 161. 
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enlightenment, their uncertain narration is actually born out of an attempt to step up to 
the author role. Sheehan does acknowledge this irony, noting that 'it is the pursuit of 
certainty that actuates the flights of rigorous logic, the mathematical gymnastics of 
permutation and enumeration, and the unstoppable flux of recall'. 57 Beckett's author-
narrators take on the rational, unifying perspective, but, as it transpires, their brand of 
reason is an inadequate tool for their investigations and often results in the discord of 
an inhuman narrative form. Beckett's inhuman narration is therefore a product of the 
inefficacy of human narrative forms. 
Having no alternative, Beckett's author-narrators persist with language and 
logic even as these faculties appear outmoded, resulting in the unproductive motions 
of uncanny narrative processes. This narrative form includes a mechanical aspect in 
its repetitive, incessant activity, but it is different to the humanistic mechanisms that 
Sheehan describes. The sovereign author who is able to render meaning explicit 
through a structured narrative is shown to be a mechanical figure in Sheehan's study, 
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efficiently processing relevant material and fabricating a final .. product, whereas 
modernism is composed of the inconstancy of 'voice'. As Sheehan writes: 'Machine, 
in short, is one of the prior conditions for making narrative comprehensible, whereas 
voice offers the chance for difference, variation and irregularity, pulling against 
narrative's machinelike precision,.s8 For Sheehan, it is usually voice that fragments a 
text and machine that makes writing coherent, but Beckett's author-narrators show 
that they are subject to patterns of thought and habitual behaviours that do not yield 
results. Since the mechanisms of narration rotate without a satisfactory product, the 
Beckettian creature is condemned to a mundane and desolate process. 
In The Unnamable, the narrator says: 'The only problem for me was how to 
S7 Ibid. p. 155. 
ss Ibid. p. 11. 
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continue, since I could not do otherwise, to the best of my declining powers, in the 
motion which had been imparted to me. This obligation, and the quasi-impossibility of 
fulfilling it, engrossed me in a purely mechanical way, excluding notably the free play 
of the intelligence and sensibility' (T, 322). The emphasis here is on continuation, as 
the narrator recognises a mechanical compulsion to keep speaking despite his 
'declining powers'. These declining powers signal the diminishing possibility of 
sating the obligation, although the chance of success clearly persists, which in turn 
perpetuates the duty to speak. The narrator therefore faces the contradiction of being 
locked into allotted motions, such as the contrivances of storytelling. Malone, for onc, 
'appears and disappears with the punctuality of clockwork, always at the same 
remove, the same velocity, in the same direction, the same attitude' (T, 296). The 
narrator of The Unnamable is at the centre of a mechanism that encircles him with 
familiar imperatives, figures and tropes. 
Yet, anticipating Derrida's use of 'free play' in his essay 'Structure, Sign and 
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' (1966) to describe the 'disruption of 
presence', the narrative voice in The Unnamable refers to the 'free play of the 
intelligence and sensibility', which respond to other stimulants besides the central 
structure of his obligation. 59 These suggestible cognitive and sensory faculties can 
distract the narrator from his established motions. As such, whilst the narrator 
recognises that 'It's a circuit, a long circuit' (T, 414), the possibility of difference is 
maintained: 'the play of lights is truly unpredictable. [ ... ] They are perhaps 
unwavering and fixed and my fitful perceiving the cause of their inconstancy' (T, 
296). Without achieving the full comprehension or appreciation suggested in 
intelligibility and sensibility, the stability of the system is susceptible to misprision 
59 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 292. 
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and encourages the narrator to reengage with the 'same old irresistible baloney' raised 
in the obligation to speak (T, 380). 
By accounting for a sense of system and free play in the obligation, Beckett 
problematizes the categories of voice and machine, making them virtually indistinct. 
Sheehan argues that The Unnamable integrates both voice and machine, labelling it 'a 
performative example of voice as machine'. 60 He suggests that a mechanical 
compulsion underwrites the mercurial nature of voice in Beckett's text, thereby 
positing the regular patterns and repetitive cycles associated with the machine as the 
source of the flux. The text is based on a 'mechanical impetus that the voice cannot 
cast off.6\ Beckett traces the voice's vacillation with such stamina in The Unnamable 
that, without quite exhausting voice, its capricious ways become more familiar and 
less organic. The structure of the obligation tempers the voice's ability to diverge so 
that the narrator surmises: 'What prevents the miracle is the spirit of method to which 
I ~ v e e perhaps been a little too addicted' (T, 305). The point to emphasise is that the 
machine, which Sheehan's study connects to humanistic narration but typically 
suggests something inhuman, is conflated with voice, which Sheehan appears to 
associate with the modernist shift away from the human. Since the possibilities of 
voice become part of a process in The Unnamable, the categories of machine and 
voice, human and inhuman, overlap to such an extent that the boundaries are 
obscured. The upshot is a creaturely composite, in which human and inhuman are in 
close proximity, or rather, the inhuman is actually what the human can become. 
The admixture of machine and voice, human and inhuman, is one way of 
thinking through the creaturely subjectivity endemic to a process of testifying for 
oneself through means that obstruct positive testimony. An undertaking that fixes on 
60 Shcehan, Modernism, Narrative and Humanism, p. 174. 
(,1 Ibid. 175. 
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the imperative to speak. as much as what is spoken engenders dehumanised witnesses, 
consumed by the effort to give voice to human experience. Taking the language and 
logical mechanics of human narrative structures to their extremes shows that an 
inhuman being is the potential of the human. The imperative to speak in Beckett 
reveals the human in a broken form and this presents problems for a conventional 
understanding of testimony that aspires to correlate event and self. Whereas testimony 
typically attempts to marry tale and teller in order to assert that an individual was 
present at an event, Beckettian testimony questions the degree to which a human 
subject is present in an account. 
In a variety of ways, Derrida and Agamben also illustrate how attempts to 
coincide identity and incident repeatedly fail, and that a juridical model of testimony 
is commonly unfulfilled. Nevertheless, it is through the continuous act of bearing 
witness to failure that the interplay between potency and impotence, machine and 
voice, human and inhuman, generates the outline of the human subject, even if that 
. outline is the residue of human properties that develops through or alongside an 
inhuman image. Derrida, one of the most influential figures in decentring the subject, 
notes that 'a fable is always and before all else speech,.62 To tell a story is to speak, 
regardless of the accuracy of the tale, and subsequently, invention will always convey 
an oratorical activity, which in turn intimates a speaking subject. It appears that a 
being is present within the act of enunciation, but as Agamben explicates, this 
ephemeral t y p e " ' ~ f f subjectivity is contrary to the idea of a complete identification with 
a stable foundation of self. 
In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben expands upon Michel Foucault's 
argument that 'enunciation is not a thing determined by real, definite properties; it is, 
62 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, p. 34. 
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rather, pure existence, the fact that a certain being -:: language - takes place,.63 This 
use of language at the moment it is employed emphasises the tongue of a speaker 
prior to its attendant semantic value and thus evidences a state of being, or rather, a 
simultaneous coming into being for both language and subject. Agamben goes on to 
relate the particular role that the pseudo-witness performs within this event: 'The 
authority of the witness consists in his capacity to speak solely in the name of an 
incapacity to speak - that is, in his or her being a subject' (italics in original),64 This 
paradoxical condition marks the witness as the pure existence achieved through a 
performance of language without secure semantic value. The witness is the host and 
bearer of a tenanted but inoperative language, conveying only the fact that language is 
happening, discrete from its signification. 
In Catherine Mill's essay on testimony in Agamben, she points out that the 
subject's 'sole point of reference is to language itself, and particularly the very taking 
place of enunciation,.6s This transitory subjectivity that relies on the performance of 
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language is a fundamental part of the precarious existential condition of Beckett's 
creatures. The relationship between speaking and subjectivity recurs most plainly in 
the fourth text of Beckett's Textsfor Nothing, a series of thirteen short texts originally 
written in French between 1950 and 1951. Coming shortly after the trilogy, these texts 
are equally concerned with the means to go on speaking, but since they average a 
couple of pages in length, the subjects they depict are remarkably evanescent. 
Nevertheless, Beckett's narrator in the fourth text identifies the fact that the act of 
speaking appears to imply a 'life': 'There's my life, why not, it is one if you like, if 
you must, I don't say no, this evening, There has to be one, it seems, once there is 
63 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 139. 
64 Ibid. p. 158. 
6S Catherine Mills, 'Linguistic Survival and Ethicality - Biopolitics, Subjectification, and Testimony in 
Remnants of Auschwitz', in Politics, Metaphysics, Death - Essays on Giorgio Agamben's 'Homo 
Sacer', ed. by Andrew Norris (London: Duke University, 2005). 198-221, p. 204. 
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speech, no need of a story, story is not compulsory' (TN, 18). The meaning of a story 
is unrequired since the words themselves manage to convey someone speaking. 
Enunciation continues to intimate a life despite the fact that who is speaking or what 
is spoken is unknowable. The resultant subject exists in the moment of language even 
as the source and substance of speech is divested from the narrative. 
However, since the subject is native to enunciation but devoid of the 
individuality achieved through story, the act of bearing witness injects a complex 
double movement into the first-person pronoun. To an extent, the witness is present in 
the'!' as the subject of speech, but this'!' also conveys the distance required to refer 
to the self, thus making the subject a perceived object. As Richard Begam express it, 
'the subject can know itself only by becoming the object of its own consciousness; but 
in becoming the object of its own consciousness it ceases to be itself, which is to say a 
subject' ,66 Furthermore, this universal and anonymous pronoun only ever replaces a 
more personal appellation, and is consequently an impersonal signifier used in lieu of 
the ability to speak from a position of complete identity. Hence, Mills describes the 
phenomenon of the pronoun as a synchronous possession and dispossession: 'the "I" 
marks the simultaneous appropriation and expropriation of the living being in 
language and their irreducible disjuncture,.67 The first-person pronoun always betrays 
the connection and disconnection inherent to self-referential speech. 
Beckett offers a distillation of this double movement in the opening lines of 
"'" The Unnamable. The phrase 'I say I' (T, 293) intimates both an owned and borrowed 
'I', the second of which serves to impair the authority of the initial utterance, thereby 
causing each to be marred by doubt. Whilst the initial self-reference implies an 
attachment to a person, the second'!' is detached as a figure of speech, which 
66 Begam, Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity, p. 69. 
67 Mills, 'Linguistic Survival and Ethicality', p. 205. 
109 
uncovers the representational function of both pronouns. The narrator expresses this 
destabilisation shortly after, saying 'I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not 
about me' (T, 293). Despite this, the phrase 'I say I' shows that the word 'say' 
remains in between the two damaged self-referential pronouns. By situating the 
enunciating 'mouth' in the middle of two 'eyes', Beckett appears to reveal the 
countenance of testimony. This face places emphasis on utterance, which is an activity 
that allows the speaker to discern the tenuous connection between pronoun and 
person, but also bears witness to this broken state of self-reflection. As a result, the 
witness demonstrates that testimony cannot achieve the unity of self and speech, and 
subsists instead as a residual subject that articulates the inability to speak. 
For Beckett's narrators, the use of language and the moment of utterance, 
alongside the recognition of these occurring activities, mark a tension between 
identification and alienation. His narrators are preoccupied with the self-constructing 
~ d d self-erasing movement of enunciation that Agamben notes. These tensions stem 
from a difficulty in negotiating the import of deixis (language dependent on context), 
firstly, and then the enduring connection between self and language. This moment of 
utterance raises a speaker, but, as a transient activity, enunciation is difficult to 
possess since it is predominantly without teleological direction. The lack of a proper 
system of semantics to allow narrative an accumulation of signification means 
enunciation yields a rather different view of self-identification because it relies on the 
present context and immediacy of speech, which discontinues reflection. There can be 
no development or accrued knowledge because language alone sustains the presence, 
and absence, of the individual. In a passage on Emile Benveniste, Matthew Calarco 
highlights the concurrence between self and language that feasibly restricts being to a 
contingent presence: 'If language is absent, there can be no self, and where there is a 
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self, there is always already language'. 6K Self and language are bound by their 
cohabitation and the mutuality of their relationship makes it difficult to view one as 
distinct from the other. It is impossible to individuate the information of language 
from the pure existence seen through enunciation. Any type of subjectivity gained 
through reflection will therefore be incomplete. 
On the doomed metaphysical task of returning language to its subject, 
Agamben writes that 'precisely this impossibility of conjoining the living being and 
language, phone and logos, the inhuman and the human - far from authorizing the 
infinite deferral of signification - is what allows for testimony' .69 Agamben perceives 
the human subject overcoming and surviving the partition between self and 
expression, or, more precisely, being partially constituted by a realisation of non-
identity. He infers that the figure of testimony emerges as a 'witness to its own 
disorder,.70 As we have seen, there is 'intimate extraneousness implicit in the act of 
speech', as the subject is at once part of and apart from the spoken word.71 According 
to Agamben, this kind of contradiction is also prevalent in the experience of shame, in 
which one simultaneously apprehends and wishes to escape selthood: '[f]lush is the 
remainder that, in every subjectification, betrays a desubjectification and that, in every 
desubjectification, bears witness to a subject'. 72 The red face of shame is the 
physiological result of being oneself and at the same time knowing oneself as an 
other. The pivotal idea is that shame is a sensation that includes and excludes the 
subject. 
For Catherine Mills, shame is 'something from which we cannot separate 
ourselves, but which simultaneously, we cannot fully take on or adopt as ours. The 
68 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies (New York: Columbia University, 2008), p. 83. 
69 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 130. 
70 Ibid. p. 106. 
71 Ibid. p. 117. 
72 Ibid. p. 112. 
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dilemma this creates for the subject is one of simultaneous subjectification' and 
desubjectification, wherein the subject is called to witness its own ruin'.73 The subject 
perceives the loss of self and is reconstituted by this process, which makes testimony 
possible and accounts for a unique type of subjectivity that resonates with Beckett's 
creatures. Images of ruin pervade Beckett's trilogy to convey the psychological and 
physical conditions of the characters, and also echo the ability to reflect on inability 
that absorbs Beckett's (in)sovereign narrators. The impotent-potent hybrid returns in 
the identity of ruins as the creatures acknowledge themselves as splintered figures. 
In Ma/one Dies, the bedridden narrator presents an arresting image of decay as 
both body and spirit are failing: 'give my body the old orders 1 know it cannot obey, 
turn to my spirit gone to rack and ruin' (T, 189). Malone resorts to stories to distract 
him for this deterioration, and yet he repeatedly recognises this division between 
reality and fiction as an aspect of his ruin. After a lengthy exposition of Sapo's 
e.,9counter with the Lamberts, Malone remarks: 'I shall hear myself talking, afar off, 
from my far mind, talking of the Lamberts, talking of myself, mY,mind wandering, far 
from here, among its ruin' (T, 216-7). The Beckettian vestige of subjectivity is 
realised through this perpetual rambling, in both senses of the word, about the 
dilapidated self. Malone's self-portrait of a detached other, talking and walking in the 
distance, effectively says 'I am not here', which demonstrates the concomitant 
presence and absence of self that causes Agamben to define testimony as that which 
bears witness to its own disorder. Malone frequently points out this disappointed self-
discovery: 'That which is seen, that which cries and writhes, my witless remains. 
Somewhere in this turmoil thought struggles on, it too wide of the mark. It too seeks 
me, as it always has, where I am not to be found' (T, 187). Though the self is elusive, 
73 Mills, 'Linguistic Survival and Ethicality', p. 203. 
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Malone continues to recognise a self that can be missed, and this kind of reflection on 
his state of ruin reveals traces of a subject privy to its own desubjectification. 
Malone's perspicacity on his ruined identity recurs in The Unnamable. The 
narrator explains how the value of words vanish because he is no longer present in his 
thoughts: 'To tell the truth, let us be honest at least, it is some considerable time now 
since I last knew what I was talking about. It is because my thoughts are elsewhere. I 
am therefore forgiven. So long as one's thoughts are somewhere everything is 
permitted' (T, 325). As with Malone, the narrator's self-presence is split into the 
current speaker and the thinker elsewhere. Nevertheless, the very possibility of 
thought residing in a remote place means the speaker belongs to its constituent other, 
which sustains the narrator's partial existence as a ruin. That is, the narrator's 
recognition of absence preserves the sense of presence. It is this coincidental dynamic 
that makes the art of failure, pure enunciation and ruined identity central to testimony 
in that these accounts always stipulate a kind of dissociation that at least alludes to the 
participating subject. The identity in ruins in Beckett is the residual subjectivity from 
articulating the inability to speak, whereby the fracture of self becomes the substance 
of testimony. 
Testimony of Fiction 
Whilst reflection fails to unite the speaking subject and the perceived object, the 
.... 
continuing acts of testimony outline the absent self, or 'not-I', to throw up an 
impression of self that is always short of totality. This is a creaturely dimension 
because the subject is an identity in action, exposed to the process of creation, and, 
moreover, because it involves conceiving self alongside other creations or projections 
of the self. The circumnavigation of complete self-identification in The Unnamable 
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inspires fictional elements, which in turn contribute to the narrator's disintegration, 
'ruined as I am and still young in this abjection they have brought me to' (T, 354). It is 
the implicit sign of testimony found in these figments of the imagination to which I 
now turn. 
In an interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida defines the subject as a 'finite 
experience of non-identity to self. 74 However, in keeping with his philosophy of 
presence, which takes issue with this finitude, Derrida adopts Antonin Artaud's rubric 
'subjectile'. as a term that evinces the intermediate site of difference and the division 
of idcntity.75 For Asja Szafraniec, the narrator of The Unnamable is a victim of the 
subjectile's helical infinity, condemned to a futile search for self that spawns and 
depletes two prosthetic guises, namely Mahood's eternal self-reflection, or not dying, 
and Worm's complete lack of reflection, or not being born.76 If, as Szafraniec affirms, 
The Unnamable is the text closest to undoing the system of identity through fictional 
~ r k s s because it is '[ u ]nable to close the circuit, not even by prosthesis', the 
conclusion must be that these fictional edifices obscure the. 'real' identity that 
fabricates them, that these voices are simply an annex and not part of the subject. 77 It 
is my contention in this final section that the fictional constructs are fundamental to 
the ruins of subjectivity in Beckett. The author-narrators gift a voice to others in a 
critical attempt to efface and desubjectify themselves. Thus, the internal avatars offer 
the opportunity to reinforce the divided nature of enunciation. They perform the 
crucial role of fabling in the sense of generating speech and encourage the important 
74 Jacques Derrida, '''Eating WeIJ''. or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques 
Derrida', in Who Comes After The Subject?, ed. by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Con nor and lean-Luc Nancy 
(London: RoutJedge, 1991), 96-119, p. 104. 
75 See Jacques Derrida, 'Maddening the Subjectile', trans. by Mary Ann Caws, Yale French Studies, 84 
(1994), pp. 154-171. 
76 Asja Szafraniec. Beckett. Derrida and the Event of Literature (Stanford, CA: Stanford University. 
2007). p. 130. 
77 Szafraniec, Beckett. Derrida and the Event of Literature, p. 127. 
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state of mediation within writing that is a condition of the personal and impersonal 
relationship with language. 
Beckett attends to the filtered and kaleidoscopic composit!on of the subject in 
Mol/oy: 'Chameleon in spite of himself, there you have Molloy, viewed from a certain 
angle' (T, 30). Beckett refers to a changeable identity, capable of assuming different 
forms, all of which are components of the subject, despite the lack of a core self. Each 
new guise is not the sum of the authorial'!', or a route to self-knowledge, but 
necessarily a persona, a manifestation of the partially desubjectified state of identity. 
The mUltiple and often fictional voices that invade Beckett's narrators are a failing 
gesture in the totalised vision of the subject, but it is a failure that serves a purpose in 
the study of the self-conscious experience of the subject. The subject must surrender 
its totality to self-reflectively fold back on oneself, not in a psychoanalytical sense of 
working through layers and depths, but in a relational sense, in order to realise the 
estranged coordinates of the subject. As such, this act is a detachment from self to be 
with self, a veritable 'inclusive exclusion', which is exemplified by the double nature 
of the word 'cleave': bound by an incision, intimate at the site ofrupture.78 
The polyphony apparent in Beckett's trilogy is the principal focus in the late 
prose text Company (1980), and it worth a brief detour into this dissection of inner 
voices before returning to the trilogy to see how fictional voices can contribute to 
testimony. In Company, the narrator attempts to bear witness to the act of one's own 
--,1\..f 
speaking by detaching the speaking self from the spoken self. The narrator 
materialises in dual form through a 'pronominal pas de deux', as he speaks in second 
person to a companion who symbolises the narrator also. 79 By announcing his 
78 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 27. In Malone Dies, Beckett illustrates the ambivalence of 'cleave'. Two 
lovers fonn a unity, 'cleave so fast together that they seem a single body', and are then distinctly 
separate beings, 'each enclosed within its own frontiers' (T, 238). 
79 Ackerley and Gontarski, The Grove Companion 10 Beckell, p. 107. 
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inventions and being 8nnounced as that invention, this bifurcated perspective amoUnts 
to a comprehensive s e l f ~ p r o j e c t i o n n since both act and subject matter are directed 
towards a veiled self-reflection, or rather, self-creation. Beckett essentially offers 
another variation of the author as creature theme since the narrator acknowledges that 
he is a 'Devised deviser devising it all for company' (C, 30). Although the narrator is 
able to utter himself into existence and compose a vision of himself as the subject of 
language, the two - act and content - remain separate. By necessity, the narrator is 
internally alienated, keeping a united identity at arm's length and re-imagining 
himself before articulating the 'you' that he deceptively inhabits. 
The narrator of Company effectively assumes roles as author and character, 
developing a speaking voice and listening confidante to objectify the story. The 
narrator's process is often available to him: 
Might not the hearer be improved? Made more companionable if not 
downright human. Mentally perhaps there is room for enlivenment. An attempt 
at reflexion at least. At recall. At speech even. Conation of some kind however 
feeble. A trace of emotion. Signs of distress. A sense of failure. Without loss 
of character. (C, 17) 
This characterisation is also a study of character; it is criteria for self-assessment as 
well as creation. In satisfying each of the specifications (reflexion, conation, emotion), 
the narrator improves his three-dimensional portrait and brings his ipseity into focus, 
revealing to himself his own capacities. Company, then, has the peculiar effect of 
presenting and effacing its subject. It throws its voice and creates the illusion of 
multiple presences when, in fact, a single presence has been split to establish a 
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conversation between its constituent parts. As such, the '1', the enunciating person, is 
absent: 'Nowhere to be found. Nowhere to be sought. The unthinkable last of all. 
Unnamable. Last person. I.' (e, 15). In turn, the narrator largely refrains from using 
the first-person pronoun to avoid phrases such as 'I said', which would suggest a more 
obvious autobiographical mode that neatly connects the present and past. 
The narrator's abstract scenario in Company is framed by a series of memories 
made complex by their resemblance to Beckett's life experiences. James Knowlson's 
celebrated biography details several passages that 'relate' to the author's past. Even 
so, Knowlson is careful not to overlook their merit as artistic devices, particularly 
since the narrative thrusts imagination to the forefront of the tale, which tempers the 
inclination to see a definite correlation between implied author and narrative 
techniques. On the contrary, memory is seen as a protean faculty that alters details and 
facts with each rendition.so In The End, for example, Beckett writes: 'A small boy, 
stretching out his hands and looking up at the blue sky, asked his mother how such a 
thing was possible. Fuck off, she said' (FN, 39). The episode returns as an alternative 
version in Ma/one Dies, where the reply is: 'It is precisely as far away as it appears to 
be' (T, 270). This memory finds a marginally different fonn in Company, in which the 
narrator remembers 'asking her if it is not in reality much more distant than it appears. 
The sky that is' (C, 5). The response is more implicit: 'For she shook off your little 
hand and made you a cutting retort you have never forgotten' (C, 6). Although the 
#;lH 
'fuck off in the first appearance of the memory echoes in the 'shook off of the third, 
the series of alterations leaves the episode without a fixed centre. As Knowlson notes, 
'there is then considerable doubt as to which version might represent authentic 
memory' .81 Consequently, the narrator of Company is unable to use the past to explain 
80 See Knowlson, Damned (0 Fame, pp. 652-3. 
81 Ibid. p. 652. 
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the present etiologically: 'How current situation arrived at unclear. No that then to 
compare to this now' (C. 29). Although memory appears to provide access to a former 
world with scenes that are fully realised and summoned at will, they are always 
present views of past events. As opposed to a conception of memory that founds a 
system of concatenation and spans the gulf between the author's and characters' 
voices, the power of remembrance actually occupies a place in the temporal now. 
subject to the witness's current disposition, contemporaneous influences and lexical 
decisions. Memory in Company is a misleading device, designed to add further voices 
and personae to the text. 
Given the preference for the second-person narrative mode and the subsequent 
multiplication of figments, it can be inferred that Beckett is essentially playing with 
the form of a Kunstlerroman (a novel on the formation of its artist). In one respect. 
Beckett's Company chronicles the creation of its narrator by selecting formative 
events and reticulating voices that imply an observing deviser. At the same time, the 
..J 
text also orphans the narrator. who necessarily speaks himself into a new existence 
that is both presence and absence. That is, Beckett presents a narrator who inserts 
biographical vignettes and studies himself in a kind of schizophrenic projection of 
self, yet filters this sense of identity with a framework of othemess that dislocates the 
announcing 'I', displaces the sovereign author and demands the text's autonomy. The 
text is oddly autobiographical, but in a way that foregrounds the creaturely dynamics 
of self-reflective partitioning and fictional constructs as opposed to a direct correlation 
between the writing and the self. 
Jean-Luc Nancy proposes that 'there is not, nor has there ever been any 
presence-to-self that would not call into question the distance from self that this 
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presence demands,.82 It is this paradoxical nature of identity, always constituted by 
the space between presences, that Beckett hits upon in the last word of Company: 
'Alone' (C, 42). This word attempts to say 'I am alone', as though the voices are 'all 
one', but already there is the impression of duality. 'A lone', as in a lone person, 
offers recognition of that isolation to split the self into the observed and the observer; 
the one who is lonely and the one who recognises he or she is alone. In this single 
word, we see the self dividing itself into object and subject, pointing out the necessary 
severance of self that such a self-conscious assertion would require. In effect, the 
narrator is making company up to and including the final utterance of the text. 
In its exploration of the implicit distance within self-presence, Company is 
comparable to Maurice Blanchot's 1994 text The Instant of My Death. Set in 1944, the 
narrator in Blanchot's text reflects on a young man's narrow escape from execution at 
the hands of what first appear to be German soldiers but, as it transpires, are members 
of the Vlassov army, allies of the Nazis. Yet, as Derrida makes known in Demeure 
with the aid of a personal letter from Blanchot - an article of evidence that introduces 
a historical and biographical edge to Derrida's reading of literature - the narrative 
viewpoint in The Instant of My Death suggests a familiarity or intimacy with the 
protagonist's episode and implies that the two presences have a single source in 
Blanchot's own biography. Far from suggesting unity, however, this short text offers a 
representation of memory and autobiography by evoking the distance between the 
present and the said event or remembered self. As a result, Derrida recognises the 
liminal space between testimony and literature, and later, testimony and fiction. He 
writes: 
82 lean-Luc Nancy in Derrida, 'Eating Well', p. 102. 
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[I]f testimony e thereby became proof, information, certainty, or archive, it 
would lose its function as testimony. In order to remain testimony, it must 
therefore allow itself to be haunted. It must allow itself to be parasitized by 
precisely what it excludes from its inner depths, the possibility, at least, of 
literature. 83 
As previously mentioned, testimony is rooted in uncertainty for Derrida .. A witness 
can swear an oath, yet his or her deposition is not purely objective or direct 
knowledge; testimony is always the retrospective act of bearing witness encumbered 
by fallacy. Blanchot's evocation of this distinction encourages Derrida to trace 'the 
meshes of the net formed by the limits between fiction and testimony, which are also 
interior each to the other'. 84 According to Derrida, there is fiction within testimony 
and testimony within fiction. The crossover takes place due to the testifying 'I"s 
inability to account for what the pronoun signifies without becoming, in some sense, a 
...J 
fictional 'I'. As Jennifer Yusin suggests, testimony r e v e a ~ s s 'the failure of 
autobiography to maintain its status as biography. It would seem, then, that any 
attempt at autobiography becomes fiction as the 1 announces, as Blanchot claims, its 
inherent failure and absence'. 85 The error of testimony emerges in the intervals 
between experience, memory and enunciation, meaning that the language of testimony 
will always be in excess of its motivation and imply a degree of fiction. 
In relation to Beckett's trilogy, the crucial point of interest in Derrida's 
reading of Blanchot is the way in which testimony might figure in fiction and the 
resultant possibility of tracing the fictional reconstruction of self - the young man or 
83 Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, published with The Instant of My Death, by 
Maurice Blanchot, both trans. by Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2000), p 30. 
~ 4 4 Derrida, Demeure, p. 56. 
8 ~ ~ Jennifer Yusin, 'Writing the Disaster: Testimony and The Instant of My Death', Colloquy, Text 
Theory Critique, 10 (Victoria: Monash University, 2005), 134-149, p. 137. 
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the 'he' in Blanchot - back to a testifying voice of sorts as a manifestation of the 
suppressed author-narrator. The possibility of identifying an originary voice amongst 
a cast of figments queries whether the substitute voices in Beckett's trilogy are figures 
ofprosopopoeia (a rhetorical device by which an imaginary, absent, or dead person is 
represented as speaking or acting), or rather heteronyms (voices imagined by a writer 
to produce idiomatic writing styles), as David Jones proposes. Prosopopoeia 
essentially gives a mask and thus a 'face' to a source, whilst heteronym poses 'other' 
constructed voices. Jones opts for heteronym because '[p]rosopopoeia may ultimately 
promise a return to intelligibility; as a rhetoric figure adopted by a particular speaker, 
it looks forward to the moment at which the mask will be lowered and the speaker's 
"true" voice restored' .86 Beckett's narrators, in texts such as The Unnamable, exert 
themselves to consolidate the multiplicity of voices and return to the singular subject, 
but, strictly speaking, this endeavour is in vain if SUbjectivity is considered as a 
complete identification with self. In this latter respect, Jones'. adoption of heteronym 
to describe the narrative dynamic in Beckett's work is a prudent position. 
However, prosopopoeia remains relevant as a term that emphasises the 
ownership between creator and creature, ventriloquist and dummy, rather than 
suggesting that these voices are completely distinct and individual, which is not the 
impression we get in Beckett.87 The narrative voice in The Unnamable suggests, 'I 
cannot be silent. About myself I need know nothing. Here all is clear. No, all is not 
clear. But th;'discourse must go on. So one invents obscurities. Rhetoric.' (T, 296) 
These rhetorical figures are conjured to exercise the voice whilst the search for self is 
adjourned. The prosopopoeia of speaking through another is therefore incorporated 
86 Jones, Samuel Beckett and Testimony, p. 21. 
87 Heteronymy is more congruent to David Jones' reading of How 11 Is (1964): 'In How 11 Is, 
specifically, it becomes impossible to distinguish the speech of the witness from the speech of the 
other: because the distinction between 'original' and citational discourse collapses, testimony, here, is 
always spoken through the other', Jones, Samuel Beckett and Testimony, p. 70. 
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into the creative awareness of Beckett's trilogy. The obscure 'troop of lunatics' (T, 
310) inhabits a melting pot of subjectification and desubjectification, caught between 
testimony and fiction, so that the creatures are not clearly demarcated from one 
another. These identities are mobile and interchangeable to the point that each voice 
appears to emanate from the last, each implying an origin, even if it is not identifiable. 
The initial 'M' for Beckett's narrator-authors, for instance, causes them to coalesce. 
These names have a strong visual and oral connection that suggests a genealogy going 
back to Murphy. In the trilogy itself, Beckett's characters are subject to mutation, 
which is evident in Moran's invocation of Molloy as Mollose (T, 113), Sapo's change 
to Macmann in Malone Dies (T, 229-30) and Basil's transformation into Mahood 
before the ambiguous relationship between Mahood and Worm in The Unnamable (T, 
311, 340). Each creature begets an other and it is this metamorphosis of identity that 
at least indicates a path back to the source. 
It might be more accurate to say that prosopopoeia and heteronymy clash in 
Beckett's work and in doing so, maintain an indecisive narrative, with the former 
fundamentally inspiring a pursuit of the host and the latter de stabilising that single 
identity. Malone suggests as much in one of his many returns from the fictional world 
of Macmann back to the self-awareness of his position as a writer in the hospital 
room: 
perhaps we'll all come back, reunited, done with parting, done with prying on 
one another, back to this foul little den all dirty white and vaulted, as though 
hollowed out of ivory, an old rotten tooth. Or alone, back alone, as alone as 
when I went, but I doubt it, I can hear them from here, clamouring after me 
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down the corridors, stumbling through the rubble, beseeching me to take them 
with me. (T, 237) 
Malone realises the possibility of assembling the constituent voices in his mind and 
also abandoning the voices to reveal his solitariness. As the 'Murphys, Merciers, 
Molloys, Morans and Malones' (T, 237) continue to implore the narrator, the image of 
ruins appears through the 'rubble' to suggest a demolished subject. By observing his 
ruins overrun with figments, however, some part of the self is reflecting on the 
uncertainty over self-presence that the voices precipitate and thus bearing witness to 
its own disorder. This creaturely subjectivity means that the fictional beings can act as 
figures of alterity that offer the host a relative value, even if his central position is 
inaccessible or untenable. By saying these voices do not amount to self, it seems that, 
rather than overwhelm the narrator, Malone gets a sustained view of himself as a 
deferred presence. Although the voices may stem from the narrator as figures of 
prosopopoeia that act in his absence, they also show that Malone is not completely 
absorbed in them and so these heteronymic voices are different to him, which 
ultimately helps to satisfy the cogito. 
In The Unnamable, the narrator experiences a range 'of different relationships 
with the figments that emerge. The initial reason for developing these fictional voices 
is to achieve the one true voice preserved in prosopopoeia. The possibility of 
retrieving an originary identity is the motivation behind the narrator's attempt to 
indulge and subsequently disband surplus voices, which would re-establish the site of 
creation. In a precursor to the 'Alone' of Company, the narrator of The Unnamable 
recognises his precarious position from the outset: 'I shall not be alone in the 
beginning. I am of course alone. Alone. That is soon said. Things can be soon said. 
123 
.' 
And how can one be sure, in such darkness? I shall have company. In the beginning. 
A few puppets. Then I'll scatter them, to the winds, if! can' (T, 294). The narrator is 
uncertain whether he is alone and therefore resolves to have company. It is only the 
dissolution of other voices that will confirm the solitariness of the narrator in the end. 
That is, only after his company has departed will he recognise the vacillations of his 
aporetic and ephectic discourse as himself alone. As such, the narrator contemplates 
the crowd of past protagonists, and, in an echo of the earlier lines, remarks: 'I'll 
scatter them, and their miscreated puppets. Perhaps I'll find traces of myself (T, 327). 
In this formulation, the voices cover a subject that lies beneath or behind their activity, 
but dispersing these creatures will help to identify the creator. 
The narrator is impelled to refer to his fictional constructs in order to 
undertake a process of elimination that will recognise and dispel fiction in order to 
identify his reality negatively. The narrator states: 'First I'll say what I'm not, that's 
hJw they taught me to proceed, then what I am' (T, 328). The oppressive 'they' that 
lurk in this passage and insist that their negative technique is a passage to self-
discovery is the same cohort of voices that move to usurp the narrator's presence. The 
upshot of the narrator's impression of reality against the touchstone of fiction is that 
the faintest knowledge of his situation cannot be achieved or expressed without a 
degree of fiction: 'All these Murphys, Molloys and Malones do not fool me. They 
have made me waste my time, suffer for nothing, speak of them when, in order to stop 
speaking, I should have spoken of me and of me alone. But I just said I have spoken 
of me, am speaking of me' (T, 305). The contemplation of his puppets here means the 
narrator inadvertently stumbles upon a passage dedicated to him. Thus, the narrator of 
The Unnamable can only attest to himself through the portal of fiction. 
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The prevalence of surrogate voices means the narrator is caught up in fiction 
for lengthy periods, to the extent that the voices encroach upon his identity. By 
focusing on what he is not, the narrator invests himself into the cohort of voices, 
moving from the negative identification of the elimination project to a sustained 
confabulation alongside heteronymic voices. It is therefore imperative that the 
narrator recognises these voices as substitutes if he is to maintain the possibility of an 
independent identity, as when he reflects: 'I thought 1 was right in enlisting these 
sufferers of my pains. I was wrong. They never suffered my pains, their pains are 
nothing, compared to me, a mere tittle of mine, the tittle I thought I could put from 
me, in order to witness it' (T, 305). The narrator clearly attempts to transfer his issues 
to the prosthetic figures, but fortuitously they cannot be employed as like-for-like 
replacements. The consolation is that the incompatibility of the fictional voices allows 
the narrator to comprehend the identity crisis that is undoubtedly his own. 
The narrator also suggests that although the fictional voices tend to efface the 
single authorial voice, they might also demonstrate his character in action. Rather than 
use the creatures as fictional others to offset his real voice, this 'dirty pack of fake 
maniacs' (T, 371) are reduced to a facet of the narrator's own personality, namely his 
'inaptitude'. He says, 'Perhaps all they have told me has reference to a single 
existence, the confusion of identities being merely apparent and due to my inaptitude 
to assume any' (T, 333). It is significant that the narrator should take ownership of 
inaptitude beciuse it means that although his creatures consume him, his subjectivity 
can consist in his being consumed, aware of himself buried 'behind my mannikins' (T, 
308). Beckett offers a concise articulation of how the subject is constituted by failure 
in his 1930 poem 'Whoroscope' and the expression 'Fallor, ergo sum!' ('I fail, 
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therefore I am,).88 The more these figures take over in The Unnamable, then, the more 
the narrator realises this invasion as a repercussion of his defining property. 
Effectively, the narrator can testify to his role in his own ruin at the hands of his 
interlocutors. 
As encounters with non-identity become increasingly relevant to the 
experience of subjectivity, the multitude of occasions in which Beckett's narrators 
claim that self-knowledge is banished from them and that speech is 'not-I' take on 
new significance. Towards the end of his assignment, Moran feels a 'growing 
resignation to being dispossessed of self (T, 149) as he gradually deteriorates to 
resemble his target MoIloy. Curiously, however, this transformation would not only 
inadvertently complete Moran's investigation by 'discovering' a Molloy-like 
condition, but also improve his sense of identity precisely by assimilating the stranger: 
.J Physically speaking it seemed to me I was now becoming rapidly 
unrecognisable. And when I passed my hands over my face, in a characteristic 
and now more than ever pardonable gesture, the face my hands felt was not 
my face any more, and the hands my face felt were my hands no longer. [ ... ] 
And this belly I did not know remained my belly, myoid belly, thanks to I 
know not what intuition. And to tell the truth I not only knew who I was, but I 
had a sharper and clearer sense of my identity than ever before, in spite of its 
deep lesions and the wounds with which it was covered. (T, 170-71) 
Previously, Moran had prided himself on a disciplined mind-set founded on 
sovereignty over self and authority over his son. Yet, the more Moran' s impression of 
RH See Samuel Beckett. Selected Poems. /930-/989 (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), p. 6. 
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his outward appearance slips and he loses grip of his regimented self-image, the more 
these ephemeral fa9ades give way to a profound recognition of the self that lies 
beneath. In other words, as he becomes a ruin of his previous state he can come to 
recognise a constitutive difference between the ordered past and disordered present. 
It is a paradoxical event in which contact with an unfamiliar version of oneself 
induces a strong sense of identity. Such a moment, it can be suggested, implies that 
the experience of desubjectification is the key component of the fictional prostheses 
and their oppressive voices in Beckett's work. This is a feature that doubles strikingly 
as a passage into testimony in that only through speaking about an other will the 
identity in ruins be available. In Yusin's essay on Blanchot, she goes as far as to claim 
that '[a]s much as testimony may assume the autobiographical voice that writes about 
a singular experience, it is fiction that opens the creative space in which the I is able to 
write as an 1'.89 Fiction indicates an acceptance of the pronoun's personal and 
impersonal characteristics, it confesses and performs its inherent failure, which, on the 
contrary, testimony tries to eschew when it employs the 'I'. As such, testimony is the 
bedfellow of fiction, despite its prefigured attempts to conceal this proximity. The 
point here is that fiction haunts every attempt at testimony and that creativity is the 
necessary ingredient in realising the unattainability of truth. The same holds true for 
Beckett, whose texts bear witness to the fact that the mediatory practice of writing as 
an'!, attests to the failure of testimony. Nevertheless, Beckett's narrators come to rely 
on fiction fotany recognition or documentation of their existence, despite it being 
permeated by the exclusion and desubjectification not usually related to judicial 
testimony. 
89 Yusin, 'Writing the Disaster: Testimony and The Instant of My Death', p. 142. 
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This chapter has shown that Beckett's trilogy resonates with rather unorthodox 
concepts of testimony that focus on the spaces between seeing and saying, event and 
account. The fallibility of the witness and the dissociation inherent to retrospect are 
most intense in Holocaust testimony, but the same issues apply to Beckett's author-
narrators to render them both ignorant and impotent, and yet oddly cognizant of their 
deficiencies. Beckett's thorough engagement with an art of failure precipitates 
contingent narrative and fractious subjective conditions that show up the inefficacy of 
epistemological and expressive modes proper to the human. The obligation to speak 
and inability to speak conspire to make Beckett's author-narrators creaturely subjects, 
bound to creation. I have introduced the term (in)sovereignty to describe the 
concomitant potency and impotence that makes up Beckett's creaturely aesthetic. A 
similar duality contributes to the identity in ruins that describes the simultaneous 
possession and dispossession of self that marks Beckett's creatures. Although the 
cryaturely dynamics I have traced depart from the standards notion of a sovereign 
witness and human subject, Beckett's creatures offer an ontological position that 
retains testimonial value and subjective viability despite the crises in language and 
identity. Bearing witness to the event and the self inevitably leaves things unsaid or 
incomplete, but it is an awareness of the impossibility of speaking and knowing 
through the performance of language and trying to understand that attests to the 
lacunae left by the thing itself. 
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2. Power 
Master-Servant Relationships 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Beckett's creaturely aesthetic undermines 
the artistic foundations of sovereign power and reconstitutes testimonial value from 
the detritus of competent practice. In the wartime and post-war context of physical 
hardship, ideological destabilisation and artistic inadequacy, Beckett's engagement 
with ignorance and impotence offers an apt focus on powerlessness. Thus far my 
analysis of testimony in Beckett's trilogy has concentrated on the 'sovereign as 
creature' dynamic that impacts individual characters. This chapter traces the abject 
state of Beckett's creatures back to other figures of power to explicate what it means 
to be a subject and a fellow creature. Instead of focusing on author-narrators, the aim 
here is to follow a series of attachments and confrontations between characters, or 
master and servant relationships, to analyse the nature of power as it is exercised, 
challenged and neutralized in Beckett. These master-servant relationships show how 
figures of authority are preserved to keep stable identities based on binaries, but also 
that power is frequently destabilised in codependent relationships. 
The German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel explicates the codependency between 
lord and bondsman in relation to identity thinking in the seminal chapter 
'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage' in his 
first major work Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Hegel explains how consciousness 
must escape itself to gain knowledge of itself and that this '[s]elf-consciousness 
achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness'.' The meeting of two self-
conscious beings triggers a struggle for superiority that aims to prove the value and 
'0. W. F. Hegel, The Hege/ Reader, ed. by Stephen Houlgate, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), p. 91. 
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freedom of the self. Ironically, the victorious lord becomes a dependent force, reliant 
on the bondsman to mediate his self-consciousness. However, for Hegel, the struggle 
engineers the extreme conditions of 'dread' and 'fear' in which threat allows the 
bondsman to recognise himself. Furthermore, the bondsman's work objectifies his 
being, thereby allowing him to 'possess his independence in thinghood' ,2 Antibiosis, 
according to Hegel, presents a kind of symbiosis whereby antagonisms between two 
foreign bodies reveal the self to consciousness, causing identity to thrive. 
This 'self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude' is a significant 
repercussion that justifies the use of the master-servant coupling over master-slave 
and lord-bondsman variations since it highlights the strength a servant can extract 
from work.3 The OED defines 'servant' as '[o]ne who is under the obligation to 
render certain services to, and to obey the orders of, a person or a body of persons, 
especially in return for wages or salary' ,4 This payment is one motivation to offer 
service, yet the servant's usefulness to a master lends this subordinate role a power of 
~ ~ . 
its own. The servant has the ability to unsettle power roles, both coincidentally, as 
Hegel shows, and through voluntary submission, as typified by the ascetic servant of 
God whose self-discipline and abstention offers purpose whilst inducing reverence 
from others. The term 'servant' thus comes to 'express a relation to the Sovereign', as 
in 'servant of the state' or a 'public servant'. The servant effectively has a dual level 
as both anonymous worker subject to the master and influential counterpart through 
his or her indispensible service. 
Master and servant identities are unstable, liable to oscillate or have a 
contradictory nature. As such, the narrative condition of (in)sovereignty, in which a 
position of power enfolds a position of impotence, finds an equivalent in the master-
2 Hegel, The Hege/ Reader, p. 95. 
3 Ibid. p. 98. 
4 OED online, <www.oed.com>. 
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servant relationship. Waiter Benjamin asserts that the sovereign power to decide and 
o v e ~ d e e decisions means the sovereign is 'confined to the world of creation; he is the 
lord of creatures, but he remains a creature'. 5 In carrying out a narrative, this 
'sovereign as creature' simultaneously occupies the peak of power and trough of 
impotence. But the sovereign creature also emerges as a social dynamic when the 
master relies on the servant for distinction and, in extreme cases, resorts to inhuman or 
monstrous levels of brutality in order to dominate an other. The master is degraded in 
order to rule; he is a creature simultaneously amongst and above creatures. In this 
way, the master-servant binary is destabilised to the extent that sovereign power 
encloses creaturely weaknesses and vice versa. The codependency between master 
and servant essentially marks a point of tension in the power struggle that can 
decentre power altogether. 
After an exposition of the socio-political and artistic transitions in France during 
the early years of the Second World War, the opening sections of this chapter interpret 
the service granted to patriarchal forms of mastery in Beckett's Watt and the 
creaturely state of melancholy in Waiting/or Godot. Not only do these texts represent 
Beckett's steps towards refreshing literary styles and content in prose and drama 
respectively, they also share an interest in how single figures of authority sustain 
power systems and dictate narrative momentum. Read together, the two texts convey 
the influence of absent others and the habit of projecting and preserving masters to 
combat the fear of abandonment. Beckett's work both invokes and undermines 
transcendental authority, I suggest, but whilst he deprecates metanarratives, they 
nevertheless remain as a potential to govern his characters. 
'Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 85. 
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The stability that an overarching narrative offers is found to a lesser extent in 
the distinction of binary roles. The second half of the chapter follows the movement 
from superhuman to subhuman others, considering the complex identity issues 
between the Nazis and Jews, and how the resulting conflicts < relate to deep-rooted 
tensions between human and animal identities, to comment upon the necessary alterity 
in Beckett's work. As the impossibility of self-identity denies independence, Beckett's 
characters attempt to develop identity through externalised conflicts. In turn, the 
pseudo-couples are deprived of singularity and are subject to neighbourly 
codependency. The biopolitical tensions of these antagonistic and compulsory power 
struggles are the primary focus of the later sections of the chapter, which move to 
expound the multifaceted apparatus of authority. With reference to Michel Foucault's 
readings of sovereign power and Agamben's analysis of the biopolitics of the Third 
Reich, I address issues of territory and care in examples from a number of Beckett's 
t9xts from the immediate post-war period, including The Expelled (French 1946; 
English 1962), The End, Mercier and Camier (written in French in 1946; French 
1970; English 1974), and Mol/oy. The organisation of space in Beckett reveals a 
political juncture at which welfare for the same crosses into violence towards the 
other. By bringing Beckett's master-servant relationships into view alongside the 
context of the Second World War and the Holocaust, this chapter on power serves to 
illuminate the artistic and extra-literary axis where compositional tensions meet socio-
political and ethical issues. 
Exercising Writing: Fascist Regime Against Liberal Art 
During Beckett's 1936-7 trip to Germany, in which he visited many art galleries and 
made friends with several artists including Karl Ballmer and Willem Grimm, he wrote 
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to Thomas MacGreevy, noting: 'the campaign against "Art-Bolshevism" is only just 
beginning,.6 Beckett anticipated what he was to witness first-hand during his stay: the 
diminishing presence of art that failed to support the ideals of the totalitarian state. 
The Third Reich's censorship of 'degenerate' art, particularly the Commission of 
Confiscation of July 1937, was enforced by the Reichskulturkammer to temper liberal 
dissent. For David Weisberg, the Fascist regime called for the 'destruction of cultural 
freedom in order to consolidate social control and maintain the repression of 
I 
democratic dissent'. 7 He goes on to argue that this suppression of artistic freethinking 
conditions Beckett's political outlook since 'it threatened the only social matrix in 
which his writing might make sense,.8 
Weisberg regards the open-minded and intellectual avant-garde creative scene 
as crucial to Beckett's reception in that the burgeoning experimentalism after Murphy 
would require an audience receptive to inventive literature. Beckett's early work in 
English was relatively unsuccessful, Murphy itself having been rejected by forty 
publishers and its eventual publisher Routledge selling only 618 of the 1500 first 
printing in the eight years after its untimely appearance in 1938.9 As a result, the 
French market would have appealed to Beckett, both artistically for the Parisian 
'bohemian' sensibilities during the 1930s and commercially for a fresh start after the 
war, thus offering Beckett both a congenial literary community and a new potential 
audience. Indeed, he was very much a struggling writer before the war, and, besides 
developing an" artistic network, Beckett's formative years were spent negotiating the 
6 Beckett, Letters, Vol. 1, p. 387. 
7 Weisberg, Chronicles o/Disorder, pp. 43-4. 
8 Ibid. p. 43 
9 Carlton Lake, No Symbols Where None intended: A Catalogue 0/ Books, Manuscripts, and Other 
Material Relating to Samuel Beckett in the Collection o/the Humanities Research Center (Austin. TX: 
The Center, 1984), p. 44. 
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wake of his artistic precursors and the contemporaneous literary voices after the Great 
War. 
However, in the context of Beckett's clandestine existence in the rural south of 
France during the Nazi occupation of Paris, his literary approach acquired an 
immediacy and significance that was missing prior to the start of the Second World 
War. Beckett mainly wrote the experimental novel Watt whilst taking refuge in La 
Croix, near the unoccupied village of Roussillon. Naturally, in the early to mid 1940s, 
Beckett's writing was secondary to his work with the French Resistance and his 
manual labour on the Audes' farm. I 0 Yet, the fact that Beckett continued to write 
suggests that creativity is a required act; it is imperative to exercise the ability to 
write. He later recognised how important writing was for his spell in the Vaucluse 
region, pointing out the mental succour it provided: 'Without my writing I would have 
gone mad'.lI It seems that writing fiction allowed Beckett to keep his bearings on 
reality. 
Beckett's reliance on writing during this difficult period appears to act as a 
private resistance to the maddening wartime conditions. Such a retreat to writing 
complicates George Orwell's contemporaneous view on the fate of the writer in 
modernity. In Orwell's 1939 essay 'Inside the Whale' on the American novelist Henry 
Miller, he states: 
From now onwards the all-important fact for the creative writer is going to be 
that this is not a writer's world. That does not mean that he cannot help to bring 
the new society into being, but he can take no part in the process as a writer. For 
10 See Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, pp. 324-5. 
11 Beckett qtd. in Rosette C. Lamont, 'Fast-forward: Lucky's Pnigos', Samuel Beckett 
Today/Aujourd'hui, Vol. 11, Endlessness in the Year 2000, ed. by Angela Moorjani and Carola Veit . 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001),132-139, p. 135. 
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as a writer he IS a liberal, and what IS happening IS the destruction of 
I 'b I' 12 I era Ism. 
Orwell suggests that to be a creative writer at all is to partake in a liberal attitude that 
is being denied in the mid-twentieth century. By implication, writing holds the 
luxuries of opposition and disagreement; it has the privilege of individual thought. 
Following Orwell's observations, Beckett's writing - which at this stage is a kind of 
outflow of writing as a non-writer - suggests that a literary protest against the 
totalitarian state will occur in the fact of writing as a necessary action. That is, not as 
a writer - the figurehead of forward-thinking, free expression and circulated for a 
likeminded audience - but as an individual in terms of an expressive survival. 13 The 
writer role is called upon here not so much for its ideological qualities, or even its 
versatility, but for the process itself. The idea is to be liberated from the pressures of 
reality at the time through writing, not to be a liberal writer figure. Beckett's personal 
writing project constitutes a defiant act of subsistence. 
Beckett described Watt as 'an exercise', which implies that this text allows him 
to preserve the act of writing despite the destabilised writer-identity. 14 At this point, 
the question for Beckett is not how to respond artistically to world events, but how to 
save one's creative faculties in critical times. Accordingly, the word 'exercise' can be 
taken in a number of ways to mark Watt as a fulcrum in Beckett's career. It suggests 
that he is maintaining a practice of the past, in a conveyance of writing as a relic 
through the period of turmoil, or even a melancholic lingering over writing. It also 
12 George Orwell qtd. in Miller, Lale Modernism, p. 38. 
13 Ironically, the Irish Legation confirms Beckett's profession as a 'writer' in November 1940, roughly 
three months before he begins his 'Watt' notebooks. See John Pilling, A Samuel Beckell Chronology 
(Basingstoke: Pa1grave Macmillan, 2006), p. 88. However, his difficulty to get Wall published with 
Routledge reinforces the original point; T. M. Ragg pronounced the manuscript 'too wild and 
unintelligible for the most part to stand any chance of publication over here at the present time', Ragg 
qtd. in Beckett, Lellers, Vol. 2, p. 14. 
14 Ruby Cohn, A Beckett Canon (Michigan: University of Michigan, 2001), p. 112. 
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suggests that Beckett is improving his practice, working out his method to craft anew 
approach. In this sense, the exercise is an experimental activity. In addition, the 
homonymic value of the word also suggests 'exorcise', and this 'driving out' or 
'getting rid' of style, convention and the sedimented idea of writing as a writer is 
contrary to the sense of exercising a well-established skill. Taken together, however, 
Beckett's approach to his novel elicits the tensions between the expressive freedom of 
yesteryears, the present task of maintaining his creativity and the direction to 
transform literature for the future. 
The eight-year period of inactivity and transition during the war, punctuated 
only by Watt, ultimately leads to Beckett's turn to the French language and his foray 
into drama, which are the outstanding changes to his artistic practice. At the same 
time, he was also quietly developing his understanding and integration of the relations 
between power and compulsion, freedom and thraldom, in the process and product of 
h i s _ ~ t i n g . . Beckett was deliberating the pitfalls of poetics based on sovereignty, 
complete with a masterful author, and moving into hitherto unexplored forms of 
incompetence. His focus on incompetence, however, does not occlude the influence of 
rigid backgrounds or strict structures, like tradition, sovereignty and reason. His art of 
failure is inextricable from the criterion of order, as the dream of expression continues 
to impel the author-narrators' pursuits and offset Beckett's achievement. As noted in 
the contradictory idea of (in)sovereignty, Beckett evinces the interplay between 
strength and weakness as he attempts to discover his own unique voice: 'I don't think 
impotence has been exploited in the past' (my emphasis).ls He shows that his work is 
very much about negotiating, pursuing and trying to apply power even as it is 
immersed in failure. In short, there can be no sense of impotence in Beckett's work 
IS Shenker. 'An Interview with Beckeu', p. 148. 
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without an intimation of the power that is lacking, but equally the continuing act of 
writing in this way acts as a powerful response to the despotic context. 
It is in light of the strict censorship and ideological conformity enforced during 
the Nazi occupation that the formal and thematic levels of mastery and service in a 
text such as Watt appear all the more apparent, innovative and radical. At a time when 
art is forced to fortify political ends as another vehicle for propaganda, Beckett's text 
protests against such systematisation by absorbing and obscuring notions of authority, 
order and control to deliver a defiantly experimental retort to the sanitized works that 
the Nazi regime approved, such as Adolf Wissel's bucolic paintings and Adolf 
Bartels' volkisch poetry. This is not the articulated liberty that Orwell suggested from 
the 'writer'. Rather, the on· going act of writing and exertions of language work 
alongside more patent content on systems of power to imply a propensity towards 
resistance, conflict, and as the title pronounces, questioning. 
Watt the Fungible and Knott There: Objectified Servant and Absent Master 
When writing Watt, Beckett was subject to the Vichy regime, which replaced the 
Republican motto 'Liberte, Egalire, Fraternire' (Freedom, Equality, Fraternity) with 
'Travail, Famille, Patrie' (Work, Family, Homeland). Anthony Uhlmann considers 
the latter to evoke 'a more medieval idea of a '''natural'' order' .16 It is within the 
context of this throwback to the feudal system that the protagonist Watt works as a 
house servant under the mysterious master Mr. Knott. Watt and his superior Erskine 
..... ¥ 
are one combination of manservant pairs from a continuous stream of servants that 
enter the Knott household, work for the master and eventually leave having rarely 
witnessed their employer. Watt is a pensive character who carries out protracted 
16 Anthony Uhlmann, Beckett and Poststructuralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University. 1999), p. 95. 
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analyses of the house rules and servants' duties in a bid to make sense of his role. The 
changes to the political slogan during the early 1940s help to illuminate the dynamics 
of the Knott household. The Vichy regime replaces the responsibility of 'freedom' in 
the original Republican motto with the more physical obligation to 'work', which 
transforms the citizen into a human resource. The change from 'equality' to 'family' 
stresses the domestic hierarchical structure, headed by the patriarch and founded on 
service to the 'house'. Whilst the word 'house' promotes the idea of a small, close-
knit community, or social microcosm, it also connotes a designated zone of 
governance - the decisive house rules under the roof. 'Family' itself derives from 
/amulus meaning servant, and the combination of work, house and servant clearly 
points to the duties that Watt performs. The fact that 'fraternity' is exchanged for 
'homeland' expands the idea of household servants to a national level, with the 
government acting as the noble or patriarch, hence 'fatherland'. The implication of the 
Vichy motto for Watt, then, is the reduction of his individual identity, as he becomes 
part of a system. Watt's place in the Knott house is emblematic of the individual's 
role in a socio-political mechanism that has reduced its democratic, egalitarian values 
and accentuated sovereign, dynastic rule, which gathers impersonalised subjects 
together to work for the benefit of a master. 
Friedrlch Nietzsche uses the terms 'noble' and 'servile' in his philosophy on 
the will to power, but as with Uhlmann's 'natural order', Nietzsche adopts these 
categories from the feudal politico-economic system and naturalizes them. In his 
philosophical bestiary, these terms come to form a fundamental dichotomy in power 
relations between the courageous nobility and gregarious animals that depend on 
others. As Alphonso Lingis recognises, in Nietzsche, 'eagles, lions and serpents are 
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noble; sheep, cattle and poultry are servile'. 17 Nietzsche employs these classifications 
not in an allegorical way, but in a kind of zoomorphic process that draws a line of 
continuity between humans and other species. The inherent nature of the noble and 
servile roles is significant in Beckett's text since, before his entrance into the Knott 
household, the first appearance of the eponymous protagonist gestures towards Watt's 
identity as an object, a thing to be used, which is a status he acquires at the expense of 
human semblance and attributes. 
Beckett's exposition of Watt is through the eyes of three observers, Mr. 
Hackett and Goff and Tetty Nixon. As Watt disembarks from a tram, the reader is told 
that 'Tetty was not sure whether it was a man or a woman' (W, 14). This thinghood, 
the questionable status of 'it-ness' that is Watt, applies to a number of sexually 
ambiguous and sexless creatures in Beckett's work that reveal the author's distrust of 
pronouns. His writing, Beckett says, 'has to do with a fugitive '1' [oo .]. It's an 
embarrassment of pronouns. I'm searching for the non-pronounial. [ ... ] [I]t seems a 
betrayal to say 'he' or 'she".ls This viewpoint leads Beckett to drop sex altogether in 
The Unnamable, for example, in which the lack of a name destabilises other 
referential determinations and becomes palpable in the redundancy of sexual 
classification. The initial portrait of Watt as a sexless creature then devolves to an 
inanimate item, with Beckett extending Nietzsche's line of servility from human to 
animal to inorganic matter: 'Mr. Hackett was not sure whether it was not a parcel, a 
carpet for example, or a roll of tarpaulin, wrapped up in dark paper and tied about the 
middle with a cord' (W, 14).19 An anthropomorphised version of this image introduces 
17 Alphonso Lingis, 'Nietzsche and Animals', in Animal Philosophy - Ethics and Identity, ed. by Peter 
Atterton and Matthew Calarco (London: Continuum, 2004), 7-14, p. 9. 
18 Beckett qtd. in Lawrence Shainberg, 'Exorcising Beckett', The Paris Review, 29.104 (1987),100-
136, p. 134. 
19 Beckett also highlights Watt's inability to self-reflectively determine himself: 'prevented him from 
saying [oo.] of the creature that still in spite of everything presented a large number of exclusively 
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Watt as a tall, clownish oddity, anticipating the stiff 'funambulistic stagger' (W, 29) 
depicted later. But it is the actual objects that Mr. Rackett sees that hold more 
significance for Watt as a servant. Re is a carpet to be walked over, which suggests 
his submissiveness, or a tarpaulin used to cover up, which implies a practical quality. 
As a mundane object, Watt is set up as an article of service belonging to a domestic 
setting. 
In Watt's likeness to a roll of carpet or tarpaulin, Beckett conveys his 
character's inertia, as a thing brought into service by an external force. Such articles 
are defined by a function assigned to them, which is a particularly creaturely state that 
recalls the definition of the creature as subject to another's control. The passivity of an 
inanimate item corresponds with the docile disposition of the creature, which is 
reinforced shortly after Watt's objectification: 'a milder more inoffensive creature 
does not exist' (W, 18). Given his enigmatic introduction, there is a question mark 
over/ Watt and he is doubly 'inoffensive' as a result of this blankness as an 
uncharacterized character. Whilst the reader learns that Watt is intriguing to Mr. 
Rackett and in debt to Goff Nixon, his destination is indecipherable and the trio of 
onlookers are ignorant of all other means of identification, such as Watt's 
'Nationality, family, birthplace, confession, occupation, means of existence, 
distinctive signs' (W, 19). In this way, Beckett, alludes to the very composition of his 
protagonist in that Watt seems to have materialized from nowhere, having no 
traceable' origins or background. Furthermore, when Goff Nixon finally does recall a 
physical feature, 'a huge big red nose' (W, 20), it is in keeping with master Knott's 
criteria for 'the two types of men' to serve him (W, 59). Watt fits the physical 
description Knott stipulates and therefore this telling first appearance defines Watt as 
human characteristics, that is was a man' (W, 79). In this passage, Watt also makes reference to 
inorganic material: 'he made the distressing discovery that of himself too he could no longer affirm 
anything that did not seem as false as ifhe had affirmed it ofa stone' (W, 79). 
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an archetypal servant. Beckett's exposition acts as a kind of job interview conducted 
through the public reconnaissance between Mr. Hackett and the Nixons, and Watt's 
indistinctness makes him a suitable candidate for the servile herd that continuously 
passes through Knott's house. 
It is apt that Watt arrives as a nondescript entity since he is appointed to fill the 
vacancy that Arsene leaves in the Knott house, and this process of replacement 
stipulates a level of homogeneity and adaptability to achieve a seamless transition. 
Watt's emptiness, as it transpires, is occupied by the inscrutable organisation and 
structure of the household tasks. His inability to comprehend menial duties, such as 
feeding the dogs, causes him to serve blindly, in one sense, in that he satisfies his 
designated function without an explanation or justification of the reasoning behind it. 
Yet his quest for lucidity through self-reflection also results in a second blindness, 
which causes his provisional status as a being continually under question. Watt 
repeatedly fails in his attempts to name exactly what he is and he effectively remains a 
mystery to himself. Since Watt is an enigmatic figure preoccupied with the enigmas of 
the house, he decides to consider himself a man for convenience. This gendered 
existence offers him little comfort and is tantamount to his objectified status. The 
narrator says that 'for all the relief that this afforded him, he might just as well have 
thought of himself as a box, or an urn' (W, 80). Watt identifies with receptacles as 
much as humanity. He is equally a hollow container loaded with cremated remains, 
operating as ti· holder of nothingness. 
The protean identity that amounts to naught is ideal for Watt's induction into a 
servile role moulded by the needs of a master since, crucially, he does not have to 
change or conform drastically to be assimilated into the system. He can perform his 
job without a massive overhaul of his personality. It is also significant that Arsene 
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initiates Watt, with 'information of a practical nature to impart' (w, 43) in his twenty-
five page 'short statement' (w, 37), because it imposes the established order onto the 
new generation, thus allowing the ground-floor operations to uphold the routines of 
the Knott household upstairs and maintain the illusion of constancy. Despite the 
changes in personnel, with Watt for Arsene, Arthur for Erskine and Micks for Watt, 
Beckett focuses on the synchronicity of this interchange. In a rich image that offers 
multiple opportunities for interpretation, Beckett writes: 'for the coming is in the 
shadow of the going, and the going in the shadow of the coming' (W, 56). The 
seamless transitions between arrivals and departures show that the servants are 
fungible, trading places with one another and presumably passing on responsibilities, 
such as preparing, serving and collecting Mr. Knott's dinner before giving the 
leftovers to the dogs. Bequeathing duties in this way mimics the heritage of an 
ancestral house, but, for the workforce, it is the post itself that takes priority over the 
pers6n that fills it, thereby withholding individuality from the servants that receive the 
role. 
The 'shadow' of the going also suggests an inherited ignorance towards the 
duties the servants perform. When Watt sees 'a figure, human apparently' (w, 224) on 
his departure from the Knott house, this new figure is described in remarkably similar 
terms to Watt: 'a sheet, or a sack, or a quilt, or a rug' (W, 225). The arriving servant 
appears as a new inanimate object to replace the old object it resembles. As Richard 
Begam points out, 'Watt finally confronts an iI?age of himself - meets himself, so to 
speak, face to face' .20 Begam accentuates the self-knowledge of this meeting, yet the 
fact that Beckett offers four variations in the description to place emphasis on 
alternatives indicates that this is not a positively recognisable mirror image of Watt 
20 Begam, Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity, p. 96. 
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that offers him a reliable reflection of himself. Although he encounters a similarly 
indeterminate figure, any sense of identification is through their mutual anonymity, 
which stresses a connection based on their unknowable selves. Indeed, Watt's 
inability to fathom the meaning of his actions, along with the lack of teleology in his 
daily undertakings, suggest that these domestic items confer nothing of his own true 
function, or rather, the reason for his docile performance. In effect, Watt is a servant 
simply because he serves, but the nature of his service is not disclosed to him. His 
status as a thing overwhelms his self-knowledge and yet denies any understanding of 
his role in the wider scheme. Watt remains unaware of the principles that govern the 
strict instructions of the eccentric Mr. Knott. As a result, the lack of context and cause 
that Watt endures divests him of an accumulative identity or idea of self, other than in 
the actual performance of his duties. 
Whilst intimating his place in a series of characters in Beckett's corpus, Watt's 
position as a device in a concatenation of devices also represents the lineal 
arrangement of life itself. The novel begins and ends at stations that resonate on a 
religious level, alluding to the 'Stations of the Cross' that depict the Passion of Christ 
and provide a vision of life and death characterized by the throes of service.21 The 
stations in Watt suggest that the novel's setting is a temporary one, with a stream of 
travellers entering and exiting by similar means. The sequential aspect of rail transit is 
apparent in the connecting shadows of the 'coming' and 'going', which imply birth 
and death. particularly since the shadows cast in this image would require a light 
source from the direction of arrival and the direction of departure. This spiritual 
21 The narrator Sam explicitly refers to Watt's likeness to a representation of Christ: 'His face was 
bloody, his hands also, and thorns were in his scalp. (His resemblance, at that moment, to the Christ 
believed by Bosch, then hanging in Trafalgar Square, was so striking, that 1 remarked it.)' (W, 157). 
Several critics expand on the parallels between Watt and Christ. See David Hesla, The Shape o/Chaos, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971) p. 62; and Jeremy Parrotl, 'The Gnostic Gospel of Sa m: 
Watt as Modernist Apocryphon', Samuel Beckell Today/Aujourd'hui, Vo!. 11, Endlessness in the Year 
2000, ed. by Angela Moorjani and Carola Veit (Amsterdam: Rodopi. 2001), 425-433. 
143 
representation of mortality, with divine light symbolising the passage in and out of 
transient earthly life, attributes a figurative value to the house, portraying it as the 
locale of lifetime. It also suggests that, paradigmatic ally , existence falls into a pattern 
of service to an overseeing but often unseen master, whilst the exact purpose of the 
routines and responsibilities continue to perplex. As Arsene informs Watt, 'in truth the 
same things happen to us all, especially to men in our situation, whatever that is, if we 
only chose to know it' (W, 44). In this way, the Knott house is an analogy for 
existence, but, more acutely, it conveys a way of life administered by 'top-down' 
systems, such as the religious and parliamentary 'houses' that govern and dispatch 
servants. Beckett's domestic setting illustrates the individual's disposable role as a 
puppet manipUlated by the strings of obscure forces, such as the habitual routines of 
life and the prescience of mortality, whilst simultaneously alluding to social, political 
and military power structures. 
\J Whereas servants are succeeded, the sempiternal head of the house Mr. Knott 
remains fixed. Before Arsene exits, the servant says that ' t h e r ~ ~ is one that neither 
comes nor goes, I refer I need hardly say to my late employer, but seems to abide in 
his place, for the time being at any rate, like an oak, an elm, a beech or an ash, and we 
rest for a little while in his branches' (w, 56). Knott is the enduring pillar of the 
household; he is a lord who watches ephemeral bodies pass through. As the employer, 
he also ordains the rules that engage the subordinates, so that he looms over the house 
'. 
as 'the shadow of purpose' (W, 57). Knott's lordship evokes an ecclesiastical model of 
patriarchal guidance, not dissimilar to the shepherd template of Judeo-Christian 
scripture that organises a flock behind a leader, and is adopted by the clergy. For 
instance, David's psalm 'The Lord is my Shepherd' speaks of the path to 
righteousness and residing in the house of the Lord (Psalms 23), which details a sense 
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of direction and belonging. In the Gospel of John, 'I am the good shcphcrd: thc good 
shepherd giveth his life for the sheep' (John 10.11) asserts that the leader protects and 
is responsible for his followers, and, in true pastoral service, willing to sacrifice 
himself. In this proverbial formulation, the shepherd and the flock supposedly offer 
purpose to one another and embark on an identification process that collapses the 
master-servant dichotomy to instil the principles of mutuality. Despite this, the flock 
is homogenized whilst the shepherd is individualised, which elevates a single figure 
above a general group. It is clear that, as a result, service is appropriated as a means to 
power. 
For Derrida, the human organisation of power does not merely resemble a 
religious hierarchy, but rather supplants that former system. There is an 'onto-
theologico-political structure of sovereignty', he writes in The Beast and the 
Sovereign, in which '[t]he human sovereign takes place as place-taking [lieu-tenant], 
he takes place the place standing in for the absolute sovereign: God,.22 In adopting 
authority, man is a substitute for, not a servant of, the divine power; the 'stand-in' 
underlines the absence of the Absolute and foregrounds its replaceability. This 
theocratic dynamic presents itself as servitude, with the monarch acting Dei gratia (by 
the grace of God) and the cleric preaching in the name of God, but the service is in 
name only since the divine power is not active and actually usurped by the 
'assistance' of the representative. This deiformity is particularly pronounced in the 
apostleship and papal jurisdiction of Catholicism, in which appointed figures assume 
authority, even infallibility, in translating and disseminating holy dogma. In this 
cynical reading, the servus servorum dei (servant of the servants of God) papal 
22 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, pp. 47, 54. 
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tradition tarnishes servitude with the possibility of power in the guise of humility. 
Service effectively leads to responsibility, which in turn leads to authority. 
Knott's mastery over his servants conveys a similar expropriation of authority, 
in which he assumes a likeness to God, but also becomes a god in the monotheistic 
dimensions of the cloistered household. As master of the house, Knott owns the living 
space, defines the hierarchical boundaries, dictates the diurnal rhythms of the staff and 
controls the domestic atmosphere. His power indicates a strong presence, and yet his 
authority is not enforced explicitly through physical or verbal means. Ironically, it is 
Knott's absence that confirms his godliness. In Exodus, for example, the Lord 
promises his presence but not in the form of pure theophany: 'Thou canst not see my 
face: for there shall no man see me, and live' (Exodus 33.20). Likewise, Watt has 'no 
direct dealings with Mr. Knott' (W, 64) and, throughout his stay in the house, 'Of the 
nature of Mr. Knott himself Watt remained in particular ignorance' (W, 199). When 
J 
Watt does see Knott in the flower garden, the master is still strangely aloof, with head 
bowed and eyes closed. This rare encounter leaves Watt sorry and glad at once: sorry 
that his wish to 'see Mr. Knott face to face' (W, 145) does not materialise but glad that 
his fear of doing so is not confronted. The equilibrium between desire and distance 
sustains Knott; a combination of fascination and mystique promotes his influence but 
also ensures his longevity. 
The manner in which Knott remotely impels the activities in the house is a 
precursor to the phantom Godot from Beckett's most famous play Waitingfor Godot. 
The two vagabonds Vladimir and Estragon stand by a tree on a country lane, 
occupying themselves with idle chatter in anticipation of a figure named Godot. The 
tension of the drama rests on the nonattendance of its deus ex machina, and Godot 
remains the cardinal power in the proceedings due to this tantalising absence. In a 
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similar manner to Godot, the master of the house in Watt is also influential in a 
negative way, as the name 'Knott' implies. He exists for the most part as an invisible 
force, absent in body but present as potential. Knott is defined by the presence of thc 
things he is not and for this reason he is effectively implied in every sight and 
situation. For Jeremy Parrott, the dialectical relationship between presence and 
absence means Knott is pervasive everywhere: 
[W]ithin the residual negation at the name's core nestles the plenum-void, 
O/zero, whence all matter comes and whither it will once again return. [ ... ] He 
may therefore be considered like an endless knot in the shape of a sideways 
figure 8 - the symbol of infinity - comprehending within himself all 
possibilities.23 
Knott's name brings to mind the nothingness that marks the beginning and end of 
everything. He represents the complete absence to which all presence is bound. When 
divided into its constituent parts, 'no-thing-ness' sees the master as the intangible 
opposite of the servant as a 'thing'. Therefore, Watt is mindful of his counterpart 
Knott whilst unable to receive communion with him. This curious concomitance of 
absence and presence, or psychological presence despite physical absence, is 
harboured within the subject to uphold an objectifying other. The unseen master is a 
diffuse figure of faith that exists as an active rule in the mind of the servant. 
The association between Knott's absence and divinity is reflected in the 
inability to summon or obligate a deity. In 'God is a witness that cannot be sworn' (W, 
6), Beckett's pun on swearing refers to profanity, and serves to evoke the overlap 
23 Jeremy Parrott, "'Nothing Neatly Named"; The Beckettian Aesthetic and Negative Theology', 
Samuel Beckell TodaylAujourd'hui, Vol. 13, Three Dialogues Revisited, ed. by Marius Buning et al. 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003) 91-101, p. 93. 
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between common law and canon law in the condemnation of blasphemy. Furtherinore, 
the judicial surface meaning of Beckett's line, in which God is a witness that cannot 
bear witness, compares religious and legal orders to demonstrate the prevailing 
judgement that takes effect de facto. The tribunal system establishes truth beyond 
reasonable doubt and delivers rulings in the absence of God's verdict, despite its 
reverence for religious law. Yet, as with Knott, being elsewhere means the deity is 
perpetually unseen and potentially anywhere.. As such, God comes to represent a 
ubiquitous force, transmuting into moral conscience and subsisting in the subject's 
doubt, guilt or fear. This compunction is replicated in the Knott household when Watt 
transgresses the house rules. Beckett writes: 'No punishment fell on Watt, no 
thunderbolt' (W, 113), which is redolent of a wrathful deity, 'But he was not so 
foolish as to found in this a principle of conduct, or a precedent of rebelliousness, ho 
no, for Watt was only too willing to do as he was told' (W, 113). The lack of 
discipline and reference to folly here indicate an approach that encourages self-
government, in a kind of imposed autonomy produced by the ~ b s e n t t but influential 
nature of Mr. Knott. Subsequently, Watt appears to conform on his own volition, 
freely obeying orders, and although he questions his duties, he does not actively 
challenge them. In effect, Beckett shows that compliant but ostensibly independent 
subjects can preserve the power of absent lords.24 
'A vague supplication': Melancholy in Waiting/or Godot 
In order for the 'absence' ofKnott and Godot to become 'non-existence', the servants, 
or 'waiters', have to be immune or ignorant to the master's influence and cease to 
24 The act of duly maintaining absent powers is exemplified and tested in the Shoah. Etty HiIlesum 
wrote in a concentration camp shortly before her death: 'You God cannot be God unless we create a 
dwelling place for you in our hearts', Hillesum qtd. in Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God 
After God (New York: Columbia University, 2011), p. 53. . 
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preserve divine power by refusing to submit to it. As in Act Without Words I (1958), 
Beckett's protagonists must finally resist the goading master, remain unmoved and 
instead take the Promethean plunge to assert non serviam, akin to Milton's quasi-
heroic Satan. 25 Yet, in terms of the identification of being, George Berkelcy's 
principle esse est aut percipi aut percipere (to be is both to be perceived and to 
perceive) continues to inform Watt and the pair Vladimir and Estragon, which stresses 
the reliance on witnessing, and crucially, witnessing being witnessed.26 As I have 
argued above, this relationship of perception can partially survive through a projected 
master, such as the faith in the absent Knott and Godot. However, Beckett's creatures 
desire more than the spiritual guarantee of deism, and, as with the intervention of 
theism, wish to summon the master and seek confirmation of the materiality of both 
their service and superior, which locks them into a state of deferral, questioning and 
waiting. They cannot wholly achieve or accept the mantle of individual freedom and 
responsibility. On the contrary, Beckett's characters continually fear the creaturely 
state of abandonment - analogous to existential angst - that comes in the wake of 
familiar ideological and identity structures. 
With Watt, the nostalgia for conventional order extends into a reliance on 
alternative determining processes, such as rational thought and 'a pillow of old words' 
(W, 115). Despite his attempts to understand the workings of the house, he is 
repeatedly baffied and denied access to a prevailing order. To return to the domestic 
metaphor, Watt suffers a kind of 'homesickness' since he is estranged from the 
systems of organization that should offer him stability. In rigorously testing variations 
25 Stan Gontarski also compares Act Without Words I to Slephen Dedalus's non serviam in Joyce's 
Ulysses. See S. E. Gontarski, '''Birth Astride of a Grave": Samuel Beckeu's Act Without Words 1', in 
The Becketl Studies Reader (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993),29-34, p. 32. On the final 
page of Act Without Words I, Beckett repeats the stage direction 'He does not move' (E, 56) five times 
in an echo of 'I shall not be moved' from the Book of Psalms. 
26 See George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues (Oxford: Oxford 
University, (999), pp. 25-7. 
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and possible solutions, he consistently turns to familiar methods, processes he is at 
home with, but this loyalty leaves him without satisfactory answers. Watt clearly 
yearns for reliable figures and forms of judgement, but is left with unwieldy 
meditations and errant signifiers. Similarly, Jeffrey Nealon's essay on Waiting for 
Godot asserts that language is the substance of Vladimir and Estragon's being. They 
are subject to the infmite extemporization of words, not an engineered overarching 
narrative. Nealon writes: 'it is the play of Vladimir and Estragon's words, not any 
agreed-upon meaning for them, which constitutes their social bond. Waiting for 
legitimation of their society in Godot is, from the beginning, unnecessary'.21 Beckett's 
two creatures each perceive and are perceived by the other, and the contradistinction 
of their lively verbal exchanges reinforces these processes. Nevertheless, their words 
continue to address and anticipate a higher, more established form of validation, and 
the interaction that sustains the couple is deemed a temporary measure prior to the 
J 
genuine purpose that the master promises. 
It is evident that Beckett's characters have epistemological allegiances and are 
committed to progressing through customary practices, despite the pitfalls of 
ratiocination, logocentric cognition and sovereign monocracy. Peter Barry discusses 
the implicit postmodern threshold that Nealon sees in Waitingfor Godot, noting that 
Vladimir and Estragon 'are trapped at the modernist stage, and hence riven with 
nostalgia for the whole lostness of the past,.28 Initially, the terms 'nostalgia' and 
27 Jeffrey Nealon, 'Samuel Beckett and the Postmodern: Language Games, Play and Waiting for 
Godot', Modern Drama, 31.4 (1988), 520-528, p. 520. 
28 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory (Manchester: Manchester University), p. 89. The endeavour to plot 
borderlines between modernism and postmodernism frequently resorts to differing views of history and 
the past. Frederic Jameson proposes a clear divide between the two movements: 'In modernism, [ ... ] 
some residual zones of "nature" or "being," of the old, the older, the archaic, still subsist; culture can 
still do something to that nature and work at transforming that "referent." Postmodernism is what you 
have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone'. Frederic Jameson 
Pos/modernism (Durham: Duke University, 2005), p. ix. In this commonly held view, modernism is 
nostalgic towards tradition and community whereas postmodernism is ironic and disconnected. 
Beckett's ambiguous literature and his contextual place between the 'periods' of modernism and 
150 
'lostness' appear incongruous to a play fuelled by the dramatic tension of an imminent 
arrival. Given that the pair persistently wait to meet Godot, and in conjunction with 
the fact that Beckett employs dramatic irony to elicit the tragedy of the forlorn 
situation, the characters appear to be trapped in a delusional state of postponed 
realisation. The lost is not acknowledged as gone, and, accordingly, the tense is not 
retrospective. Instead, the past is conducted in the present, with the characters 
subscribing to prospective events whilst the audience is wise to the tragic emptiness of 
their situation. For the majority of the play, then, the characters' 'nostalgia' - which 
suggests memory, or a 'return back' - lacks the closure of the mourning process to 
give it historical distance. Godot remains a prospect not yet arrived, and therefore a 
possibility still. 
However, a sense of nostalgia is included in the play retrospectively when 
Vladimir appears to awaken from the enduring past and allude to the dramatic irony at 
work. As Pozzo exits, Vladimir briefly suspects that Lucky's blind master was Godot 
after all, before entering into a rare soliloquy: 
But habit is a great deadener. [He looks again at Estragon.] At me too 
someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, he is sleeping, he knows 
nothing, let him sleep on. [Pause.] I can't go on! [Pause.] What have I said? 
[He goes/everishly to and/ro, haltsfinally at extreme left, broods.] (WFG, 83) 
As the idea of the absent master becomes unmoored, mobile and transposed through 
the initial confusion between Godot and Pozzo, Vladimir subsequently assumes the 
role of overseeing Estragon. Whilst he watches over his companion, Vladimir also 
postmodemism makes him a medial author, along with Vladimir Nabokov, Charles Olson and Louis 
Zukofsky, according to Jameson. 
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continues to imagine a witness overseeing himself, as though the patriarchal model 
. inspired by the God of the Old Testament, or God(OT), is an inveterate default. 
Despite that, in this glimpse into his own somnolent state, Vladimir detaches from self 
to contemplate self, becoming at once observer and observed. The two final utterances 
in the above example - the statement '1 can't go on!' and question 'What have 1 said?' 
- serve to condense the process of reflection through which Vladimir finds an 
apprehending counterpart in himself. By respqnding to his own statement, Vladimir 
effectively shifts the focus of mastery once more. Having contemplated Godot, Pozzo 
and himself as masters over others, Vladimir realises that he is his own master or at 
least the maker of his master. His self-examination allows him to realise the fact that 
the idea of mastery is located or created internally, within the self, which briefly 
deposes the original idea of Godot from a privileged position. 
Vladimir's move into soliloquy during this section of the play accentuates his 
..J 
independence and as the stage becomes an arena for his short-lived self-analysis, his 
internal drama comes to dominate the attention of the viewing audience. His 
momentary detachment from the others onstage means that the singular speaker 
briefly assumes a more direct command of the audience's focus. Although draped in 
the poetics of self-reflection here, Vladimir treads the thin line between introspection 
and public speaking. By talking to himself alone and simultaneously selling his 
thoughts to the audience, the soliloquy clearly fixates on the individual whilst 
disseminating the individual's view in the process. When Vladimir re-joins the antics, 
signposted by the remark 'Off we go again' (WFG, 84), there is a subtle but 
noticeable shift in Beckett's dramaturgy from a more candid tone to the 
inconsequential register that characterizes the play. As a mode of address, the 
soliloquy highlights the power relations between the speaker and the audience in the 
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playhouse, signalling a level of servile passivity from the audience and the speaker's 
capacity to capture, persuade and instruct the listener. Therefore, this episode alludes 
to the word 'propaganda' itself in the sense of a religious 'congregation for the 
propagation of the faith', and indicates the uncomfortable proximity between dramatic 
conventions and political communication.29 
Despite dethroning Godot, Vladimir's inward gaze fails to supply a le/os that 
would provide a definitive meaning and purpose to life. Whilst Vladimir's speech 
intimates his oratorical power, he is not in a sovereign position. His internal division 
marks the threshold to the infinite problem of apperception in which the subject is 
unable to perceive selfhood transcendentally, at least other than as a perceiver. As 
with the identity in ruins discussed in the previous chapter, in which any knowable 
subjectivity is based on a simultaneous possession and dispossession of self, 
Vladimir's self-mastery appears to cause an internal subject-object rupture. Beckett 
explores this problem of self-knowledge most directly in his 1965 motion picture 
Film, directed by Alan Schneider and starring Buster Keaton.30 In Beckett's visual 
piece, '[l]ike Godot the camera never appears, but as a metaphor of self-perception, 
the camera photographing itself photographing itself becomes a trope for the paradox 
of apperception' ,3l The absent onlooker, or eye (E), pursues and is part of the self, or 
object (0), that takes flight and is pursued. 32 This insurmountable disjunction, 
visualized as a steady distance between camera and actor in Beckett's film, inserts a 
barrier of alterity for Vladimir that can be projected back onto a transcendental figure 
in an attempt to reconsolidate the individual. The absent master, as such, becomes a 
29 OED online, <www.oed.com>. 
30 The title Film itself conveys an engagement with self-knowledge, as a nomination that is caught up in 
its medium whilst also identifying the piece. 
31 Ackerley and Gontarski, The Grove Companion 10 Samuel Beckell, p. 194. 
32 See Samuel Beckett, All Thai Fall and Olher Plays/or Radio and Screen (London: Faber and Faber, 
2009), p. 97. 
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representation of everything the subject cannot perceive or confront through 
reflection. 
In contrast to Vladimir's inescapable mirroring, the absent master promises a 
totalising narrative extraneous to the characters that can redeem the ruined subject. 
Through Vladimir's return to the 'Godot' paradigm, he holds onto the original state of 
potential objectification and continues to cultivate a buried prospect. When Godot's 
messenger boy arrives to inform the pair the master will not be coming, it is Vladimir 
who pre-empts him saying, 'He won't be coming this evening', but who also states, 
'But he'll come tomorrow' (WFG, 84). Vladimir does not accept Godot as a 
manifestation of the desire for wholeness, but as a real validating figure who will 
complete him. Vladimir turns back to the tree and country lane overshadowed by 
Godot, 'to remain mad' as Beckett's famous maxim suggests (WFG, 73). As a 
consequence, the couple Vladimir and Estragon reactivate a ruined history, they 'keep 
..J 
their appointment', and return to a relative comfort zone: 'Yes, one thing in this 
immense confusion is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come', (WFG, 72). Having 
peered through the artifice at his ignorant self, Vladimir immediately reverts to an 
unconscious condition now consigned to the past. Thus, these Beckettian creatures 
refuse to accept their identity in ruins or the testimony of fiction since they re-
subscribe to a soteriological solution to their plight in the guise of the saviour Godot. 
As a result ofVladimir's brush with clarity, it is clear that throughout the play 
Vladimir and Estragon wish to incarnate a lost idea, and in doing so endure what 
WaIter Benjamin calls 'melancholy immersion' ,33 In The Origin of German Tragic 
33 Benjamin, The Origin o/German Tragic Drama, p. 232. Matthew Feldman notes that Beckett read 
Robert Burton's The Anatomy 0/ Melancholy (1621) and, as Mark Nixon makes known, Beckett's 
German diaries show that he planned to write a prose piece entitled 'Journal of a Melancholic', In 
conjunction, these points indicate that Beckett was interested in ideas and terms associated with the 
crcaturcly preoccupation with the past from the late 1930s onwards. See Matthew Feldman, Beckett's 
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Drama, Benjamin focuses a section on melancholy, describing how 'in its tcnacious 
self-absorption it embraces dead objccts in its contemplation, in order to redeem 
them' ,34 Although Benjamin's melancholy resembles a nostalgic preoccupation with 
the past, it places emphasis on the proximity and immediacy in reanimating bygone 
material. In Waiting for Godot, this reconnection with the past catapults Vladimir 
beyond waiting towards an active desire for the lost authority that could validate his 
I 
existence. He becomes a victim of the rosy retrospection principle memoria 
praeteritorum bonorum (the past is always well remembered) that he previously 
called 'unpleasant' (WFG, 79), perhaps because it ensnares people in reflection and 
replicates the kind of static nostalgia that Vichy France held for agrarian life.3s 
Accordingly, Vladimir swiftly begins to resurrect a familiar wrathful figure, stating 
that Godot will punish them if he is dropped and save them when he arrives (WFG, 
86-7). 
For Eric Santner, melancholic fixations are a component of the creature. In 
particular, he highlights the pause over absence in his study of creaturely life: 
'melancholy retards adaptation, attaches itself to loss; it says no! to life without the 
object (or ideal), .36 The ideal for Vladimir and Estragon is a figure of meaning for 
their future and the charade that Godot embodies provides a suitable distraction from 
their abandoned state. For them, holding on to Godot preserves the idea of a natural 
order that would offer intrinsic meaning for their lives. Vladimir therefore refuses to 
take on the existential angst that realises the artificiality of this order. He would rather 
believe in the construction than be cast adrift into a physical life without the 
Books: A Cultural History of Samuel Beckett's 'Interwar Notes', p. 60; and Mark Nixon, Samuel 
Beckett's German Diaries 1936-37 (London: Continuum, 2011). p. 110. 
34 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 157. 
3' See Shannon L. Fogg, The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France: Foreigners. Undesirables. and 
Strangers (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009), p. 33. 
36 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 89. 
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possibility of higher meamng. Vladimir's deflection of abandonment ironically 
continues to retrieve a sense of genesis and original motivation from Godot, rather 
than recognise himself as a co-creator of a play of language that ultimately generates 
their melancholy condition. 
Vladimir does not acknowledge himself as a free agent because his play of 
language with Estragon cannot deliver this revelation in an intelligible way. As 
Nealon goes onto to discuss in his essay, Lucky's tirade parodies the idea of a 
totalising narrative that could perceive and express the manifold complexities of 
ontology.37 Lucky's final thought on the fragments of academic and philosophical 
dross is 'unfinished ... ' (WFG, 38), and this open end implies that the incomplete 
account will recommence, that further attempts will be made to 'think' the conclusion. 
The deluge of words and thoughts in Lucky's sustained form, but also the pseudo-
couples' rapid-fire crosstalk and Watt's permutations, shows that the silence of 
-) 
metaphysical realisation cannot be finally articulated or brought into being as part of 
the narrative, but only experienced as abandonment. Although the creatures exist 
through their words, they cannot use words to apprehend the conditions of their 
existence once and for all. 
The covenant of totality subsists in the absence of Godot, yet when the reality 
of their orphanhood beckons, Beckett's characters cannot provide an alternative 
unifying structure through self-reflection and self-expression. Consequently, they 
slide back into the creaturely space of melancholy immersion. Andrew Slade's 
description of melancholy elucidates this relapse that Beckett's characters experience: 
'a melancholic subjectivity remains bound to the lost object of its history resolutely 
holding to the traces of its memory and seeking to find it again, repetitively missing 
37 Nealon, 'Samuel Beckett and the Postmodem', p. 523. 
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it' .38 This recurring lack inflicts a cycle of loss, retrieval and belief that unfolds in the 
struggle to express and understand in Beckett. These creatures are exposed to an 
enterprise that refuses to accept the loss of the desired state and therefore protracts the 
unspoken entropy that remains underneath. 
Godot does not positively represent, but instead elicits a constant lack, a 
lacuna that is unable to be tenanted or assimilated into the characters' knowledge. 
Beckett's depiction of absent masters illustrates that, for him, the idea of a 
transcendental vantage lingers in and around the problematic of subjectivity that 
denies oneness and resorts to contingent, albeit hollow, safety measures. His creatures 
are bound to decrepit conventions, feeding nostalgia for the ruined past. They are 
abandoned at a point of interregnum, but claw their way back from this bewildering 
state to enter a survival state with the hangover of previous orders of authority. In the 
face of a lawless, meaningless existence, Watt and the pair in Waiting for Godot 
continue to subscribe to the established illusions of a truant figure. Beckett's creatures 
project a master figure to fill the lacuna that they inevitably confront in self·reflection 
and self-expression. 
Master-Servant Context: The Holocaust and the Jewish Creature 
A master narrative that rises above disparate perspectives to arrange an objective 
whole is a dangerous concept according to Beckett. During his time in Germany, he 
was wary offuis totalising presentation of history and commented to Axel Kaun: 
I am not interested in a 'unification' of the historical chaos any more than I am 
in the 'clarification' of the individual chaos, and still less with the 
38 Andrew Slade, Lyolard, Beckett, Duras and the Postmodern Sublime (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 
p.3. 
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anthropomorphism of the inhuman necessities that provoke the chaos. What I 
want is the straws, flotsam, etc., names, dates, births and deaths, because that is 
all I can know. [ ... ] Rationalism is the last form ofanimism.39 
Beckett suggests that a single explanatory account of reality is akin to an inflexible 
worldview anchored by supernatural powers. The fastidious diary that Beckett kept 
during his Germany trip is testament to these misgivings, as he prefers to note 
empirical details without arranging them into a coherent account. Beckett found that 
the Nazi tendency to totalise history, particularly the 'interminable harangues' of 
Hitler and Goering, eclipsed the reductive accounts he saw in German history books.40 
For Beckett, these oratory displays had the ring of faith-mongering. Mark Nixon notes 
that 'Beckett's correlation between Nazi discourse and biblical ''truth'' appears several 
times in the pages of his diary' .41 In Beckett's references to animism and truth, then, 
..J 
he identifies a messiah complex in Nazi historiography and political addresses. 
Beckett compares political propaganda with religious dogma, to suggest that the 
polemical and rhetorical style of the Nazi campaign against racial intermixture 
invokes the supreme judgement of divinity.42 
Although Beckett's observations predate the Nazis' so-called Final Solution, the 
correlation between autocratic and biblical authority is most evident in the sovereign 
power applied against the Jews. James McNaughton argues that the 
'anthropomorphism of inhuman necessities' to which Beckett refers 'was in its worst 
39 Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, p. 244. 
40 Ibid. p. 238. 
41 Nixon, Samuel Beckeu's German Diaries, p. 85. 
42 Hitler referred to God's will directly in his final radio speech: 'My duty consists solely in this: to 
work and fight for my people. I can only be released from this duty by him who called me to it. 
Providence spared me from the bomb that exploded only five feet from me on 20 July. It was intended 
to wipe me out and end my life's work. I see the Almighty's protection on that day as proof of the duty 
I have been given', qtd. in Randall L. Bytwerk, Landmark Speeches of National Socialism (College 
Station. TX: A&M University. 2008). p. 166. . 
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allegorical simplification the Jew, who was the necessary scapegoat for a rational 
system of history that could not reconcile Germany's supposedly divine Germanic 
destiny with its egregious historical failures, such as losing World War },.43 The Nazis 
created a palpable figure of German downfall, a diabolic figure stemming from two-
thousand-year-old anti-Semitic prejudices, to provide a readily digestible narrative 
that would explain German history and determine their future actions. As Victor 
Klemperer attests, 'the Jew is in every respect the center of the L TI (lingua tertii 
imperii or language of the Third Reich), indeed of its whole view of the epoch' .44 In 
its singular, reductive approach, Nazi anti-Semitism indoctrinated a holistic view of 
history that was expedient to inculcate as the definitive account. This tactic 
contributes to Beckett's mistrust of master narratives, which is clearly seen in his 
derisive jab at the Fiihrer's messianic position. In a 1938 letter to George Reavey, he 
writes 'I heard Adolf the Peacemaker on the wireless last night. And thought I heard 
the air escaping - a slow puncture'. 45 Beckett refers to Hitler's 'peace or war' 
ultimatum to Czechoslovakia here and recognises the hostility behind the Nazi 
rhetoric on protection and intervention. He also wryly implies that Hitler's speech is 
hot air and that the Fiihrer is slowly deflating under the pressure of his own 
fanaticism. Beckett sees through this narrative, then, but he also recognises that 
Hitler's political front is collapsing into all-out war. 
Beckett's (in)sovereignty largely undermines the veracity of master narratives, 
and yet, as in" Watt and Waiting/or Godot, the authority of a panoptic perspective has 
a residual influence in his work. Whereas author-narrators such as Molloy, Moran and 
Malone struggle to produce sovereign narratives, Watt, Vladimir and Estragon appeal 
43 McNaughton, 'Beckett, Gennan Fascism, and History', p. 107. 
44 Victor Klemperer, To the Bitter End: The Diaries of Vietor Klemperer, /942-/945, trans. by Martin 
Chalmers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), p. 321. 
4S Beckett, Letters, Vol. 1, p. 642. 
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to others in order to maintain the idea of absolute rule. As such, the aspiration towards 
testimonial and ideological authority continues as an oppressive fixture. Parallel to 
these influential conceptual structures, however, is a more physical version of the 
master-servant relationship. After the war, as the iron-fisted biopolitical nature of the 
Nazis' Btut und Boden (Blood and Soil) policy seeps into public consciousness, 
Beckett's creatures also display more rudimentary power struggles based on territory 
and violence. Mastery persists as an abstract presence in the guise of obscure voices 
and imperatives, but Beckett often depicts the corporeality of power. These bodily 
tensions begin with the organisation of space, as living environments and social 
domains are limited to distinct groups, and this segregation culminates in the violent 
application of sovereign power. In a harrowing echo of Nazi radicalisation, the master 
Pozzo from Waiting for Godot points out the move from expulsion to extermination. 
Referring to Lucky, Pozzo says: 'The truth is you can't drive such creatures away . 
..J 
The best thing would be to kill them' (WFG, 25). It appears that the pursuit of power 
and the racial hierarchy that gripped Europe in the middle of tl,le twentieth century 
gave Beckett an acute awareness of the more aggressive aspects of social and political 
relations. 
The nadir of the catastrophe, the Holocaust, is an extreme example of the 
antibiosis between masters and underlings. The systematic nature of the killing, the 
efficiency with which modem technology terminated life and transformed the 
intimacy of death into a shared experience, in conjunction with the sheer amount of 
casualties, sets its scale and intent apart from previous mass murders. The Nazis 
reasoned that the genocide of the Jews, alongside gypsies, homosexuals and the 
mentally and physical disabled, was necessary to eliminate inferior beings, regarded 
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as a drain on resources, as well as a social and genetic dilution of the superior race.46 
It is not clear what knowledge Beckett had of the Nazi rationale behind the 
concentration and extermination camps, but it is probable that he was aware of the 
German persecution of Jews from radio broadcasts and newspapers. Lois Gordon's 
biographical text on Beckett offers some assessment of the sources and experiences 
that informed his view. She notes that Beckett's half-Jewish uncle Boss Sinclair had 
left Germany for Dublin by 1933 owing to safety concerns, and she goes on to suggest 
that Beckett's enduring compassion towards downtrodden Jews was instilled prior to 
the war through his friendship with James Joyce: 
That Beckett was interested in the Jewish plight is certain; as Richard Ellmann 
notes, forty years after the war the subject of Jewish suffering made Beckett 
weep. That Beckett would have empathized with the Jews as a persecuted 
people even before his London days is also likely. In addition to his general 
'sensitiv[ity] to the suffering around him', his friend and hero James Joyce, 
who had forged an epic figure in the Jew Leopold Bloom, often spoke of 
himself as a Jew. Joyce equated the Jews and Irish as persecuted peoples 
('Israelite-lrish,).47 
Although Gordon settles for a simple equation of Jewish and Irish persecution, 
Joyce's depiction of Jews in Ulysses (1922) remains a contested issue.48 Despite Joyce 
claiming to 'have written with the greatest sympathy about the Jews', it clear from the 
nationalist citizen's mockery of Bloom and the Jewish faith in the 'Cyclops' episode 
46 See Doris L. Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History a/the Holocaust (Plymouth: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 1-28. 
47 Lois Gordon, The World a/Samuel Beckeu 1906-1946 (New Haven: Yale University, 1998), p. 106. 
48 For a detailed account of Joyce's portrayal of Jewishness. see Neil R. Davison. James Joyce. U/ysses 
and the Construction of Jewish Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998). 
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of U/ysses that Joyce also risks reinforcing anti-Semitic Jewish stereotypes in his 
writing.49 It is fair to say, however, that Beckett shares Joyce's fascination, if not 
identification, with Jewish culture and the Jews as a persecuted people. The Nazis' 
treatment of Beckett's Jewish friend Paul Leon (who was Joyce's personal assistant) 
certainly serves to galvanize Beckett's empathic leaning towards oppressed 
communities. Tellingly, Beckett joined the Resistance in 1941, the month after the 
Gestapo arrested, starved and tortured Leon.50 
However, despite any historical insight into persecution or personal affinity 
with the persecuted, Beckett's knowledge of the Holocaust itself is dominated by the 
death of a key figure in his Resistance cell, Alfred peron. Beckett's friend was 
arrested by the Gestapo in 1942, deported to the Mauthausen concentration camp in 
north Austria and died in Switzerland shortly after liberation in 1945.s1 Beckett quite 
possibly discovered more about Peron's ordeal at Mauthausen from Georges 
..J 
Loustaunau-Lacau's first-hand account of the camps entitled Chiens maudits: 
Souvenirs d'un rescape des bagnes hitleriens (Cursed Dogs: Memories of a Survivor 
of Nazi Labour Camps), which was published in 1945 and therefore one of the earliest 
Holocaust accounts available to the public. S2 As a non-Jewish civilian who escaped 
deportation, Beckett could only imagine the physical and emotional suffering based 
on the limited information he could access, including reports and tributes in The Irish 
Times. Yet as a friend, sympathizer and resistance member, it is legitimate to claim 
that the Holocaust profoundly affected Beckett on a specific, personal level as well as 
a broader anthropological level. Not only did he witness the disaster's demolition of 
49 James Joyce qtd. in Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (New York: Oxford University, 1982), p. 709. 
See also James Joyce, U/ysses (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008), pp. 280-330. 
~ o o Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, p. 304. 
SI Beckett, Letters, Vol. 2, p. 16. 
52 Sce Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, p. 381. 
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the idea of humanity, his way of life had also changed and cherished people were now 
gone. 
In 1983, Rosette Lamont asked Beckett about the political connotations of his 
literary imagery in relation to Auschwitz, and although the author avoided the direct 
enquiry, he spoke of Peron: • At the time of liberation he was still alive. He started on 
a trek in the direction of France. On the roads, survivors resorted to cannibalism. 
Peron died of exhaustion and starvation' .53 Beckett describes the transformation of 
humans into desperate competitors stripped of civilised standards as they struggle to 
return to the normality of home. The horrific image of enervated and emaciated 
figures feeding on the dead or dying shows a cruel twist of irony in that the ingestion 
of the human produces a savage inhuman other. Beckett's sympathy goes out to these 
suffering creaturely victims as they journey back to humanity. 
It is significant that Beckett should concentrate on this particularly inhuman 
experience because this reduction was at the centre of the Nazis' ambition. The 
incarnation of the inhuman other from the human goes back to the original 
devaluation of egalitarianism in the concentration and death camps. The Nuremberg 
Laws of 1935 that culminated in genocide present a clinical endeavour to confirm the 
status and improve the security of the self-identified master race. The legislation 
effectively divided people into orders of worth, divested human life of its universal 
sanctity and reserved importance for a designated group. This filtering of life, 
predicated upon the developed and sophisticated social and medical science of 
modern civilisation, boils down to a biopolitical activity that introduces sovereign 
political calculations into the materiality of life. 
S3 Rosette C. Lamont, 'Samuel Beckett's Wandering Jew', in Reflections of the Holocaust in Art and 
Literature, ed. by Randolph L. Braham (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1990),35-53, p. 43. 
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In Giorgio Agamben's terms, biopolitics means to invest zoe - the term used to 
describe life outside a particular way of life - into the sphere of polis. 54 This implies 
that there is a political dimension to 'bare life' at a point where the simple fact of 
living is transformed into a totalised version of life, such as the concentration and 
extermination camps as the consequence of Fascism. In these conditions, the lifestyles 
and cultures known as bios are funnelled into a single vision of zoe. For Agamben, 
these exemplary biopolitical sites cast judgements on types of life to pursue a supreme 
version of life worth living. Sovereign power over life considers undeserving beings 
exempt from the political measures for preserving and improving the quality of life, 
thus rendering the Jews outlaws. In its most extreme form, this political neglect 
develops into biopolitical activity, whereby the extermination camps enforce the 
notion of 'life that does not deserve to live' .55 The subalterns are separated from the 
master race, distinguished as biopolitical material and thus rendered expendable 
.J 
creatures. 
On a biopoliticallevel, the Nazis' sovereign decision on the fate of the Jewish 
people elevates and asserts the claims of the Aryan 'race'. Since the superiority of one 
cannot be confirmed without the inferiority of the other, the Nazi propaganda 
campaign constructed an image of the Jew as an infectious disease ('racial 
tuberculosis') and commensal organism {'world parasite,).s6 In the 1940 Fritz Hippler 
propaganda film The Eternal Jew, Jewish people are depicted as rats, with the Nazis 
battling an infestation of unclean vermin. Whilst presuming supremacy over the 
target, Nazi propaganda is also replete with fear-mongering images of threat and 
corruption. This use of animal symbolism in a hierarchical method of identification, 
and the extermination that sought to concretise the supposed superiority, appropriates 
S4 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 4. 
ss Ibid. p. 136 
S6 G. G. QUo, Der Jude als Weltparasil (Munich: Eher Verlag, 1943). 
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the human-animal binary to reinforce the relationship between superior masters and 
subordinates. One particularly contentious debate arising from this parallel is the 
extent to which the Holocaust is comparable to livestock slaughter. A thorough 
examination of the differences and similarities in the relationship between the Nazis' 
treatment of the Jews in the Holocaust and human treatment of animals in factory 
farming is beyond the scope of this thesis. Such ethically sensitive material is rightly 
the subject of several dedicated monographs and articles. 57 However, the fact remains 
that the very existence of this debate means that the human-animal polarity in the Nazi 
invectives against Jewish people, particularly the association with primitive, hidden or 
rapidly breeding creatures, highlights a familiar identification tactic that focuses on 
heterogeneity to allay the uncomfortable proximity with a perceived other. 
In order to link Beckett's creatures with the contemporaneous dehumanisation 
properly, it is worth stressing how, in the most general sense, alterity positions are 
exploited to promote individuality and gain status in identity struggles. The idea of an 
identity in ruins and the author-narrators' fictional prostheses found in Beckett's 
trilogy show that the acknowledgement of an other retains a sense of subjectivity for 
the individual, albeit through a necessary experience of desubjectivity. That is, a part 
of the subject is dispossessed in order to preserve a relative coordinate with which to 
partially identify oneself. The examples of division noted in chapter one occur within 
the individual, but, in a more tangible way, they translate into the power dynamics 
between characters in Beckett's texts. It is not difficult to see the lordly Pozzo and his 
slave creature Lucky in Waiting/or Godot as an instance of how masters rely on the 
possible subordination of an other to elevate themselves and dispel any parity. Pozzo 
57 For example, Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of .Animais and Ihe Holocaust 
(New York: Lantern, 2002); and Boria Sax, Animals in the Third Reich - Pets, Scapegoats, and the 
Holocaust (New York: Continuum, 2000). For a discussion of the differences and similarities between 
Jews and animals as 'figures', see Andrew Benjamin, Of Jews and Animals (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University,2010). 
165 
laughs at the idea that Vladimir and Estragon are of his own kind: 'You are human 
beings none the less. As far as one can see. Of the same species as myself. [Laughs.] 
Of the same species as Pozzo!' (WFG, 15). Whilst it is amusing for Pozzo to think of 
himself on a par with these poor creatures, he does not extend the same status to . 
Lucky. Knowlson notes the contextual significance of this identification tactic: 
'Pozzo's treatment of Lucky reminded some of the earliest critics of a capo in a 
concentration camp brutalising his victim with his whip' .58 Pozzo's whip certainly 
recalls the head prison guards in the Nazi camps and the violence used to assert their 
authority. I would add that, alongside the rope passed around Lucky's neck, Pozzo's 
treatment of Lucky also illustrates how the slave recalls the animal. Whereas Lucky is 
a 'human being' (WFG, 20), or at least a 'cretin' to Vladimir and Estragon (WFG, 18), 
he is a dancing 'hog' and a thinking 'pig' to his master (WFG, 16). Therefore, Pozzo's 
lordship over Lucky evokes human mastery over animals and applies to the power 
..J 
hierarchies between human others. The power dynamic in Beckett's Waiting for 
Godot traces human social tensions as well as interspecies, relationships. This 
ambivalence creates a plausible comparison with the Nazis' persecution of Jewish 
people, in which the phenomenon of radical difference has passed from 
anthropocentric identification into racial persecution. 
The Nazis' extreme separation of identities is physically enforced to reinstate a 
master-servant binary. In a crude and selfish protection of individuality, the peril of 
conflated identities and reshuffled boundaries initiates a return to a fixed monadic 
state through dependable polarised roles. However, whilst the endeavour to elevate a 
group in this way echoes the anthropocentric project to distinguish humans from 
animals, the warped Nazi perspective does not exactly promote the Holocaust and 
58 d Knowlson. Damne to Fame. p. 380. 
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livestock slaughter analogy since the value of noble animals often exceeds that of the 
Jews in Nazi ideology. In a massive contravention of the Hippocratic oath, Nazi 
doctors used prisoners as Versuchspersonen, test subjects or human guinea pigs, often 
in place of animals. Medical professionals justified this type of treatment with 
biopolitical rhetoric, as physician Fritz Klein exemplifies when he infers, '[t]he Jew is 
the gangrenous appendix in the body of humankind'. 59 The Third Reich also 
introduced a range of measures to ensure that animals were respected and killed 
humanely.60 Furthermore, as a dog owner and a vegetarian himself, Hitler contributed 
practically to animal liberation, as Peter Singer relates: 'Becoming a vegetarian is a 
highly practical and effective step one can take toward ending both the killing of 
nonhuman animals and the infliction of suffering upon them,.61 In keeping with the 
ethical treatment of animals, but also a discriminating view of life worth living, the 
Nazis extend compassion to nonhuman animals whilst inflicting severe human 
suffering. 
The expUlsion and extermination of the Jews is not repeated in kind for animals, 
which indicates that Nazi ideology is comfortable with the stability of the human-
animal distinction, or rather, it lauds particular qualities in living creatures to shift the 
self-other boundaries. Boria Sax suggests that the species difference was not a 
primary concern for the Nazis: 'In their nihilistic perspective the important distinction 
was not between "humans" and "animals", at least in any traditional way. It was 
between victor and vanquished, between master and slave' ,62 The peculiar implication 
is that Nazi animal rights convert inhumane forms of mastery over animal 
commodities into a guardianship that promotes animal husbandry and the master-pet 
59 See Agamben. Homo Sacer, pp. 154-9. Laurence Rees, AuschwilZ: The Nazis and the 'Final 
Solution' (London: BBC Books, 2005), p. 185. 
60 See Sax, Animals in the Third Reich, p. 35. 
61 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 161. 
62 Sax., Animals in the Third Reich, p. 23. 
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intimacy for certain noble animals. The treatment of the Jews, then, can be considered 
a pursuit of othemess within humans that modifies anthropocentrism to revolve 
around the Aryan, whilst the human-animal alterity is secure enough to grant custody 
to an equivalent class of animal. This view holds that modem violence does not treat 
people like animals identically, but that human groups are exposed to the same 
compulsion to assert identity that delineated humans from the base collective term 
'animal'. From a Nazi perspective, the Jew is part of a new inferior class that includes 
servile animals and constitutes the necessary other. The focus on identifying against 
as opposed to identifying with means the aspiring power imposes a state of othemess 
on the counterpart in an attempt to gain distinction and organise difference 
hierarchically . 
. It is this sense of a necessary other that is intrinsic to the power politics of 
Beckett's codependent pseudo-couples, and the grotesque relation and revulsion that 
.J 
informs the biopolitical exclusion of his characters. As I now move on to discuss the 
biopolitical struggles that appear in Beckett's work, I want to reiterate the claim that 
the concept of animality consistently haunts the alterity thinking behind social and 
racial identification. In Ma/one Dies, Beckett offers a most explicit reference to how 
human mastery over animals is reflected in the human mastery over other humans. 
Malone himself relies on the 'goodness' of his nurse (T, 185) and Malone's character 
Macmann is under the charge of 'his keeper' Moll (T, 261). It is the relationship 
between Macmann and Moll that conveys the subordination of animals that underlies 
human power struggles. Malone writes that 'Moll's lips puffed and parted in a 
dreadful smile, which made Macmann's eyes waver like those of an animal glared on 
by its master and compelled then finally to look away' (T, 260). Moll's intimidating 
expression reveals Macmann's vulnerability, which makes him distinctly animal-like 
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under her control. This type of reaction shows how the animal other is invoked as the 
subject is dehumanised by another in the pursuit of power. As such, the victim is 
made to feel like an animal because the master wants to be dissociated from that 
status. As soon as human weakness is exposed or exploited, the human is redolent of 
the animal. Agamben asserts that animality remains an ineradicable element of the 
human's composition and that the Jew, as 'the non-man produced within the man', is 
synonymous with 'the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner, as figures of an animal 
in human form,.63 Like Foucault before him, who argued that 'it is animality that 
reveals the dark rage, the sterile madness that lie in men's hearts', Agamben suggests 
that the animal continues to exist as a trope for the deplorable and errant aspects of 
human behaviour.64 In conjunction, Foucault and Agamben recognize how the well-
rehearsed human-animal divide is interior to the human and reproduced in society; the 
animal's legacy continues between humans and within humans riven by identity wars. 
Biopolitical Struggles: Territory and Custody 
Beckett's master-servant relationships present both the corporal battles of social 
nature and the internal battles held within the self. The hostility and dependency 
between his characters depicts the physical conflicts between adversaries and 
counterparts, and alludes to individual psychological conflicts in a purgatorial state of 
subjectivity. Adorno mentions how these internal affairs spill over into the external 
world in his essay on Endgame: 
As soon as the subject is no longer doubtlessly self-identical, no longer a 
closed structure of meaning, the line of demarcation with the exterior becomes 
63 Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, p. 37. 
64 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, trans. by Richard Howard (Oxford: Routledge, 200 I), p. 
18. 
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blurred, and the situations of inwardness become at the same time physical 
ones.
65 
As noted above, in Watt, this overlap causes the protagonist to confuse his identity 
with objects, namely a pot. In Beckett's master-servant relationships, the 
psychological disunity in self is also manifest as domination over another, often in the 
form of violence and abuse, but also custody and service. Hence, Beckett's term 
'pseudo-couples', which he uses to describe M:ercier and Camier in The Unnamable 
(T, 299), encapsulates the bind and bond of the necessary other. The term implies a 
problematic togetherness between two entities since the relationship is at once 
required and antagonistic. Adorno goes so far as to argue that the pseudo-couple in 
Endgame lack independence and are therefore without personal distinction. He writes 
that '[ e ]ven the outlines of Hamm and Clov are one; they are denied the individuation 
.J 
of a tidily independent monad' .66 In other words, they are a veritable pseudo-couple, a 
false twosome, in the sense that they constitute a bipartite singular. Esslin's more 
explicit reading in The Theatre of the Absurd compares Endgame to Nikolai 
Evreinov's The Theatre of the Soul (1915) to suggest that Beckett's play is a 
monodrama, which represents 'different aspects of a single personality'. 67 The 
ambiguity over the physical denotation or psychological connotation of Beckett's 
plays appears to support the idea that issues of subjectivity and identity are local to 
both body and mind. Since it is difficult to determine whether the pseudo-couple are 
real people in a room or abstractions in a 'skullscape', the result is that the self-other 
binary pervades public and private spheres.68 In this way, Beckett's pseudo-couples 
65 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 129. 
6" Ibid. p. 144. 
67 Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd. 3rd edn. p. 66 
oK Linda Ben-Zvi. Samuel Beckell (Boston: Twayne, \986), p. 4. 
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act as a device to convey psychological duality and its propagation in social 
interaction. 
As beings subject to the non-synthesis of self that leads to subsequent pursuits 
of difference amongst others, Beckett's creatures do not exactly conflate the homo-
hetero tensions seen in either internal self-consciousness or the external human-animal 
divide. Contrary to hybrid figures that emerge as the original progeny of two distinct 
parents, Beckett's characters are vessels for duality to co-exist and they reveal this 
schism within the self in their antibiosis with others. MolIoy recognises the interplay 
between his more autotelic animal self and idealistic human self: 'For in me there 
have always been two fools, among others, one asking nothing better than to stay 
where he is and the other imagining that life might be slightly less horrible further on. 
[ ... ] And these inseparable fools I indulged turn about, that they might understand 
their foolishness' (T, 48). Molloy's selves jostle within him, with the prospect of 
knowing only the asininity of their condition. This tension between the static and 
progressive sides of MolIoy is reflected in his dealings with external others. When he 
meets the charcoal-burner in the forest towards the end of his narrative, there is a 
conflict of interests as MolIoy wants to continue on his quest and the stranger wants 
him to stay. Their inability to communicate verbally underlines the antibiosis between 
them: 'Either I didn't understand a word he said, or he didn't understand a word I 
said, or he knew nothing, or he wanted to keep me near him' (T, 84). MolJoy resolves 
this conflict· through violence, kicking the charcoal-burner to death and thereby 
mastering a situation he could not master internally. In this way, there is a correlation 
between the identity tensions of the internal sphere and the tensions surrounding the 
pursuit of difference between humans and animals, or self and other. The symbolic 
human and animal within each individual is illustrated between individuals. 
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The basic theme of elevating and demarcating one's individual or group 
identity translates from primal creatures to modem power struggles. The executions of 
power that stalk distinction are an intrinsic part of a bioprocess: the sulvival of self. In 
the movement from raw life material to a refined elite, from anonymity to 
sovereignty, the self is perennially detaching from peers and emphatically reforming 
itself anew. In Strangers, Gods, and Monsters (2003), Richard Kearney studies how 
alien, divine and grotesque others satisfy the necessary alterity that grants the subject 
identity by virtue of relativity. In his discussion of Heidegger, Keamey notes that 
'each mortal remains a cleft creature with one eye on its terrestrial genesis, the other 
on its celestial aspirations'. 69 Caught between earth and sky, this cleft creature 
struggles with its lowly past and inglorious beginnings whilst striving towards its 
divine end. As such, the pursuit of power over difference is a process that appears as a 
step in evolution; it is a way of advancing, defining or safeguarding oneself or one's 
.J 
group. 
Fin de siecle social Darwinism took this biological connection to affirm that 
the laws of natural selection explain human hierarchies as well as plants and animals. 
The shift from terrestrial to celestial spheres is most apparent when the Nazis integrate 
notions of selectivity and evolution - particularly the theories of biologist Ernst 
Haeckel - into their political policies, thereby turning natural selection into the active 
Selektion of the death camps: 'Their political dictionary was replete with words like 
space, struggle, selection, and extinction (Ausmerzen). The syllogism of their logic 
was clearly stated: The world is a jungle in which different nations struggle for space. 
The stronger win, the weaker die or are killed'. 70 The continuity between humans and 
69 Richard Keamey, Strangers, Gods, and Monsters (Oxford: Routledge, 2003), p. 167. 
70 Joseph Tenenbaum, Race and Reich - The Story of an Epoch (New York: Twayne, 1956), p. 211. 
Patterson outlines Haeckel's view: 'Emst Haeckel, whose ideas had a strong influence on Nazi 
ideology, maintained that since non-European races are "psychologically" nearer to the mammals (apes 
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animal ancestors in Charles Darwin's The Descent of Man (1871), for example, shows 
that 'man is descended from some less highly organized form' but 'ifhe is to advance 
still higher he must remain subject to a severe struggle'. 71 Whilst these power 
dynamics become more complicated and obscure as psychological, social, political, 
ethical and metaphysical tensions, they continue to hark back to a primordial struggle. 
Each onward step evokes primitive competitions and early forms of domination. 
For Beckett, however, who considered Darwin's The Origin of the Species 
(1859) 'badly written cadap', the Victorian idea of evolution as a narrative of 
improvement is false. 72 These on-going, animalistic struggles are not directed towards 
idealism, but instead signal a kind of biotic stasis since the ever-present contest for 
power arrests the humanist vision of development?3 In How It Is (French 1961; 
English 1964), Beckett highlights the retrogression that attends the pursuit of 
advancement through his explicit portrayal of the exertion of power and violent 
control in the master-servant relationship between the narrator and Pim. Beckett began 
writing what turned out to be his last novel-length work the year after Fin de Partie 
(the French original of Endgame) was published in 1957, and completed it two years 
later in 1960. In a letter to Donald McWhinnie, Beckett explains the basic premise: 'A 
"man" is lying in the mud and dark murmuring his "life" as he hears it obscurely 
uttered by a voice inside him,.74It is tempting to interpret this imagery, as Adelman 
does, as 'an apocalyptic world like that of soldiers dying in the mud of no-m an's land 
and dogs) than to civilized Europeans, we must, therefore, assign a IDtally different value 10 their lives', 
Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, pp. 25-6. 
71 Charles Darwin, Darwin - Evoit,lIionary Writings, ed. by lames A. Secord (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 2008), pp. 319, 331. ' 
72 Beckett, Letters, Vol. I, p. 111. 
73 Although Darwin is a key figure in the literature mediating the historical period between Beckett and 
Schopenhauer, the struggles in Beckett have a distinctly Schopenhauerian flavour. For example, we can 
compare the German's belief that 'everywhere in nature we see contest, struggle, and the fluctuation of 
victory' with Beckett's line in Malone Dies 'the trees are at war with one another, and the bushes, and 
the wild flowers, and weeds, all ravening for earth and light' (MD, 277). See Arthur Schopenhauer, The 
World as Will and Representation, Vo\. 1, trans. by E. F. J. Pay ne (New York: Dover, 1969), p. 146. 
74 Knowlson, Damned to Fame, p. 461. 
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between the trenches, murmuring their prayers' .75 Despite this, Beckett's inverted 
commas suggest that the narrator is not exactly a 'man' or a figure with a recognisably 
human 'life', and that these terms are only employed to refer to some relatable form of 
being. 
Although Beckett's imagery recalls the barbarism of war, its primitivism also 
stretches back through 'vast tracts of time' (HII, 3). The narrator's description of 
crawling in the mud, 'the cord sawing my neck the sack jolting my side' (HII, 39) 
evokes the depiction of Lucky from Waitingfor Godot, tethered and equally bogged 
down by the bag, basket and stool. These afflictions connect the narrator of How It Is 
with the animal-like treatment and oppressive situations that Beckett's other 
creaturely servants endure. As a result, the narrator, the eventual master, first appears 
as a similarly primitive, browbeaten creature, and this reminds the reader that the 
narrator and his eventual servant Pim are essentially of the same primordial origin. 
J 
Consequently, the narrator's sovereignty over Pim is an imperious display of power 
over his own kin, which signals a pivotal stage in the development of differentiation 
and individuality. Since verbal communication between the pair appears to be beyond 
their capability, the narrator stabs, thumps and scratches his counterpart to physically 
assert his superiority. As mud dwellers, both the narrator and Pim resemble 
mudskipper fish, or Gobies, and this reinforces Beckett's nod to evolution in that 
these animals neatly illustrate the step from a purely aquatic life to an amphibious 
one.76 The narrator displays this evolutionary process in his belief that although he is a 
creature, he can at least be less of a creature than Pim: 'the wish to be less wretched a 
little less' (HII, 8). Despite this, the pursuit of highness appears bound up with 
7S Gary Adelman, Naming Beckett's Unnamable (Lewisburg: Bucknell University, 2004), p. 199. 
76 Beckett refers to Emst Haeckel in this text (HIl, 34) and brings to mind the controversial and now 
disproved 'recapitulation theory', commonly expressed as 'ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny', which 
states that the development of an individual from embryo to maturity reflects the evolution of its 
species. 
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downfall: 'progress properly so called ruins in prospect' (Hll, 17). This is not the 
upward trajectory of historical progress, but a progress that incorporates its own 
decline. It seems Beckett is undeterred by the epic scale of this principle so long as it 
undercuts itself, predicting its own collapse. In kind, the title How It Is itself suggests 
both an axiomatic statement and the contingency of the present tense. 
Despite Beckett's distrust of master narratives, then, his narrators evidently 
lodge views of a similarly grand magnitude and survey immense temporal and 
historical patterns. Prior to How It Is, the unnamed narrator in the seventh text of 
Texts for Nothing refers to the cycles of memory as 'the same return, like the spokes 
of a turning wheel' (TN, 30) and later, in text nine, the narrator briefly dollies back 
from the busy foreground of existence to perceive a permanent backdrop when he 
utters 'what vicissitudes within what changelessness' (TN, 37). These phrases have a 
profound resonance, and yet Beckett often faces the scale of philosophical thinking 
whilst refusing the authority of the philosophical form. His narrators are tasked with 
untangling the bewildering human condition from within that bewildering human 
condition. That is to say, the characters are unable to transcend themselves to reflect 
on an ontological axiom. The narrators in both Texts for Nothing and How It Is are 
consumed by an insistent performance, evidenced by the line 'I say it as 1 hear it' (TN, 
22; HIl, 3), and this overwhelms the possibility of any indubitable wisdom. As such, 
these passing insights do not allow them to improve their knowledge, alter their 
approach, surpass their constitutive conditions or gain a metaphysical truth, but rather 
haunt and ruin them periodically. It appears that Beckett's clearest glance at a master 
narrative is in its repeated return and collapse. 
The idea that ancient traits remain in the present, lingering and resurfacing, is 
noticeable in the images of crawling and creeping figures in Beckctt's post-war 
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writing. These depictions serve to prostrate the upright human and reduce him to a 
primitive creature. For example, Beckett describes Molloy 'crawling on his belly like 
a reptile' (T, 90) and bluntly calls to mind lice in the name Lousse (T, 33). The word 
'reptile' itself stems from the Latin for 'crawled' whilst the alternative name given for 
Lousse in Mol/oy, Sophie Loy, gives credence to the idea that civilization is a f a ~ a d e e
for barbarism. 'Sophie' derives from the Greek for wisdom, as in philosophy, and the 
Irish pronunciation of 'lie' reads phonetically 'loy'. The lie of wisdom therefore gives 
way to Lousse, or louse, suggesting the primacy of parasitic insects, or contemptible 
and unpleasant creatures. Estragon brings these crawling and louse images together in 
Waiting for Godot when he exclaims 'All my lousy life I've crawled about in the 
mud!' (WFG, 52). Furthermore, in Endgame, Clov discovers a flea, or crablouse, from 
which humanity might start again (E, 22) and Hamm says: 'Dig my nails into the 
cracks and drag myself forward with my fingers' (E, 41). Although moving forward, 
crawling is an undignified and taxing mode of transit that betrays a constant barbarity 
and therefore declines the idea of evolution as progress to suggest that primitivism 
accompanies humanity's onward trajectory. In this way, the Nazis' depiction of the 
Jew as a primitive being, as the 1941 propaganda poster exclaims 'Jews are lice; they 
cause typhus', backfires onto humanity in general for Beckett. His creatures 
effectively carry the evolutionary archive with them as baggage into an unavoidably 
ancient modernity. 
Beckett's portrayal of master-servant relationships points to basic and chronic 
systems of governance, such as physical strength and intimidation, as well as the 
primal psychology behind these systems, such as self-interest. Although his depictions 
of power avoid a specific political critique, he nevertheless grasps the drives at the 
core of governance and ascendancy that find their epitome in the Holocaust. Beckett 
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includes various encounters with authority that display a level of order and control 
based on territory - on making and managing space. In the first volume of The History 
of Sexuality (1978), Foucault makes a clear distinction between territorial sovereignty, 
which allows life and threatens death, and biopower, which allows death and fosters 
life.77 Despite this; policed spaces are a preliminary step towards a biopolitical level 
when considered as part of the Nazis' determination to create Lebensraum (living 
room) for their people. As the state nurtures the select population, it produces the 
adverse effect of excluding others from the political, and eventually the physical, 
territory. Agamben points out such an overlap in which 'an unprecedented 
absolutization of the biopower to make live intersects with an equally absolute 
generalization of the sovereign power to make die, such that biopolitics coincides 
immediately with thanatopolitics,.78 As people exiled and displaced from the 
governed space, Beckett's creatures illustrate the biopolitical threshold that appends 
passive neglect and active abuse. 
Beckett's narrators in The End and The Expelled are never settled in their 
surroundings or belong to a place. Written in the year immediately after the war, these 
novellas follow the narrators as they are evicted from homes and gradually ostracized 
from society. The final act of charity towards the narrator in The End suggests the 
beginnings of isolation and self-sufficiency: 
This is a charitable institution, he said, and the money is a gift you receive 
when you leave. When it is gone you will have to get more, if you want to go 
on. Never come back here whatever you do, you would not be let in. (FN, 39) 
71 See Foucault, The History o/Sexuality, Vol. 1, pp. 135-145. 
78 Agamben, Remnants of AuschwilZ, p. 83. 
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Beckett's narrator is a subject of territorial sovereignty since the state has abandoned 
him. He is no longer a concern for the welfare system and thus left to fend for himself 
independently. However, this end of care is the start of his voyage out of society 
altogether, which surely guarantees his demise. The narrator is told that he 'must not 
loiter in the cloister' (FN, 39), that he is not welcome in the sheltered space. 
Moreover, the word 'loiter' resonates on both a narrative and physical level, implying 
that the idea of nomadic progression is paramount, as his wonderings and wanderings 
are enforced as a result of a sovereign decision. Hence, his peripatetic movements are 
administered firstly and then monitored: 'One day I had a visit from a policeman. He 
said I had to be watched, without explaining why. Suspicious, that was it, he told me I 
was suspicious' (FN, 43). This vague oppressive authority serves to coerce the 
threatening narrator out of the governed sphere and make him a vulnerable outlaw. At 
times, the public is complicit in this banishment, ~ l n d d even prioritise their useful 
animals over fellow human beings. A landlord ejects the narrator from his home for 
this reason: 'He said he needed the room for his pig which even as he spoke was 
catching cold in a cart before the door and no one to look after him' (FN, 44). 
Although this kind of human devaluation is outrageous, the domestic and social 
spaces in The End are nevertheless the domain of a discriminate sovereign rule that 
orders humans into types and excludes its deviant subjects. 
The policing of territory is more punctilious in The Expelled, which is a text 
that bears the status of Beckett's homeless figures in its title. The narrator is evicted 
from his house in the opening pages in a manner that recalls pest control: 'A thorough 
cleansing was in full swing. In a few hours they would close the window, draw the 
curtains and spray the whole place with disinfectant' (FN, 5-6). The extent of this 
purification suggests that the authorities wish to erase the narrator's filthy presence 
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and that he is a stain upon society. Once expelled, the narrator decides to walk on the 
road so as not to inconvenience the people on the pavement. He says, • A policeman 
stopped me and said, The street for vehicles, the sidewalk for pedestrians. Like a bit of 
Old Testament' (FN, 8). This blunt rule resounds like a biblical commandment, as 
though it is an elemental law that also applies to the narrator for his safety. Yet a 
second policeman approaches: 'He pointed out to me that the sidewalk was for 
everyone, as if it was quite obvious that I could not be assimilated to that category' 
(FN, 8).79 The narrator is not included in the precise organisation of space, diverted 
from the street to the sidewalk, but is instead dissociated from the public in general. 
He is alienated from the community and sundered from the Everyman as an 
aberration. This ideological separation is later enacted as a bodily distance when the 
narrator spends a night in the stables with a cab horse and finally retreats into the 
sunset until he is 'down among the dead' (FN, 16). Beckett's itinerant narrator lacks 
the solicitude granted to the working animal and is banished to the dark periphery of 
biopolitical responsibility. As a subject of territorial sovereignty, he is initially a black 
sheep, a disgrace to the social group, but as he becomes an isolated biopolitical pariah, 
he is a scapegoat in the wilderness beyond provisions. 
The comparisons between unassimilated beings and animals complicate 
Beckett's marginalised figures, notably in Mercier and Camier. Written around the 
same time as the four nouvelles in 1946, this text shares the same movement between 
city and countryside. Whilst in a public garden, a ranger referred to as a 'maleficent 
being' (MC, 8) drives two copulating dogs away from the pagoda. He proceeds to 
order Mercier and Camier to move on from the shelter, thus creating a parallel 
between the animals and the men. The law rather comically interferes with the dogs 
79 Jackie Blackman considers this unassimilated figure to reflect the Jewish situation, particularly the 
pre-war political status of a rabbi that Seckeu's cousin Deirdre Sinclair witnessed in Germany. See 
Blackman, 'Seckett Judaizing Seckett', p. 328. 
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on a biological level, stopping them in the act of procreation, and the government of 
territory suggests a similar, yet subtler, biopolitical action towards the men. Mercier 
and Camier initially think the ranger does the dogs a 'service', and question whether 
he has served them also. Mercier says 'Can it 1 wonder be the fillip we needed, to get 
us moving?' (MC, 9), which implies that petty rules and regulations keep the social 
mechanism turning, in the same way that they ensure Mercier and Camier's narrative 
unfolds. But, as with the dogs pulling in opposite directions, Beckett's original 
pseudo-couple are sent off without a sure purpose and ultimately meander aimlessly to 
a bridge on the edge of the town, where they remember the animals they have recently 
encountered. They think back on Helen's talking parrot, which is a peculiarly liminal 
being as an animal capable of mimicking human speech. This parrot coincides with 
the bridge as an interstitial structure to reflect the pseudocouple's own ambivalence 
and mobility between the suburban fringes and the rural hinterlands. Furthermore, the 
liminal creature and interstitial structure signify the pair's crossover into a state of 
biopolitical vulnerability. Mercier claims the parrot 'will haunt ~ e e till my dying day' 
(MC, 20), thus suggesting that the present memory of the bird might portend his 
imminent demise. Ominously, the parrot is remembered at the point Mercier 
approaches the countryside in the dark, where he says 'I have a feeling he was dead 
the day she told us she had put him out in the country' (MC, 100). Like abandoned 
domesticated animals, it seems Mercier and Camier stray onto the edges of an abject 
and fatal state that the absence ofbiopolitical guardianship induces. 
Beckett's vagrants are subject to more indirect forms of power that benefit 
appointed social circles but cause inequity, limit opportunities and restrict the well-
being of others. This idea of control expresses the crux of power for Foucault: 
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In effect what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that 
does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their 
actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present 
actions.so 
The dominant force divests the other of influence and efficacy, and effectively 
monopolises active power. In Mol/oy, this 'action upon an action' renders Beckett's 
protagonist a social misfit. When Molloy rests on his bicycle, a policeman asks 'what 
are you doing there?' (T, 20) and suggests that Molloy's inert occupation of valuable 
space is a 'violation of [ ... ] public order, public decency' (T, 20). Molloy's mere 
presence transgresses the law and, in a physical sense, he is clearly refused sanctuary. 
He is also excluded from the bureaucratic system because he is literally 'without 
papers' (T, 24) and is therefore effectively without certain human rights but not totally 
without human support. 
As a result of the vague oppression of biopolitical power, Molloy receives his 
care elsewhere, namely through Lousse. Nevertheless, Lousse's brief custody of 
Molloy is also entangled in a Foucauldian sense of power as care becomes an act that 
must be accepted. Molloy points out that beggars cannot be choosers: 'Against the 
charitable gesture there is no defence, that I know of. [ ... ] To him who has nothing it 
is forbidden not to relish filth' (T, 24). The needy are at the mercy of their benefactors 
and are predominantly biddable subordinates, expected to abide by the established 
protocols. This influence takes on a more forceful, sinister hue when Molloy attempts 
to depart the house: 'doubtless she had poisoned my beer with something intended to 
mollify me, to mollify Molloy' (T, 47). Lousse tries to make Molloy a more 
80 Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', in Power: Essential Works ofFoucaul1 /954-/984, Vot. 
3, ed. by James D. Faubion, trans. by Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 2002), 326-348, p. 340. 
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malleable, submissive patient, which suggests that care is an alternative means of 
controlling people. It is evident that custody is integral to the anatomy of power when 
Molloy resists Lousse's supervision, and that her matronly control attempts to acquire 
the type of dedication that Molloy displays in the dogged pursuit of his mother. 
Molloy's custody at Lousse's home presents maternal care as a veiled form of 
dominance that reveals the intimacy between mastery and service. 
The power dynamics raised in Molloy's encounter with a figure of care 
corresponds with the relationship between pets and owners to further elucidate the 
master-servant binary. Judging by Lousse's adoption of Molloy, it appears that 
indigents and domestic pets are incapacitated with support; they are helped to the 
point of subordination. Molloy is associated with dogs in particular, as he effectively 
replaces Lousse's pet dog Teddy, having accidentally killed him. The parallel is 
conftrmed at the dog's interment when Molloy thinks, 'On the whole I was a mere 
spectator, I contributed my presence. As if it had been my own burial. And it was' (T, 
37). Molloy implies that the dog's passing marks his own death and the birth of 
Lousse's dog-man. In place of Teddy, Molloy is a human pet, a creature to care for 
and lord over through a coinciding sense of responsibility and ownership. 
Notably, Molloy's own obligation to replace Teddy evokes the Irish 
mythological figure Cuchulain. Whilst maintaining the human-canine proximity, this 
legend balances the scales of power considerably given that Setanta, the warrior son 
. 
of the god of light Lug, volunteers to act as Culain's guard in place of the hound he 
killed in self-defence. The legend retains ideas of servitude and ownership since 
Setanta becomes Cuchulain, which literally means 'Hound ofCulain'. Considering the 
gregarious nature of the human-canine relationship, the legend also reflects loyalty, 
friendship and mutuality. The power of care appears to extend both ways here, and 
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thus the dog is 'the animal that perhaps more than any other runs to and fro between 
the human and animal worlds, simultaneously marking and crossing the boundary 
between them,.sl Such is the mobility of canine company between civilization and 
savagery that commander Kurt Franz ordered his dog to attack prisoners at the 
Treblinka death camp using the words 'Man, bite the dog,.82 Here, in a reversal of 
\ 
lycanthropy, the hierarchy is thoroughly confused, treating the dog as a man and 
elevating the animal to the level of a loyal fellow, and at the same time deriding the 
prisoners with the derogatory term 'dog'. 
In Beckett, the dog's ability to traverse human and animal worlds brings 
together the two distinct spheres to show that power is shared between master and 
servant. Returning to Mol/ay, Lousse needs to care for Molloy to feel purpose and 
belonging. Molloy explains, '1 would take the place of the dog 1 had killed, as it for 
her had taken the place of a child' (T, 47). This sequence of replacement aligns 
Molloy with both animal and infantile dependents, but it also highlights how Lousse 
requires a dependent subject. Her gain from the caregiving role is made clear when 
Molloy observes how Lousse sells 'the benefits for both of us if I would make my 
home with her' (T, 48). The suggestion that the arrangement is mutually beneficial 
indicates how the subordinate provides a vital service to the master that leaves the 
master in debt to and reliant on the subordinate. Giving care is akin to gaining 
responsibility, but receiving care means to inherit the status of the necessary other and 
therefore aICoddly powerful role as an identity position. The effect is that Beckett's 
pseudo-couples develop a level of codependency that obfuscates the boundaries 
, between mastery, service and companionship. 
81 Philip Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), p. 17. 
82 Sax, Animals in the Third Reich, p. 22. 
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In Beckett's Endgame, control and dependence are similarly inextricable, 
which results in a deadlock between the pseudo-couple Hamm and Clov. Eric Santner 
points out that the title of this play evokes the 'turbulence of sovereignty, the rise and 
fall of kings and queens (on the chessboard of battle)' .83 In this sense, Endgame also 
suggests the strategic contest for territory, although these sovereign struggles are in a 
stalemate. On one hand, the blind master Hamm has the trump card in the larder 
combination and its contents, and therefore has a dependent subject in Clov. On the 
other, the lame but motile Clov has the power of care, symbolised by the painkillers, 
and therefore takes control in making Hamm dependent on his service. Their relative 
identity is notable when Hamm demands to be 'Bang in the centre' of the room (E, 
19). Although it posits Hamm as the primary focus of attention, the audience witness 
that Clov places him there, which centres the master only in relation to his satellite 
servant. As Adorno puts it, 'Hamm is the king, about whom everything turns and who 
can do nothing himself. 84 This turnaround in the master-servant relationship discloses 
the power of the other and accentuates the codependency that unsettles the power 
distribution. 
The ruling force requires a subordinate to actualise the hierarchy and without a 
reference point, the master lacks an outlet to exercise such power and is only 
theoretically potent. The toy Pomeranian, for example, whose servitude and obedience 
are very much illusory, reveals the falsity of Hamm's position without Clov. In an 
-
exhibition of megalomania, Hamm believes the stuffed dog is gazing at him and 
begging for food: 'Leave him like that, standing there imploring me. [C/ov straightens 
up. The dog falls on its side.]' (E, 26). Beckett's stage directions show that the 
inanimate toy is beyond the realms of authority, whereas Cloy duly follows orders. 
83 Santner, The Royal Remains, p. 251. 
84 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 146. 
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Unlike Gertrude Stein's 'I am I because my little dog knows me', Beckett's 
formulation sees Clov become Hamm's little dog as he sits the prop up.85 But like 
Stein's insight, the subordinate position becomes key to identity. Maud Ellmann 
explains that '[i]f the'!' depends upon the knowledge of a little dog, this is not a 
neuter, neutral universal I, but a contingent subject rooted in relations with human and 
inhuman others' .86 In this respect, the master relies on the servant to give dominance 
meaning; there is no dominion without a minion. Separately, each party lacks the 
context, the gaze, or the all-important dialogue that the other affords. As a result, 
Beckett's pairs are contracted to one another in mutual dependence. Before Cloy halts 
at the door, they verbalise their bind: 
HAMM: I'm obliged to you, Cloy. For your services. 
CLOY: [Turning, sharply.] Ab pardon, it's I am obliged to you. 
HAMM: It's we are obliged to each other. (E, 48) 
This obligation has the double sense of requirement and service, 'I oblige you' and 'I 
am obliged to you'. At once, Hamm and Cloy shows their needs and know they are 
needed in a bind that both gives and takes power. It is a tension of the master-servant 
relationship that Beckett captures in Clov's suspended departure in the final tableau of 
Endgame. 
Beckett's portrayal of power struggles between masters and servants navigates 
religious models, social relations, evolutionary processes and biopolitical activity. 
These tensions and conflicts are destined to continue in Beckett's vision since they 
search for a centred unity that is essentially non-existent; the necessity of the contest 
ss Gertrude Stein, The Geographical History of America, or The Relation of Human Nalure 10 the 
Human Mind (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. Ill. 
86 Ellmann, 'Changing into an Animal', p. 83. 
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itself disputes such a sovereign reconciliation. Despite this, his figures refuse to 
renounce the possibility of polarised identities, and are therefore imprisoned in a 
melancholic state of relative being and the act of relation - in dialectical modes that 
govern their social and experiential narratives. The various figures of superiority and 
inferiority covered in this chapter, expressed in terms of human and animal figures, 
self and other, master and servant, reveal a paradoxical relationship that is 
antagonistic and yet loaded with elements of compatibility, cohabitation and 
collaboration. Although control and degradation make creaturely figures in the hands 
of power, riving a lowly and lofty binary, the real creaturely state is trapped in the 
process of being made, in the interminable clash of required alterity and the on-going 
failure to tessellate. The transcendent level of power, whilst an aspiration still, is a 
myth that leaves Beckett's creatures redrawing the lines of territory, identity and 
fellowship. 
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3. Humour 
Failure and Degradation 
Over two decades after the end of World War Two, in 1969, Beckett experienced 
what his partner Suzanne Deschevaux-Dumesnil described as a 'catastrophe': he won 
the Nobel Prize for Literature. I Beckett adjudged the ensuing publicity and pressure to 
publish a disaster for his private life and writing career. He did not accept the award in 
person, but in the philanthropic spirit of the award, he gave the prize money away, 
which was a generous act characteristic of the man.2 Within the confines of Beckett's 
writing though, it is not immediately clear how he fulfils Alfred Nobel's general 
criterion for an award to someone who has 'conferred the greatest benefit on 
mankind', and specifically in literature, to 'the most outstanding work in an ideal 
direction'. Humanism and idealism are not commonly associated with Beckett's work, 
certainly not as defining characteristics in the public consciousness of his writing. 
Karl Ragnar Gierow's awarding speech recognised the grim pessimism of Beckett's 
works, but claimed that '[ t]rom that position, in the realms of annihilation, rises the 
writing of Samuel Beckett like a miserere from all mankind, its muffied minor key 
sounding liberation to the oppressed, and comfort to those in need,.3 Given Gierow's 
reference to mercy, emancipation and solace in the face of extreme human misery, the 
absence of any direct mention of the humour of Beckett's post-war work is a peculiar 
omission. The ability to laugh in the face of adversity seems to be an obvious point to 
reinforce the relief that the Nobel Prize committee find in Beckett. 
Seven years prior to Beckett, John Steinbeck became the sixth American to 
receive the Nobel Prize for Literature, and the presentation speaker Anders ()sterling 
1 Knowlson, Damned to Fame, p. 570. 
I Ibid. p. 572. 
3 Sture Allen, ed., Nobel Lectures in Literature, 1968-1980 (London: World Scientific, 1994), p. 20. 
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noted that, '[t]here is in him a strain of grim humour which, to some extent, redeems 
his often cruel and crude motif. His sympathies always go out to the oppressed, to the 
misfits and the distressed,.4 This description of Steinbeck also befits Beckett and 
shows that the Nobel committee appreciates humour, even grim humour, as an 
element of human compassion. In contrast, Gierow's speech for Beckett merely 
touches on two elements that happen to figure in Beckett's humour: paradox and 
degradation. In Beckett"s writings, the breakdown or inefficacy of logical structures 
sits alongside persistent human indignity and atrophy as common sources of humour. 
As such, the inspiration for these aspects of Beckett's humour derives from the wider 
aesthetic schema of ignorance, impotence and indigence. The Swedish Academy fails 
to address this relationship between deficiency and humour, perhaps owing to the 
ambivalence of laughter in and at Beckett's work. The difficulty with Beckett's 
humour is that he engages with and problematizes theories of superiority, relief and 
,J 
incongruity laughter as he obscures or multiplies the targets of humour to complicate 
the relationship between the audience and the character .. 
Thomas Hobbes gives an early definition of superiority laughter as he surveys 
human passions in The Elements o/Law Natural and Politic (1640). In a rare mention 
of laughter, Hobbes says it is 'nothing else but sudden Glory arising from a sudden 
conception of some Eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the Infirmity of 
others, or with our own formerly'.s Alexander Bain reconsiders this definition of 
laughter -to focus on the degradation and relief that superiority implies, and, 
furthermore, consider ideas, practices and organisations as targets of derision. In The 
Emotions and the Will (1859), Bain asserts that 'Laughter is connected with an 
outburst of the sense of Power or superiority, and also with a sudden Release from a 
4 Horst Frenz, ed., Nobel Lectures in Literature, 1901-1967 (London: World Scientific, 1999), p. 574. 
5 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (New York: Oxford University, 1999), p. 
54. 
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state of constraint,.6 Beckett's humour certainly engages with the infirmity and 
constraint in these theories of laughter, but the eminency and power suggest a 
detachment from the object of humour that is at odds with the universal humanism of 
the Nobel ethos. One of the questions Beckett asks about the status of the human as he 
interrogates the motives and meaning behind laughter is whether the reading and 
viewing audience can empathise with his characters and at the same time feel above 
another's misfortune. 
Bain's contemporary Herbert Spencer concentrates on the notion of release in 
his theory of relief laughter in 'On The Physiology of Laughter' (1860). Spencer 
describes laughter as a means of channelling excess nervous energy and notes that 
'laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares transferred from great 
things to small - only when there is what we may call a descending incongruity,.7 
This type of relief is clearly connected with the incongruity humour advanced by 
Immanuel Kant in his famous definition of the laugh in 1790 as 'an affect arising from 
a strained expectation being suddenly reduced to nothing' (italics in original).8 Beckett 
would have been familiar with the incongruity theory having read Schopenhauer's 
work in the 1930s. In a brief chapter on laughter in The World as Will and 
Representation (1818), the German philosopher claims that it is simple and easy to 
understand that 'laughter results from nothing but the suddenly perceived incongruity 
between a concept and the real objects that had been thought through it in some 
relation,.9 The notion of descending incongruity in the shift from high expectations to 
base revelations is closer to Beckett's post-war humour. 
6 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899), p. 259. 
7 Herbert Spencer, Essays on Education (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911), p. 310. 
8Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University, 
2007), p. 161. 
9 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vo\. 1, p. 59. 
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As we shall see, Beckett produces some sophisticated incongruity humoUr by 
pairing technical language, spiritual ideas or cultured references with descriptions of 
orifices and their workings. This dichotomy between the products of the mind and the 
processes of the body relies partially on privileging the mind over the body. As Ruby 
Cohn notes with reference to Flemish philosopher Arnold Geulincx in her second 
monograph on Beckett: 'The Mind alone is rich and graceful, adds Geulincx, but it is 
fastened to a dying animal'. 10 This view holds that the human mind occupies a 
powerful, elevated position whilst the body is a lowly biological vessel prone to 
decay. For Beckett, however, it seems the mind-body duality is unstable and that the 
psyche is as equally fallible and fragile as the physical self. Beckett's depiction of the 
mind, then, often involves equalising the levels between the cerebral and the 
terrestrial, which means embodying the processes of the mind, situating signs of 
intelligence alongside depictions of the vulgar body and highlighting language's 
contribution to physical humour. 
Going back further in the history of humour, Aristotle claimed that no animal 
but man ever laughs, and although this assertion has not gone without dispute, humour 
has long been perceived as a component of the human, the homo ridens. 11 As with the 
justification of Beckett's Nobel Prize, Beckett scholars, most notably Simon 
Critchley, cite humour as a consolation to the received nihilism of Beckett's literary 
world, with laughter offering a fonn of boundary and resistance. In Suzanne Dow's 
essay on the laughable but persistent negativity in Beckett, she recognises that 
'Beckett's humour is often taken to be a lucid reckoning with a horizon, the taking 
10 Ruby Cohn, Back to Beckett (Princeton: Princeton University, 1973), p. 5. 
11 Aristotle, On the Parts of Anima/s, trans. by James G. Lennox (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001), p. 
70. For discussions of animal laughter, see Peter Berger, Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension 
of Human Experience (Berlin: Waiter de Gruyter, 1997), p. 46; and Max Eastmen, The Enjoyment of. 
Laughter (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2008 [1936]), pp. 15-40. 
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cognizance of a limit' .12 In this respect, humour in Beckett is inherently human and 
deemed to be an instrument of perseverance, called upon in humanity's continual 
confrontations with the harsh realities of mortal life. Although it might seem improper 
to focus on humour alongside the context of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust, it can also be said that the respite of humour is most vital in these 
despairing times. As Terrence Des Pres expresses, 'humour counts most in precisely 
those situations where more decisive remedies fail' .13 But whilst there are certainly 
instances of the sword, shield and succour of humour in Beckett's work, in the context 
of his netherworld in which going on is never particularly desired, humour's actual 
incapacity to change or cleanse negativity make it strangely complicit in incarcerating 
the human. 
The dark underbelly of humour has the potential to compromise the 
supposedly defiant laugh sounded in Beckett and the neat formulation of humour as a 
resistant or subversive force, thereby intimating an altogether more affirmative 
negative, which actually accepts, confirms and reinforces misery. It is this humour 
that suggests a creaturely element in that the laugh no longer merely reflects on the 
human predicament but contributes to it. The detached assessment of the world slides 
into an actual experience of that world. In this way, humour is 'the exploration of the 
break between nature and culture, which reveals the human to be not so much a 
category by itself as a negotiation between categories'. 14 In revealing and responding 
to unhappiness, Beckett's humour occupies a paradoxical space since the laugh is both 
a conscious recognition of the situation, as though an interruption of life as a result of 
perceiving life, and an action indistinct from the situation, as though laughter is 
12 Suzanne Dow, 'Beckett's Humour, from an Ethics of Finitude to an Ethics of the Real', Paragraph, 
34.1 (2011), 121-136, p. 122. , 
13 Terrence Des Pres, 'Holocaust Laughter?', in Writing and the Holocaust, ed. by Berel Lang (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 1988),216-233, pp. 217-218. 
14 Simon Critchley, On Humour (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 29. 
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another part of the life to which it supposedly responds. Humour appears to slip 
between human cognition and animal immersion. It is this limbo of indeterminacy that 
engenders the concomitance of the highly comic and deeply tragic in Beckett's work. 
In the context of the thesis as a whole, this chapter retraces the themes of 
testimony and power explored in previous chapters to re frame issues of failure and 
degradation in light of Beckett's humour. I make use of a number of influential 
theories on h u m ~ u r r to interpret the degrading elements of Beckett's humour, 
including the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud. The initial 
focus of the chapter is the comic failures of Beckett's author-narrators and their 
stories. I discuss the humour of linguistic and narrative excess as Beckett's aUthor-
narrators persist with errant modes of description and explanation. They effectively 
perform humorously confusing acts that bring communication into the realm of 
slapstick comedy to deride diegetic modes of storytelling. The result is a series of 
textual spectacles that narrow the gap between the mind and the body, and between 
subject matter and formal considerations. Beckett's humour, I a.rgue, is an expression 
of the unspeakability that emerges in the breakdown of language and should therefore 
be considered in relation to the Beckettian pursuit of silence. The following section 
inverts Beckett's textual evocation of the body to analyse how words are performed 
on stage. Using Beckett's Endgame, I examine how Hamm and Clov's language 
materialises as a component of the physical humour of the play, namely through the 
. 
joke of their bodily entrapment, or creaturely suspension. In the penultimate section, 
the focus on degradation develops into a discussion of Beckett's tragicomedy, 
particularly how the relationship between comedy and tragedy unsettles the laughter 
of superiority and produces spontaneous, delayed and stifled types of laughter for the 
individual and the collective audience. Furthermore, I. propose that Beckett's 
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metanarrative techniques produce a creaturely movement between captivation and 
realisation that embroils the audience in the profound joke of being. The concluding 
section explores Beckett's version of gallows humour to pose the idea that laughter, as 
both a gesture of resistance and preservation, is conducive to endurance for Beckett as 
it defies despair and sustains unhappiness. The humour of failure and degradation 
does not decisively purge the anxieties of mortal life, or the socio-political constraints 
therein, through a return to the finitude of the materiality of being. In its transient 
assuaging, the laugh is a coping strategy, not a long-term solution. Whilst it helps to 
avoid capitulating to despondency, it cannot finally come to terms with the human 
condition. 
Humour in Failure 
Having written Watt from a Roussillon farm during the Nazi occupation of France, 
much of the literature Beckett produces during the post-war period revolves around 
destitute figures in scenes characterized by failure and disappointment. The characters 
are at the mercy of insatiable compulsions, futile tasks and maddening goals, made 
torturous by the Sisyphean, cyclic form of stasis that these pursuits assume. The 
eponymous heroes of Beckett's first post-war novel Mercier and Camier wander 
without direction or purpose in and around the city, filling time with inconsequential 
episodes and quotidian paraphernalia, and bound by a vague impulse to continue. 
Camier says:' 'if I have any light to throw it is rather on what we are going to do, or 
rather again on what are going to try and do, than why we are going to try and do it' 
(MC, 47). The deadbeats of the four novellas The Calmative. The Expelled, The End 
and First Love are all outcasts and misfits, unable to settle. in domestic quarters or 
integrate with society, thrown into confusing and unfriendly situations, and left to 
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roam. The narrator of The Expelled sums up their bewilderment: 'Poor juvenile 
solutions, explaining nothing. No need then for caution, we may reason on to our 
heart's content, the fog won't lift' (FN, 7). The quests in Beckett's trilogy of novels 
Molloy, Ma/one Dies and The Unnamab/e are also without discernible success, both in 
terms of the physical journeys, such as Molloy's search for his mother and Moran's 
search for Molloy, and the narrative journeys in the form of stories, reports, memoirs, 
and speech. Similarly, in the two dramas Waitingfor Godot and Endgame, Vladimir, 
Estragon, Hamm and Clov all seek out means to grant the termination of their 
enduring struggles. Words are unsuccessful, as Clov complains to Hamm: 'I use the 
words you taught me. If they don't mean anything any more, teach me others. Or let 
me be silent' (E, 28). In each of these works, the minds and bodies of Beckett's 
characters are deteriorating and ineffective, and these psychological and physical 
conditions serve to highlight the perpetual nature of their unfulfilled desires; they are 
abject figures subject to the thrall of foundering pursuits. 
Although Beckett's work is unremitting in its immersion ,in protracted failure, 
his writing is not blind to the humour in failure. His works are funny because his 
author-narrators often imitate the idea of the human in their efforts to succeed. They 
adopt reason, language, narrative and consciousness in their pursuit of success, but 
these faculties are exaggerated, misused and ultimately broken in the hands of 
Beckett's creatures. The image of the human is destabilised, and yet the creatures 
largely persist with this paragon, which engenders a grotesque version of the human, 
at once disconcertingly familiar and amusingly different. It should be noted from the 
outset, however, that the intentional turn to inefficacy in Beckett's writing is markedly 
different from Theodor Adorno's notion of humorous artistic inadequacy. In Aesthetic 
Theory (1970), the posthumously published text Adorno had intended to dedicate to 
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Beckett, he identifies a type of humour that arises as a by-product when the author's 
agenda is conveyed through inadequate or explicit means:s Accordingly, Adomo 
generally refrains from engaging with humour since it does not coincide with the 
successful truth content in Beckett from the collapse of meaning. He argues that: 
Beckett's oeuvre gives the frightful answer to art that, by its starting point, by 
\ its distance from any praxis, art in the face of mortal threat becomes ideology 
through the harmlessness of its mere form, regardless of its content. This 
explains the influx of the comic into emphatic works. It has a social aspect. In 
that their effectively blindfolded movement originates exclusively in 
themselves, their movement becomes a walking in place and declares itself as 
such, just as the unrelenting seriousness of the work declares itself as 
frivolous, as play.16 
Besides social critique through the impact of form, works of art are reduced to 
rhetorical ideology, which appears ridiculously affirmative or absurdly facile. The 
overt and subsequently weak attempt at the serious renders it laughable, but, as a 
result, it is not light-hearted. Instead, the explicit work of art is a truly comic failure, 
achieving humour only in its obvious effort. The explicitly light-hearted is also 
reduced to a recognisable commodity, too easily identified as a contrived appeal, and 
thus loses its"joyous quality. If Adomo is to register his support for Beckett's formal 
innovations and at the same time address the humour of Beckett's work, he must 
highlight a sense of humour that is generated by means delineated from the definite 
IS See Lambert Zuidervaart, 'Theodor W. Adomo', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2011), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edularchives/win201 I1entries/adomo/> [accessed 
11/4/2012), para. 26 of 42. 
16 Theodor Adomo, Aesthetic Theory, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone, 1997), p. 250. 
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and clearly intentional seriousness or comedy that Adorno describes as 'emphatic 
works', 
In contrast to Adorno's insight into the ridiculous quality of serious art and the 
weakened humour of obvious comedy, Beckett's humour of failure presents the 
antithesis to the transparency of emphatic works. Andrew Gibson notes that in the 
'Three Dialogues' with Georges Duthuit, Beckett 'makes it quite clear that he is 
consciously rejecting an art that "pretends to be able'" ,17 Beckett holds up the ideals 
of prelapsarian language as an aspiration for his narrators, with its perfect 
correspondence between signifier and signified, intent and expression, and, in 
contrast, has them endure the inability that their expressive weaknesses impose. He 
introduces a sense of humour on a narrative level through what Gibson describes as a 
'comedy of description' or simply 'wastage', which protracts the problems in 
employing language and the difficulties in relating information. ls 
Beckett's early use of pun contains the rudiments of this foolish narrative 
excess. In paronomastic humour, the polysemy of language opens up mUltiple 
significations for each word, whereby a comic alternative undercuts the expected 
meaning. In the 1938 novel Murphy, Beckett presents a protagonist particularly 
receptive to puns owing to his deep thoughtfulness and great erudition. The opening 
image of Murphy tied to his rocking chair portrays him as a thinker, set free in his 
mind when his body is restricted. The narrator remarks that Murphy studied under 
Neary, a philosopher who can stop his heart at will, and that 'Murphy was one of the 
elect, who require everything to remind them of something else' (M, 40). Murphy is 
clearly attuned to the allusive quality of words, yet as Ruby Cohn notes, of the 124 
17 Andrew Gibson, 'Comedy of Narrative: Nabokov, Beckett, Robbe-Grillet', Comparative Literature, 
37.2 (1985),114-139, p. 116. 
18 Gibson, 'Comedy of Narrative', p. 118. 
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puns included in the novel, the majority comes from the narrator.19 It is Beckett's 
narrator who embraces the pun as a fundamental part of the world when he says, 'In 
the beginning was the pun' (M, 41). This joke mimics the first verse of the book of 
John to mock the idea of a stable, pre-created meaning grounded in God. It suggests 
that using 'Word' as a metonym for 'God' already entails the unpredictability of 
language. 
\ However, Beckett's narrator in Murphy tends to exploit the proliferation of 
meaning for comic effect in a conscious way in this early novel. The narrator can 
draw on language's capacity for other meaning privately, without allowing the 
narrative to digress. For example, he says that Neary's servant 'Cooper never sat, his 
acathisia was deep-seated and of long standing' (M, 69). The use of a medical term 
here makes this an esoteric pun, causing the joke to rely heavily on the reader's 
vocabulary or willingness to consult a dictionary. It suggests that Cooper's 
restlessness is well established whilst implying the symptoms. This type of highly 
intellectual display in Murphy shows a more personal type of humour that can exclude 
the reading audience. Murphy exemplifies a similar self-satisfying humour when he 
tells his partner Celia a joke: 
'Why did the barmaid champagne?' he said. 'Do you give it up?' 
'Yes,' said Celia. 
'Because the stout porter bitter,' said Murphy. 
This was a joke that did not amuse Celia, at the best of times and places it 
could not have amused her. That did not matter. So far from being adapted to 
19 Cobn, A Beckett Canon, p. 82. 
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her, it was not addressed to her. It amused Murphy, that was all that mattered. 
(M, 81) 
Murphy pleases himself with the wordplay but Celia does not appreciate this linguistic 
humour. He delights in the joke's homophonic value and neglects the fact that it lacks 
sense. The question 'Do you give it up?' also reveals Murphy's smug victory in 
revealing the punch line. Together, the medical pun and this aural pun show that 
certain information and tastes must be shared in order for the pun to avoid alienating 
the audience. 
Whereas the arcane pun in Murphy shows a competent narrative VOIce 
conducting a level of humour that can exclude the reader, Beckett's later puns in 
Mol/ay reserve the knowing grin for the reader and for Beckett. In the second part, for 
example, Moran encounters a dim man one evening and describes how the man's face 
and body are appropriately matched. Moran notes, 'If I could have seen his arse, I do 
not doubt I should have found it on a par with the whole' (T, 150). Beckett increases 
the crudity of his humour as he turns to the monologue. The verbal dexterity displayed 
in Murphy is reduced in this instance and the lack of a third-person narrator generally 
ensures that puns no longer occur from such a position of sovereignty over possible 
meaning. Instead, the alternative meaning appears accidental and serves to divert the 
intention of the sentence towards new and unwanted significance, without the smile of 
omniscience. This type of ignorant pun that avoids esoteric words and resorts to 
crudity is easier to detect for the reader. 
Although Beckett tones down the erudition of his humour in the· example 
above, he continues to employ cultured references and learned ideas to produce an 
eclectic, and indeed comic, mix of highbrow thinking and bodily reality. In Cartesian 
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dualism, the body is distinct from the superior component of being, the mind. It is the 
mind, or the res cogitans, that constitutes the person fundamentally whilst the body, or 
the res extensa, is a sensory machine.2o French philosopher Henri Bergson addresses a 
similarly hierarchical conception in his study Laughter, first published in French in 
1900. He writes: 'When we see only gracefulness and suppleness in the living body, it 
is because we disregard elements of weight, of resistance, and, in a word, of matter; 
\we forget its materiality and think only of its vitality which we regard as derived from ) 
the very principle of intellectual and moral life' .21 This positive image of the body is 
actually achieved by seeing past the normal properties of the material form, but when 
the body qua matter is recognized, it is a source of laughter: 'No sooner does the 
anxiety about the body manifest itself than the intrusion of a comic element is to be 
feared'.22 These basic anxieties about the body are widespread and do not necessarily 
rely on access to specific cultural codes or social conceptions of the body. The 
physical state is a shared condition and therefore a common source of humour. From a 
later anthropocentric perspective, the mind remains the pride of the human, capable of 
symbolic thought and language systems far in advance of the capacity of nonhuman 
animals. The body, on the other hand, reminds us of the shared materiality of living 
things and what Judith Butler describes as 'mortality, vulnerability, agency', which 
can be extended to the animal kingdom, as Cary Wolfe has pointed out. 23 
Since Beckett's humour navigates between, on the one side, elite language and 
learned cultUre, and, on the other, the universal fact of the body as matter and process, 
Beckett offers a sophisticated juxtaposition of mind and body that not only involves 
20 See Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and 
Replies, trans. by Michael Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008), pp. 51-64. 
21 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. by Cloudesley Brereton and 
Fred Rothwell (Kobenhavn and Los Angeles: Green Integer, 1999), p. 49. 
22 Bergson, Laughter, p. 51. 
23 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), p. 27. 
See Cary W olfe, Before The Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitica/ Frame (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 2013), pp. 18-21. 
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the nuanced texture of supposedly high and low subjects, but also conveys the 
tensions of a duality that makes up the human being. As Agamben suggests, 'man has 
always been thought of as the articulation and conjunction of a body and a soul, of a 
living thing and a logos, of a natural (or animal) element and a supernatural or social 
or divine element' whereas we should 'think of man as what results from the 
incongruity of these two elements,.24 In this context, Beckett's humour involves what 
I call 'degradation' or 'debasement' in the sense of situating the abstract or superior 
alongside the physical or natural. That is, in terms of deposing the human mind from 
its pedestal and bringing the immaterial back to down to earth. Whereas the pun in 
Murphy uses a technical term to make a joke about a physical condition, Beckett 
undermines elevated language in Molloy by pairing it with base content for a bathetic 
comic effect. This paves the way for a marginally more magnanimous approach to 
humour since the cruder material gives the audience a common ground in the 'horrors 
of the body and its functions' (T, 118). There nevertheless remains an intellectually 
demanding aspect to Beckett's incongruity humour as his candid assessments of the 
body and bodily processes are often filtered through or placed alongside technical 
language and erudite material. 
On entering the forest, Molloy contemplates his physical weaknesses and 
refers to his 'arse-hole' before long: 'Jesus-Christ, it's much worse than yesterday I 
can hardly believe it's the same hole' (T, 79). The use of a spiritual icon stands out as 
a humorous, and indeed blasphemous, outburst in the context of Molloy's bodily 
issues. Molloy appears to recognise the crudeness of this topic, only to replace the 
religious reference with an artistic tradition: 'I apologise for having to revert to this 
lewd orifice, 'tis my muse will have it so' (T, 79). Beckett juxtaposes a vulgar 
24 Agamben, Open: Man and Animal, p. 16. 
200 
reference to the body with the romantic notion of a creative inspiration that recalls the 
daughters of Zeus in Greek mythology. Since Molloy implies, scurrilously, that the 
'muse' is fixated on his arsehole, Beckett effectively connects a figure of inspiration 
to a site of expulsion for a comic sense of incongruity. As Molloy continues to list his 
bodily afflictions, he also employs medical and scholarly language: 'But my prepuce, 
sat verbum, oozes urine, day and night, at least I think it's urine, it smells of kidney. 
\ What's all this, I thought I had lost the sense of smell. Can one speak of pissing, under 
these conditions? Rubbish!' (T, 81). By employing the technical name for foreskin 
and following it with the Latin adage meaning 'a word to the wise is sufficient', 
Molloy signals the obscurity of his wording through an equally elitist phrase. Hence, 
Beckett still demands a high level of knowledge from the reader for the incongruity 
between the technical language and body part to be fully understood. The difference 
here is that 'oozes urine', 'kidney' and 'pissing' make the missing subject relatively 
obvious. Beckett applies sophisticated language to a more vulgar scene to make a 
mockery of the cultured style whilst allowing the gist of the humour to be recognised. 
This incongruity is itself a sophisticated form of humour about the body, although the 
intellectual weight of 'prepuce' or 'sat verbum' is less in light of the more 
plainspoken later parts of the passage. Beckett effectively retains the difficulty of the 
high modernist imperative in his use of cultured references and bookish terms to 
depict the body, but also includes more vernacular descriptions to produce challenging 
and surprising comical contrasts. 
Beckett's art of failure complements these humorous juxtapositions as the 
narrators often respond with confusion to their own fragments of intellect. Obscure 
words are still deployed but their meanings are not definite, so that esoteric language 
is subsequently filtered through the narrator's uncertainty. At the beginning of Ma/one 
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Dies, after the repeated use of 'perhaps' when Malone is devising his writing plan, he 
employs a technical word but is unsure whether it is appropriate. Malone surmises, 
'There I am back at myoId aporetics. Is that the word? I don't know' (T, 181). There 
is a double sense of humour in this line in that Malone's narrative incompetence is 
amusing for uninformed readers whereas informed readers recognise that the 'I don't 
know' reinforces the 'aporia' of the text. Beckett returns to this comic illustration of 
an apparently unknown word in The Unnamable. Again, Beckett's narrator uses the 
technique at the beginning whilst deliberating how to proceed: 'I should mention 
before going any further - any further on - that I say "aporia" without knowing what 
it means' (T, 293). The narrator dwells on an empty word that actually develops the 
static conditions he is attempting to identify with 'aporia'. His use of the word without 
knowing its meaning contributes to the impassable path that involves speaking despite 
the inability to positively communicate. In this turn to ignorance, Beckett opens up his 
imitation of narrative and linguistic frailties to the audience, directing the confusion 
away from the reader and towards the narrator. He therefore, focuses on bodily 
materiality in two ways that each democratise his humour: directly referring to the 
body, which draws attention to a shared condition, and subverting mental faculties, 
which lessens the alienating effect of erudite language. Beckett diminishes the 
authorial intelligence seen in Murphy through an emphasis on trying to employ words 
in a state of common ignorance in the trilogy to make the humour more accessible. 
Nevertheless, the sophisticated subject matter that Beckett addresses ensures an 
intellectual and textured sense of humour. 
The pun is effectively a microcosm of Beckett's amusing narrative tone, or 
'syntax of weakness' as he described it, that developed in the 1940s and 50s.25 The 
25 Lawrence Harvey, Samuel Beckett: Poet and Critic (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970), p. 445. 
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reader is frequently invited to observe the humorous potential of language whilst 
Beckett's narrators are excluded from the joke in their attempts to relate stories 
sincerely. Sigmund Freud calls this type of inadvertent humour 'naiVe' in his 1905 
study Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. Freud's analysis of humour builds 
on Spenser's relief theory but suggests, in part, that humour is either 'tendentious' or 
' n o n ~ t e n d e n t i o u s ' . . The former is the product of an aggressive impulse that engages 
\ oppressive or forbidden material to grant a psychological release. Non-tendentious 
humour on the other hand lacks the same hostile drive, and is therefore tame or 
innocent. Freud defines this division through the phrase '[a] joke is made, the comic is 
found', although he does suggest that naive humour can sound like a joke despite 
lacking intention.26 On occasion, Beckett's narrators chance upon what they consider 
to be a joke but is actually closer to the comic in the Freudian sense, such as when 
Malone vows to write his memoirs despite his short memory: 'When I have completed 
my inventory, if my death is not ready for me then, I shall write my memoirs. That's 
funny, I have a made a joke. No matter. There is a cupboard I have never looked in' 
(T, 184). Malone has not made a joke here, but rather found the comic element of his 
naivety. This seldom occurs in Beckett's f i r s t ~ p e r s o n n narratives, and humorous 
moments are frequently left undetected or unremarked. Malone's reflections are in 
fact littered with humorous glitches in language and thought, such as 'My body does 
not yet make up its mind' (T, 198) and 'let us leave these morbid matters and get on 
with that of my demise' (T, 236). Despite this, Beckett's characters largely fail to 
appreciate or construct humour, and tellingly, a distracted Malone indicates that jokes 
might be another unexplored 'cupboard'. 
26 Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. trans. by James Strachey (London: 
Penguin, 1976), pp. 239, 240. 
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The reader's vantage of knowledge in the comprehension of a joke, or the 'in-
joke' at the narrator's expense, injects a voyeuristic aspect into the relationship 
between teller and receiver, which exposes the narrator's awkward communication 
and fumbling narrative style. The inefficiency with which Beckett's narrators conduct 
their stories is paramount to his humour in the prose. Gibson recognises that the 
narrators 'refuse to conform to the convention of salience which so often governs 
description in the classic text. Salience becomes a pose, adopted only to be 
travestied,.27 This digressive technique halts the action to dwell on a single, often 
superfluous, piece of information. Aporia stifles any possibility of developing 
significant events and the narrative progression ebbs as a consequence. Three 
examples across Beckett's work serve to highlight humour's presence in the exercise 
and interrogation of reason and language in his narrative form. Firstly, in Watt, 
Arsene's lengthy induction of the new arrival Watt shares the title character's 
penchant for permutations and commitment to excessive explanation. As Arsene 
traces their predecessors in the Knott house, he follows a logical process but forgets 
the content: 
For Vincent and Waiter were not the first, ho, no, but before them were 
Vincent and another whose name I forget, and before them that other whose 
name I forget and another whose name I forget, and before them that other 
whose name I forget and another whose name I never knew, and before them 
that other whose name I never knew and another whose name WaIter could not 
recall [ ... ]. (W, 58) 
27 Gibson, 'Comedy of Narrative', p. 118. 
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The sustained attention to variations in Watt satirises the attempt to present 
infonnation comprehensively. Arsene is unable to retrieve the names of the servants 
as he concentrates on the system. The repetition of 'forget' in the above example 
parodies the repetition of 'begat' in the first chapter of the gospel of Matthew to show 
how a repetitive fonn can supplant meaning. In the Bible, Matthew employs the word 
'begat' thirty-nine times over fifteen lines, moving forward in time from Abraham to 
\ trace Christ's ancestry (Matthew 1.2-16). This fixation on one word suggests a type of 
pedantry, which Schopenhauer describes as 'that clinging to form, the manner, the 
expression and the word that is peculiar to pedantry, and with it takes the place of the 
real essence of the matter,.28 Similarly in Beckett, the process overwhelms the point 
of the passage. Beckett's text echoes the advancing 'begat' with the receding • forget' , 
thereby reversing the flow of time as it moves back into an increasingly obscure past 
whilst maintaining the pattern of thought. He shuns the implicit etcetera that 
conscientious readers would expect with repetition and patterns, and instead, the 
rigorous mental practice replaces elliptical spaces, which effectively fills the text with 
hollow, predictable and unnecessary passages. These exhaustive attempts at 
explanation are a waste of effort and comic in their ignorance of sufficiency. 
Beckett develops these textual shortcomings for comic effect in Mercier and 
Camier when the two heroes repeatedly miss one another having appointed a meeting 
time and place. Beckett writes out the scene in full, before summarising: 
... 
In other words: 
Arr. Dep. Arr. Dep. Arr. 
9.05 9.10 9.25 9.30 9.40 Mercier 
Camier 
(MC, 4) 
9.15 9.20 9.35 9.40 9.50 
28 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation. Vo\. I, p. 60. 
Dep. Arr. 
9.45 9.50 
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Evidently, the 'other words' to which Beckett resorts is a timetable. The reason for 
Mercier and Camier's failure to meet is simple: one waits whilst the other walks, the 
other waits whilst the first one walks. Despite that, the written description complicates 
the scene, making it difficult to track the characters' movements. The table elucidates 
the matter with more efficiency and signals the failure of description in words, but the 
narrator is not content with this perspective, suggesting it is overly contrived when he 
says 'What stink of artifice' (MC, 4). Indeed, timetables are devised to organize and 
be efficient, and, as Foucault affirms, serve to 'establish rhythms, impose particular 
occupations, [and] regulate the cycles of repetition' .29 This type of structured layout 
certainly clears up the scene but also makes it sterile, which implies that although the 
written description fails to elucidate the sequence of their non-coincidence, it is at 
least a more organic expression of the wayward protagonists. The contrast between 
convoluted prose and clear tabulation is a patent source of humour that allows the 
narrative to move fOlward whilst heralding the inadequacy of this compromised mode 
of 'progression'. 
Molloy also resorts to numbers to surmount a narrative impasse and proceed 
with his ramblings. Beckett's narrator hibernates for winter in swathes of newspaper, 
noting 'The Times Literary Supplement was admirably adapted to this purpose, of a 
never failing toughness and impermeability. Even farts made no impression on it' (T, 
30). The implication is that literary criticism is stringent and closed off, but also 
flatulent in the figurative sense. In any case, Molloy is not concerned with the written 
content of the book review and values it only for the insulating properties of the paper 
it is printed on, perhaps sharing the disdain of Vladimir's cutting retort 'Crritic!' in 
29 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin,1991),p.149. 
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Waiting for Godot (WFG, 67). On the other hand, mathematics offers Molloy a 
reliable insight into himself, although this science is merely used to calculate the rate 
of his flatulence: 
Three hundred and fifteen farts in nineteen hours, or an average of over sixteen 
farts an hour. After all it's not excessive. Four farts every fifteen minutes. It's 
\ nothing. Not even one fart every four minutes. It's unbelievable. Damn it, I 
hardly fart at all, I should never have mentioned it. Extraordinary how 
mathematics help you to know yourself. (T, 30) 
Mathematics is used to analyse his past and is preferred over language alone. The 
numbers have fixed values and, in relation to the scale of time, Molloy can quantify 
and contextualise his being using averages to divide periods of existence into 
fathomable parts and thus gain a level of perspective. Words are laborious and 
confusing whereas mathematics acts as reliable shorthand and is an appropriate, 
efficient mode of expression for problems and solutions. Despite all this, Beckett's 
creatures persevere with words and consign scientific thought to the vulgar body. 
Molloy reduces mathematics to mere 'trumpery' as he uses his show of arithmetic to 
discuss trivial matters. In this way, Beckett confronts 'the vile suggestion that art has 
nothing to do with clarity, does not dabble in the clear and does not make clear' .30 
This humorous degradation of language into lengthy digressions and the use of 
rational thinking for base subject matter shows that Beckett situates sophisticated 
disciplines alongside a benighted dimension of the human that society tries hard to 
30 Beckett qtd. in Valerie Topsfield, The Humour o/Samuel Beckett (New York: St. Martin, 1988), pp. 
25-6. 
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censor. Beckett's humour of failure indulges ineffective narrative techniques that 
mimic human modes of meaning to present a distorted caricature of the classic author. 
Textual Performances 
I have traced the decline of the word as Beckett's narrator-authors descend from the 
erudition of the sovereign mind to the waste products of narrative and debased 
language. In different ways, Beckett's narratives halt when attempting clarification 
and in each case there is a humorous failure of language, whether through excessive 
use of explanation, novel emergency measures or superficial revelations. Furthermore, 
the form underpins the comic element of the content, as seen in the vague and 
forgetful manner used to track Vincent and WaIter's precursors in Watt, the numerical 
'other words' in Mercier and Camier and the arithmetic used to calculate farts in 
Mol/ay. Beckett degrades language and evinces the petty utility of words through the 
incongruity between high intellect or mental rigor and the minor or base material to 
which it is directed. The mind's abstract constructions and conceptual powers may 
offer sanctuary from the physical world, but these illusions merely set up the mind to 
plummet back to a recognition of its weak corporal vessel and poor expressive 
vehicles. The point I want to stress in this section, however, is not the body as a site of 
finitude, but. how the body is invoked at the limits of communicative language to 
express a language of its own, a body language so to speak. The tension between 
contenf and form in Beckett helps to produce a level of humour that traces the limits 
of the word whilst continuing to traverse them in corpore, thereby deferring the 
complete failure of language and the complete acceptance of physical finitude. In 
short, Beckett's language-body formulation creates a creaturely state of suspension as 
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laughter occurs at the limit of the language performance, but it does not realise the 
dream of transcendence. 
Mikhail Bakhtin discusses the downward movement from the elevated, 
abstract level to the lowly, bodily level in Rabelais and his World (1965). His work on 
the carnival and grotesque realism holds degradation as an essential principle. 
Bakhtin's notion of the 'carnivalesque' describes the humorous festivities of the 
\ people as they unite against the official culture. The community resort to the 
grotesque to resist the governed world, which 'exaggerates and caricatures the 
negative, the inappropriate ,.3 I This subversion of power promotes the lower stratum, 
associated with 'food, drink, defecation, and sexual life', which is easily understood 
and shared by others in order to produce a collective atmosphere.32 Bakhtin explains 
that this rebellion against authority is a form of 'grotesque realism', which entails 'the 
lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract' so that symbols of the upper 
stratum, such as the heavens, the face and the mind are reduced to the lower stratum 
of the earth, the genitals and the buttocks.33 In this respect, the bodily element is 
'deeply positive' since it is 'something universal, representing all people' .34 Similarly, 
in Beckett's world, the cerebral level is equal to the terrestrial. Yet, whereas the 
downward movement of degradation in Bakhtin has a purely 'topographical meaning', 
Beckett's humbles the elevated sphere of the mind that anthropocentricism and 
humanism privileges.3S Reason, language, narrative and consciousness prove to be as 
ineffective as the body, but suffer a steeper degradation in comparison to the already 
'grounded' physical self. As Beckett explores the weaknesses of the metaphysical 
31 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. by H e h ~ n e e Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana 
University, 1984), p. 303. 
32 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 18. 
33 Ibid. p. 19. 
34 Ibid. p. 19. 
3S Ibid. p. 21. 
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alongside the physical, and effectively amalgamates the mental sphere· of his 
monologues and the bodily sphere of his drama, Beckett's humour of failure disrupts 
the mind-matter duality. The bathetic interplay between the mind's faculties and the 
body's crude workings suggests that the noble is reduced to the common, and that 
'laughter degrades and materialises' .36 
The degradation from the upper to the lower strata indicates a parallel between 
Beckett's prose and drama. Beckett turned to drama in the late 1940s with his first 
(unperformed) play Eleutheria, which uses the Greek word for 'freedom' for its title. 
Although Beckett resorts to actual performances on stage, the appearance of his texts 
on the page and the experience of reading the prose offer textual equivalents to the 
physical clowning he explores in the drama. Much has been written about the physical 
humour of Beckett's prose and drama, particularly the ribald and scatological sides of 
the imperfect body.37 Yet, on separate occasions, both Shane Weller and David 
Houston Jones have examined the point of crossover between physical abjection and 
textual abjection. In WeBer's book Beckett, Literature and the Ethics of Alterity 
(2006), he introduces the idea that laughter at the other is always the laughter of the 
other to assess the extent to which Beckett's humour includes an ethical principle. 
Weller rightly suggests that the abject body in Beckett 'does not possess the power of 
resistance to the official or normative that Bakhtin claims for the Rabelaisian body' .38 
Beckett does not celebrate the body nor grant it the unifying or subversive quality of 
the carnival. If the body is a common ground for people, it is also an embarrassing 
fact that is socially repressed and a burden for Beckett's decaying creatures. 
36 Ibid. p. 20. 
37 For example see Manfred Pftster, 'Beckett, Barker, and Other Grim Laughter', in A History of 
English Laughter - Laughter from BeowulJ to Beckett and Beyond, ed. by Manfred Pftster (New York: 
Rodopi, 2002), pp. 175-189, and Laura Salisbury, Samuel Beckett: Laughing Matters, Comic Timing 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University. 2012). 
38 Shane Weller, Beckett, Literature, and the Ethics of Alterity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), pp. 115-6. 
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Nevertheless, WeBer does briefly follow the idea that in Beckett's brand of 
'wordshit', literature itself becomes an abject body;9 Beckett's prose gives physicality 
to intellectual processes inasmuch as his narratives deliver a formal impact that 
renders and imposes cognitive movements through amusing textual performances. 
Watt's lexical loops, Mercier and Camier's timetable and Molloy's calculations are all 
textual spectacles, whereby linguistic forms translate the metaphysics of reason into a 
\ visual and experiential substance. These passages fall short when transmitting 
information through the semantic value of language, and yet each example continues 
to offer a textual embodiment of the mind since they execute language's execution. As 
such, language is a suitable tool to demonstrate the inability to communicate 
effectively as it bears out its own deficiency. As the reader encounters stories devoid 
of generic narrative capabilities and books that lack the messages of conventional 
writing, Beckett's prose manages to replicate creaturely chaos rather than expressing 
sovereign order to render the protagonist's cognition and perspective. In essence, 
Beckett presents a grotesque and abject textual body. 
As with the crude humour of the wretched body, the textual performance of 
the grotesque and abject in Beckett carries humorous undertones. Molloy's attempt to 
solve the problem of his sucking-stones is a prime example of how Beckett causes 
words to appear virtually senseless through an excess of reason and at the same time 
offer a humorous formal display. As Molloy attempts to find a way of sucking each 
stone in turn by circulating them around his various pockets, his description of this 
process mimics the rearrangement of the stones. Words too are rearranged into similar 
but different patterns as he replaces 'left' with 'right' and 'greatcoat' with 'trousers' 
(T, 69). MoBoy's 'Watch me closely' (T, 72) marks the beginning of his show, 
39 Weller, Beckett, Literature, and the Ethics of Allerity, p. 116. See also David Houston Jones, The 
Body Abject: Self and Text in Jean Genet and Samuel Beckett, (New York: Peter Lang, 2000). 
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implying that the solution he describes is a kind of close-up magic trick that 
necessitates concentration and eagle-eyed vigilance to follow. On stage, the rotation 
of Molloy's sucking stones would equate to Vladimir and Estragon's hat-cycle skit. 
As it is, Molloy's fidelity to logic verges on nonsense since the profusion of repeated 
words and recycled syntax largely makes his reasoning confusing for the reader. 
Molloy's careful and extended consideration of the rearrangement of his sucking-
stones is at once amusing and frustrating. Molloy appears to recognise as much when 
he says 'Do I need to go on?' and replies 'No', and yet he does persist with his 
maddening reasoning. Crucially, immediately after this scene, Molloy remembers a 
woman who approached him on the beach and then returned to her companions 
'Huddled together like sheep [ ... ], laughing no doubt, I seem to hear laughter far 
away' (T, 75). This laughter suggests a sardonic reaction to Molloy in the context of 
his performance and the reference to 'huddled sheep' indicates a crowd, particularly a 
mindless or biddable audience. In the same way that theatre audiences laugh at the 
pratfalls and slapstick antics of Waitingfor Godot, Molloy perceives a plausible group 
reaction to his own performance and, by implication, himself. This laughter of 
superiority highlights the failure of Molloy's intended explanation, and indicates that 
his attempt to elucidate in fact achieves the opposite and is therefore risible. 
The distance of the laughter after Molloy's sucking stones performance 
suggests it is from an outsider and not from the implied spectator that he initially 
addresses. The audience is no longer in league with the performer, but rather laughing 
from afar in a detached, judgemental way. More than this, the distance of the laughter 
and the uncertainty in the word 'seem' implies that Molloy is paranoid about his 
performance, that he reflects mentally on the impression he. gives to others and 
imagines an obscure laughter directed at himself. The failure of Molloy's reason 
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actually provokes a self-conscious reaction, a kind of phantom laughter analogous to 
feelings of embarrassment and shame. Therefore, this distant laughter echoes the 
reading audience's laughter at Molloy's textual acrobatics and conveys the laughter 
that Molloy imposes upon himself. The result is that Molloy becomes a part of the 
crowd that closely watches his performance. 
Beckett's bedridden protagonist in Ma/one Dies reinforces the human mind's 
I 
rdlationship with the physical self that Molloy introduces. Malone describes how 
\ 
Macmann's carer Lemuel strikes himself on the skull with a hammer because the head 
is 'the seat of all the shit and misery' (T, 269). Beckett clearly contradicts the Roman 
physician Galen who considered the head the source of reason. He also appears to 
draw from Greek mythology here, parodying the birth of the Goddess of wisdom 
Athena from the head of Zeus. The head as 'seat' conjures a clever depiction of the 
degradation of the mind, playing on the term to indicate buttocks, which marries the 
head and arse to create a comic image of the headspring of worthless and 
contemptible drivel. The lofty head is at once the seat, or the centre, and the bottom, 
or the butt of the joke. In addition, 'seat' refers to the sedentary position and intimates 
a viewer. As with Molloy's distant laughter, the seat has double relevance as source 
and audience, culprit and witness, as though the brain sits and observes the misery of 
the body it controls and to which it belongs. The head is therefore implicated in the 
plight of the human as the seat of nonsensical reason, the coordinating centre of the 
wretched body and the reflective capacity that laughs at it all. 
In Beckett's prose and plays alike, humour stems from the rigidity of the 
respective targets, with physical humour exposing the inflexibility of the body whilst 
textual humour unhinges the systematic rational mind and contorts narrative 
conventions. In Bergson's study Laughter, he theorises rigidity as a source of humour, 
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focusing chiefly on physical humour. He writes: 'We laugh every time a person gives 
us the impression of being a thing,.40 Bergson's example is the inability to adapt when 
falling over, noting that the body appears simply as an object in time and space, 
subject to physics, and thus stripping the human momentarily of an ideological value 
and anthropocentric ascendency. He proposes that absent-mindedness and ignorance 
of self are measures of humour, and, in this state, human agency collapses into 
automatism: 'The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body are laughable 
in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine' .41 This 'thingness' 
extends to human faculties and their limits for Beckett, which reduces modes of 
thought and expression to empty frameworks and redundant customs. Hence Beckett's 
characters trip up figuratively in the prose, stumbling on epistemological and 
communicative obstacles. Beckett applies Bergson's mechanics of the body to the 
mind's operations, presenting automatic, lengthy and unsuccessful workings of 
rationality in a laughable attempt to resolve contradictions and settle on reliable 
information. 
However, from the trilogy onwards, Beckett's narrative mode offers a further 
alternative version of Bergson's notion of absent-mindedness. The monologues are 
self-conscious and self-reflexive projects, situated within the individual mind. Despite 
this introspection, the inward glance in Beckett withholds complete self-knowledge 
and preserves psychological blind spots so that, in effect, levels of the mind remain 
absent. This principle is noticeable in Molloy's contemplation of the dog in the A and 
C scene. Molloy is perched high on the hill, overlooking two men walking in opposite 
directions. Man A or man C (MolIoy is unsure which) is walking a small dog: 'a 
pomeranian I think, but I don't think so. I wasn't sure at the time and I'm still not 
40 Bergson, Laughter, p. 56. 
41 Ibid. p. 32. 
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sure, though I've hardly thought about it. [ ... ] Yes, it was an orange pomeranian, the 
less I think of it the more certain I am. And yet' (T, 12). Doubt repeatedly returns to 
make Molloy a casualty of the voices in his mind and the more he thinks, the further 
he is dragged into a cognitive oblivion. The humour of absent-mindedness in 
Beckett's version is that vacuity is demonstrated through the narrator's psychological 
self-examinations. The narrator of The Unnamable, for example, is entangled in a web 
of/C'ontradictions in the attempt to unravel his meditations on the self: 'If I say 
anything to the contrary I was mistaken. If I say anything to the contrary again I shall 
be mistaken. Unless I am mistaken now' (T, 347). For all of the narrator's efforts to 
make sense of experience, pay attention to detail, be alert to one's position and invest 
in the structures of language and logic, the result is a humorous circumnavigation of 
the crux, which amounts to a lacuna akin to Bergson's absent-mindedness. 
Essentially, the failures enclosed within the body of the text emerge as the concretised 
evidence of the mind's presence, but only in its inefficacy. 
In both body and mind Beckettian Man is a degraded version of the humanistic 
ideal; he is Homo incapacitus. By reducing the constitutional properties of 
humankind, typically held as evidence of human supremacy, Beckett presents an 
altered vision of humanity that cannot be considered elite. The humour inherent to this 
failing figure rests on the detritus of epistemology and expression that foregrounds the 
lower stratum of the body. In turn, the attention to degradation in Beckett's humour of 
failure reveals his resistance to signification in favour of aesthetic impact. The 
(in)sovereign inability to master meaning triggers the debasement of the high 
intellectual realm and emphasises the low physical realm that is parallel to Beckett's 
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aesthetic impact, or what Adorno calls the 'shock of the unintelligible' .42 That IS, both 
the emptiness and effect of Beckett's work comes through a formal experience that 
rejects any explicit meaning through diegetic content. 
The emphasis on form and enactment in Beckett prompts Adorno's reading of 
Endgame, in which Adorno identifies truth content in incomprehensibility and the 
absence of meaning. However, as Simon Critchley comments, Adorno underestimates 
the comic element consistently to the extent that Beckett can 'make a philosopher as 
subtle and intelligent as Adorno appear slightly maladroit and flat-footed'. 43 
Admittedly, Adorno bluntly states 'the only comical thing remaining is that along 
with the sense of the punchline, comedy itself has evaporated' in Beckett's 
Endgame. 44 Considering that Adorno seldom addresses Beckettian humour, it is 
tempting to accept this as the sum total of Adorno's thoughts. Critchley focuses 
heavily on this statement and asserts that 
humour is this very experience of evaporation, which ~ s s the evaporation of a 
certain philosophical seriousness and interpretative earnestness. Humour does 
not evaporate in Beckett; rather laughter is the sound of language trying to 
commit suicide but being unable to do so, which is what is so tragically 
comic.4S 
Critchley refers to two points in this extract that I will unpack at length in the 
following sections, namely the 'tragically comic' and the 'experience of evaporation' , 
42 Theodor Adomo, 'Commitment', in Can One Live After Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader, ed. by 
RolfTiedemann, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2003), 240-258, p. 
243. 
43 Simon Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (Oxford: RoutIedge, 
1997),p.160. 
44 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 135. 
4S Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, p. 157. 
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but I introduce these ideas briefly here to elicit their relation to Beckett's textual 
performances and humour's contribution to the unsayable. At first, Critchley identifies 
a sense of humour engendered by its desiccation, and, as Shea Coulson emphasises, 
this part of Critchley's interpretation means 'the evaporation of humour is necessary 
for that evaporation to be humorous,.46 The evaporation of humour returns to a comic 
sensibility through humour's failings. In effect, humour displays its paradoxical nature 
here sikce it can continue to exist within irreconcilable differences. When humour is 
\ 
seemingly non-existent, the serious or humourless context can result in infectious 
laughter and the very intolerance to comedy can be intensely funny. Coincidentally, 
Adorno acknowledges a related point in 'Is Art Lighthearted?': 'Humour is salvaged 
in Beckett's plays because they infect the spectator with laughter about the absurdity 
of laughter and laughter about despair' .47 Thus, the insignia of humour, the laugh, 
becomes a mark of the serious as humour is desiccated and reconstituted 
simultaneously. 
According to Critchley, humour is not evaporated altogether in Beckett; it 
remains as language attempts to mute itself, as an employed language tries to 
articulate and theorise its own end, never satisfying the teleological goal of 
philosophical seriousness and interpretative earnestness. The laugh, as 'the sound of 
language trying to commit suicide', implies that language is active and valuable, albeit 
preoccupied with self-obliteration. Therefore, the laugh is not the end of language, but 
the perpetual coda of language. It is the interstice between the termination of language 
and the goal of Beckett's language, namely silence. The laugh is an utterance that is 
46 Shea Coulson, 'Funnier than Unhappiness: Adomo and the Art of Laughter', New German Critique, 
Arendt, Adomo, New York, and Los Angeles, 100 (2007), 141-164, p. 157. 
47 Theodor Adomo, Notes to Literature, Vo!. 2, trans. by S. W. Nicholsen (New York: Columbia 
University, 1992), p. 253. 
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anchored in the on-going reduction of language structures and always a product of 
language as it tries to silence itself. 
In The Unnamable, Beckett returns to textual performance in order to convey 
the disintegration of language into a more primitive semantic code based on sentience: 
that's how it will end, in heart-rending cries, inarticulate murmurs, to be 
invented, as I go along, improvised, as I groan along, I'll laugh that's how it 
will end, in a chuckle, chuck chuck, ow, ha, pa, I'll practise, nyum, hoo, plop, 
psss, nothing but emotion, bing bang, that's blows, ugh, pooh, what else, oooh, 
aaah, that's love, enough, it's tiring, hee hee, that's the Abderite, no, the other, 
in the end, it's the end, the ending end (T, 412) 
The narrator disgorges a range of inarticulate but emotionally charged sounds. He 
predicts that the laugh will finally burst out and signal the end of the expressive 
dilemma, but evidently the laugh requires skill. The narrator is unable to laugh on 
demand and must 'practice' the art of laughter. Ironically, the curtailed chuckle 
released here is precisely an art; it is artificial or 'invented', which suggests that the 
narrator actually requires a more spontaneous or 'improvised' laugh that responds to 
the situation without hesitation or contrivance. The narrator needs a laugh that moves 
towards the end of language and in closer proximity with silence. Tellingly, the 
n a r r a t ~ r ' s s reference to the Abderite invokes the Ancient Greek philosopher 
Democritus. Commonly known as the laughing philosopher, Democritus is associated 
with 'scoffing' and famously pronounced 'no thing is more real than nothing' .48 In 
this allusion to 'scoffing' and 'nothing' in The Unnamable, Beckett intimates 
48 Beckett refers to Democritus' aphorism in Murphy, 'the Nothing, than which in the guffaw of the 
Abderite naught is more real' (M, 138) and in Malone Dies, 'Nothing is more real than nothing' (T, 
193), 
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laughter's role in mocking language and evoking ineffability. The laugh stands 
between the matter of language and the vacuum of silence. 
Critchley's notion of 'laughter as the sound of language trying to commit 
suicide' also evokes WaIter Benjamin's aphorism in The Arcades Project: 'Laughter 
is shattered articulation'. 49 Far from being altogether unintelligible, Benjamin 
suggests that laughter is the breakdown of the formerly successful, stable and clarified 
structures of communication. The laugh is not the after-effect of shattered articulation 
\ 
either, but is itself a gesture oflucidity in pieces. Although Critchley forwards a more 
dilated and dramatic version of Benjamin's phrase, both emphasise that laughter does 
convey meaning, however scantly. Similarly, the narrator of The Unnamable 
pronounces how the end will occur but nevertheless continues to emit a series of 
rudimentary sounds that have expressive value. As Sara Crangle rightly points out in 
her chapter on laughter in Prosaic Desires (20 I 0), sound ·is an expression of 
knowledge, meaning, or emotion and, fundamentally, meets a basic and continuous 
human longing for communication'. 50 The narrator of The Unnamable bypasses 
knowledge and meaning to an extent to insist upon 'nothing but emotion', and yet 
these sounds have the intention of silence behind them and are therefore related to the 
thousands of words uttered before, each aiming to say the end. But even the most 
reduced forms of expression, including outbursts of emotion, contain a paronomastic 
quality of excess. As Beckett himself exemplifies when he explains to Alan Schneider 
that his work is 'a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended)" sounds, like 
49 Waiter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999), p. 325. 
50 Sara Crangle, Prosaic Desires - Modernist Know/edge, Boredom, Laughter and Anticipation 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2010), p. 130. 
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words, reveal more or other than intended.51 They fill the void with a parenthetic 
supplement that holds off the nothingness of silence. 
However, the narrator of The Unnamahle is correct in suggesting that laughter 
is related to the end of language, and it is particularly noticeable in the term 'gag'. 
Referring to Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus (1594), Manfred Pfister picks up on 
laughter's relation to silence: 
It is a laugh beyond, or at the far side of, tears, a pathological laughter. And 
what it expresses - like the silence, like being struck dumb, to which it is 
closely related and which it disrupts - is utter helplessness and the most 
radical protest against the horrors of existence and the failure of language to 
express them discursively. 52 
Laughter, like silence, is expressive, but laughter is also an incursion on silence and, 
as such, it denies the absence of sound. The laugh can t h e r e ~ o r e e be valid as a non-
discursive expression that reacts to context and indicates a communicative value. It 
can also desecrate silence to help punctuate and perpetuate the obligation to speak. As 
the voice in The Unnamable demonstrates in its spluttering and coughing 
performance, words and sound partake in the unending end of language in an attempt 
to claw towards the final expression of utter silence. The paradox here is that the act 
of speaking is motivated towards the silence that it also denies. Adomo is well aware 
of this insurmountable problem: 'The words resound like merely makeshift ones 
because silence is not yet entirely successful, like voices accompanying and disturbing 
SI Beckett qtd. in Maurice Harmon, ed., No Author Beller Served: The Correspondence of Samuel 
Beckell and A/an Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1998), p. 24. ' 
52 Pfister, 'Beckett, Barker, and Other Grim Laughter', p. 185. 
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it,.53 These words, like the obscure sound of laughter, say the unsayable, but are not a 
guillotine for expression as a whole. They postpone complete silence with the 
remnants of meaning to sustain the impact of degradation and failure. Beckett realises 
that 'every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence and nothingness' and yet he 
also knows he 'could not have gone through the awful wretched mess of life without 
having left a stain upon the silence'. 54 Since silence is not entirely successful, the 
fundameAtal joke of Beckett's humour of failure is that the failure is never complete. 
The expressive dilemma cannot arrive successfully at the terminus of a failed 
language. Laughter, as the shattered and suicidal throes of language, fails to achieve 
the silence and is unable to cease staining silence. Laughter, then, can be seen as a 
part of the unspeakable that testifies to the catastrophe. At the limits of comprehension 
and articulation, the sound of laughter signals the nervous energy and sense of 
vulnerability that attests to the magnitude of the event and how it exceeds verbal 
communication. In this way, the laughter in and at Beckett's work is parallel to the 
way a stutter might physically react to the urge to speak and not speak. Far from the 
simple expression of pleasure, the laugh is associated with the spoken silence that 
connects Beckettian testimony to the Holocaust. 
Words and Flesh in Endgame 
Beckett's humorous textual performances offer a textual embodiment of the human 
subject's" rational and linguistic failures. Beckett degrades the representative powers 
of language to the visual, aural and formal impacts that evoke the physicality of a 
spectacle. In this context, laughter is a vocal and physical expression that occurs at 
53 Adomo, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 137. 
54 Beckett qtd. in Mary Bryden, 'Sounds and Silence: Beckett's Music', Samuel Beckell 
Today/Aujourd'hui, Vol. 6, Crossroads and Borderlines, ed. by Marius Buning et al. (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1997), 279·288, p. 279. Beckett qtd. in Bair, Samuel Beckell, p. 681. 
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language's limits. It conveys the simultaneous obligation to speak and inability to 
speak that constitutes Beckettian testimony, which I have previously related to the act 
of bearing witness to the Holocaust. I now want to follow this descent in which 
language is bound up with bodily issues, not in terms of Beckett's debased novelistic 
content or textual performances, but rather how words are part of the physical humour 
of creaturely suspension as it appears on stage. In Beckett's theatre, the dialogue 
ensures that characters' physical presences are maintained; whilst they are speaking 
they stay put. The restless verbal exchanges therefore underwrite the physical joke in 
Beckett's plays, namely that words prolong the creatures' physical incarceration. 
When language is uprooted from its human ability to make sense effectively and 
efficiently, it is transplanted into a more visceral, inhuman capacity. The words lose 
much of their semantic value and become the minimal stimulus required to continue 
the characters' fettered bodily conditions on stage. 
In Maud Ellmann's essay 'Changing into an Animal', on what she perceives as 
the dehumanising process of writing in Joyce's composition of the 'Circe' episode in 
Ulysses, she highlights language's connection to materiality in its ability to make the 
author a medium. Ellmann writes that '[r]eason, consciousness, free-will - those 
"wideawake" attributes supposed to elevate the human over the inhuman - give way 
to animal drives and mechanical compulsions, while language, rather than 
transcending those automatisms, dances to their epileptic rhythm'. ss Language 
appears to be subject to the convulsive energies associated with the nervous system, 
thereby framing words as involuntary reflexes originating in the unconscious. She 
goes on to say, '[l]anguage, far from transcending the body, is present as a form of 
discharge, comparable to the hallucinations of the Freudian dream, in which impulses 
ss Ellmann, 'Changing into an Animal', pp. 75-6. 
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discharge themselves as spectacles' .56 For Ellmann, this degradation of words to the 
body suggests a kind of anxious outflow that recalls both rejected animality and the 
automatism of the mind. 
Beckett stages similar verbal discharges, most famously in Lucky's seven-
hundred word tirade in Waiting/or Godot, but also in more sustained forms, such as 
the 1964 stage piece Play, in which three figures in urns take turns to rapidly meditate 
l 
on their triangular love affair, and the 1972 dramatic monologue Not I, in which a 
stream of words spew from an illuminated mouth. The effect is called logorrhoea, 
which describes an excessive outpouring of language and highlights the reduction of 
words to waste. I suspect Joyce and Beckett did not often resort to such a reflex 
writing method that bypasses consciousness and causes an efflux of words. For these 
authors at least, the impression of an instinctive or unconscious free writing is likely a 
contrivance as opposed to a natural occurrence. Nevertheless, the valid point remains 
that the delivery of language can accentuate the materiality of the word over its 
meaning to develop more physicalized spectacles. Beckett's bathetic movement from 
high to low subject matter, and from representation to the formal impact of the 
unspeakable, are testament to this evocation of the body through language. 
The relationship between the symbolic level and its possible physical 
manifestations is one that Eric Santner develops in his study The Royal Remains 
(2011). Santner makes use of an eclectic range of complex sources in order to trace 
how 'the"normative pressures injected into human life by way of one's inscription into 
a symbolic order are imagined to return as real bodily impingements and violations'. 57 
,Drawing on the sovereign'S duality as a divine icon and mortal being, as well as the 
modem biopolitical development from a single royal subject to the collective 
56 Ibid. p. 91. 
57 Santner. The Royal Remains. p. xiv. 
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sovereign citizenship, Santner argues that representative value translates· to the 
physical self. Broadly put, the significations housed in the mind and the word 
materialise through the workings of the brain and nerves. In his epilogue to the text, 
Santner refers to Beckett's theatre as 'a unique kind of convergence of language and 
physical comedy' ,58 In an echo of the sovereign transition from the symbolic order to 
a bodily incarnation, he claims that Beckett's characters and settings are strangely 
abstract and concrete. In terms of the creature, this existence as both idea and thing 
pertains to the creaturely junction between the human constructed world, invested 
with conceptual content, and the animal open, with its carnal, corporal form. As such, 
'in Beckett's theatre, the time of creaturely life invades the space of the play, 
Trauerspiel is not so much elevated to the dignity of tragedy as it is lowered to the 
comedy of an Endspiel, in which a rather new sense, flesh becomes words and words 
take on the agitations of the flesh'. 59 The psychosomatic relationship that Santner 
develops suggests that the contingency of creaturely life contributes to the humorous 
physical dimension of Beckett's drama. 
Santner asks whether Beckett's Hamm and Clov, amongst others, are 'figures 
in and through which the verbal and physical twitches of creaturely life, [ ... ] take 
centre stage?', 60 I have already considered the idea that, on a figurative level, 
Beckett's Endgame depicts a 'skullscape' occupied by two components of a single 
identity and, on a literal level, depicts two characters in a room. In this way, the 
physical situation and the psychological monodrama are blurred as Beckett's play 
conveys both private and public spheres. In Santner's suggestion, this type of 
convergence of body and mind applies to the action and words of Beckett's creatures, 
particularly how the tensions of the endgame are perpetuated through language to 
S8 Ibid. p. 251. 
59 Ibid. p. 251. 
60 Ibid. p. 251. 
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realise the physical joke of their entrapment. Beckett's protagonists in Endgame are 
enclosed in a shelter, with each other for company and nothing but the grey remains of 
a world outside. The possibility of a swift release is the prevailing comic tension in 
the play, as Hamm points out in one of his few laughs: 'I imagined already that 1 
wasn't much longer for this world. [He Laughs. Pause.]' (E, 33). Life is agonisingly 
prolonged, dnd as Hamm and Clov encounter new avenues of discussion to stretch out 
l 
their denouement, the language works to reveal their physical situation. The more 
inconsequential the dialogue becomes, the more the creatures develop a vacuous but 
neurotic quality that emphasises their bodily stasis. These digressions play a 
fundamental part in the mutual obligation the pair have to one another, which grounds 
them in the room. In effect, the irresolution of their language games marks the 
amusing physical element of the play. 
However, the convergence of language and physical comedy in Endgame is 
not an easily exemplified idea since every instance of speech is implicated in Hamm 
and Clov's on-going plight. When language is employed to say nothing in particular, 
but to dwell on the fact that things are still being said, the focus turns from the value 
of words to the act of speech. As with the pure existence of enunciation, the semantic 
level collapses into the action of language. Consequently, the entire speaking 
relationship between the pair reveals their need to talk in order to carry on together. 
The physicality of language is therefore intimated as soon as Hamm wakes up at the 
beginning of the play. He says, 'Enough, it's time it ended, in the shelter, too. [Pause.] 
And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to ... to end. Yes, there it is, it's time it ended and yet I 
hesitate to-[He yawns.]-to end' (E, 6). The hesitation here forms a stutter, which 
magnifies the twitching action of the body through the words. The repetition of 
'hesitate' reveals Hamm's convulsive reaction to the tension between the desire to end 
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and the reluctance to end. In an echo of Hamlet's famous question 'to be, or not to 
be', Hamm's uncertainty shows his pressing existential dilemma 'to end, or not to 
end', which materialises in the faltering verbal expression. The body is appropriately 
present within this briefly disruptive hesitation that sees him clutching onto his bodily 
existence. Hamm's stuttering language performance demonstrates the agitations of his 
physical predicament. 
At the same time, Hamm's entrapment is very much dependent on the vital 
stimulation and objectification that language provides. The ability to respond to his 
own words, evident in the 'Yes, there it is' cited above, helps to sustain his physical 
existence by allowing him to perform his hesitation again, this time with another 
telling involuntary action, the yawn. Since the focus is on the act of speaking, Hamm 
effectively confirms that he is hesitating in order to speak again, but a sign of fatigue 
invades his sentence the second time around to remind him of his bodily presence 
also. As with the stutter of hesitation, the yawn arises through language, as though the 
body tenants and responds to the uttered words. Since it is v i t ~ l l for Hamm to talk in 
order to induce these bodily actions, it is no surprise that he later associates the end of 
his entrapment with the absence of language: 'It's finished, we're finished. Nearly 
finished. There'll be no more speech' (E, 31). The repetition of 'finished' and the 
modifier 'nearly' shows how language is liable to postpone his physical end. The 
restless pulse of energy in this recurring and variable combination of words maintains 
Hamm's animated presence. 
Hamm equates speech with his existence as a physical entity, but more 
important are his conversations with Clov, such as the one that keeps Hamm from 
returning to bed in the first place: 'I can't be getting you up and putting you to bed 
every five minutes, I have things to do' (E, 7). Once Hamm is awake, however, it is 
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the master who refuses to let the servant leave. The dramatic tension of Endgame 
begins with Clov's threats to leave, but as his threats are repeatedly shown to be 
empty or easily ignored, this non-departure becomes a running gag. The physical 
comedy of not leaving is also bound up with the continuation of the words, so that 
what Clov actually does is speak with Hamm. On nine separate occasions, Clov says 
'-----
'I'll leave you' and each time Hamm manages to distract him, often with questions, 
such as 'So you remember when you came here?' (E, 24), 'Is my dog ready?' (E,25), 
and 'Have you had your visions?' (E, 26). This deflective tactic is employed to keep 
Clov talking and consequently keep them both there. Yet these are questions that 
require minimal mental activity for Clov to answer. He exclaims, 'All life long the 
same questions, the same answers' (E, 7) and 'You've asked me these questions 
millions of times' (E, 25). Since Clov is often reduced to stock responses, he is called 
upon as an active speaker and not so much as a thinking presence. Hamm engages 
Clov as a co-speaker in a way that incites an emotional response and emphasises the 
delivery of the words as opposed to their conceptual meaning. 
Towards the end of the play, Hamm makes his dependence on speech and the 
dialogues with Clov more explicit: 
CLOY: I'll leave you. 
HAMM: It's time for my story. Do you want to listen to my story? (E, 30) 
CLOV: I'll leave you. 
HAMM:No! 
CLOY: What is there to keep me here? 
227 
HAMM: The dialogue. (E, 36) 
CLOY: I'll leave you. [He goes towards door.] 
HAMM: Before you go ... [Clov halts near door.] ... say something. (E,47) 
If the act of speaking helps to incarnate Hamm's life conditions, it is a listener to his 
stories and an addressee in dialogue that objectifies him. The physical anchor of 
language is most evident in the second example, although this time the weight of the 
word also applies to Clov's existence. The dialogue 'keeps them here', but at this 
juncture in the play it is rather strained and desperate. Hence Hamm abandons the 
prompts of his distracting questions and simply exclaims 'No', It is now that the 
agitations of their conversations really reflect the frustrations of being trapped in the 
room, tethered to each other. Beckett's stage directions suggest that Hamm and Clov's 
exchanges get 'anxious', irritable, 'very agitated', angry and 'violent'. Whilst the 
jerks of inner hesitation intimate nervous energy, it is the i ~ a n e e dialogue between 
Hamm and Clov that exhibits how the slight mental stimulation of their words gives 
primacy to their bodily conditions. Although the words are all but empty, venting 
them remains necessary. As with relief laughter, then, the pair channel their excess 
nervous energy, but they do so through charged words rather than bursts of laughter. 
These exchanges are certainly amusing for the viewing audience, yet Hamm and Clov 
. . 
rarely bridge silence with laughter unless an obvious joke arises. Instead, they resort 
to saying things that implore or oblige the other to reply. The tension in the language 
between master and servant therefore coincides with the suspended physical 
conditions that mark the comedy of Endgame. The postponed departure is invested 
into the fraught language of the play. 
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Hamm's blindness also contributes to the necessary physicality of the words. 
Since Hamnl experiences a sensory detachment from the physical world, he relies on 
\ 
Clov's descriptions to make it known. The blind master can only imagine his 
environment and situate himself in it through the commentary that his servant 
provides. Clov's words act as Hamm's eyes and this arrangement injects a tangible 
quality into the language as it renders the place that Hamm inhabits. At the same time, 
this relationship agitates both Hamm and Clov, and again their physical frustration is 
highly apparent in their dialogue. It is worth quoting a longer passage of dialogue to 
illustrate this correlation between their verbal tensions and bodily transfixion: 
HAMM: Open the window. 
CLOY: What for? 
HAMM: I want to hear the sea. 
CLOY: You wouldn't hear it. 
HAMM: Even if you opened the window? 
CLOV:No. 
HAMM: Then it's not worth while opening it? 
CLOV:No. 
HAMM [Violently.]: Then open it! [C/ov gets up on the ladder, opens the 
window. Pause.] Have you opened it? 
CLOY: Yes. 
[Pause.] 
HAMM: You swear you've opened it? 
CLOY: Yes. 
[Pause.] 
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HAMM: Well ... ! [Pause.] It must be very calm. [Pause. Violently.] I'm asking 
you is it very calm! (E, 39) 
This kind of double act is funny in the way they quarrel over trivial details and the 
fact that Clov was correct to begin with. It is notable that even though there is no 
purposeful reason to do things, these futile actions are all they have. Through the 
pointless opening of the window, Hamm and Clov can continue to bloviate, which 
emphasises the very breath in speaking over the content of what is said. The whole 
comic dynamic of them being there is therefore entangled in their conversations, as 
they act out the words that constitute their stationary lives. Beckett's play is not 
exactly a case of words and action coexisting in a dual or even complementary 
layering of meaning. Rather, the action in Endgame is so intimately bound with 
language as to showcase the creaturely combination of words and flesh. The words 
become the senseless action that occupies the creatures. 
As language and physical comedy merge in the stimulations of Endgame, it is 
possible to see how creaturely contingency applies to Hamm and Clov. These figures 
are subject to the pressures of performance as they cultivate or revisit opportunities 
for speech in anticipation of the end. They are dependent on words, and therefore 
afflicted with a particularly human property, but it is this language, the realm of the 
signifier, that translates into Hamm and Clov's physical state of becoming, or realm of 
the signified, that will not finally let them be'. For Santner, this kind of discomfort 
emerges at an interstitial point, namely the tension of an endgame between idea and 
thing, which questions the possibility of ever sitting comfortably in the 'office' of the 
human. It can be inferred that to be human is to be caught in a state of vicissitude 
between words and flesh that cannot be accepted as human. In other words, the human 
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is subject to the duality of Man and man, representation and actuality, which denies 
1 
him a singUlar position. Santner goes on to refer to Hennan Melville's Bartleby, the 
I 
Scrivener (1853) and the inhuman declaration 'I prefer not to' to describe how the 
only way to endure, and perhaps even enjoy, this tension is to 'experience its 
pressures-its twitching-as a LachkrampJ, a paroxysm of laughter that simply 
cannot-and ought not-be held down. Bartleby could thus be seen as the harbinger 
of a new sort of "divine comedy" of creaturely life, one created out of the troubles that 
plague the office of the human,.61 In reacting to the tension between ideas and things 
with a convulsive outburst, the laugh refuses to resolve the pressures and instead 
strikes against them. In Endgame, this comic tension is apparent through the sustained 
codependence of Hamm and Clov. Their twitching materialises through the leases of 
language that keep them physically restrained. It is this intimacy between words and 
flesh that produces the comic dynamic that Santner sees in the dual pressures applied 
to the human. Hence, Santner deems comedy the 'genre par excellence of a troubled 
monism,.62 It is the art fonn that reveals the combination of symbolic and physical 
strains on the subject. Laughter and the humour in the convergence of language and 
the body in Endgame are products of such a disturbance of unity. 
Metanarrative Tragicomedy 
Beckett finds humorous material in the protracted struggles of his characters as they 
enact a grotesque vision of the human. Failure and degradation are sources of comic 
energy, and the phosphorescence of decay spares his work from uniform darkness. 
But Beckett does not anesthetise the tragic suffering of his creatures. In the physical 
humour of the agitations and frustrations between Hamm and Clov, there is an 
61 Ibid. p. 247. 
62 Ibid. p. 109. 
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undeniable unhappiness. Though it constitutes the humour of the play, the fact that 
Clov and Hamm are incarcerated is a sad state of affairs. Moreover, Beckett embroils 
the audience in a joke that is at the same time a miserable truth. The 'leaving' that 
underpins Endgame, for instance, captures the predicament and anticipates the 
reaction of a stultified audience, especially since Hamm concedes that the dialogue is 
the sole point of interest. As such, Beckett's audience is not detached from the 
poignant tragedy of the creatures' plight, and whilst the characters' melancholic 
immersion clearly contradicts the catharsis of Greek tragedy that Aristotle outlines in 
On The Art of Poetry, there is room still for emotion and empathy.63 This hypothesis 
on Beckett's humour conflicts with one of Bergson's three tenets of laughter: 
'Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than 
emotion,.64 Beckett's work complicates Bergson's argument, if only because his 
characters are familiar subjects with hopes and dreams. As John Orr notes, Beckett's 
'heroes are at times pathetic creatures, but through aspirations which will not die they 
still achieve a genuine pathos we cannot take away from them'. 65 Beckett manages to 
uphold the tension between pity and passivity, solidarity and superiority, as the 
audience relates to and recoils from Beckett's figures. This section of the chapter 
contends that Beckett's humour gains its full impact from the way both the characters 
and audience members feel. 
The subtitle to Waiting for Godot offers a clue to Beckett's balance of the 
'. 
laughing Democritean and weeping Heraclitean dispositions. The play is set up as a 
'tragicomedy', with the serious and the humorous as codependent as the play's two 
protagonists. The collocation of the solemn and the trivial is entrenched in the play to 
63 See Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, trans. by Ingram Bywater (London: Oxford University, 1920), p. 
35 
64 Bergson, Laughter, p. 10. 
65 John Orr, Tragicomedy and Contemporary Culture: Play and Performance from Beckett to Shepard 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 6. ' 
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the e x ~ ~ n t t that the characters have formal full names, Vladimir and Estragon, as well 
/ 
as the clownish nicknames Didi and Gogo. The audience witness tramp-like figures 
wearing ill-fitting shoes and hats, but, like the clown, they are not altogether derelict. 
Beyond the fa9ade of their comic interplay lies the vague suggestion of upstanding, 
intelligent men with past lives and relations. Vladimir says, 'You should have been a 
poet' to which Estragon replies, 'I was. [Gesture towards his rags.] Isn't that obvious' 
(WFG, 4). Although the reference to this particular vocation offers a metatheatrical 
joke that serves to withhold the idea of a real back story, it also comes after 
Estragon's recollection of the maps of the Holy Land and his plans for a honeymoon 
by the Dead Sea, which increases the possibility of him having a past. Admittedly, 
there is not a great deal of this kind of background in Beckett's play, and the 
repetition of events and the characters' defective memories nullify lineal temporality 
somewhat. The word 'again' appears four times on the very first page, but the past is 
hardly distinguishable from the present, the events are too similar and the power of 
memory not strong enough to break out of the time capsule to recall details that would 
clearly differentiate then from now. Nevertheless, Beckett's woebegone creatures and 
their vaudeville routines are tinged with loss, and in their few references to the Eiffel 
Tower, to days when they were 'presentable' (WFG, 2), to the Macon country and 
River Rhone (WFG, 53, 47), there is a 'dead and buried' other world (WFG, 47), a 
sadness at having been dislodged from time and the hope that eventually there wi1\ be 
a r e l e a s e : ~ ~
It is Pozzo, the privileged aristocratic figure of the play, who spells out the 
tragicomic balance: 'The tears of the world are a constant quantity. For each one who 
begins to weep, somewhere else another stops. The same is true of the laugh. [He 
laughs.], (WFG, 26). When Pozzo laughs, Vladimir, Estragon and Lucky do not join 
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him. All the others are members of the non-laughing population, which is necessary 
for Pozzo's own burst of joy. Beckett isolates the laugher in this instance and causes 
an imbalance between laughter and solemnity. Since the majority lies with the three 
non-Iaughers, group mentality might place the audience in league with the subjugated 
figures. Pozzo's position of superiority and joy, on the other hand, might encourage a 
similar laughter in the audience. It is certain that if Beckett's humour does not achieve 
a blanket laugh or silence from the entire audience, the tragicomic balance asserts 
itself in the auditorium. One spectator can laugh, whilst his neighbour acts as a 
counterbalance to that laughter. This juxtaposition means the laughing spectator is 
confronted with his non-laughing counterpart, whilst it is difficult for the non-
laughing spectator to yearn for a place on the other side of the scales knowing it will 
be at the expense of another's solemnity. In the conscientious person, the constant 
balance of laughter and weeping presents an ethical conundrum that interrupts pure 
joy and underpins it with guilt. 
Beckett's play shows that the two genres, comedy and tragedy, do not simply 
meet and cohabit, but rather rely on one another to produce a new tonality, as Verna 
Foster recognises: 
A tragicomedy is a play in which the tragic and the comic both exist but are 
formally and emotionally dependent on one another, each modifying and 
determining the nature of the other so' as to pronounce a mixed, tragicomic 
response in the aUdience.66 
66 Vema Foster, The Name and Nature o/Tragicomedy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 11. 
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whin the audience find comic value in Beckeu's play it is accompanied by the tragic 
and vice versa. For example, when Pozzo says 'Can't you see he wants to rest? 
Basket!' (WFG, 19), what at first appears to be a defence of Lucky rouses empathy. 
Pozzo initially performs an uncharacteristic act of sensitivity that the audience can 
agree with. Yet the barked order • Basket!' is the punch line that restores Pozzo' s true 
colours and underscores Lucky's poor treatment. This glimpse of tenderness serves to 
confirm the persistent hardship Lucky suffers, but still the audience can laugh despite 
the pathos. In effect, Beckett orchestrates a divided reaction that exploits the 
ambiguity of tragicomedy. There is a chuckle at the irony and a shake of the head at 
Pozzo's hypocrisy. As a result, Beckett is often described in mixed terms, as 'an 
alarming comedian' with a 'gloomy, humorous view' .67 Essentially, the bisected mask 
of Thalia and Melpomene that depicts drama is shown to be part of the same 
countenance in Beckett. 
The tragic undercurrent of the situation in Beckett's plays, as well as the pitiful 
and pathetic figures that populate them, cause a tragic aspect to occur within the 
laugh. The German reception theorist Wolfgang Iser builds upon this mixed reaction 
in his notion of the stifled laugh.68 In Iser's experience, Beckett's audience members 
are unsure when to laugh, laugh at different things and suppress their laughs 
depending on the collective response. Most audience members only acknowledge the 
tragedy after self-consciously reflecting on their initial outburst of laughter. As an 
inappropriate but entirely organic occurrence, the stifled laugh confronts natural 
reaction with social awareness. lser clearly takes his impetus from the characters' 
situation: 
67 Morton Gurewiteh, 'The Comedy of Decomposition', Chicago Review, 33.2 (1982),93-99, p. 94; 
Topsfield, The Humour o/Samuel Beckett, p. 9. 
68 Wolfgang Iser, 'The Art of Failure: The Stifled Laugh in Beckett's Theatre', in Samuel Beckell, ed. 
by Jennifer Birkett and Kate Inee (London: Pearson, 2000), 201-229. 
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[VLADLMIR breaks into a hearty laugh which he immediately stifles, his hand 
pressed to his pubis, hisface contorted.] 
VLADIMIR: One daren't even laugh any more. 
ESTRAGON: Dreadful privation. 
VLADIMIR: Merely smile. (WFG, 3) 
Vladimir curtails his laughter again moments later: 
[Laugh ofVLADIMIR, stifled as before, less the smile.] 
VLADIMIR: You'd make me laugh if it wasn't prohibited. 
ESTRAGON: We've lost our rights? 
VLADIMIR: [Distinctly.] We got rid of them. (WFG, 11) 
The audience-response and communal aspects of Iser's reading is present within these 
two examples. Each instance implies that laughter is consciously restrained, not 
naturally absent. Terms such as 'privation', 'daren't', 'prohibited' and 'rights' all 
suggest obligations beyond that of the individual. These two exchanges between 
Vladimir and Estragon reveal the characters' awareness of social propriety and ethical 
codes, and nod to the incongruity of laughter in times of catastrophe, which waits in 
-
the wings in Waitingfor Godot. In this way, Beckett evokes the totalitarian censure 
against the subversive power of laughter, such as the 1942 Nazi Germany propaganda 
posters directed at Roosevelt's administration and German Jews, which exclaim 'They 
Wilt Stop Laughing!!!' (Das Lachen wird ihncn vergehen). bl) Beckett makes the 
audience laugh in tragic contexts where the very freedom of laughter is at stake. 
For Foster, it is through tragicomedy that the tragic mode found an appropriate 
fonn of expression in post-war literature. As she points out, 'tragedy presupposes 
fonn and our world has none; tragedy presupposes individual guilt and responsibility, 
but these qualities have eroded; tragedy, finally is predicated on an audience that is 
already a community, and this, too, no longer exists'. 70 The tragicomic mode, 
however, reinstates some of the qualities that the serious voice has lost. If the 
connection to community has been severed in the serious mode, the trivial still unites 
people, albeit negatively, and with recourse to Iser's observation, it is possible to see 
how the stifled laugh introduces a community of individuals. Nonnally, the audience 
might join in with laughter, as Robert Provine asserts in his study on the behaviour of 
laughter: 'When we hear laughter, we become beasts of the herd, mindlessly laughing 
in turn, producing a behavioural chain reaction that sweeps through our group, 
creating a crescendo of jocularity or ridicule' .71 In the spontaneous impulse to laugh at 
Beckett's work, however, the laughing spectator can be isolated and in order to return 
to the community the laugh must be suppressed, 'cut-off, so to speak in mid-
guffaw,.72 In this moment, the guilt of laughing without the synchronicity of the 
audience leads to a tragic element. From the individual laugher's perspective, the 
other audience members are not only a non-laughing community, they are an anti-
laughing' community, condemning humour and bespeaking the tragedy within the 
69 See images section in Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War /I and 
the Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2008). 
70 Foster, The Name and Nature o/Tragicomedy. p. 31. 
71 Robert Provine, Curious Behaviour: Yawning, Laughing, Hiccupping, and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University, 2012), pp. 40-41. 
72 Iser, 'The Art of Failure', p. 203. 
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laugh. The spectators are aware of the tragedy through the laugh, as Iser's reading 
implies, but they are also contributing to the tragedy by laughing. 
Beckett achieves tragic undertones in his comedy, and yet he is also acutely 
aware of the comic potential of tragedy. If the purity of the comedy has been 
compromised, so too has the tragedy as it reveals its own brand of laughter. As Nell 
phrases it in Endgame: 'Nothing is funnier than unhappiness' (E, 14). It seems that 
misery propagates humour for Beckett. His comment on Waiting for Godot in a letter 
to Roger Blin offers a better insight into this dynamic than Nell. Beckett insists that in 
the scene where Estragon's trousers fall down, they must drop to his ankles. He 
explains: 'The spirit of the play, to the extent to which it has one, is that nothing is 
more grotesque than the tragic,.73 'Grotesque' is not typically interchangeable with 
'funny' despite the comic elements to its meaning, but the term does encapsulate the 
divided quality of Beckett's humour. In Bakhtin's work on the grotesque, he asserts 
that 'exaggeration, hyperbolism. excessiveness are generally considered fundamental 
attributes of the grotesque style,.74 It is this sense of the familiar but alien in the 
grotesque that produces the simultaneous condition of relation and revulsion in 
humour. In the grotesqueness of tragedy, then, Beckett points out the relief 
experienced at the expense of others' misery, which recognises tragedy as a human 
predicament but also detaches from and laughs at the particular situation. This type of 
humour brings together feelings of relief and unease, or as Vladimir puts it, 'Relieved 
and at the same time ... appalled' (WFG, 3), before he utters the word 'funny' shortly 
thereafter. It engenders a state of compassion and self-centredness that recognises 
tragedy as a general possibility and yet deflects its specificity. Therefore, Beckett's 
vision of the grotesque in tragedy realises both the tragedy and the comedy; each 
73 Beckett qtd. in Bair, Samuel Beckett, p. 453. 
74 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 303. 
) . ~ ~ d' h h h" aspect IS loun m t e ot er to create t e tragicomic tone that binds together 
conflicting feelings. 
The laugh that unhappiness stimulates is the third type of laughter Beckett 
mentions in Watt: 
The bitter, the hollow and-Haw! Haw!- the mirthless. The bitter laugh 
laughs at that which is not good, it is the ethical laugh. The hollow laugh 
laughs at that which is not true, it is the intellectual laugh. Not good! Not true! 
Well well. But the mirthless laugh is the dianoetic laugh, down the snout-
Haw!-so. It is the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the laugh laughing at the 
laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest joke, in a word the laugh that 
laughs-silence please-at that which is unhappy. (W, 46-7) 
The mirthless type is a remote laugh that undermines and satirises the action of 
laughing. Rather than counter sadness or tragedy, it finds fault in laughter's 
composition and alters the tenor. In one sense, this laughter devoid of cheer is akin to 
the howls and wails, or 'modes of ululation' (W, 46), that suggest a release of emotion 
or tension. Yet the dianoetic snort 'down the snout' is not intuitive, and this indicates 
a more deliberate and deliberated personal affair. In relation to Beckett's audience, the 
mirthless laugh favours the textual form, as the experience of humour in Beckett's 
novels and drama on the page is different to that on stage. Beckett's texts elicit the 
mirthless laugh more readily because they privatise the jokes, thus allowing the 
deriding smile to go unnoticed and the dianoetic laugh to resonate without fear of 
condemnation from the theatre audience. In other words, the reader can focus on the 
laugh at unhappiness as opposed to fellow spectators. 
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If, as Bergson notes, 'laughter is always the laughter of a group" it follows 
that the mirthless laugh deviates from conventional laughter in that it does not feed off 
the present community.75 Its pessimism is not contagious like a funny sight, sound or 
implanted thought. The laugh at the laugh prevails over and silences the Bergsonian 
communal type of humour, as the 'silence please' in Watt indicates, and works to 
reveal another side of laughter. To return to NelPs 'nothing is funnier than 
unhappiness' in Endgame, the less-quoted second part of her speech alludes to the 
silence in which mirthless laughter can also emerge: 'we laugh, with a will, in the 
beginning. But it's always the same thing. Yes, it's like the funny story we have heard 
too often, we still find it funny, but we don't laugh any more' (E, 14). When the 
unadulterated, hearty guffaw is no longer operative or appropriate, the mirthless laugh 
can replace it. In this respect, the mirthless laugh can reside in the aftermath of the 
stifled laugh; it still exists in the absence of the reflex laugh. 
Beckett's humour probes the substance of laughter as it shifts instantaneously 
in tone. In one of Beckett's standout incongruity jokes, Clov looks in the trashcan at 
Nagg and announces 'He's crying' before Hamm replies 'Then he's living' (E, 38). 
The impulse is to laugh at the character in a detached way, and this initial phase 
contributes to the existential tragedy of Sisyphean 'hellish hope' (T, 133), or the 'old 
joke of being' as Beckett describes it. 76 As the laugh matures or fades, it develops into 
a mirthless laugh as the spectator apprehends the shared nature of the characters' 
dilemma. Although this example might not provoke a laugh from the entire audience, 
those that do laugh respond to a personal realisation of the parity between themselves 
and the character. Since each laugh er does this,· it can be described as a common laugh 
75 Bergson, Laughter, p. 11. 
76 Beckett replied to Alan Schneider's questions on Happy Days: '''Old joke" not Winnie, rather the 
joke of being that is said to have caused Democritus to die of laughter. To be related also if you like to 
Nel\'s "nothing is funnier than unhappiness etc." Same idea in Watt (the 3 smiles)'. Beckett qtd. in 
Feldman, Beckett's Books: A Cultural History o/Samuel Beckett's 'Interwar Notes', p. 61. 
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d· / d . d"d \.. h' hid d' • d' . lrecte at in IVI ua IsatlOn, w IC conveys a mutua un erstan mg ot con It Ions that 
are universal and at the same time must be felt as particular. To underline this 
complicity, Beckett has his characters poke fun at the reading and viewing audience's 
own dire situation. He does this through the waiting, repetition, endurance and 
boredom on page and stage that is the shared human condition. He also resorts to 
metatheatrical pointers, which embroil the audience in a joke that recognises the style 
and duration of the prose and drama as a demonstration of the human condition. 
Consequently, Beckett's humour moves from the fictional level that laughs at the 
other, to that which is felt in esse and laughs as an other at the self. 
According to Carla Locatelli, Beckett's post-war prose displays his second 
phase of humour, which she labels 'metanarrative'. In this period, Beckett creates 'an 
art whose shortcomings are amusing, enjoyable even if they are ridiculed,.77 Jonathan 
Greenberg goes a step further to argue that 'laughter is something the reader can cling 
to in the oceans of possibilities in which Beckett's prose immerses her,.78 As with 
Beckett's use of pun, the reader can identify instances of communicative incapacity 
and be entertained by the misuse and abuse of convention. Laughter is a welcome 
retreat from the overwhelming indecision of Beckett's narrators and the tedium of 
their narrative tasks. However, laughter also tricks the reader into drawing out the 
perpetuity, or humouring the narrator's weakness. The reader's privileged position of 
knowledge outside of the text could be enjoyed if the story progressed regularly and 
the momentum stalled only intermittently, but on the contrary, Beckett's humour 
. derives chiefly from a realisation of the irony that 'literary production grows on the 
77 Carla Locatelli, 'Comic Strategies in Beckeu's Narratives', in Samuel Beckell, ed. by Jennifer Birkett 
and Kate Ince, (London: Pearson, 2000), 233-244, p. 239. 
78 Jonathan Greenberg, Modernism, Satire and the Novel (London: Cambridge University, 2011), p. 
180. 
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shortfalls of literary self-reflection' .79 The humour of narrative failure is effectively 
locked into the monotony of its own downfall. Since the narrators identify narrative 
and expressive weaknesses, seen clearly in Malone's ironically repetitive 'What 
tedium' (T, 187, 189,216,219,254) as well as 'Mortal tedium' (T, 218) and 'This is 
awful' (T, 191), the awareness of a fumbling artistry, or mastery of failure, means the 
reader is no longer distanced from the joke but ensnared by it. The metanarrative joke 
of Beckett's post-war prose is that the reader is cast as an object of humour. 
In Ugly Feelings (2005), Sianne Ngai proposes that the incessant torrent of 
inanity in literature produces a shocking or boring effect, or both, that amounts to a 
stupor. Ngai coins the portmanteau 'stuplimity' to capture the essence of this 
awesome tedium, or the 'simultaneously astonishing and deliberately fatiguing' that 
Beckett demonstrates.so The double bind of Nagai's 'stuplimity' grasps the wider joke 
in Beckett, in which the overwhelming commitment to failure is woven into the 
textual fabric of the work and, as such, is without a punch line. Beckett's readers are 
made to endure the stupidity and stupor that do not frequently offer the impact of a 
revelation. Of course, the reader can choose when to consume the text and for how 
long, but the death grip of Beckett's work tends to repel and impel the reader at once, 
thus evoking the 'I can't go on, I'll go on' of The Unnamable (T, 418) throughout the 
reading experience. In turn, the joke that Beckett's prose applies to the reader actually 
highlights his author-narrators' writing approaches. The aesthetic accentuates the 
mutual struggle to progress - in the mould of Beckett's own experience of reading 
Franz Kafka's The Castle (German 1926; English 1930), '1 must say it was difficult to 
get to the end' - although it is a struggle fragmented by intermission for the reader.sl 
79 Locatelli, 'Comic Stmtegies', p. 239. . 
80 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005), p. 260. 
81 Beckett qtd. in Adelman, Naming Beckett 's Unnamable, p. 147. 
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The real-time of theatre, on the other hand, exacerbates Beckett's drawn-out 
humour and his metatheatrical techniques actualise an experiential joke, as opposed to 
the illusion of synchronicity between character and reader in the textual equivalent. 
The auditorium doubles as a cage as Beckett forces the observer to undergo inaction 
and participate in boredom. In a staging of Waitingfor Godot at the Criterion Theatre 
in London, an audience member responded to the line 'What shall we do now, now 
that we are happy?' (WFG, 51) with 'I'm not happy, I've never been so bored in my 
life'. The actor Hugh Burden, playing Vladimir, released the tension of this heckle, 
which is itself a common feature of stand-up comedy, with 'I think that was Godot,.82 
Inadvertently, the actor replicates a technique that Beckett himself employs to subtly 
pierce the barrier of performance between stage and audience. Beckett has his 
characters seemingly reflect on the situation and allude to the audience to relieve the 
bind of'stuplimity' on several occasions in Waitingfor Godot. Vladimir's assessment 
'This is becoming really insignificant' (WFG, 60) and the refrain 'We're waiting for 
Godot' show an awareness of the situation for character and audience alike. Similarly, 
the audience is invoked when Estragon faces the auditorium and surmises 'Inspiring 
prospects' (WFG, 6), and later as Vladimir gestures to the front announcing 'There! 
Not a soul in sight' (WFG, 66). The moments when Beckett's figures threaten to break 
out of the f a ~ a d e e of performance combine to remind the audience they are implicitly 
connected to the characters and cast as extras, subject to the protagonists' plight. Yet 
the recognition of this kinship lightens the tedium momentarily, shifting the emphasis 
towards a cognizant and playful tone, tantamount to an authorial wink, rather than an 
outright bore owing to artistic incompetence. The audience can appreciate Beckctt's 
hand in constructing a play that captures the audience but purposely does not engross. 
82 David Bradby, Beckell: Wailing/or Godol (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 200 I), p. 78. 
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Although there is no punch line, then, there is comic relief that punctuates the 
extended joke of failure. 
The tedium that Beckett's aesthetic inflicts moves his work into creaturely 
territory. As Santner understands the concept, by way of Agamben, boredom paves 
the way to the realm of the creaturely as it recognises humanity'S proximity with 
animal captivity in 'the open'. 83 For Agamben in particular, human existence 
constitutes a paradoxical state of enlightened' consciousness that delivers humanity 
from, and realigns it with, an animalistic being: 'Dasein is simply an animal that has 
learned to become bored: it has awakened from its own captivation to its own 
captivation' .84 The cleft that boredom precipitates between the human and animal 
conjures the creaturely for Santner, as the boundaries of classification are destabilised 
and inclined to overlap. Beckett's characters, readers and viewing audience are 
subject to a similar profound boredom that is made noticeable by humour's ability to 
throw one out of a stupor, to shock one into consciousness. Yet the initially amusing 
and ultimately paralysing aesthetic of Beckett's work underpins these humorous jolts, 
offering only a short relief from the context of enduring failure. As incessant failures 
and humorous interjections numb and enliven the reading and viewing audience, the 
effect is to draw the audience into the characters' creaturely suspension. Faced with 
the degraded cerebral sphere and the grotesque investment in language and reason, 
Beckett's audiences are forced to reflect on the fabrication of art through humorous 
m e t a ~ a r r a t i v e e techniques. The creaturely shift from dull captivation to conscious 
captivation replicates the reading and viewing audience's participation in and distance 
from the narrative goings-on, whereby the audience is in and out of proceedings, 
facilitating the old joke of being and alienated by the artistic recognition of artifice. ' 
8.1 See Santner, On Creaturely Life, pp. 10-12. 
84 Agamben, The Open; Man and Animal, p. 70. 
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Beckett's humour captures the audience in the physical joke of entrapment and then 
intermittently pierces this incarceration with humorous metanarrative asides that 
reveal the tragicomic creaturely captivation. 
'turd waiting for the flush': Gallows Humour 
The foregrounding of failure and degradation in Beckett takes the unpleasant or 
unwelcome negatives in life and turns them into an absurd joke. This experience of 
living through the joke and at the same time being aware of the joke forms another 
bifurcated tension, what we might again label the 'sovereign as creature', or 
(in)sovereign, dimension. In the same way that Beckett's creatures reconstitute 
testimony by articulating the inability to speak, and are codependent in their master· 
servant relationships, humour fashions a convergence of potency and impotence as the 
subject recognises a hopeless situation but attempts to reign over it through an ironic 
assessment. Steve Lipman describes how laughter 'kept countless persons from taking 
their own lives or slipping into the zombie· like state of the "Muselmanner'''. 8S Those 
that could reflect on their dire situation and laugh had the capacity to endure it better. 
In extreme cases of destitution, the Holocaust victims used humour as a tool to 
persevere, but in the aftermath, when the human has revealed its capacity for such 
devaluation and the sanctity of human life is in pieces, humour appears to act as a 
measure to survive in a vacuum of meaning. A sense of humour is a vital resource for 
deflecting incomprehensible and destabilising events. Last·ditch bouts of laughter 
attest to the affront to reason that such an event produced and respond to the threat 
facing the idea of the human. In this way, humour and laughter can appear as ways of 
moving on, of negotiating the fragments of meaning and ruins of culture left in the 
85 Steve Lipman, Laughter in Hell - The Use of Humor During the Holocaust (Northvale, NJ: Jason 
Aronson, 1991), p. 12. 
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wake. Indeed, Des Pres proposes that certain works on the Holocaust that include 
humour might break out of the impasse facing attempts to find meaning from the 
catastrophe. In such texts, 'what survives is the integrity of an imagined world that is 
similar to, but deliberately different from, the actual world of the Holocaust. Our 
knowledge of history is not denied but displaced, and we discover the capacity to go 
forward with, so to speak, a foot in both worlds,.86 
However, in this section I argue that humour is not a lasting solution to the 
human predicament, but rather a complicit fixture in the enduring struggle with the 
hardships of life. Suzanne Dow asserts that 'Beckettian comedy does not allow us to 
laugh off the negativity of senescence, decrepitude, death, finitude, nothingness etc. 
that intrudes or impinges upon life; it invites us to laugh at this egregious excess, this 
infinitude, that sallies forth or seeps, and which refuses to be shaken off or 
staunched' .87 To take this persuasive argument a step further, I contend that Beckett's 
humour is a necessary component in the perpetuation of negativity as it contributes to 
the cycle of release and restoration that sustains failure and degradation. 
For Sigmund Freud, the different levels of the psyche allow consciousness to 
protect itself from the full weight of the stark realities it must confront. In his essay 
'Humour' (1927), Freud finds a particularly impressive example of this defence 
mechanism in the levity of gallows humour, a type of humour that posits self as both 
subject and object in the joke, thus taking ownership of a situation but diminishing its 
severity. 'The grandeur in it', Freud writes, 
clearly lies in the triumph of narcissism, the victorious assertion of the ego's 
invulnerability. The ego refuses to be distressed by the provocations of reality, 
86 Des Pres, 'Holocaust Laughter?', pp. 220-21. . 
87 Dow, 'Beckett's Humour, from an Ethics of Finitude to an Ethics of the Real', p. 133. 
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to let itself be compelled to suffer. It insists that it cannot be affected by the 
traumas of the external world; it shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more 
h . fi' . I IH! t an occasIOns or It to gam p easure. 
Freud views humour as a hedonistic activity, associated with good feelings and 
enjoyment, although the drive to pleasure is not necessarily concerned with the 
empirical world or conducive to pragmatic productivity. In this instance, the pleasure 
in gallows humour derives from an apprehension of one's reality admixed with a 
detached perspective on that reality. Unusually, this humour renders its subject both 
victim and victor, since it comes from and is directed towards a single party. On the 
edge of annihilation, gallows humour revels in the self-centredness of narcissism, at 
once cognizant and dismissive of reality, responding with the authority of wit to one's 
grave situation. The example to which Freud refers reads: 'a criminal who was being 
led out to the gallows on a Monday remarked: "Well, the week's beginning nicely",.89 
This gallows humour is ironic and can only feign its distance from reality, as the joke 
relies on the context and betrays its position of knowledge. Indeed, '[t]hese jokes may 
be a form of bravado, a kind of necessary defence mechanism, designed to articulate 
genuine fears and at the same time partly allay terror through humor'. 90 This bravado 
is a projection of superiority and an outward performance of immunity. In its self-
possession, gallows humour anaesthetises the reflex action and rationalises an 
alternative perspective. Therefore, as gallows humour moves to deflect the seriousness 
of the circumstances, the display of control only makes sense as a knowing refusal to 
88 Sigmund Freud, 'Humour', in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. 21 (1927-193/): The Future of an Jl/usion. Civilization and its Discontents. and 
Other Works, ed. and trans. by James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001),159-166, p. 162. 
89 Freud, 'Humour', p. 161. 
90 Alan Dundes and Thomas Hauschild, 'Auschwitz Jokes', Western Folklore, 42.4 (1983), 249-260, p. 
249. 
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collapse in despair; otherwise it is simply a tragic ignorance of the impending events. 
In this way, Freud's celebration of the interiority of gallows humour and the capacity 
to resort to the mind's superior detachment actually borders on delusion. For this 
reason, the Freudian terms 'triumph', 'victory' and 'refusal' are synonymous with 
fantasy and evasion. 
However, the original self-awareness at the centre of gallows humour is not 
completely detached from the situational. context since the triumph of narcissism 
stems from seeing oneself in the world. In its incongruity, gallows humour is clearly a 
manifestation of the fear and anxiety that befits imminent death. As such, the 
liberation that gallows humour offers is questionable. Paul Lewis observes that the 
subject 'experiences a moment of detachment·from his fear or anxiety, but as Freud 
notes, since this humor works by denying or evading reality, by definition the joke can 
do nothing to change the reality it evades,.9\ In fact, the escape from reality helps to 
deliver the victim to the fate of reality. The tragicomic element of Freudian gallows 
humour, then, is that it is packaged as a rebellion but displays docile acceptance. This 
is evident in self-abasing Jewish humour, such as the compliant Jew before the firing 
squad who says to his fellow detainee, 'Take a blindfold. Don't make trouble,.92 This 
coping mechanism replaces the furniture of distress with that of pleasure, but it is a 
counterfeit pleasure, since humour's 'release' is into inevitability. It steps obediently 
into physical captivity under the pretence of psychological ascendency. 
It is clear that humour in Beckett's prose and drama does not strictly adhere to 
the gallows variety. Within the texts, his characters do not make light of imminent 
death and their circumstances are not as pressing or clear-cut as the gallows. 
91 Paul Lewis, 'Three Jews and a Blindfold: The Politics of Gallows Humor', in Semites and 
Stereotypes: Characteristics of Jewish Humor, ed. by Avner Ziv and Anat Zajdman (Connecticut: 
Greenwood, 1993).47-58, p. 49. 
92 Lewis, 'Three Jews and a Blindfold', p. 47. 
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However, in Antonin Obrdlik's study of Nazi oppression and the resultant humour in 
Czechoslovakia, he uses the term gallows 'in a more general sense as referring to 
humor which arises in connection with a precarious or dangerous situation'. 93 
Beckett's work is more consistent with this view as his characters endure bodily 
afflictions and mental duress. Many are in purgatorial states, subject to goading lives 
that dangle death over them. Gurewitch suggests that gallows humour, as 'the kind of 
humor that transforms into joke material both the fact of catastrophe and the threat of 
death - resonates in the repeated self-derogations of Beckett's disaster-ridden 
voyagers and immobilized inmates of calamity' .94 The difference is that life is the 
source of suffering and misery in Beckett; life is a slow demise on death row. The 
result of this is that Beckett's creatures have incongruous views and inverted 
valuations of life and death that are bountiful sources of black humour. 
Like the descending incongruity of the relief laugh, black humour distorts the 
typical view of things. Andre Breton describes this dark sense of humour in his 1938 
Anthology o/Black Humour, drawing on a fellow soldier named Jacques Vache, who 
was active in the First World War: 'In Vache's person, in utmost secrecy, a principle 
of total insubordination was undermining the world, reducing everything that then 
seemed all-important to a petty scale, desecrating everything in its path' ,95 Beckett's 
pessimism is also humorous in its sheer devaluation of life. Molloy's take on life as 
'air in a water-pipe' (T, 53) and especially Moran's aphorism on existence as 'that of 
the turd waiting for the flush' (T, 163) are comic in the way they relegate human 
"' ... 
being and conflict with the common inclination to appreciate life. Beckett treats death 
with the same inverted principle for comic effect, and, as opposed to ignoring 
93 Antonin J. Obrdlik, 'Gallows Humor - A Sociological Phenomenon', American Journal of 
Sociology, 47.5 (1942), 709-716, p. 709. 
94 Gurewitch, 'The Comedy of Decomposition', p. 95. 
9S Andre Breton, Anthology of Black Humour, trans. by Mark Polizzotti (San Francisco: City Lights, 
1997), p. vii. 
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impending death as gallows humour does, Beckett's characters embrace· it as a 
merciful release. In Ma/one Dies, for example, Malone says, 'The end of a life is 
always vivifying' (T, 212), and in a more graphic image, 'The feet are clear, already, 
of the great cunt of existence. Favourable representation I trust' (T, 285). The 
reflection at the end of this second example recognises the misogyny of this 
representation, but it also relates to the transposed values of life and death. Beckett's 
aberrant and vulgar depiction of death introduces a note of levity on profound issues 
and this kind of surprising oxymoronic approach is ludicrously humorous. 
Nevertheless, Beckett's black humour in the disdain for life and morbid 
fixation on death is also saddening in that it reinforces his creatures' incarceration. In 
terms of gallows humour's enlightened superiority over grave situations, Beckett's 
characters are mindful of their destitute conditions and helpless to actually alter them, 
but they are also unable to mitigate them through witty humour, and are therefore not 
typical gallows victims. Although they understand life as a grave situation, that 
apprehension does not allow them to alleviate it. Beckett's dark humour is rooted in 
their risible existence, the fact that they are still trapped in moribund lives with the 
hope against hope and cannot manage a perceptive, wry twist on serious 
circumstances in the way that the gallows victim can liberatingly ignore 
foreknowledge. Martin Esslin makes the point that '[tJhe dianoia, the insight of the 
classical tragic hero, is denied to these paradigmatic figures who clearly stand as 
·0 
metaphors for humanity itself, enmeshed, as we all are, in a web of self-deception, 
illusion, and deliberate repression from our consciousness, of the harsh realities of the 
human predicament' .96 Esslin alludes to the melancholy immersion that fixates on a 
preferable state in order to distract from the bitter existential truth, as seen in 
96 Martin Esslin, 'Dionysus' Dianoetic Laugh', in As No Other Dare Fail: For Samuel Beckett on His 
sdh Birthday, ed. by John Calder (London: Calder, J 986), J 5-23, p. J 8. . 
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Vladimir's melancholic subscription to Godot. It is true that Beckett's creatures are 
not released from their plights through tragic realisation, but it is not simply the case 
that Beckett's creatures allay their suffering through self-deception. They certainly do 
not combat misery with the protective irony associated with conventional gallows 
humour. In fact, their dire predicaments are often rooted in their commitment to 
quests bound to failure, in which they realise the futility but must carry on regardless. 
Beckett's creatures simultaneously acknowledge their failures and continue to submit 
to their imperatives, which might be construed as self-deception, but actually reveals 
that they perceive no other choice. This mixture of awareness and necessity leads 
Beckett's creatures to articulate miserably distorted perspectives on life that are 
humorous, albeit inadvertently, and at the same time carry out the physical 
tragicomedy of their incarceration. 
Beckett's characters are amusingly pessimistic not simply because they mock 
states of being and finitude, but because they are clearly suspended in the conditions 
of life, experiencing the hardships of mortal existence as subjects in the lifelong 
gallows. In Waiting/or Godot, Estragon and Vladimir consider hanging themselves to 
end it all, yet even this morbid exchange is wrapped up in practical considerations that 
trivialise the scene. Estragon explains the problem: 'Gogo light - bough not break -
Gogo dead. Didi heavy - bough break - Didi alone' (WFG, 10). Vladimir soon asks, 
'Well? What do we do?' and Estragon replies, 'Don't let's do anything. It's safer' 
(WFG, 10). As with the well-known gallows joke in which an inmate steps up to the 
electric chair and asks his executioner 'Are you sure this is safe?', Beckett plays on 
the word 'safe', not to joke about the risk of death but the risk of loneliness. Similarly, 
as Estragon wonders if they should 'strike before the iron freezes' (WFG, 10), his 
negative philosophy towards life is a mirror image of the quasi-positivity in gallows 
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humour prior to death. Death is a possibility before it ceases in Estragon's case, as 
opposed to an opportune moment to seize. This configuration of the aspirational idiom 
is so pessimistic as to inspire laughter whilst at the same time retaining the sad 
remnants of the original rallying cry. Beckett's characters do not use humour that 
discerns or escapes from reality, then, because every funny moment is bound up with 
their adversity. They demonstrate a kind of gallows humour that comes not in spite of 
life or in flight from life, but in the grim conditions of living. That is, humour is 
contained in the horror; it is not seen from afar, but always an integral part of the 
tragic experience. 
However, the audience does benefit in part from a kind of universal gallows 
humour as it is played out and endured before them, with Beckett repeatedly 
embroiling and releasing the audience from the existential joke through bouts of 
tedium and humour. His characters do not knowingly compose gallows jokes, and are 
therefore riveted to their predicament. Nevertheless, they are naively humorous and 
convey humour in a way that their lives actually condition, that ridicules and is 
ridiculous in the sustained experience of suffering. Towards the end of Mol/oy, in the 
final scene before Moran makes his way back home, Gaber relays Youdi's words 'life 
is a thing of beauty, Gaber, and a joy forever'. Moran is sceptical and asks, 'Do you 
think he meant human life?' (T, 165). Moran clearly fails to equate human life with 
beauty and joy. This is not apparently meant as a joke since there is no laughter from 
either character. Despite this, the reading audience can at least appreciate the 
insinuation that the human lives they lead are miserable, thereby transforming it into a 
source of pleasure. When Beckett jokes about human life, then, it allows the reader to 
either enjoy the surprisingly sacrilegious devaluation or simply laugh in agreement 
with the truth of his assessment. 
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In Iser's essay on Beckett's stifled laugh, he recognises that humour can help 
to distance anguish as the laugh confronts pain. Iser initially suggests that humour can 
'face up to unhappiness, which in being faced is no longer exclusively itself but 
appears in the perspective of its being perceived,.97 The laugh gives the impression of 
observing unhappiness rather than feeling it. However, he questions the longevity of 
this once-removed position, asking 'are we really able to free ourselves from 
unhappiness by facing up to it?'. 98 It is doubtful for Iser, as he suggests that the 
subject has an urge to cultivate or revert to states of captivation in order to continue 
the possibility of liberation, without entering into the actual bewildering state of 
freedom. It is the tension between the alleviating effect of laughter and the resumption 
of unhappiness that comes closest to describing the joke of entrapment in Beckett's 
work. Beckett's humour feeds on negativity and this ensures that his work does not 
perish in the depths of arrant despair. Yet it is clear that humour does not convert or 
remedy suffering, but rather sustains suffering as the source of its own existence. 
Humour and suffering are therefore self-perpetuating; the laugh is the sadistic knot of 
perseverance that forms a loop of pain. 
The laugh at gallows humour is never simply defensive, particularly when it 
pokes fun at the life one must endure and not the oblivion one must ignore. As noted 
above in the discussion of Freud, gallows humour is also damning in its concession to 
the horror of reality. Lisa Colletta touches on this fact in her reassessment of humour 
in modernism. She writes: 'In dark comedy, rooted as it is in gallows humor, change-
even survival - is beside the point. The point is to wrest from pain a momentary 
victory in laughter; it makes no other claims' .99 Similarly, in Beckett, the bitter truth 
97 Iser, 'Art of Failure', p. 222. 
98 Ibid. p. 225. 
99 Lisa Colletta, Dark Humor and Social Satire in the Modern British Novel (Gordonsville, V A: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 11. 
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contaminates the fantasy and evasion of gallows humour. Laughter is less about 
protecting the self and escaping reality, and more to do with the diminishing space of 
untruth to hide in. Therefore, it is no surprise that Beckett's characters rarely laugh in 
a purely joyous spirit and that laughter is increasingly curtailed, ambivalent and silent. 
In a more obvious example of gallows humour, Moran contemplates his failure to find 
Molloy and comments that 'at the thought of the punishments Y oudi might inflict 
upon me I was seized by such a mighty fit of laughter that I shook, with mighty silent 
laughter and my features composed in their wonted sadness and calm' (T, 163). 
Moran experiences the convulsive nature of laughter as it silently dominates his body 
and leaves a pensive countenance. Humour is still present, but the laughter is 
contradictory, at once hysterical and reposed, dramatic and muted. This is a composite 
outburst that reveals its miserable origins and coping strategy in equal measures. 
If conventional gallows humour releases the subject, with the ego under the 
protection of the superego, Beckett's gallows humour focuses on the actual possibility 
of deriving humour from the worst, not in conciliatory or tendentious tones, but as 
part of the engagement with and experience of struggle. Freud works to separate the 
psychological levels of gallows humour and trace their interaction, whereas Beckett 
takes up the idea of division that Freudian psychoanalysis advances but channels out 
the mental sense of liberation. Beckett brings the poles of joy and sorrow into contact, 
whereby relief from pain betrays further pain, every interlude to suffering renews 
suffering and each end marks a point of survival. These repeated imperious gestures 
of victory, the next last laugh, give way to the persistent toil of reality, which actually 
refreshes unhappiness, dressing wounds only to open them again. Beckett dissociates 
humour from superiority, and instead utilises it as part of an amusing and depressing 
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phenomenon that effects a convergence of mind and body, Man and man, comedy and 
tragedy, potency and impotence, to offer different levels of light and shade to the 
general gloom. 
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4. Survival 
Incompleteness and Continuation 
In the previous three chapters I have described the various modes of creaturely life 
that appear in Beckett's work. In chapter one I introduced the creature through the 
notion of subjectivity suspended in action, as the. author-narrators perform 
(in)sovereign testimonies in order to bear witness to the unspeakable. In the second 
chapter I examined the melancholic and biopolitical power struggles with interior, 
projected, and actual figures of alterity. In chapter three I set out the tragicomic 
texture of humour as it helps the subject to persevere and yet perpetuates the ability to 
suffer. The obligation to testify, the insoluble ~ e n s i o n s s between codependent masters 
and servants, and the awakening to captivation through humour, are all ways in which 
Beckett's creatures appear to be encumbered and yet manage to live on. This chapter 
will dwell on a shared characteristic of these creaturely elements, namely the survival 
evident in the sense of continuity in deadlock that Beckett's inscribes in his work. 
Gary Adelman argues that the spirit of survival marks a watershed in Beckett's 
literary development. In Naming Beckett's Unnamable (2004) Adelman avers that 
'Beckett's Unnamable narrator merged in his mind with the idea of the Jew survivor 
of the Holocaust, giving him a powerful analogy for exploring the plight of the 
artist' ,I Beckett's artistic approach, according to Adelman, is itself evidence of an 
engagement with the extreme figures of survival who endured the horrors of the 
camps. Beckett produces an aesthetic of survival whereby his creatures manage to 
keep speaking through figments, attachments to real and projected others, and the 
supplement of humour, despite their narrative failures and identities in ruins, which 
I Adelman, Naming Beckett 's Unnamable, p. 79. 
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not only parallels the real survival of the context but also appears to recognise the 
status of art after Auschwitz. The obligation to speak despite the inability to speak in 
Beckett is the artistic predicament after, and artistic equivalent to, the historical 
climate of survival. 
Adelman continues to assert that the voice in the final text of the trilogy 'is 
the interior life of the Muselmann, who is neither living nor dead, refusing, resisting 
both life and death '.2 It is in the context of this suspension between life and death, and 
knowledge of the possibility of such a survival, that Beckett addresses the extent to 
which survival is burdensome. The fact of the matter is that Beckett's creatures are 
'festooned with lifebelts, praying for rack and ruin' (T, 342). They are possessed of an 
existence of sorts, as though an authority, creative or otherwise, has issued survival. 
This vision of the Beckettian creature sees it going on and not going on, doing nothing 
when there is nothing to be done. The theme of survival in Beckett, then, conveys a 
dimension of being that evokes the suspended existence of the Muselmann and yet 
also appears to bespeak humanity'S endurance during a period of great destabilisation 
after the Holocaust. 
In this chapter I trace how Beckett's post-war texts bear out a kind of 
straightened artistic vitality, which, I argue, evokes the idea of survival as an amiction 
experienced by beings whose meaningful lives have evaporated. In particular, the 
perseverance at the point of impasse, or 'stirrings still' as Beckett expressed it late in 
his life, relates to Eric Santner's notion of 'undeadness', a term that plays an integral 
part in Santner's theorisation of creaturely life. Whether survival is desired or not, the 
creature is consigned to a performative being that conveys the inhuman potential to 
experience a symbolic death in the absence of recognised value and subsist as raw 
1 Ibid. p. 8 I. 
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matter beyond meaningful life. After a reading of the incomplete narrative structures 
and aesthetics of continuation in Beckett's Mol/ay, I examine how the creaturely 
author-narrators in this text reveal the excess spirit of the human, whereby religious, 
political and social systems are remote, and yet the creature remains subject to the 
power of their absence. This exclusionary dynamic governs Beckett's abandoned 
creatures as they repeatedly attempt to adhere to networks of meaning that fail to 
acknowledge them as ideologically valuable or redeemable. Beckett's creatures are 
not exactly dissidents, then, but rather inadvertent eccentrics owing to their ignorance 
of the governing system's essence. They are unconventional by nature of their 
exclusion from the logic behind these conventions, as opposed to being purposely 
aberrant. Thus, Beckett's creatures exist in an endless spiral of nonfulfilment in their 
actual detachment from and psychological reprisal of the idea of sovereign order. 
'oh all to end': Beckettian Stirrings Still 
Survival means that life goes on, that finality has not arrived, but it does not obviate 
the possibility of experiencing a type of death. J e a n - F r a n ~ o i s s Lyotard contends that 
'the word "survivor" implies that a being who is dead or should have died is still 
living,.3 This survival after death, or cheating death having accepted it, illustrates how 
survival transgresses the divide between life and death. Similarly, in Beckett's work, 
his creatures subsist despite their profound inertia; they continue in deadlock, living 
out peri-mortem lives. The end, whether silence or death, is not something that finally 
occurs in Beckett but is rather endured. The purpose of this first section is to describe 
Beckett's expressions of survival as they recur over the course of his work and explain 
how survival varies between texts to become a more general artistic preoccupation. 
3 J e a n - F r a n ~ o i s s Lyotard, 'The Survivor', in Toward the Postmodern, ed. and trans. by Robert Harvey 
and Mark S. Roberts (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1993), 144-163, p. 144. 
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Throughout his career, Beckett repeatedly expresses the ideas of 
incompleteness and continuity that constitute the spirit of survival in his writing. His 
work after 1945 up until his last texts in 1989 finds various ways of refiguring aporia 
to extend the exploration of stasis and evoke the capacity to persist. In his dialogues 
with Georges Duthuit in the late 1940s, Beckett offers a prescient point: 'There are 
many ways in which the thing I am trying in vain to say may be tried in vain to be 
said,.4 Around the same time, however, Beckett also shows his awareness of the 
diminishing creative opportunities for his writing in the reflective 'Where now? Who 
now? When now?' (T, 293) that begins his text The Unnamable. These questions 
depict the narrating voice at a loose end, without a specific place, subject or time. 
Indeed, the following word of this opening line 'unquestioning' suggests the narrator 
has abandoned an earnest pursuit of these narrative foundations. As discussed in the 
first chapter on (in)sovereign testimony, Beckett's work reflects on expressive 
dilemmas as a means of speaking without necessarily having anything to speak about: 
'Yes, in my life, since we must call it so, there were three things, the inability to 
speak, the inability to be silent, and solitude, that's what I've had to make the best or 
(T, 400). As Beckett distils his art of failure, the narrators negotiate the shrinking 
creative forum as well as they can. 
In the 1955 interview with Israel Shenker, Beckett claims that this approach is 
at its limit: 
... 
For some authors writing gets easier the more they write. For me it gets more 
and more difficult [ ... ]. In the last book - 'L'Innommable' - there's complete 
4 Beckett, Disjecta, p. 144. 
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disintegration. No 'I,' no 'have,' no 'being.' No nominative, no accusative, no 
verb. There's no way to go on.s 
Beckett's dismantling of the text has seemingly ushered him to a grammatical dead 
end. Yet The Unnamable itself suggests otherwise in the last line 'I can't go on, I'll go 
on' (T, 418). The narrative voice vows to continue, but it does not happen in this text, 
as the last full stop leads into the desolation of the blank white page. The affirmation 
'I'll go on' appears to be false, but the metafictional value ofthis line implies that it is 
Beckett who will go on, and of course, Beckett does continue to write. In the same 
interview with Shenker, Beckett describes Texts for Nothing written in the early 1950s 
'as an attempt to get out of the attitude of disintegration,.6 Beckett clearly seeks ways 
of progressing beyond a tapering form, but he concedes that this series of thirteen 
false starts ultimately 'failed'. As Beckett himself recognises, he continues with a 
process of disintegration that was thought complete after The Unnamable, which 
indicates that there is further creative substance to decompose. His assault on the 
pretence of narrative lacks the absolute degree zero as it entails reduction but not 
extinction. 
As much as Beckett attenuates, he is unable to produce silence to get beyond 
the language that allows surviving figures a lifeline. Indeed, in Christopher 
Devenney's essay 'What Remains?' on Beckett's departure from an atomising literary 
approach, he argues that 'the path of escape is continually obscured by the images, the 
voices, the figures, the characters and identities, the endless proliferation of shapes, 
narratives, and narrations, that suggest the outline of a legible and identifiable 
S Shenker, 'An Interview with Beckett', p. 148. 
6 Ibid. p. 148. 
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presence' ,7 In the pursuit of less, Beckett's testimony of fiction conjures material that 
refuses to be totally lifeless. As Texts for Nothing shows, Beckett is inclined to re-
iterate the questions: 'Where would I go, if I could go, who would I be, if I could be, 
what would I say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying it's me?' (TN, 17). Beckett 
employs a hypothetical register here that is always available. Therefore, these texts in 
favour of nothing are not exactly nothing themselves since writing fosters 
irrepressible activity even as Beckett minimises the extent of this textual sustenance. 
In kind, Beckett's eponymous characters make cameo appearances in other 
texts, as though their survival is not limited to a prescribed sphere. In Ma/one Dies, 
for instance, Beckett's prophetic title appears to confirm that Malone's dwindling 
account of Lemuel on the last page represents the narrator's own demise: 'never there 
he will never / never anything / there / any more' (T, 298). But this is predominantly a 
novel about the process of dying and the present tense of the title connotes that 
Malone's death is continuous or prospective. When Malone appears in the following 
text The Unnamable, it is clear that the names are transferable, that Beckett's 
characters can transcend their texts and survive beyond their ostensible deaths. This 
kind of overlapping contributes to a sense of continuity across Beckett's body of work 
as it assimilates the individual survivors in each text into a broader oeuvre of survival. 
Beckett repeatedly returns to the degree to which creative forms entail a level 
of survival, but as his work gets shorter and more abstract, his already relatively 
sparse characterisation recedes further to leave only obscure voices and stark 
presences. Although there is a distinct absence of the protagonists' appearances, 
backgrounds, occupations, nationalities, motivations and aspirations, the tendency to 
subtract in Beckett's later texts still reveals the survival spirit. The three-page text 
7 Christopher Devenney, 'What Remains?', in Engagement and Indifference: Beckell and the Political, 
ed. by Henry Sussman and Christopher Devenney (Albany: State University of New York, 2001), 139-
160, p. 144. 
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Imagination Dead Imagine, written in French and translated into English in 1965, 
exemplifies Beckett's engagement with residual life in otherwise sterile environs.s As 
light and heat rise and fall, two bodies lie murmuring on the ground. The scene begins 
with 'No trace of life anywhere, you say, pah, no difficulty there, imagination not 
dead yet, yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagine' (TN, 86). The phrase 
'imagination dead imagine' contains a directive to envision the death of creative 
powers, but as with Beckett's use of language to interrogate language, the death of 
imagination can only be imagined, thereby ensuring its own survival. Thus speech and 
imagination soon populate the lifeless space with a presence that observes. This kind 
of unavoidable attendance has a particularly Freudian resonance, relating to a 
psychoanalytical view of morbid thoughts. In his 'Timely Reflections on War and 
Death', Freud asserts that '[o]ur own death is indeed unimaginable, and however often 
we try to imagine it, we realize that we are actually still present as onlookers. Thus, 
the psychoanalytic school could venture to say: fundamentally no one believes in his 
own death or, which comes to the same thing:· in the unconscious each of us is 
convinced of his immortality'. 9 As with the spectator witnessing the death of a 
projected self, the implicit point of view that comes with thought and speech 
continues to accompany Beckett's etiolated works. 
The type of residual presence that Beckett evokes endures the movement 
towards nothing and is manifest in his most concentrated works. In the 1983 text 
Worstward Ho, Beckett pares down the impetus that underlies many of his texts to 
'On' (e, 1). Even when the inclination turns to despair in the later 'nohow on', 
Beckett's qualifier 'said nohow on' confirms the continuation of the 'Voice that 
8 According to Beckett, this text is the 'residue precipitate' of the abandoned work All Strange Away, 
which itself suggests that unfinished ideas have a tendency to re-emerge (TN, xiv). 
9 Sigmund Freud, On Murder. Mourning and Melancholia, trans. by Shaun Whiteside (London: 
Penguin, 2005), p. 183. 
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performs, and thus contradicts, the inability to go on. The saying always undermines 
the end, so that not going on is appropriated as a means of going on. In a textual 
sphere that conspires to reduce the presence of beings, Beckett's creatures abide as 
they observe and express their deterioration. This survival fails to suggest extrication 
from a single accident or ordeal, but rather a continuous paralysed existence. It is the 
creaturely self in ruins that occurs when the subject is a witness to the loss of self, or 
desubjectivity, that persists here. 
Incompleteness and continuation occupy Beckett right up until Stirrings Still, 
his last expression of activity and inertia. Written between 1983 and 1987 in English 
and French, this final prose piece is nine pages in length, divided into three parts, and 
attests to Beckett's propensity for less. However, as the title suggests, Beckett never 
stopped writing and his minimalism never arrived at naught. 'Stirrings still' makes it 
known that an impassioned level remains, that stirrings occur 'even now'. Whilst 
there continue to be stirrings, the pun on 'still' as adjective, intensifier and verb also 
implies that the stirrings cease. As an oxymoron, Beckett's phrase indicates that the 
work 'provokes' stillness, in terms of conjuring and disturbing it, and that stirrings 
occur despite or through stillness. Such variation on a similar theme has been the basis 
of a whole body of writing for Beckett. Since it occurs at the very end of Beckett's 
career, the phrase 'stirrings still' is significant in the way it connects his artistic 
revision with the thematic concern of survival. Beckett's corpus has circled the idea of 
death without becoming entirely 'corpsed' itself (E, 20). 
In Stirrings Still, a familiarly hatted and coated protagonist exists in a strange 
elevated place, 'high above the earth' (C, 107) but unable to look down and 'seeking 
the way out' (e, 108). Trapped within his four walls, the narrator ceases to listen and 
look, despite hearing and seeing. In this passive sensory condition, he decides to seek 
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sanctuary in thought. The protagonist's desire to escape means that existence appears 
as an imposed condition. As he observes himself rising and leaving, his attitude is one 
of 'half hoping when he disappeared again that he would not reappear again and half 
fearing that he would not' (C, 108). This split self clearly repeats the Freudian 
spectacle of imagined death as the figure remains as an onlooker, but the remaining 
figure is split again between the desire for his other self both to depart and return. The 
result is that Beckett's creatures exist in a suspended predicament in which survival is 
intractable as it exceeds powerlessness and the unity of self. Without finishing or 
progressing, disappearing or returning, the creatures endure in the eqUilibrium of 
competing inabilities and hopes. 
The majority of Stirrings Still meditates on a handful of recognizably 
Beckettian motifs: light and dark, cries and. silence, waiting, time, memory, and 
reason. Yet the text practises the title's interplay between torpor and stimulation, as 
Beckett writes: 'soon weary of vainly delving in those remains he moved on [ ... ]. So 
on unknowing and no end in sight' (C, 113).' Although he "contemplates recurrent 
images and themes, the protagonist is also restless, which inscribes a sense of motion 
into the text. It is his weariness that moves him on, so that he exhausts things and 
searches for something else. As with the bouts of tedium and vigour that cause a 
creaturely state of suspension in Beckett's humour, this fluctuation between 
enervation and invigoration frustrates completion to make the 'stirrings still' dynamic 
an excruciating continuation: 
Perhaps thus the end. Unless no more than a mere lull. Then all as before. The 
strokes and cries as before and he as before now there now gone now there 
again now gone again. Then the lull again. Then all as before again. So again 
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and again. And patience till the one true end to time and grief and self and 
second self his own. (C, 110) 
Every encounter with what seems like finality is actually an interval that can restore 
activity. This passage is suffused with the repetition of 'again' and 'before', which 
focuses attention on going back to life to resume past conditions but in the present. 
Beckett accentuates this present vitality with the frequent use of 'now' to highlight the 
being-in-the-moment that survival encompasses. The survivor must struggle through 
each moment, but does so in anticipation of a better future, whether that is 'the one 
true end to time' as suggested here, or an alternative experience of living without the 
intense pressures that survival implies. The use of repetition to evoke sameness and 
difference, as well as the relationship between past and present, is a point addressed 
later in this chapter along with the prospect of the 'one true end' through forbearance. 
For now it suffices to note that the desire for an end evident in this passage confirms 
that survival is undesired. For instance, the word 'lull' recalls sleeping and the idiom 
'lulled into a false sense of security' to indicate the temporariness of his pacified 
condition. Each agitation therefore returns the protagonist to the pressing 'strokes and 
cries' of survival. Hence, the provisional 'perhaps thus the end' gives way to the 
wishful exclamation 'oh all to end' (C, 115) in the final line of Stirrings Still. 
Since each supposed limit is illusory, the abiding experience for Beckett's 
figures appears to be perseverance in spite of themselves; they consciously pursue an 
end whilst subject to a conflicting will to continue. In Remnants of Auschwitz, 
Agamben also questions whether the capacity for survival is desirable. Agamben 
discusses Xavier Bichat's distinction between the 'animal', the aspect of being 
engaged with the world environment, and 'organic', the biological substance of 
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being. to Bichat suggests that the animal can perish whilst the organic survives, as in 
the comatose patient. However, Bichat also imagines an organic death whilst the 
animal survives, in a type of immaterial consciousness from the excess of human 
spirit. Agamben's conclusion is that '[w]hether what survives is the human or the 
inhuman, the animal or the organic, it seems that life bears within itself the dream - or 
the nightmare - of survival,.1I Bichat's division asserts that a being can survive 
without its animal or organic aspect, and, for Agamben, this means life contains the 
hopeful or horrific potential for survival. 
Agamben goes on to place this type of fragmented continuation in the context 
of modem biopolitics and its exemplum the Nazi concentration camps, which aim to 
rive the inhuman from the human to activate pure survival. The dream of survival 
appears to apply to world-conscious beings 'surviving' under the wing of the state, 
complete with military protection and the insurance of medical science. The 
nightmare of survival sees continued life forced upon ostracized creatures denuded of 
all human value and subjected to a state worse than death. I ~ ~ is this desensitisation, 
demoralisation, and negation of all human value that reveals the biological level of 
bare life that is pure survival. In other words, the Nazis extinguish the human to 
expose the inhuman survival of the Muselmann. Theodor Adomo had already 
expressed his horror at this ontological dimension exposed in the camps. In his 'Notes 
on Kafka', Adomo writes: 'In the concentration camps, the boundary between life and 
. 
death was eradicated. A middle ground was created, inhabited by living skeletons and 
putrefying bodies, victims unable to take their own lives, Satan's slaughter at the hope 
10 Xavier Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (Paris: Flammarion, 1986), pp. 200-
206. 
11 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 155. 
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of abolishing death'.12 Modem biopolitics therefore declares the 'survival' of the 
included citizen as the justification for the real biological survival that follows the 
exclusion of others. The supposed 'survival' of the insider is more like a will to power 
and progress, or an excess of resources that ensure life, whereas the desperate survival 
of the degraded outsider actually traverses the edge of death. It is this latter nightmare 
of survival that induces the plea for an end to life in the camps, which chimes eerily 
with the last line of Stirrings Still: '[In Auschwitz] only death could bring deliverance, 
the final rest, oh rest' ,13 
Both Agamben and Beckett refute the idea that survival is desirable, and 
instead suggest that it can be a pensum - a task set as a punishment. In Agamben, this 
survival punishment is the biopolitical consequence of Nazi ideology. In Beckett, the 
literary beings who appeal for an end to their suffering clearly resonate with the 
imposed survival conditions that Agamben relates to Auschwitz. But survival in 
Beckett also extends to an oppressive thanatology that sees mortal subjects born into 
death, as the prospect of the end overshadows life and renders human existence an 
agonizing meantime. Life already contains the survival dynamic that finds its most 
odious form in the concentration and extermination camps as the Nazis turn the will to 
life against their victims. Survival is therefore a nightmare, devoid of the desirable 
human values and meaning of a good life, and exposed to a state of incompleteness 
that denies life or death. 
Yet, in one remarkable case, Beckett implores that one of his creatures be 
given the right to a completion of sorts, in order to avoid going on indefinitely in a 
state of abandonment. In 1946, Beckett learnt that a truncated version of the story 
12 Theodor Adomo, 'Notes on Katka', in Can One Live After Auschwilz?: A Philosophical Reader, ed. 
bl. RolfTiedemann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2003), 211-239, p. 227. 
1 Tadeusz Stabholz qtd. in Boaz Neumann, 'The National Socialist Politics of Life'. New German 
Critique, 85 (2002),107-130, p. 129. 
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'Suite', the French version of the short story The End, was to be printed in the 
magazine Le Temps Modernes, thus leaving his character unfinished. Beckett's acting 
literary agent submitted half of the story to editor Simone de Beauvoir who published 
it under the impression it was an entire text. Beckett reacted angrily, writing a candid 
letter expressing the gravity of the situation as he saw it: 
I am thinking of the character in 'Suite', denied his rest. [ ... ] [I]t is quite 
impossible for me to evade the duty I feel towards a creature of mine. Forgive 
these grand words. If I were afraid of ridicule I would keep quiet. [ ... ] You are 
immobilising an existence at the very moment at which it is about to take its 
definitive form. There is something nightmarish about that. 14 
The voice of a writer determined to protect his work is distinct here and it is no 
exaggeration for Beckett to regard his creatures as living beings in the making. The 
publication process has clearly interfered with the form of a life, leaving this stifled 
being a formless nightmare. It forces an open end upon him, but as something 
curtailed and therefore always in potentia. 
However, it is striking that Beckett posits 'denied rest' alongside 
'immobilisation' in the letter, which brings to mind a survival dynamic analogous to 
the activity and paralysis in his own conclusion to the short story. Beckett's 'end' in 
. 
The End is to contemplate the other stories the narrator might have told, which could 
have related the conditions that resemble his life more accurately, namely an existence 
'without the courage to end, or the strength to go on' (FN, 57). Beckett depicts a type 
of being not altogether finished or developing in this line. The creature lacks certain 
14 Beckett, Letters, Vol. 2, pp. 41-2. 
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heroic attributes that would grant him an end or a means of progression. It is notable, 
then, that Beckett's sense of duty to his beings involves enabling them to survive 
finally, to be fully incomplete, in a manner that would properly sustain the creatures 
and grant them their stirrings still. 
Creaturely'Undeadness' 
The opening section on Beckett's ability to rejuvenate limited themes shows that a 
contradictory mix of vitality and inertia pervades his work. In On Creaturely Life, 
Eric Santner's notion of 'undeadness' theorises the kind of life-death amalgam 
demonstrated in Beckett's 'stirrings still'. Santner's term refers to a tenacious 
revenant that shares the proximity with death but resistance against finality that 
characterizes survival in Beckett. Santner derives the term from WaIter Benjamin's 
'petrified unrest' and it is therefore worth glossing Benjamin's idiosyncratic views of 
allegory and natural history in order to elucidate Santner's concept sufficiently. In the 
'Central Park' drafts on Baudelaire, Benjamin borrows the phrase 'petrified unrest' 
from Gottfried Keller's poem 'Lost Right, Lost Happiness'. Benjamin uses the phrase 
twice, noting firstly that '[a]Uegory holds fast to the ruins. It offers the image of 
petrified unrest' and later that '[p]etrified unrest is also the formula for Baudelaire's 
life history, which knows no development' .IS The idea of petrified unrest is part of 
Benjamin's complex writings in The Origin of German Tragic Drama on the temporal 
differenoes between the symbol and allegory. The symbol accesses the 'mystical 
instant', achieving a momentary glimpse of totality, whereas Benjamin claims that 
allegory produces a series of moments in the friction between religious, literal 
IS WaIter Benjamin, 'Central Park', in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 1938-1940, ed. and trans. by Howard 
Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2003), 161-199, pp. 169, 171. The phrase 
appears a further five times in The Arcades Project. See Waiter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, pp. 
319,325,326,329. 
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meaning and secular, other meaning.16 As with Benjamin's famous 'dialectics at a 
standstill', the idealist project of synthetic progress is halted.17 Instead, the clash of 
signification in allegory between denotation and connotation dislodges transcendent 
value and produces artefacts that continue to exist but outside of their meaningful 
place. 
Benjamin's dissection of allegory has wider implications in terms of human 
life and an understanding of historical time. Through the anti systematic imprint of 
allegory, he poses a melancholic subject that is thrown out of the hegemonic thought 
space and into the creaturely expanse of 'natural history'. Santner notes that the word 
Naturgeschichte in Benjamin's work means that 'the artefacts of human history tend 
to acquire an aspect of mute, natural being at the point where they begin to lose their 
place in a viable form of life'.ls In this s p h ~ r e , , the 'creaturely life' that Santner 
develops from Benjamin's 'creature' survives as an anachronism, hence the 
paradoxical state of suspended animation that is 'petrified unrest'.t9 
In Benjamin's study, allegory is a key element of Trauerspiel, the mourning 
play. Like architectural ruins, in which the structure is both shattered and preserved, 
the melancholic disposition of the mourning play sets up an alternative history that 
bears witness to a kind of 'still life' that transfixes the dialectical abrasion between 
types of meaning. Beatrice Hanssen suggests that, in Benjamin's view, 'the mourning 
play no longer pointed to a "higher life" or realm of transcendence. Instead it was 
caught in an infernal game of reflections destined to display the empty mirror image 
16 Benjamin, The Origin o/German Tragic Drama, p. 165. 
17 'Ambiguity is the appearance of dialectic in images, the law of dialectics at a standstill', Benjamin, 
The A rcades Project, p. 10. 
18 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 16. 
19 'Benjamin argues that the melancholy affect "emerges from the depths of the creaturely realm" and 
"is the most genuinely creaturely of the contemplative impulses''', Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 16. 
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of transcendence, which it infinitely reflected and deflected' .20 Unlike the messianic 
fulfilment of time that Benjamin later formulated, the inauthentic time of allegory and 
the mourning play demonstrates a repetitive turning about that finds no real progress 
or closure. 
The expression 'still life' suggested in the 'petrified unrest' of Benjamin's 
interpretation of Trauerspiel grasps the peculiar concomitance of motion and stasis in 
Beckett's work. It encompasses the same mixture of cessation and continuation that 
Beckett implies in 'stirrings still'. Whilst the visual art genre 'still life' depicts 
inanimate subject matter, Beckett's use of the term in III Seen III Said injects activity 
into this inertia. In this 1981 text, an old woman resides in a cabin surrounded by 
twelve sentinels that stand in the pastures. The narrator imagines lambs on a moor, 
and briefly describes their behaviour: 'Still. Then a moment straying. Then still again. 
To think there is still life in this age' (C, 48). Stillness and liveliness oscillate here to 
form this Beckettian 'still life' that indicates both a halted existence and a remaining 
existence. In Mary Bryden's discussion of Beckett's relationship with the 'dynamic 
still' ofpainterly art, she remarks that the expression 'still life' 
draws into collocation two tendencies which, though potentially mutually 
exclusive, are in fact part of an uncomfortable continuum in Beckett's scenic 
world. As well as being an adjective, 'still' can be a noun. A 'still' denotes an 
image which, while not being cinematographic, may be applied to a frame, or 
series of frames, from an ongoing reel ofpictures.21 
20 Beatrice Hanssen, Benjamin's Other History: Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings, and Angels 
(Berkeley: University of California, 2000), p. 58. 
21 Mary Bryden, 'Beckett and the Dynamic Still', Samuel Beckell TodaylAujourd'hui, Vot. 14, After 
Beckett, ed. by Anthony Uhlmann et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 179-192, p. 182. 
271 
Bryden argues that the contradiction in still life is not simply equal to stagnancy, but 
to a sense of movement within confines that works to intensify the image. This is 
evident in the brief tableaux that begin and end Endgame, which draw on the 
traditions of the tableau vivant, or 'living picture', to capture the life present in a 
single moment. In Beckett's play, this captivation in a moment is entirely relevant to 
the characters' experiences of life, and the tableaux serve to magnify the paralysing 
tensions of their lingering existence. 
However, there is a specific type of survival intimated in 'still life' that I want 
to stress, which evokes the ruins and lack of development evident in Benjamin's 
'petrified unrest'. Still life suggests both suspension, as in the frozen single frame, and 
continuation, as in the implied series of frames. Hence, Bryden surmises that 
'[i]mplicit in the mobility is the immobility and vice versa,.22 The result of this 
dialectic is that life is always in tension with stillness, and it is this dynamic in Beckett 
that relates to Benjamin's notion of historical time. There is movement but no 
progression, as all activity is tethered to virtually static points. This sense of excess 
energy that revolves around past things and unviable meanings marks the suspended 
animation of Beckett's creatures. 
Moran embodies the concomitance of motion and stasis during young Jacques' 
trip to buy a bicycle in Hole. Moran waits restlessly at the shelter, occasionally 
exploring the near surroundings: 'But each time I had to retrace my steps, the way I 
had come, to the shelter, and make sure all was in order, before I sallied forth again. 
And I consumed the greater part of this second day in these vain comings and goings, 
these vigils and imaginations' (T, 148). Moran is moving to and fro, but from a wider 
perspective he is actually static. His movements are restricted to the shelter and the 
22 Bryden, • Beckett and the Dynamic Still', p. 182. 
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process of 'retracing' shows him literally going over old ground. Since Moran reviews 
what has already been done, he effectively consumes time with his vacillations rather 
than using it productively. This physical motion between the shelter and the 
wilderness reflects an attachment to the past, fixated on the shelter of the old, even as 
he attempts to venture forth into the unknown future. In this way, Moran is 
simultaneously continuing and suspended, as he survives to demonstrate there is still 
life, but is caught in what is essentially a still life. 
As much as the restricted movement intensifies the survival conditions of 
Beckett's creatures, it nevertheless incorporates a deadening activity. The exposure to 
a life stuck in a rut, subject to the competing forces of activity and inertia, implies the 
kind of purgatorial state seen in Benjamin's inauthentic time. In the tensions of 
allegory and pensiveness of mourning, the artefacts of history fall into perpetual 
destruction, as Howard Caygill notes: 'The events of historical time are inauthentic, 
repeats and copies of earlier repetitions. There is no possibility of an authentic 
"source"; historical time drains its events of any significance. There is no moment or 
place where the "passing over" of tradition can be gathered; its sole issue is ruination 
and dispersal'. 23 Benjamin compares this irresistible decay to a sign of death in life 
and the spiritual plane of the undead. He asserts firstly that 'in allegory the observer is 
confronted with the facies hippocratica of history. as a' petrified, primordial 
landscape'.24 Allegory is the 'death face' of the past, a countenance that stands for the 
throes of historical meaning. Benjamin takes this a stage further, noting that '[g]hosts, 
like the profoundly significant allegories, are manifestations from the realm of 
mourning; they have an affinity for mourners, for those who ponder over signs and 
23 Howard Caygill, 'Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition', in Waiter Benjamin's 
Philosophy: Destruction and Experience. ed. by Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osbome (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 1-31, p. 11. 
24 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 166. 
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over the future' .25 These agitated spectres from the past drag their histories with them, 
unable to rest in peace. In the same way that the obligation to testify, melancholy 
immersion and perseverance through humour noted in previous chapters all contribute 
to Beckett's 'hell of stories' (T, 383), the sepulchral monuments of allegory and the 
mourning play present a vision of enduring death. 
The unfinished business of allegory and Trauerspielleads Santner to propose 
the term 'undeadness' as a description for the aesthetic, but also historical and 
political movements, that Benjamin describes. In Santner's reading, petrified unrest is 
a mesmeric combination of excitation and numbness as a result of the repetitive 
motions of modern capitalism's production culture. He refers to the alienation and 
fetishization outlined in Marxist and Freudian discourse to explain humankind's entry 
into natural history. In turn, the term 'undeadness' refers to the state of living that 
remains in the overflow of manic activity. Santner connects this lingering being to an 
extra capacity within the human: 'Man's subordination to the course of natural history 
is a consequence of a spiritual supplement that separates man from animal while in 
some sense making him more animal than animal, this "more" being the very seal of 
his "creatureliness'" .26 The human slips into the contingent level of natural history by 
virtUe of a subsisting drive, more habit than instinct. This detachment from the human 
constructed world, which stops short of the animal open, suggests a 'sur-vival' in the 
etymological sense of additional life, a substrate of human existence levied by the 
accretion of the human repetition compUlsion. 
The work of German writer W. G. Sebald acts as Santner's paradigm for 
tracing the creaturely void found in Benjamin's notion of natural history. The 
presence of historical remains in Sebald's images of decay and spectres of memory, 
25 Ibid. p. 193. 
26 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 105. 
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and particularly his focus on dust, ash and sand, captures the inexorable spirit of 
undeadness. Santner writes that 'for both Benjamin and Sebald creatureliness signifies 
a materiality dense with "deposits" of unredeemed suffering' .27 Benjamin and Sebald 
refer to this process of 'deposition', or the layering of sediment, to evoke the logic of 
disintegration and perpetuation in simultaneously transient and persistent historical 
artefacts. This type of engagement with the past is also highly apparent in the 
disintegrated material substances with which Beckett depicts perpetuating 
denouements. As Clov announces unconvincingly that it is 'nearly finished' at the 
very beginning of Endgame, he realises that the near end will continue indefinitely as 
a series of moments that will never constitute a whole but always form a 'heap' of 
single particles. He says 'Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there's 
a heap, a little heap, the impossible heap' (E, 6). Hamm recognises the same problem 
late on in the play, noting, 'Moment upon moment, pattering down, like the millet 
grains of ... (he hesitates) ... that old Greek, and all life long you wait for that to mount 
up to a life' (E, 42). Clov and Hamm continually anticipate the wholeness of a life, as 
if they could survey the cairns of their complete existences. 
Despite this elusive finality, there is the impression that dying pastimes 
envelop Clov and Hamm. In an echo of T. S. Eliot's 'heap of broken images' in The 
Waste Land, Beckett's impossible heap suggests his characters are subject to a 
fragmented experience of life, forced to draw on and add to a mound of dilapidated 
ideas ill an 'Old endgame, lost of old' (E, 48). In this respect, the heap also evinces an 
intertextuallegacy, a history of literary traditions and their products that resurface in 
subsequent generations.28 Beckett engages with a particularly modernist idea as he 
draws attention to these nostalgic and allusive aspects of the present in his image of 
27 Ibid. p. 114. 
28 See T. S. Eliot, The Annotated Waste Land with Eliot's Contemporary Prose, ed. by Lawrence 
Rainey (New Haven: Yale University, 2005), p. 58. 
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positive entropy. But as the past comes to occupy the present as memory, the 
irresistible flow of time means the past is infinitely transposed into new contexts and 
perceived from fresh perspectives. The past is always being reshaped by the present, 
so there is always more material for Clov and Hamm to pile on the heap, thereby 
forestalling totality. As the chess term of the title suggests, Endgame stretches out and 
is locked into a final stage so that life has seemingly passed but death itself remains a 
formality, allowing the characters to continue playing. 
Beckett employs the image of layering in both of his other major dramas after 
Endgame to describe the bearing of past experiences on the present. In Krapp's Last 
Tape (1958), Krapp listens to and reflects on annual tape recordings that capture his 
past thoughts on earlier recordings in a process that adds layers of commentary to his 
life in a growing archive of spools. On tape, a thirty-nine year old Krapp refers to the 
composition or editing of his writing as 'separating the grain from the husks' and 
says: 'The grain, now what do I mean by that, I mean ... (hesitates) ... I suppose I 
mean those things worth having when all the dust has - when all my dust has settled' 
(K, 5). Krapp implies that he wishes to leave the kernel of his writing as a legacy, free 
from all superfluous paraphernalia, but his autobiographical project on tape does not 
settle on the past, but rather disturbs the memories and appends the archive. The 
present is simply an interpretation of the recorded past, meaning he lives through the 
cannibalisation of his memoirs. As Krapp's name indicates, he is immersed in 
material he has already digested once. Most notably, in Happy Days (1961), Winnie is 
embedded up to her neck in a mound that signifies her imprisonment in a 'world 
without end' (HD, 35) complete with the existential pressure to be stoic, but also, 
more specifically, the societal expectations of women, hence the daily cosmetic and 
sartorial routine. As she brushes her teeth and applies lipstick, Winnie's monologues 
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are peppered with references to Shakespeare and Milton, so that she effectively recites 
the 'exquisite lines' of the 'classics' to subsist (HD, 35).29 Winnie is therefore stuck in 
the repetitive patterns of life and an inherited stockpile of quotes from literary history. 
This brief sketch of the temporal deposits in Beckett serves to show that the 
past continues to impact his creatures in the present, but not in a perspicuous way that 
catalogues memory from a superposition. As with Benjamin and Sebald, the 
movements of time and history disobey linear chronology for Beckett. In a 
metaphorical sense, these heaps and mounds are not simply accumulations of 
experience, thought, and memory, as if the characters behold their pasts as a panorama 
from the summit of their lived lives. These sediments are transient moments, stirring 
in the memory but decaying with the subject; they symbolise the attachments to traces 
of life that bury his creatures alive. Clov, Hamm, Krapp and Winnie cannot sift 
through their life material and extract specific grains of experience at will. Instead, the 
heap of history is all around Beckett's creatures. They are inhabitants not curators of 
their time, at once estranged from the past but haunted by revisiting images. In effect, 
their past lives are both irretrievable and engrossing as they submit to 
autobiographical and fictional projects, attempt to relate the story of their lives and the 
lives of figments, but revolve around the empty spaces of lost experiences and absent 
selves. Immersed in the temporal deposits of creaturely life, the characters themselves 
stand as ruins of their pasts, evoking history and enacting their survival as they 
s t r u g g l ~ . . to account for the detritus of their being. 
The creative process of memory and the habitual re-enactment of the past is 
key to the survival of Beckett's creatures. In one of the most explicit comments on 
29 For example, 'Woe woe is me to see what I see' (HD, 7) refers to Ophelia's '0, woe is me, To have 
seen what I have seen, see what I seel' in Shakespeare's Hamlet (3.1, 164-165). '0 fleeting joys oh 
something lasting woes' (HD, 8) refers to '0 fleeting joyes. Of Paradise, deare bought with lasting 
woes!' in Milton's Paradise Lost (10.741-742). 
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memory in Beckett's work, the narrator in The Expelled underlines how recalling the 
past can be deadly but how frequent remembering can also make the past so 
unrecognisable as to bury the truth. After the narrator is thrown out of his place of 
residence, down a flight of stairs and into the vestibule, he tries to remember the 
number of steps to the staircase, before stating: 'Memories are killing. So you must 
not think of certain things, of those that are dear to you, or rather you must think of 
them, for if you don't there is the danger of finding them, in your mind, little by little. 
That is to say that you must think of them for a good while, every day several times a 
day, until they sink forever in the mud' (FN, 3). Firstly, these killing memories 
suggest that a melancholic absorption in the past is an enervating existence. A 
disproportionate indulgence in memory stagnates life through the repetitive 
engagement with the bygone. Secondly, the narrator suggests that in actively pursuing 
memories, the past experience is distorted and the essence remains elusive. This 
particularly Proustian conception of intentional recollection accesses a selective or 
censored version of the past, complete with the i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ e e embellishments of the 
subject. When the actual memory is lost, then, it is the loss of memory that is not 
forgotten. Beckett's characters remember that they have forgotten, but not always 
what has been forgotten. Hence, the ad hoc memory unravels the past and can thwart 
any possibility of gleaning its essence, thus making the past irretrievable but also, 
crucially, allowing 'the long sonata of the dead' (T, 32) to play on. Beckett's 
characters engage with the infinite lacunae of the past, which occupies them in the 
present and encourages their continuation. In this way, they reveal the survival in 
undeadness as they are absorbed in senescent personal histories and sustained by the 
missing essence of the misremembered past. 
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Repetition and Performance 
The repetitive nature of undeadness means that existence persists in the restless 
fixation with the past. The survivor is largely detached from the original meaning of a 
formerly authentic life that he tries to recuperate, so that survival is composed of an 
obsession with bygone things. As such, the survivor effectively endures a symbolic 
death as the repetition compulsion is affixed to a meaningful life that has died. Whilst 
Santner's undeadness presents survival as a state additional to meaningful life and 
beyond a symbolic death, Derrida develops a contrasting line of thought in which 
survival is immanent to life. In a 2004 interview with Le Monde, conducted whilst 
Derrida was terminally ill with pancreatic cancer, he asserts: 'I have always been 
interested in this theme of survival, the meaning of which is not to be added on to 
living or dying. It is originary: life is living on, life is survival' .30 At the end of the 
interview, Derrida reaffirms that 
survival is an originary concept that constitutes the very structure of what we 
call existence, Dasein, if you will. We are structurally survivors, marked by 
this structure of the trace and of the testament. [ ... ] Surviving is life beyond 
life, life more than life, and my discourse is not a discourse of death, but, on 
the contrary, is the affirmation of a living being who prefers living and thus 
surviving to death, because survival is not simply that which remains but the 
. l·fi ·bI 31 most mtense 1 e POSSl e. 
In no uncertain terms, Derrida asserts that survival is intrinsic to the structure of life. 
It does not derive from life, nor is it an excess of life. Instead Derrida argues for an 
30 Jacques Derrida, Learn 10 Live Finally - The Lasl Interview, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael Naas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 25. 
31 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, p. 52. 
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intensity of life in all forms of survival, as though even the repetition compulsion 
could still constitute a powerful vitality. In contrast to Benjamin's 'petrified unrest' 
and Santner's subsequent 'undeadness', Derrida' s survival is always unsettled and 
does not simply enact an unsettled past. As such, he does not consider surviving as the 
remnants of what was before, as if there could be an index of life force. According to 
Derrida, anything that survives is alive as the greatest manifestation of life possible in 
the present. 
Santner's term 'undeadness' is a particular mode of survival that is activated 
with the loss of settled meaning, whereby viable life forms are nullified to produce the 
suspended animation of a repetition compulsion. Since undeadness is triggered, it 
follows that there is still an alternative form of life existing beyond the realm of this 
agitated survival. On the other hand, in Derrida, unsettlement is fundamental so that 
survival is a ubiquitous condition of being. Although more sweeping than Santner in 
his discussion of survival in general, the implication of Derrida's view is that there is 
no alternative to survival - life can never be relieved from the urgent pressures of 
'living on', If survival is not a remnant or leftover as it is in undeadness, the 
conditions of life appear all the more pressing since survival is not a substrate of 
human existence but an ontological necessity. 
In his post-war drama, Beckett sustains the tension between the possibility of 
achieving a viable form of life that Santner's undeadness contains, and the 
unconditional survival described by Derrida. Beckett prefigures both views of survival 
in Waiting for Godot and Endgame as he negotiates the benumbing monotony and 
revitalising presence of repetition. Through the respective waiting for a non-attendee 
and exposure to the abiding end, Beckett's two plays navigate the restricted conditions 
of undeadness and call upon deconstruction's infinite play of difference. As such, 
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phases of vigour temper the inertia, as Vladimir exemplifies: 'We were beginning to 
weaken, now we're sure to see the evening out' (WFG, 86). A comparable 
perseverance drives Endgame, as when Hamm says, 'This is deadly' and Clov replies 
'Things are livening up' (E, 20). As Beckett's characters get caught in the bottleneck 
of repetition, they begin to lack the affirmation of life that Derrida sees in survival and 
verge instead on the still life of undeadness. Yet, as iteration discloses contrast, an 
indefatigable life force resurfaces so that whilst undeadness appears petrified, the type 
of volatility that Derrida traces underwrites its unrest. 
The verbal sparring that occupies Beckett's characters exacerbates the sense of 
deferred resolution in both plays. As Vladimir and Estragon anticipate Godot's 
arrival, and Hamm and Clov await the resolution of the end times, they rely on 
discursive crosstalk with one another to distract themselves. Each word bears witness 
to Beckett's characters going on whilst simultaneously revealing stasis through the 
repetitive phrases that emerge. The line 'waiting for Godot' appears nine times over 
the course ofBeckett's play, serving as a catchphrase to remind the characters of their 
default position and restart their fatuous chatter. Nevertheless, each repeated utterance 
contains a negligible difference. Although the repeat is identical to the previous 
version, it is displaced from the original site and subsequently acknowledged as a 
reproduction. Derrida finds this transference of the same expression to different 
contexts intrinsic to communication in 'Signature Event Context' (1972). He names 
this possibility 'iteration', noting that iter comes from the Sankrit for other and that 
his entire essay 'may be read as the exploitation of the logic which links repetition to 
alterity,.32 Derrida elaborates on iterability in 'Limited Inc a b c ... ' (1977) to explain 
that 
32 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. by Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1977), p. 
7. 
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the structure of iteration [ ... ] implies both identity and difference. Iteration in 
its "purest" form-and it is always impure-contains in itself the discrepancy 
of a difference that constitutes it as iteration. The iterability of an element 
divides its own identity a priori.33 
This iteration applies in Beckett's play to make the same phrase 'waiting for Godot' 
include a difference with each appearance. Every recurrence identifies with its 
namesakes but is at the same time other. These minor incongruities between repeated 
utterances convey transit, but they also serve to accentuate the essentially unchanging 
circumstances. Words are duplicated yet the context only alters superficially so that 
linear time is obscured owing to the general lack of change. 
Likewise, in Endgame, Beckett introduces the elderly Nagg and Nell 
endeavouring but failing to kiss, after which Nell says, 'Why this farce, day after 
day?' (E, 12). Clov repeats Nell's question halfway through the play only for Hamm 
to reply 'Routine' (E, 21). The question itself includes the idea of imitation in the 
word 'farce' and emphasises monotony in the repeated element 'day'. Furthermore, 
the two references to this question during the play indicate the repetitive structure of 
their activities to underline both similarity and difference. The overall situation 
remains the same, which precludes the end, and yet Beckett's characters are subject to 
time, represented by their physical decay and the dimming light, which implies 
procession. The difficulty with labelling Beckett's work either dynamic or static is 
that the reliving of the past is a process that occurs in the present, thus. making the 
repeat a current view of the past that is never fully identical to what went before. This 
JJ Derrida, Limited Inc., p. 53. 
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rendition of the past injects a level of liveliness into repetition that contradicts the idea 
of a static immersion in the past. The iteration of the words betrays the movement of 
difference as well as stagnancy of similarity. Beckett's use of repetition and refrain 
effectively produces the inertia and activity of 'still life' . 
Whilst Beckett marries tedium with renewal through his repetitive techniques, 
he also manages to balance habit and spontaneity in these plays to create the 
metatheatrical blurring of performance and reality. Indeed, Beckett is already 
eradicating the distinction between action and acting in the repetitive elements noted 
above. In their catchphrase, Vladimir and Estragon appear to insist that they are 
waiting for Godot and Waiting for Godot; the pair seemingly accept that they are 
subject to an imperative and constitute the play itself. Equally, Hamm the ham-actor 
recognises his situation as a 'routine', thus indicating the repeat performances of 
theatre productions. These kinds of references are numerous and serve to underline 
the fact that the characters' 'lives' are perilously close to exhibitions. The characters 
appear to speak from habit at times, particularly in the use of stichomythia, which 
suggests scripted and rehearsed lines. These exchanges are often delivered with 
unnatural rapidity that presumably bypasses thought. However, the characters are lost 
for words on occasion too, as if defective memories call for improvisation. For 
example, after a swift passage of dialogue, Estragon says 'That wasn't such a bad 
little canter' before Vladimir replies 'Yes, but now we'll have to find something else' 
( W F G , . , . ~ 6 ) . . These hiatuses in conversation call for impromptu shows to fill the 
meantime, but the emphasis remains on performance. 
In Waitingfor Godot, as the pair guess what period of day it is, Vladimir says 
'it is not for nothing I have lived through this long day and I can assure you it is very 
near the end of its repertory' (WFG, 78). Each day is thus an act made up of several 
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stock pieces, and although Vladimir suggests he is at the end of his repertoire, the 
rendition is likely to return tomorrow. Similarly, as Clov removes the sheet to reveal 
Hamm in his chair, like a second curtain rising from the stage, Hamm's first yawning 
words are 'Me ... to play' (E, 6). His life is framed as a tiresome performance since 
there is minimal variety to his existence. Each day is a recapitulation of the well-worn 
routine, or as Clov puts it, 'All life long the same questions, the same answers' (E,7). 
As this reference to the futility of their actions shows, the authenticity of the 
characters' everyday existences is contaminated by issues of performance, which 
suggests they are going through the motions as opposed to actually living through 
completely new events. Therefore, the idea of continuation through reiteration that 
occurs within the two plays is a microcosm of the play itself continuing through 
multiple performances. 
Taking these metatheatrical links to performance into consideration, it is 
notable that survival for Beckett's characters involves echoing their own existence, 
with the repeated awareness of the waiting and unending mimicking an actual 
experience. As they reflect on their predicaments and operate within a trite range of 
actions, Beckett's creatures continue in a state of replication. Godot and the end 
appear as postures as the characters recite previous utterances and imitate the suspense 
of an impending release from banality. In fact, Beckett implies that Vladimir has 
already met Godot, that Hamm has experienced the end, and that existence continues 
in a state of nostalgia for these past junctures. Before the audience is introduced to the 
boy messenger, Vladimir indicates that Godot himself arranged to meet them 'by the 
tree' on 'Saturday' (WFG, 6, 7), which differs notably from the infinitely renewable 
'tomorrow' the boy later uses (WFG, 44). Likewise, in Endgame, Hamm refuses to 
call their existence 'life', labelling it 'this ... thing' (E, 28) before he laments 'The end 
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is in the beginning and yet you go on' (E, 41). Beckett keeps open the possibility that 
the desired moment has gone and is being replayed. Therefore, he supports both the 
deferral of the desired event and the idea that desire actually transcends the 
experienced event in a retrospective yearning for the past. The creatures' onward 
momentum shows that survival can occur as an excess of life after the end of the ideal 
life, which compels the subject to perform a rendition of the possibility now passed. 
In terms of survival, the pertinent issue from this simulation of self is the 
degree to which Beckett's characters lose their fictional bearings to become hollow 
interlocutors. The focus on repetition distorts the causal chain of events of realist 
narratives that represent human life. Rather than depicting 'realistic' personal 
experiences, Beckett's texts are concerned with their status as constructed 
performances, or what Hamm calls the 'prolonged creative effort' (E, 37). According 
to Beckett, this kind of self-awareness is crucial for the staging of his plays. When 
directing the 1975 production of Waiting/or Godot at the Schiller Theatre in Berlin, 
he explained: 
It is a game, everything is a game. When all four of them are lying on the 
ground, that cannot be handled naturalistically. That has got to be done 
artificially, balletically. Otherwise everything becomes an imitation, an 
imitation of reality [ ... ]. It should become clear and transparent, not dry. It is a 
. d . 34 
• game In or er to survlve. 
Beckett is obviously intent on minimising the naturalistic elements of his plays, but 
what it is that actually survives remains ambiguous. Although Beckett might refer to 
34 Beckett qtd. in Knowlson, Damned 10 Fame, p. 607. 
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the spectacle of the play itself, 'survival' inevitably evokes organic life. Beckett 
insists that the figures are precisely choreographed but the games resist total 
impersonality, as they appear to have continuation in mind. Hence, the slapstick pile-
up in Waitingfor Godot is not a natural coincidence, but Vladimir and Estragon must 
still perform these diversions to busy themselves. Despite yearning to be 'saved' 
(WFG, 87), the characters are nevertheless impelled to survive in the meantime, which 
lends each new playful game an existential weight. It is difficult for survival to escape 
its ontological resonance, even if that being is alienated distinctly from a recognisable 
reality. 
In Steven Connor's discussion of Beckett's metatheatrical techniques, he 
argues that '[a]ll these features induce consciousness not of the stage simply itself, but 
of the stage as representation - even if it is the minimal representation of itself. No 
matter what is stripped away from character: plot and setting on the stage, there 
always persists, within the most reduced performance, a residual self-doubling - the 
stage representing itself as stage, as performance,.35 Connor makes the point that in 
acknowledging the medium, the plays reflect on the dramaturgy and come to represent 
dramatic performance. The plays are therefore about performance, making use of mise 
en . abyme to return to the contract of performance as depiction, if only as a 
representation of itself. The characters even appear to realise this tendency to satisfy a 
mimetic function and acquire meaning. Vladimir observes 'This is becoming really 
insignificant' and Estragon replies 'Not enough' before adding 'We always give 
ourselves the impression we exist' (WFG, 60, 61). Likewise, Hamm queries 'We're 
not beginning to ... to ... mean something?' (E, 22). As much as Beckett leans towards 
3S Steven Con nor, Samuel Beckett - Repetition. Theory and Text (Oxford: Basil BlackweIl, 1988), p. 
124. 
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metatheatre to eliminate representation, the performance and performers rebel against 
their vacancy to retain the semblance of life. 
As with The Unnamable, Beckett includes non-endings in Waiting for Godot 
and Endgame in the respective 'Let's go. [They do not move]' (WFG, 87) and 'You ... 
remain' (E, 50) to encourage a sense of continuity and sustain the promise of 
resolution. Although the expectations of these eventualities diminish, it is patent that 
the creatures have 'resumed the struggle' (WFG, 1) and that 'life goes on' (E, 40). 
With this possibility in tow, the implication is that despite the repetitive nature of the 
plays, Beckett's creatures survive as the hypothetical interruption of the repetition 
process. As Beckett himself notes, '[t]he key word in my plays is "perhaps"', and it is 
this uncertainty that nurtures the possibility of real life aside from the surface play of 
repetition.36 In other words, they are passengers in a performed life but can potentially 
disembark, at least according to the models provided by 'Godot' as a validating figure 
and the 'end' as a liberating event.37 This potential means that Beckett's creatures are 
beings in waiting, as yet unformed and thus continuous. Nevertheless, they require the 
active performance of the suspended self to sustain the hope of an authentic life.38 The 
possibility of achieving a non-survival state, such as authentic living or termination, 
actually drives their continuation; they are stuck in survival due to their hope for a 
more meaningful life. The repetitive survival is therefore peculiar in Beckett in that 
the desired condition that will emancipate the creatures from survival is also the 
aspiration that binds them to it. 
36 Beckett qtd. in Tom F. Driver, 'Beckett by the Madeleine'. Columbia University Forum, 4 (1961), 
21-25, p. 23. 
37 As Steven Connor notes, in terms of subjectivity, the extrication from repetition into an authentic life 
means '[t]he self will pursued as though it were a locatable essence, or presence, even though that 
EUfsuit is to reveal the self as difference', Connor, Repetition, Theory and Text, p. 49. 
8 In response to a world of mechanical reproduction that Benjamin identified, Beckett's creatures are 
affiicted by what Jean Baudrillard calls 'the nostalgia for origins and obsession with authenticity'. Jean 
Baudrillard, The System o/Objects, trans. by James Benedict (London: Verso, 2005), p. 80. 
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Forms of Activity and Stasis in Molloy 
Beckett conveys the animated impasse of undeadness throughout Molloy and this 
creaturely dimension forms an integral part of the aesthetic, subjective and testimonial 
significance of Beckett's post-war work. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to 
the ways in which Beckett's novel Molloy, particularly the first part on Molloy, 
evokes survival on aesthetic and ontological levels. Beckett develops several narrative 
techniques ranging from the internal dialogues of uncertainty to the cyclic structure of 
the text in order to enact both activity and stasis. The inability to speak together with 
the obligation to speak sustains his author-narrators, but these same conditions mean 
they persist in unproductive, enervating tasks. Beckett's creatures are therefore 
exposed to the 'excitations' noted in Santner's concept ofundeadness, which result in 
a rechargeable deadening process that allows them to survive without really living.39 
Although confined to a footnote, Santtier suggests that this type of creaturely 
existence finds a parallel in the Muselmann. He writes: 'The Muselmann is, it seems, 
the figure whose being has been fully reduced to the substance of a "cringe," whose 
existence has been reduced to its pure, "protocosmic" being, who is there yet no 
longer "in the world." What remains, that is, at this zero degree of social existence, in 
this zone between symbolic and real death, is not pure biological (animal or 
vegetable) life but rather something like the direct embodiment of creaturely life. We 
might say that the Muselmann is the human in the neighborhood of zero' .40 In the 
sections that follow, the structural and existential modes of survival I analyse in 
Beckett's Molloy are evocative of the Muselmann as the 'direct embodiment of 
creaturely life'. Locked into repeating stories and drifting into psychical worlds, 
Beckett's creaturely forms and beings enact the peculiar type of lingering life that 
39 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 24. 
40 Ibid. p. 25. 
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relates to the Muselmann. Yet, these repetitive narrative structures and moribund lives 
also intimate the precarious state of the human after Auschwitz. As Slade recognises, 
the 'survivor ethos is the effect of material losses related to traumatic historical 
events, and the effect of the loss of an idea, the idea of the human,.41 With the 
symbolic value of the human in ruins after the Holocaust, the human category is 
shown to be a hollow construction made evident by the very performance of the now 
defunct model of humanity. The remaining two sections lay bare this curious type of 
survival as it appears in Beckett's novel. 
Beckett wrote Mol/oy in French between May and November 1947 during a 
concentrated period of creativity after the war that he called the 'siege in the room' .42 
He translated the novel into English, in collaboration with Patrick Bowles initially and 
then alone, before receiving some final assistance from Maria Per6n. It is divided into 
two monologues, capturing the confused perspectives of the increasingly decrepit 
narrators Molloy and Moran as they move from town to countryside and back. In part 
one, Molloy attempts to relate his meandering journey on foot and bicycle in search of 
his mother, in which he experiences a series of incidents, including the meeting of two 
figures A and C, a run-in with the police, accidentally killing a dog and custody at 
Lousse's residence. Molloy eventually finds himself slowly deteriorating in the 
wilderness, where he assaults a charcoal-burner and ends up in a ditch. In the second 
part, the agent Jacques Moran is a strict Catholic who leads a comfortable lifestyle 
centred, on his stringent parenting. The messenger Gaber delivers word from the 
mysterious Y oudi that Moran is assigned to track down Molloy and report his 
findings. Moran and his son Jacques Jr. venture covertly into the countryside, but 
Moran gets injured, asks his son to purchase a bicycle and in the meantime clubs a 
41 Slade, Poslmodern Sublime, p. 4. 
42 Bair, Samuel Beckett, p. 367. 
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respectable looking man to death. His son returns with the bicycle but soon abandons 
Moran, who eventually manages to return home alone despite his worsening physical 
condition. 
Mol/oy is an appropriate example of the survival that Beckett's work evokes 
since the text is contemporaneous with his realisation that the future of his writing was 
in 'incompleteness'. Beckett's mother May died in 1950, the year before Mol/oy was 
published, and her demise clearly informs Molloy's search for his mother. The 
deterioration of this influential maternal figure also appears to lead Beckett towards a 
new approach to writing. He recalls seeing his mother when she was stricken with 
Parkinson's disease: 
_ Her face was a mask, completely unrecognizable. Looking at her, I had a 
sudden realization that all the work I'd done before was on the wrong track. I 
guess you'd have to call it a revelation. Strong word, I know, but so it was. I 
simply understood that there was no sense adding to the store of information, 
gathering knowledge. The whole attempt at knowledge, it seemed to me, had 
come to nothing. It was all haywire. What I had to do was investigate not-
knowing, not-perceiving, the whole world of incompleteness.43 
As a result of this 'revelation', Molloy features ignorant and incognizant protagonists 
embedded in expressive and epistemological graves. I have already drawn on 
Beckett's creatures as examples of the 'non-knower' and 'non-can-er' in my analysis 
of Beckett's art of failure in chapter one. I examined how the (in)sovereign 
testimonies that the author-narrators carry out exhibit the creaturely indecisiveness 
43 Beckett qtd. in Shainberg, 'Exorcising Beckett'. p. 106. 
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that results from attempts to adhere to the human way of prioritising and ordering 
meaning. As such, they exemplify the 'sovereign as creature' dynamic that relegates 
Beckett's creatures from a position of narrative power to a predominantly impotent 
narrative condition. This culminates in the 'incompleteness' that pervades Mol/oy on a 
narrative level, and induces the creaturely modes of continuation seen in melancholy 
immersion and humour, which evoke the excess being of natural history that Santner 
identifies. As Molloy and Moran try to follow the bewildering social and expressive 
conventions that isolate them, they appear as artefacts removed from a meaningful 
sphere but persist as creaturely life in the void. 
In part one of Mol/oy, there is a cyclic pattern to Molloy's odyssey that 
involves different motivational intensities ranging from purposeful imperatives to idle 
stopgaps. Although generally preoccupied with his mother, Molloy notes that 'these 
were ancient cares and the mind cannot always brood on the same cares, but needs 
fresh cares from time to time, so as to revert with renewed vigour, when the time 
comes to ancient cares' (T, 64). As such, the cycle in Beckett's novel lurches 
onwards: 
the buckled wheel that carried me, in unforeseeable jerks, from fatigue to rest, 
and inversely for example. But now I do not wander any more, anywhere any 
more, and indeed I scarcely stir at all, and yet nothing is changed. And the 
,confmes of my room, of my bed, of my body, are as remote from me as were 
those of my region, in the days of my splendour. And the cycle continues, 
joltingly, of flight and bivouac, in an Egypt without bounds, without infant, 
without mother. (T, 66) 
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This example encompasses both the narrative rhythm of Beckett's Mol/oy and the 
sense of survival in the absence of a governing system. The reference to Egypt, 
according to Knowlson, evokes the many 'Rest on the Flight to Egypt' paintings that 
Beckett viewed in European galleries.44 For example, Caravaggio's baroque version 
depicts an angel in a violin recital, Joseph holding the musical score, the mother Mary 
cradling the infant Jesus and an inconspicuous donkey in the background. In contrast, 
the 'without infant, without mother' line in Beckett's evocation suggests that the 
relationship between the 'infant' Molloy and his mother is elided whilst the rest and 
flight routine goes on. Beckett removes the maternal care present in many of the 
paintings that depict the escape from Herod the Great, and instead retains an 
impression of the journeying, the burdensome 'donkeywork' in the patterns of 'flight 
and bivouac'. On a greater scale, the whole religious iconography of the Madonna and 
Christ-child images is absent. Considering that this iconography conveys divinity on 
earth in human form, its absence leaves only the boundless struggles of a secular 
world. The consolation of religious meaning is gone, and yet life continues 
nonetheless. It is worth noting at this juncture that whilst my initial point is that 
Beckett's intermittent narrative movement suggests a mode of continuation, my 
subsequent claim is that Beckett's creatures are surviving in the aftermath of or 
exclusion from fundamental ideological systems. 
The spirit of continuation in Beckett includes contextualizing intervals that 
revitalize the impetus and consequently highlight the tedium of the enduring 
imperative. The Beckettian predicament is not a single monotonous activity, or, to 
invoke Benjamin, a mystical instant capturing eternity. Rather, it is a dialogue 
between phases that serves to emphasise the repetitive nature of the cycle. This 
44 Knowlson, Damned to Fame, p. 375. 
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contrast means that Beckett's creatures are perpetually worn down as each new lease 
of life eventually dwindles only to be resuscitated and so on ad infinitum. Beckett's 
prose style pays testament to this renewable energy, deploying the logic of 
alternatives to take detours away from each creative cul-de-sac. The idiosyncratic 
Beckettian collocation 'don't know' occurs 46 times and the adverb 'perhaps' 192 
times in the 78,000 words of Mol/oy. In James Joyce's slightly longer text, A Portrait 
o/the Artist as a Young Man (1916), at around 85,000 words, these examples appear 7 
and 38 times respectively.45 Beckett clearly intensifies ignorance and possibility, yet 
he combats complete stagnancy through his repeated use of 'but', particularly to begin 
new sentences, and 'not', which he employs approximately twice as frequently as 
Joyce.46 This ability to keep talking in contrasting and negative registers allows the 
narrators to say double without doubling the amount of meaning. On the contrary, 
Beckett effectively reduces the text to ruins when exercising this contradictory mode; 
his narrators sabotage any claim to verisimilitude, professing their unreliability and 
cancelling out statements. Despite the restrictive position of ineptitude, Beckett's 
writing reveals ways of reflecting on and responding to itself as the author-narrators 
accentuate their uncertainty to juggle different possibilities and proffer new 
suggestions that counter, modify or converse with old ones. 
Beckett cultivates an aesthetic of ignorance to leave trains of thought open and 
posit his creatures in a world of incompleteness. Molloy, for example, is partial to 
internal dialogues that encourage further speech. At the end of the A and C episode, in 
which Molloy observes two passing strangers, he describes an ambiguous meeting 
with one of the two men. It is unclear whether this is an imaginary or actual meeting, 
but after the man has left, Molloy returns to thinking of himself: 
45 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (London: Penguin, 1996). 
46 'But' appears 749 times and 'not' appears 865 times in Mol/oy. The words appear 355 and 448 times 
respectively in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. 
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And once again I am I will not say alone, no, that's not like me, but, how shall 
I say, I don't know, restored to myself, no, I never left myself, free, yes, I 
don't know what that means but it's the word I mean to use, free to do what, to 
do nothing, to know, but what, the laws of the mind perhaps, of my mind (T, 
13) 
Molloy's thinking is plagued with digression here as he suggests ideas that he either 
denies or accepts and poses questions to himself. This type of dithering narration 
makes MolIoy an unreliable narrator. His meditation is reduced to fragments of 
thought as he fumbles around for the right idea. Although the meaning is all but 
submerged in cognitive waste, it is this inconclusive expressive and mental practice 
that sustains MolIoy's narrative. The internal dialogue of doubt in Molloy allows him 
to perpetuate his account as he negotiates different formulations in pursuit of the 
precise expression. 
The ability to continue despite the incapacity for positive statements extends to 
MolIoy's analyses of self. Beckett's creatures manage to reflect on their conditions 
despite recognizing the limits of self-analysis. Whilst in the Lousse house, Molloy 
recal1s having tried to find a meaning for the . human condition in the disciplines of 
astronomy, geology, anthropology, psychiatry and magic. This last school of 
supernatural phenomena and mysterious trickery is the final straw for MolIoy; his 
absorption in magic has the 'honour' of his ruins, consigning him to a confused 
shambles of being (T, 39). This deteriorated self 
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is not the kind of place where you go, but where you find yourself, 
sometimes, not knowing how, and which you cannot leave at will, and where 
you find yourself without any pleasure, but with more perhaps than in those 
places you can escape from, by making an effort, places full of mystery, full of 
the familiar mysteries. I listen and the voice is full of a world collapsing 
endlessly, a frozen world, under a faint untroubled sky, enough to see by, yes, 
and frozen too. And I hear it murmur that all wilts and yields, as if loaded 
down, but here there are no loads, and the light too, down towards an end it 
seems can never come. For what possible ends to these wastes where true light 
never was, nor any upright thing, nor any true foundation, but only these 
leaning things, forever lapsing and crumbling away, beneath a sky without 
memory of morning and hope of night. (T, 40) 
The broken subjectivity that Molloy sketches is a result of the lack of meaning or 
explanation for existence and an inability to discover the truth of the human 
experience. In contrast to the other science-based disciplines, the magic that brings 
about this condition is synonymous with alchemy, the occult transformation of matter. 
Alchemy includes the nigredo phase, a darkening chemical process that reduces 
substances to black prima materia. Jungian analytical psychology adopts the nigredo 
phase to discuss the mind as it confronts the chaos of its inner shadows.47 This initial 
stage in a process of individuation, or wholeness, is associated with the self-
examination of melancholy.48 Similarly, Molloy associates the obscurity of magic 
47 See C. O. Jung, The Collected Works olG. G. Jung, Vol. 14, 2nd edn, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 497. 
48 At the end of The Spirit Mercurius, Jung acknowledges his debt to Freudian psychoanalysis: 
'Approaching the problem for a scientific angle, and innocent of any religious aim, Freud uncovered 
the abysmal darkness of human nature which a would-be enlightened optimism had striven to conceal. 
Since then psychotherapy, in one form or another, has persistently explored the extensive area of 
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with his exposure to the welter of the human condition. His engagement with the 
perplexing illusions of magic and the self only direct him to the abyss of being, 
riddled with echoing voices, lost memories and unexplainable impressions. But the 
result is not totally distasteful since, unlike the 'familiar mysteries' of the human self 
and metaphysical truth, there is no prospect of escape when resigned to this formless 
being. His study of magic enters him into a state of ruin, or 'the indestructible chaos 
of timeless things' (T, 40), in which there is no longer magic or mystery. If '[a] final 
overcoming of melancholy is not possible', in Beckett, and 'the nigredo phase is 
endless', the ability to surrender to this chaos would at least exempt Molloy from the 
alternative pursuit of positive knowledge.49 
Self-examination is a Platonic exercise to remove ignorance, as Ernst Cassirer 
asserts: 'Man is declared to be that creature who is constantly in search of himself - a 
creature who in every moment of his existence must examine and scrutinize the 
conditions of his existence. In this scrutiny, in this critical attitude towards human life, 
consists the real value of human life'. so Molloy and Moran exemplify the scrutinizing 
part of this attitude through their questioning inclinations. Moran, the more 
meticulous of the two narrators, produces three fifths of the questioning material in 
Molloy.sl He says: 'to kill time I asked myself a certain number of questions and tried 
to answer them' (T, 154). In one passage, Moran even includes a list of thirty-three 
darkness which I have called the shadow', see C. G. Jung, Collected Works o/C. G. Jung, Vol. 13, 
traM. by R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Pau,l, 1968), p. 244. 
49 Daniel Birnbaum and Anders Olsson, As a Weasel Sucks Eggs - As Essay on Melancholy and 
Cannibalism (New York: Sternberg, 2008), p. 81. Beckett's interest in Jungian psychology is 
significant in the context of 'undeadness'. Waiter Asmus describes how '[i]n the thirties C. G. Jung, the 
psychologist, once gave a lecture in London and told of a female patient who was being treated by him. 
Jung said he wasn't able to help this patient and for this, according to Beckett, he gave an astonishing 
explanation. The girl wasn't living. She existed but she didn't actually live'. See Waiter Asmus, 
'Rehearsal Notes for the German Premiere of Beckett's That Time and Footfalls', in On Beckett: 
Essays and Criticism, ed. by S. E. Gontarski (New York: Grove, 1986), 335-349, p. 338. 
so Emst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven: 
Yale University, 1972), p. 6. 
SI Question marks appear 345 times in Mol/oy: 140 times in Molloy's part and 245 times in Moran's 
part. 
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questions, which is a technique that keeps him thinking as the answers elude him or 
generate more questions (T, 167-9). Molloy on the other hand employs the question 
mark for a series of suggestions: 'For otherwise how could I have reached the 
enormous age I have reached. Thanks to moral qualities? Hygienic habits? Fresh air? 
Starvation? Lack of sleep? Solitude? Persecution? The long silent screams (dangerous 
to scream)? The daily longing for the earth to swallow me up?' (T, 80-1). Molloy's 
approach, like Moran, fails to identify information, but nevertheless manages to 
maintain activity through deliberation. Through their inquiries, Beckett's creatures 
can adopt a probing attitude that avoids the certain knowledge that would pacify 
contemplation. For Beckett also, the question mark fills the text with doubt, which 
resists the quietus of totality but essentially revolves around the same enigmas. 
In contrast with Cassirer, however, Beckett's work does not sustain the 
exaltation of self-examination nor accept it as a defining human property. The 
scrutiny of human existence and subjectivity in Beckett only proliferates ignorance, 
foregrounding the incompleteness of the self. It is unable to transcend the infinite 
mirroring of self-reflection to perceive such practice as a veritable human value. 
Thus, the 'place' that Molloy discovers is, in part, the prison of self-reflection and the 
cage of the cogito. Indeed, this constant search is precisely the creaturely condition of 
incompleteness, which is a fact that Molloy appears to accept as the lesser of two evils 
- the inescapable, ruined self over the familiar mystery of the meaning of the human. 
This is not to say that Molloy finishes with self-examination, but that he is open to the 
logic of disintegration and the 'endlessly collapsing world' that ensues. In fact, he is 
unusually lucid about his entropic condition, diagnosing 'leaning things, forever 
lapsing and crumbling away' from a place 'where true light never was'. Although 
Molloy often insists upon his fallaciousness, noting 'I express without sinking to the 
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level of oratio recta, but by means of other figures quite as deceitful, as for example, It 
. seemed to me that, etc., or, I had the impression that, etc.' (T, 88), he actually 
recognizes his tentative approach and is surprisingly eloquent when describing his 
ruination. Consequently, Molloy is in a frozen world with an equally frozen sky, the 
'frozen' suggesting a particularly melancholic self-examination. His exploration of the 
ruins of self keep him at a standstill, but this condition is nevertheless fuelled by the 
half-light of comprehension represented by the pale sky, which preserves the subject 
in the very process of obliteration, immanent in its effacement.52 It is this kind of 
reflection on his state of ruin that reveals traces of a subject privy to its own 
desubjectification. This aporetic activity, 'without memory of morning and hope of 
night' (T, 40), lacks an origin and terminus, arche and relos, meaning that Molloy is 
suspended in the limbo of narrative scepticism. 
Although the buckled wheel image captures the disrupted revolutions around a 
fixed point experienced in Molloy's search for his mother and Moran's search for 
Molloy, the structures in both parts of Mol/oy convey a more complex helical shape to 
the narrative movement. Molloy's account e n ~ s s with him in a ditch, 'Molloy could 
stay where he happened to be' (T, 91), but presumably he is then transported to his 
mother's room, 'perhaps in an ambulance' (T, 7), since this is where he writes his 
account. In the chronologicalfabula (the elemental materials of the story) ofMolloy's 
journey, the initial framing paragraph is the last event to take place, with Molloy the 
author-narrator in his mother's room discussing the writing process.S3 The second 
paragraph and indeed the remainder of Molloy's tale are retrospective, representing 
~ 2 2 Beckett offers some explanation of this chiaroscuro in his work: 'If life and death did not both 
present themselves to us, there would be no inscrutability. If there were only darkness, all would be 
clear. It is because there is not only darkness but also light that our situation becomes inexplicable', 
Beckett qtd. in Driver, 'Beckett by the Madeleine', p. 23. 
53 Definitions of Russian formalism narrative terminology are taken from M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of 
Literary Terms (London: Thomas Wadsworth, 2005), p. 181. 
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the events leading up to the scene in the first paragraph. Beckett advertises the fact 
that this is the syuzhet (the concrete representation used to convey the story) and that 
Molloy lives in the text twice, or rather is twice removed, firstly in the confused 
experience of events and secondly in the unreliable account. In effect, the story loops, 
yet in a way that allows the repeated cycles to worm forward in a parallel real time. In 
other words, the account is repeated, but there is the sense that time is not simply 
repeated but wasted as the old eats up the new. Molloy is therefore perpetually 
searching for the object of his narrative, his mother, which sustains his own demise. 
As Molloy replays his quest, he effectively languishes in a past event. 
In the second part, Moran's final words are: 'Then I went back into the house 
and wrote, It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It 
was not raining' (T, 176). The penultimate lines declaring the rain at midnight repeat 
the opening lines of part two, which insinuates that the account the reader has read is 
Moran's submitted report. However, in conjunction with the last eight words, 
asserting that it is no longer midnight or raining, the reiteration of the first sentences 
reminds the reader of the previously narrated events and encourages one to see Moran 
writing the rest of his report again, similar to the account just read but with the added 
knowledge of a parallel present forming a subtext to the narrated past events. 
Accordingly, there would be an eventual return to the writing of the report at the 'end' 
again, where the evocation of the beginning would occur again. The implication is an 
ever-increasing series of loops progressing on a forward-moving timeline, projecting 
the same story or memory into the future, which would mean the target Molloy is 
preserved in thought and yet always elusive. In this way, Moran's report anticipates 
the paradox of simultaneously not going on and going on explored in The Unnamable. 
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In the Beckettian helix, the composition process undercuts the related account 
and intimates the teller behind the tale. In the tradition of the oral tale, Molloy and 
Moran's stories are reiterated and repositioned, but the same absence is invested into 
each new generation of the text. Like a zoetrope in which still images appear animated 
when glimpsed through the apertures of the rotating wheel, the performative quality of 
Mo/loy, the sense of doing, gives the impression of the active hand behind the writing. 
As the stories revolve, the written subjects Molloy and Moran are reprised, appearing 
repeatedly in the narrative loops, whilst Beckett's narrators appear as vague figures 
trapped behind on a single coiled path that insinuates a perpetually destructive 
activity. In this way, the compositional real time is swallowed in the literary other 
time; both past and present are lost and lost again in the writing. This is the loophole 
of Beckett's iteration process, in which the explicit foreground and implicit 
background work in tandem to produce cyclic repetition on a degrading trajectory. 
Retelling the moment he sets off for Molloy country, Moran recognises the 
truly Sisyphean aspect of his duty to report the past as though present: 'For it is one of 
the features of this penance that I may not pass over what is over and straightaway 
come to the heart of the matter. But that must be again unknown to me which is no 
longer so and that again fondly believed which then I fondly believed, at my setting 
out' (T, 133). Moran's account means the past has not passed, but is reanimated. In 
Benjaminian terms, temporality in Mol/oy is inauthentic as the fulfilment of historical 
progression is emptied to reveal duration, or evanescent moments that spin out into a 
melancholic frozen time. For Beckett's characters, then, the past is not an accessible 
archive of distant experiences. It is an overflow of time that saturates the present with 
anachronisms to give rise to the suspended animation ofundeadness. 
300 
'finish dying': Death Without Death in Mol/oy 
Whilst Benjamin's conceptions of time and history have Marxist-inflected 
preoccupations with materiality at the root, he is sensitive to the psychological 
implications of ruins that Beckett's novel tends to emphasise. As Santner notes, 'what 
Benjamin refers to as petrified unrest pertains to the dynamics of the repetition 
compulsion, the psychic aspect of the eternal recurrence of the same that for Benjamin 
defined the world of commodity production and consumption' (italics in original).54 
Beckett's 'stirrings still' also threaten the very idea of the originary or unique aura as 
Molloy and Moran's narratives mime the process of reproduction, stuck in a making 
and breaking oscillation. These creatures survive in an annular pattern that poses as 
life, as Molloy expresses: 'If I go on long enough calling that my life I'll end up by 
believing it. It's the principle of advertising' (T, 53). Yet, as both Steven Connor and 
James O'Rara note, the repetition compulsion evident in the sceptical imperative of 
Beckett's work is indicative of the Freudian death-drive - the thanatological urge 
towards the inorganic material form. 55 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922), Freud 
poses the idea that 'all instincts tend towards the restoration of an earlier state of 
things', but owing to the convergence of the preservative instinct and the death-drive, 
he adds that each 'organism wishes to die only in its own fashion,.56 As Beckett's 
characters recommence their quests and repeat their stories compUlsively, they display 
this magnetism towards a singular death and enter into a drawn-out negotiation 
between the pleasure principle and the death drive that delineates the very precise 
death immanent to the subject. 
54 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 81. 
55 See Connor, Repetition, Theory and Text, pp. 9-11; and James Donald O'Hara, Samuel Beckett's 
Hidden Drives: Structural Uses of Depth Psychology (Gainesville:· University Press of Florida, 1997), 
ft. 133. 
6 Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in The Freud Reader, ed. by Peter Gay (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1989),594-625, pp. 612,614. 
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In Mol/ay, the obsessive repetition of stories causes physical and 
psychological decay that sees the protagonists ailed and addled. The combination of a 
diminishing and enduring will translates to the body, which is subject to the atrophy 
caused by psychological absorption. The lame Molloy crawls on his front, 'racked by 
a kind of chronic arthritis' (T, 89), whereas Moran is diseased with a 'sick leg' and 
'failing flesh' (T, 165, 166). Such physical afflictions are apparent in Agamben's 
sketch of the associations and physiological consequences of melancholy, which, 
given its parity with decline in Beckett, is worth quoting in full: 
In medieval humoral cosmology, melancholy is traditionally associated with 
the earth, autumn (or winter), the dry element, cold, the north wind, the color 
black, old age (maturity); its planet is Saturn, among whose children the 
melancholic finds himself with the hanged man, the cripple, the peasant, the 
gambler, the monk, and the swineherd. The physiological syndrome of 
abundantia melancholie (abundance of melancholy ~ u m o r ) ) includes darkening 
of the skin, blood, and urine, hardening of the pulse, burning in the gut, 
flatulence, acid burping, whistling in the left ear, constipation or excess of 
feces, and gloomy dreams; among the diseases it can induce are hysteria, 
dementia, epilepsy, leprosy, hemorrhoids, scabies, and suicidal mania.s7 
Beckett's infirm tramps are riddled with similar symptoms; they are senile cripples 
with palpitating hearts, oozing body fluids and bristling with skin conditions. Their 
bodies deteriorate whilst the mind is gripped in the saturnine state. More than this, 
however, the grotesque physical symptoms that Agamben notes in the medieval views 
57 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, trans. by Ronald Martinez 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993). p. 11. 
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of melancholy serve to offer an outward representation of the purely psychological 
self-evaluation that dominates Freud's definition of melancholy. In 'Mourning and 
Melancholia' (1917), Freud writes, '[i]n mourning, the world has become poor and 
empty, in melancholia it is the ego that has become less so. The patient describes his 
ego to us as being worthless, incapable of functioning and morally reprehensible, he is 
filled with self-reproach, he levels insults against himself and expects ostracism and 
punishment'. 58 For Freud, melancholy is based on an assessment of personal 
inferiority, not physical infirmity. Yet, when read together, Freud's psychoanalysis 
and Agamben's overview suggest a psychosomatic melancholy that harvests self-
hatred and shows on the body. Certainly, in Beckett's case, the melancholy that begins 
internally is manifest as an external deterioration in Mol/oy. The material self is a 
casualty of the cyclic repetition of Molloy and Moran's imperatives as they 
externalise the inner emptiness and disappointments that pervade their doomed but 
dogged quests. 
Freud concludes this view of melancholic self-deprecation with the thought 
that '[t]he image of this - predominantly moral- sense of inferiority is complemented 
by sleeplessness, rejection of food, and an overcoming of the drive - most curious 
from the psychological point of view - which compels everything that lives to cling to 
life,.59 Freud identifies a disregard for life, and yet a lack of self-preservation does not 
necessarily mean that death automatically ensues. Although Freud's melancholia 
relinquishes the preservative life force and precipitates an existence open to the death-
drive, the ruined body evokes a kind of living death. This is not quite an absolute lack 
of will at every level of the psyche or a determined pursuit of death, but rather an 
S8 Freud, On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, pp. 205-6. 
S9 Ibid. p. 206. 
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organic existence after life that is snagged on the retrogressive slide towards death; it 
is the enduring being of the worthless life divested of the Eros principle. 
Beckett also engages with this idea of an apathetic living death in the second 
part of Mol/ay. As a mirror image of 'libido', the Obidil figure suggests a reversal of 
desire and the antithesis of the life instinct. The lack of an actual meeting with Obidil, 
however, implies that Moran never achieves or fully subscribes to the death-drive 
towards non-will. After his son abandons him, Moran reflects, • And with regard to 
Obidil, of whom I have refrained from speaking until now, and whom I so longed to 
see face to face, all I can say with regard to him is this, that I never saw him, either 
face to face or darkly, perhaps there is no such person, that would not greatly surprise 
me' (T, 162). With wry self-consciousness, Beckett pokes fun at the fact that Obidil 
fails to materialise. He plays with fiction's capacity to incarnate a psychological drive 
and jettison this embodiment at the same time. If Obidil is a personification of the 
death-drive, it seems that Moran questions the very existence, or at least his 
acquaintance with, this particular Freudian phenomenon. The absent Obidil, the figure 
representing the radical absence of desire, exists on the edge of Moran's 
consciousness, held in check by a lingering life force. As such, Moran is consigned to 
a level of survival and not to the inorganic state that his material deterioration 
forecasts. 
At times, both Molloy and Moran speak as though they have already endured a 
death and survive beyond it. As Moran departs his house having introduced the region 
of Ballyba, he takes a short walk from his living quarters, 'twenty-paces from my 
wicket-gate', to visit the graveyard (T, 135). Moran says: 
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Sometimes I went and looked at my grave. The stone was up already. It was a 
simple Latin cross, white. I wanted to have my name put on it, with the here 
lies and the date of my birth. Then all it would have wanted was the date of my 
death. They would not let me. Sometimes I smiled, as if I were dead already. 
(T,135) 
It is significant that Moran's house is close to his grave as it indicates the space 
between life and death in Beckett's work, ranging from a narrow margin to a 
distorting crossover. The fact that Moran's headstone has already been erected 
confirms the grip that mortality has on Beckett's creatures. It invades Moran's 
consciousness and commands his prospective' view. Adomo asserts that this fixation 
on death is characteristic of Beckett's Endgame, in which '[a]ll existence is levelled to 
a life that is itself death, abstract domination' .60 The oppressive shadow of death is 
also evident in Moran's fascination with the graveyard, especially his own resting 
place, as if the thought of dying suffocates his life. However, the cross is anonymous 
and undated, which suggests that Moran cannot prepare for death or take control of it. 
Whilst death waits on the horizon as a potential, his demise nevertheless remains 
deferred. Yet, more disconcertingly, Moran's date of birth is also refused, as though 
life is only determined on expiry. In one sense, Moran has not lived until he has died, 
but equally, if he does not have a birth and is not living, he cannot truly die. 
Furthermore, through the strange smile 'as if I were already dead' at the end of this 
excerpt, Beckett gives the impression of rictus, which is a fixed grimace associated 
with the countenance of death. Moran's corpse-like expression confuses the 
appearances of vitality and inanition so that he effectively endures death but is unable 
60 Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', pp. 145-6. 
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to finally die. Moran is clearly a creature susceptible to the obfuscated boundaries of 
life and death. 
Similarly, on the opening page of part one, Molloy aims to 'finish dying', 
which implies that he has died partially already but, like his mother, wants to die 
'enough to be buried' (T, 7). For Molloy, this mode of existence is a mystery: 
My life, my life, now I speak of it as of something over, now as of a joke 
which still goes on, and it is neither, for at the same time it is over and it goes 
on, and is there any tense for that? Watch wound and buried by the 
watchmaker, before he died, whose ruined works will one day speak of God, 
to the worms. (T, 36) 
Firstly, Molloy refers to the expressive and temporal difficulties of his existence as his 
undeadness confounds both the logic of grammatical tenses and time frames. He must 
necessarily speak of his past life as though it is total, which seems to imply that his 
death is present in every living moment. If Molloy cannot talk about what life is and 
chronicle it, he is destined to perform as a middle voice, shuttling indifferently 
between death and life, between the refusing 'no' and the insistent 'on'. Since Molloy 
is over in one sense but goes on in another, he evinces an ontological status of 
survival that exists between different types of life and death. The autobiographical 
tense wants to address life as a complete experience but every reflection on that life 
exposes the fact that his life is incomplete. Molloy is therefore subject to a survival 
that sees many 'deaths' as each new word extends and replaces his life. . 
Molloy is also subject to a symbolic death that sees the collapse or removal of 
a meaningful mode of being and entails the suspended, anachronistic existence of 
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creaturely life. In Beckett, the parameters of life and death are not only determined by 
the physical limits of the human body, they are also a question of existential value and 
identification with worldly worth. If a person cannot find a sense of meaning for their 
life, they endure the death of their valuable existence, which places emphasis on the 
human as a bare, melancholic entity. Beckett's reference to the watchmaker analogy 
implies that Molloy is on the edge of such an existential crisis. In Treatise on Man 
(1664), Descartes offers a mechanistic conception of the living body, arguing that 
internal 'functions (including passion, memory, and imagination) follow from the 
mere arrangement of the machine's organs every bit as naturally as the movements of 
a clock or other automaton follow from the arrangement of its counter-weights and 
wheels,.61 The components of the living body interact like a machine, with the 
implication that, like a timepiece, the human machine is evidence of a maker. The 
English theologian William Paley employs the watchmaker analogy in Natural 
Theology (1802) in his argument for the divine design of the universe. He infers that 
since the intricacies of a watch imply that 'there must have existed, at some time, and 
at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which 
we find it', the same principle applies to the intricacies of nature.62 In Mol/oy, the 
presence of a watchmaker would guarantee Molloy an origin and purpose as part of a 
pre-determined mechanism fashioned by intelligent design. 
However, Molloy points out that the authorial presence is dead and therefore 
his own function is forever unknown. Since the creator figure is not with him now, 
Molloy is an abandoned creature, charged with life and left to survive. As with 
Beckett's elision of the religious elements in his allusion to Mary and Jesus's 'flight 
and bivouac', the validation offered by a totalising system of thought is absent for 
61 Rene Descartes, Treatise on Man, ed. and trans. Edward Steele Hall (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University, 1972), p. 113. 
62 William Paley, Natural Theology (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), p. 8. 
307 
Molloy, leaving only a terrestrial existence devoid of higher meaning. He is as much 
evidence of divinity, or the absence of divinity, as other primitive earthbound 
creatures. The transcendental meaning of being is therefore stripped, and yet Molloy 
subsists undeniably as a vulnerable, rootless life. As a buried ruin in a secular world 
with only the memory of an origin story, he demonstrates that 'life can persist beyond 
the symbolic forms that gave it meaning' .63 Molloy has died according to the idea of 
the human as a meaningful part of a divine plan, which moves him closer to the raw 
matter of mere existence. 
Although the loss of a divine governing figure suggests a rather commonplace 
existential reading of Beckett, this sense of alienation is enacted on a more local level 
in the vacuum of biopolitical care that takes place for Beckett's creatures. In chapter 
three on master-servant relationships, I argued that a process of territorial sovereignty 
excludes Beckett's creatures from a state of biopolitical protection. This kind of 
segregation and devaluation took place at an unprecedented level during the Third 
Reich and ultimately led to designated spaces of exclusion, the concentration and 
extermination camps, in which the detached Muselmann was forced into being. 
Molloy describe such an experience of exclusion: 
But I entered the first shelter I came to and stayed there till dawn, for I knew I 
was bound to be stopped by the first policeman and asked what I was doing, a 
question to which I have never been able to find the correct reply. But it 
cannot have been a real shelter and I did not stay till dawn, for a man came in 
soon after me and drove me out. And yet there was room for two .. (T, 60) 
63 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p. 17. 
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Molloy appears as a misfit when he comes into contact with other people in society. 
Although Lousse takes him in, Molloy is subjugated and pauperized by her charity, 
and given that the policemen treat him as a second-rate citizen, Molloy lacks the value 
of respected subjects. The policemen in particular, as representatives of the state, 
reveal the official policy on these subaltern creatures. Clearly, this exclusion pertains 
to a survival mode for Beckett's creatures as they exist on the periphery of state 
welfare, but there is another sense of survival that occurs as they try to adhere to 
social and legal structures. Alongside a bodily survival that attempts to secure a less 
vulnerable position by achieving the immunity and respect granted to other citizens, 
Beckett's creatures also attempt to comply with the ideas and ideals of a civilised 
world to gain a sense of ideological belonging. Since this status is denied to them in 
various ways, their enduring attachment to the template of meaning precipitates their 
creaturely suspension, or what could be described as the survival of undeadness. 
After Molloy's first encounter with the police in which he is briefly detained 
for violating public decency, threatened with a cylindrical ruler and impudently 
interrogated, he insists: 'I have only to be told what good behaviour is and 1 am well-
behaved, within the limits of my physical possibilities' (T, 25). As far as his bodily 
limits go, Molloy exemplifies the Latin maxim necessitas non habet legem (necessity 
has no law). He is governed by physical necessity at times and incapable of abiding by 
certain rules, particularly 'no loitering'. However, it is not only Molloy's physical 
infirmity that makes him transgressive. His need to understand the underlying 
principles that produce the intricacies of public order is also problematic. Molloy is 
not apprised of the nature of these statutory laws, and therefore exists in an 
inapprehensible snare he is bound to trigger. He argues: 'if! have always behaved like 
a pig, the fault lies not with me but with my superiors, who corrected me only on 
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points of detail instead of showing me the essence of the system' (T, 25). Molloy 
requires the founding reasons of the structure in order to extrapolate the correct action 
in any given situation. In stark contrast, he is subject to the mechanics of authority 
that preclude his ability to conform and integrate. As such, he subscribes to the rules 
but is unable to abide by them fully as he is refused access to their logic. The point to 
stress is that Molloy is at least willing to conduct himself according to propriety in 
order to fit in and is therefore not purposely rebellious. The idea of conforming is still 
active for Molloy even though the system of thought rejects him or no longer applies 
to him. Consequently, Beckett's creatures exemplify the survival of undeadness as 
they repeatedly appeal to a mode of living that is untenable for them and subsist as a 
surplus nostalgic energy. 
In The Royal Remains, Santner alludes to the collapse of a viable worldview 
when he notes that creaturely life is an exposure, not 'simply to the elements or to the 
fragility and precariousness of our mortal, finite lives, but rather to an ultimate lack of 
foundation for the historical forms of life that distinguish human community'. 64 
Beckett's creatures are subject to the fragility of biological life, but in their 
inadvertent perversity they also threaten to expose the entire system as an absurd 
contrivance. The civilised construct appears unable to accommodate a creature like 
Molloy and whilst he endeavours to be assimilated into the order, he ends up 
revealing the limitations of this form of life. As he is released from the police station, 
Molloy recognises his transgressive quality: 'Were they of the opinion that it was 
useless to prosecute me? To apply the letter of the law to a creature like me is not an 
easy matter. It can be done, but reason is against it' (T, 24). Such peculiar creatures 
seem to upset the system not because they are especially fractious, but because they 
64 Santner, The Royal Remains, p. 5. 
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are ignorant subjects, without the vigorous body or docile mind courted by the state. 
Crucially, Molloy's thoughts on the destabilisation of propriety come as a result of his 
proximity with a kind of death: 'I was in the dark, most of the time, and all the more 
completely as a lifetime of observations had left me doubting the possibility of 
systematic decorum, even within a limited area. But it is only since I have ceased to 
live that 1 think of these things and the other thing' (T, 25). Although Molloy ceases to 
live as a subject in this ideological domain, he nevertheless tries to reengage with it, 
and in his confrontations with order, Molloy ultimately serves to unsettle the status 
quo. He survives in a 'raglimp stasis' (T, 26) as a dehumanised pariah after his viable 
life in the civilised world. 
Molloy's mode of being intimates a symbolic death and invokes the additional 
capacity for existence noted in Santner's undeadness. Survival in Beckett does not 
completely avoid death, then, but rather distends the last relics of vitality in an 
otherwise moribund life bereft of import. Nevertheless, the fact is that Molloy treks 
through the wilderness of the forest and lapses into a ditch, at which point he hears 
that 'help' is coming and says that 'other scenes of my life came back to me' (T, 91). 
As noted above, he subsequently finds himself in his mother's room, which is where 
his account begins. Therefore, Molloy's investment in a former mode of life occurs in 
the mind, through habitual narratives, memories and imaginings. He does not simply 
cultivate a physical attachment to a particular way of life, as though he obstinately 
hangs around the town, hoping to learn from his encounters with the police, make 
himself a less indigent figure and acquire a meaningful sense of being. Instead, the 
helical structures of the novel explain how Molloy repeatedly traces his engagements 
with lost ideological models through virtual recitals. He replays the possibility of 
finding his mother and restoring her as a figure in his life. At the same time, Molloy 
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relives the memory of his past endeavours to comprehend the governing structures of 
the biopolitical domain that would offer him a life worth living. It is through the idea 
ofundeadness that Beckett's aesthetics of continuation and the incompleteness of the 
narrative structure convey a psychological state, in which Molloy survives as sti11life 
by repeating his pursuits of now dead figures of meaning. 
Molloy is estranged from meaningful domestic, social and political worlds, 
and descends into the abyss of thought. He persists in this mental space through the 
ruined performance of past meaning structures, such as the guarantee of a source in 
his mother and the value of a dignified social existence. Despite being disconnected 
from the structure of a governed realm and resembling biopolitically worthless 
material, Molloy survives in a spiralling narrative that finds him absorbed in the act of 
bearing witness to the past, complete with a projected alterity figure and a platform 
for humour. All of these creaturely modes contribute to this survival that subscribes to 
the possibility of stable meaning even whilst it is shown to be elusive. They maintain 
the creature's contact with previous ideals, and although this continuation sustains the 
present possibility of restoring the past, it also suggests that creaturely life is 
composed of a moribund rendition. In this way, the natural historical artefact outside 
of viable life emerges as a psychological repetition compulsion fixed on lost sources 
and past structures. Beckett's creatures are disposed to inaccessible but still 
aspirational models of meaning that leave them surviving with the remnants of history 
and shows that there are stirrings still beyond the values attributed to a life worth 
living. 
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Epilogue 
At the beginning of this thesis, I quoted an extract from a letter that Beckett wrote to 
Georges Duthuit on Ith August 1948. In this letter, Beckett apologizes for the 
'unbelievably silly letter' he had sent previously to Duthuit in which he offers some 
near inscrutable thoughts on art, before noting that: 'One must shout, murmur, exult 
madly, until one can fmd the no doubt calm language of the no, unqualified, or as 
little qualified as possible'. 1 As Beckett picks up momentum in this earlier letter he 
stops himself, saying: 'But I'm starting to write,.2 Beckett's correspondence drifts into 
his current creative direction, which suggests some parity between his fiction and the 
request for pardon in the next letter: 
Forgive me now and always for all my stupidities and blanknesses, I am only a 
tiny little part of a creature, self-hating vestiges, remains of an old longing, 
when I was little, for rounding out, even on a small radius. That shuts you in 
your whole life long. And one drives in vain towards figurelessness.3 
This short extract covers several of the creaturely dimensions raised over the course of 
this thesis. The 'stupidities and blanknesses' to which Beckett refers parallel the 
ignorant and incompetent testimonies of his author-narrators. He appears to recognize 
the same asininity and lacunae in his letters that constitute his art of failure and attest 
to the impossibility of bearing witness. The idea of being 'part of a creature' itself 
recalls the creaturely subjectivity that emerges when the subject is present at its own 
desubjectification. Beckett describes himself as a fragmented being in the way 
I Beckett, Letters, Vol. 2, pp. 102,98. 
2 Ibid. p. 98. 
3 Ibid. p. 102. 
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Beckett's creatures are sundered as they articulate their own disordered identities. 
'Self-hating vestiges' and 'remains of an old longing' offer a striking depiction of a 
melancholic figure, particularly the ruined result of a sustained saturnine disposition. 
Similarly, Beckett's creatures are the disintegrated subjects of the unfulfilled desire 
for resolution and subscription to previous templates of meaning. The fact that 
Beckett's longing is for .'rounding out' evokes the manner in which humour helps to 
persevere with failure and contribute to a perpetual cycle of relief and suffering. As 
the laugh relieves the pressures at the limits of language and the tolerance of 
monotony, the creature is granted a reprieve that allows further misery to ensue. More 
than this, the idea of rounding out 'on a small radius' betrays the kind of exacting 
economy that characterizes the aesthetic trajectory of Beckett's oeuvre but maintains 
the creaturely spirit of survival. These small spaces of vitality precipitate the futile 
drive 'towards figurelessness' that renders Beckett's characters enervated and 
etiolated creatures, but resists complete liquidation. 
The complex shape of creaturely life in Beckett is dominated by what I have 
repeatedly called 'suspension' and 'survival'. A number of tensions give rise to the 
suspended lives of Beckett's creatures: the fncapacity to speak together with the 
obligation to speak; the urge towards distinction and ascendancy together with the 
reliance on a necessary other; the pursuit of an end to words together with the laugh 
that signals and forestalls conclusion; and the inability to go on together with the act 
of going on. These contradictions create figures subject to open-ended processes, 
often repeating the same in the hope of change and subsequently surviving on the 
small differences of iteration that prevent the creatures' completions. Beckett depicts 
subjects engaging a past they cannot fully comprehend or express, burdened with the 
search to make sense of and validate their lives, and driven by the prospect that a 
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resolution will come. The creature is therefore carrying a past it cannot quite grasp 
and a future it cannot quite realise. Beckett's creatures live on encircling the loss, or 
worse, the absence, of a meaningful life. 
This reading is significant in the way it deploys a particular trope, the creature, 
as a means of accessing the historical and biopolitical relevance of Beckett's work. 
The creature traverses the borderline between aesthetic and extra-literary levels to 
show how Beckett's art of failure is attentive to the way models of expression and 
epistemology are destabilised in the wake of catastrophe. Adorno describes the artist's 
predicament in Aesthetic Theory, asserting that 'externally art appears impossible 
whilst immanently it must be pursued,.4 For Adorno, the Holocaust has a profound 
impact on the very validity of art, philosophy, language and knowledge. This kind of 
enlightened culture effectively pulls the rug from under its own feet to appear barbaric 
in light of recent history. Thinking through Beckett's work in terms of the suspended 
but surviving creature encompasses the contradiction of this creative impasse in which 
art is undermined but must endure all the same. The stirrings still of Beckett's 
creatures implies a process of persevering under these difficult conditions, in which 
the success of a final product is denied and whereby the creature emerges as a 
persistent figure of failure. Yet this failure is itself an ethical and empathic response to 
the catastrophe. Beckett's writing enacts 'a writing of terrorized disempowerment as 
close as possible to the experience of traumatized victims without presuming to be 
identical to it'. S He confronts the impossibility in the challenge facing art after 
Auschwitz and conveys the fact that speaking will always be instead, as a powerless 
secondary witness. 
4 Adomo, Aesthetic Theory, p. 320. 
S Dominic La Capra, Writing His/ory. Writing Trauma (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins 
University, 2001), pp. 105-6. 
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The creature is particularly related to the biopolitical nature of the Holocaust. 
The creaturely aesthetic based on ignorance and impotence in Beckett's work offers 
an oblique response to the contemporaneous climate in which the value of the human 
was the focus of a political ideology that interfered with the bodily conditions of its 
subjects. In terms of the narrative obligation itself, Beckett's creatures are bound to a 
necessity that sees their very existence dominated by their negotiations with the 
complete overhaul of the idea of a valuable human life. As Agamben writes: 'One of 
the essential characteristics of modern politics [ ... ] is its constant need to redefme the 
threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside,.6 
This effort to decide upon a new criterion for life worthy of political significance 
relates to Beckett's aesthetic firstly, as his creatures pursue a field of meaning that is 
perennially denied to them. As they employ language and reason in their accounts, 
their narrative endeavours clearly lack the human ability to master positive meaning 
and the author-narrators are instead stranded in the creaturely world of insistent 
creation. On the level of words, then, Beckett's creatures offer an implicit critique of 
certain key humanist assumptions. 
Beckett's creatures are also subjected to more explicit biopolitical exclusions 
on a social level, which I have outlined in this thesis. In Santner's brief mention of 
Beckett in the epilogue of his book The Royal Remains he refers to the phrase 'merely 
human' to describe Beckett's subaltern characters. He writes: 'Recalling Arendt's 
account of the stateless, one could say that Beckett's characters acquire their 
particular strangeness by being rendered merely human,.7 In the footnote, he adds that 
'Arendt's great insight was that being rendered "merely human" results in becoming 
6 Agamben. Homo Sacer, p. 131. 
7 Santner, The Royal Remains, p. 251. 
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something less than human and yet not simply animal'. 8 Santner refers here to the 
exclusion from viable forms of life that engenders debased creaturely life, 'a 
dimension created, in a word, by a process of destitution'. 9 Though Beckett's 
creatures are refused human belonging in the biopolitical sense, they are not united 
with the natural world in the way the animal is with the open. Rather the creature is 
estranged from the world through consciousness and alienated from socio-political 
value as a result of biopolitical order. With an awareness of their exclusion from both 
spheres, Beckett's creatures drift in between, closer to the raw matter of a biological 
entity but with awareness of the potential for human meaning. This 'merely human' 
state is the uncanny proximity of the creature to the progressive human and autotelic 
animal. 
On the edge of these human and animal modes of being, the creature subsists 
in negotiating the remains of the former frameworks of value and meaning. The 
biopolitical interference in classifying types of people ruptures the idea of humanity 
founded on civilised standards, universal rights and the sacrosanctity of human life. In 
this way, the creature offers a rather global perspective in which '[m]aking sense of 
the senseless remains the essential element in recovering the idea of humanity after 
the holocaust' .10 This process of refiguring the human in a post-human era discloses 
the human's creaturely potential. As we have seen in Beckett, human components are 
distorted: language is inadequate, reason is defective, power is dependent, laughter is 
tragic and life is a death. These properties do not have the same authorial efficacy or 
organic quality, and can appear to be antithetical to themselves. Thus, as the creature 
seeks to be readmitted from its double poverty in world, it acts out a human template 
'Ibid. p. 251. 
9 Ibid. p. 57. . 
10 Robert Fine, 'Hannah Arendt: Politics and Understanding after the Holocaust', in Social Theory after 
the Holocaust, ed. by Robert Fine and Charles Turner (Liverpool: Liverpool University, 2000), 19-46, 
p.23. 
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subject to reconfirmation, which, to use Beckett's phrase, shows that 'Humans are 
truly strange' (FN, 65). In adhering to the human after the model has been undermined 
and made incongruous, the survivor unveils the creaturely dimension of the human. 
However, as Beckett wrote in 1946 for a Radio Erin broadcast called 'The 
Capital of the Ruins', about the rebuilding efforts at Saint-La in Normandy: 
"'Provisional" is not the term it was in this universe become provisional' .11 Since 
Enlightenment humanism has been destabilised, in its place is a strange performance 
of that ideal. Evidently, Beckett recognises that everything is subject to a continual 
meantime, that systems of thought can be revised or refuted and that the human 
condition effectively becomes the conditional human. In offering a kind of grotesque 
simulation of the human, then, Beckett's creatures convey the pro tern conditions 
between the outmoded stability of the past and the unforthcoming solution to the 
crisis. This creaturely life is suspended in transition after the fall and before any 
satisfactory replacement. It is effectively an afterlife of waiting for life to come, as 
Beckett shows in Endgame when Clov asks 'Do you believe in the life to come?' and 
Hamm replies 'Mine was always that' (E, 30-31). 
Although Hamm has the last word in this exchange, Clov's more anticipatory 
question pervades Beckett's work. If the mid-twentieth century saw the perversion of 
the human cosmos, it is not necessarily the absolute end to these former systems. 
Beckett's work indicates that the spectre of the human goes on in the habitual 
repetition of its own ruined model. It still attends the creaturely life of trying to 
reconstitute a viable sense of meaning. In the final passage of 'The Capital of the 
Ruins', Beckett's ambivalence towards this salvaging process surfaces: . 
11 Samuel Beckett, 'The Capital of the Ruins" in As No Other Dare Fail: For Samuel Beckett on His 
8dh Birthday, ed. by John Calder (London: Calder, 1986), 71-76, p. 75. 
318 
[S]ome of those who were in Saint-La will come home realizing that they got 
at least as good as they gave, that they got indeed what they could hardly give, 
a vision and a sense of a time-honoured conception of humanity in ruins, and 
perhaps even an inkling of the terms in which our condition is to be thought 
again. These will have been in France.12 
The idea of humanity is one that is repeatedly destroyed and what survives is a re-
conception of a broken image. In a kind of token of humanism, however, Beckett 
suggests that the lesson for humanity appears to be within its own ruins, which might 
offer the opportunity for the human condition to be reconsidered. As Andrew Slade 
notes, '[t]he ruins of St. La are not just in St. La, they will be the material with which 
thought must grapple if it is to re-think its condition without falling into the amnesia 
of repetition or the conscious repetition of remembrance'. 13 Despite this, the phrase 
'thought again' is itself deeply equivocal as it envelops both perpetuation and 
transformation. The creaturely disposition would indicate a relapse into the habitual 
performance of the disaster-bound human. Equally, the creature is dissatisfied with 
perpetual reversion. It awaits a better future, holding onto the possibility of change 
and an implied otherwise: 'The fact is, it seems, that the most you can hope is to be a 
little less, in the end, the creature you were in the beginning, and the middle' (T, 32). 
In the melancholic fixation on past models of meaning, then, Beckett's characters are 
not completely bare, but creaturely, surviving as a haunting echo of meaning, a 
remnant of the past and a hope for the future. Indeed, it is this progressive desire 
without the meanS of progression that engenders a creaturely state of suspension. The 
Beckettian creature is an anti-humanist figure that emerges from a ruined humanist 
12 Beckett, 'The Capital of the Ruins', p. 76. 
13 Slade, Postmodern Sublime, p. 58. 
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ideal, but retains, even if only negatively, an element of humanism that cannot be 
expunged. 
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